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Lifestyle Behaviors and Wealth-Health Gaps in Germany 德国的生活方式和财富-健康差距
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20603
Lukas Mahler, Minchul Yum
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引用次数: 0
Propagation and Amplification of Local Productivity Spillovers 地方生产力溢出效应的传播和放大
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20029
Xavier Giroud, Simone Lenzu, Quinn Maingi, Holger Mueller
{"title":"Propagation and Amplification of Local Productivity Spillovers","authors":"Xavier Giroud,&nbsp;Simone Lenzu,&nbsp;Quinn Maingi,&nbsp;Holger Mueller","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20029","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The gains from agglomeration economies are believed to be highly localized. Using confidential Census plant-level data, we show that large industrial plant openings raise the productivity not only of local plants but also of distant plants hundreds of miles away, which belong to large multi-plant, multi-region firms that are exposed to the local productivity spillover through one of their plants. This “global” productivity spillover does not decay with distance and is stronger if plants are in industries that share knowledge with each other. To quantify the significance of firms' plant-level networks for the propagation and amplification of local productivity shocks, we estimate a quantitative spatial model in which plants of multi-region firms are linked through shared knowledge. Counterfactual exercises show that while large industrial plant openings have a greater local impact in less developed regions, the aggregate gains are greatest when the plants locate in well-developed regions, which are connected to other regions through firms' plant-level (knowledge-sharing) networks.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1589-1619"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contractual Chains 合同链
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19797
Joel Watson
{"title":"Contractual Chains","authors":"Joel Watson","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19797","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper develops a model of private bilateral contracting, in which an exogenous network determines the pairs of players who can communicate and contract with each other. After contracting, the players interact in an underlying game with globally verifiable productive actions and externally enforced transfers. The paper investigates whether such decentralized contracting can internalize externalities that arise due to parties being unable to contract directly with others whose productive actions affect their payoffs. The contract-formation protocol, called the “contracting institution,” is treated as a design element. The main result is positive: There is a contracting institution that supports efficient equilibria for any underlying game and connected network. A critical property is that the institution allows for sequential contract formation or revision. The equilibrium construction features <i>assurance contracts</i> and <i>cancellation penalties</i>.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1735-1774"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19797","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust Real Rate Rules 稳健的实际汇率规则
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21069
Tom D. Holden
{"title":"Robust Real Rate Rules","authors":"Tom D. Holden","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21069","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Central banks wish to avoid self-fulfilling fluctuations. Interest rate rules with a unit response to real rates achieve this under the weakest possible assumptions about the behavior of households and firms. They are robust to household heterogeneity, hand-to-mouth consumers, non-rational household or firm expectations, active fiscal policy, and to any form of intertemporal or nominal-real links. They are easy to employ in practice, using inflation-protected bonds to infer real rates. With a time-varying short-term inflation target, they can implement an arbitrary inflation path, including optimal policy. This provides a way to translate policy makers' desired path for inflation into one for nominal rates. U.S. Federal Reserve behavior is remarkably close to that predicted by a real rate rule, given the desired inflation path of U.S. monetary policy makers. Real rate rules work thanks to the key role played by the Fisher equation in monetary transmission.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1521-1551"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21069","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Random Votes to Parties and Policies in Coalition Governments 对联合政府中的政党和政策随机投票
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20942
Matteo Cervellati, Giorgio Gulino, Paolo Roberti
{"title":"Random Votes to Parties and Policies in Coalition Governments","authors":"Matteo Cervellati,&nbsp;Giorgio Gulino,&nbsp;Paolo Roberti","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20942","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We exploit a natural experiment involving a randomization of votes across parties within coalitions in all local elections in Italy for over a decade. A lottery on the position of party symbols in the ballot papers allows estimating the causal effect of increasing votes to parties for coalition policies. A non-marginal random boost of votes shifts budgetary spending towards the treated party's platform, but only for issues that are salient in that party's political manifesto. We study the chains of mechanisms mapping votes into policies and link it to an increase in bargaining power within legislative majorities. Parties leverage their higher electoral support to gain the appointment of politically affiliated cabinet members. Empowering different parties also leads to the selection of cabinets with different socio-demographic characteristics. The unintentional experiment helps shed new light on mechanisms mapping votes to parties into coalition policies.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1553-1588"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20942","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 5 经济计量学前沿》第 92 卷第 5 期5
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA925FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 5","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA925FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA925FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms 论信息稳健最优机制的结构
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20240
Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du
{"title":"On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms","authors":"Benjamin Brooks,&nbsp;Songzi Du","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20240","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We study the design of optimal mechanisms when the designer is uncertain both about the form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. The <i>guarantee</i> of a mechanism is its worst performance across all information structures and equilibria. The <i>potential</i> of an information structure is its best performance across all mechanisms and equilibria. We formulate a pair of linear programs, one of which is a lower bound on the maximum guarantee across all mechanisms, and the other of which is an upper bound on the minimum potential across all information structures. In applications to public expenditure, bilateral trade, and optimal auctions, we use the bounding programs to characterize guarantee-maximizing mechanisms and potential-minimizing information structures and show that the max guarantee is equal to the min potential.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1391-1438"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20240","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Rise of Fiscal Capacity: Administration and State Consolidation in the Holy Roman Empire 财政能力的崛起：神圣罗马帝国的行政管理与国家整合
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20612
Davide Cantoni, Cathrin Mohr, Matthias Weigand
{"title":"The Rise of Fiscal Capacity: Administration and State Consolidation in the Holy Roman Empire","authors":"Davide Cantoni,&nbsp;Cathrin Mohr,&nbsp;Matthias Weigand","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20612","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper studies the role of fiscal capacity in European state consolidation. Our analysis is organized around novel data on the territories and cities of the Holy Roman Empire in the early modern period. Territories implementing an early fiscal reform were more likely to survive, increased in size, and achieved a more compact extent. We provide evidence for the causal interpretation of these results and show key mechanisms: revenues, military investments, and marriage success. The imposition of Imperial taxes, quasi-random in timing and size, increased the benefits of an efficient tax administration on the side of rulers, driving the implementation of fiscal centralization. Within territories, Chambers became the dominant administrative institution, tilting the consolidating states toward absolutism.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1439-1472"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20612","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Comment on “Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence From Two Experiments” 关于 "测试网络上的社会学习模型：来自两个实验的证据"
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22442
Marina Agranov, Benjamin Gillen, Dotan Persitz
{"title":"A Comment on “Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence From Two Experiments”","authors":"Marina Agranov,&nbsp;Benjamin Gillen,&nbsp;Dotan Persitz","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22442","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"1-6"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 5 Backmatter of Econometrica Vol.5
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA925BM
{"title":"Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 92 Iss. 5","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA925BM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA925BM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 5","pages":"iii-v"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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