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Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 3 计量经济学背景，第93卷第3期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA933BM
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引用次数: 0
Quality Disclosure and Regulation: Scoring Design in Medicare Advantage 质量披露与监管：医疗保险优势的评分设计
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21182
Benjamin Vatter
{"title":"Quality Disclosure and Regulation: Scoring Design in Medicare Advantage","authors":"Benjamin Vatter","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21182","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Policymakers and market intermediaries often use quality scores to alleviate asymmetric information about product quality. Scores affect the demand for quality and, in equilibrium, its supply. Equilibrium effects break the rule whereby more information is always better, and the optimal design of scores must account for them. In the context of Medicare Advantage, I find that consumers' information is limited, and quality is inefficiently low. A simple design alleviates these issues and increases total welfare by 3.7 monthly premiums. More than half of the gains stem from scores' effect on quality rather than information. Scores can outperform full-information outcomes by regulating inefficient oligopolistic quality provision, and a binary certification of quality attains 98% of this welfare. Scores are informative even when coarse; firms' incentives are to produce quality at the scoring threshold, which consumers know. The primary design challenge of scores is to dictate thresholds and thus regulate quality.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"959-1001"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21182","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risk and Optimal Policies in Bandit Experiments 强盗实验中的风险和最优策略
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21075
Karun Adusumilli
{"title":"Risk and Optimal Policies in Bandit Experiments","authors":"Karun Adusumilli","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21075","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We provide a decision-theoretic analysis of bandit experiments under local asymptotics. Working within the framework of diffusion processes, we define suitable notions of asymptotic Bayes and minimax risk for these experiments. For normally distributed rewards, the minimal Bayes risk can be characterized as the solution to a second-order partial differential equation (PDE). Using a limit of experiments approach, we show that this PDE characterization also holds asymptotically under both parametric and non-parametric distributions of the rewards. The approach further describes the state variables it is asymptotically sufficient to restrict attention to, and thereby suggests a practical strategy for dimension reduction. The PDEs characterizing minimal Bayes risk can be solved efficiently using sparse matrix routines or Monte Carlo methods. We derive the optimal Bayes and minimax policies from their numerical solutions. These optimal policies substantially dominate existing methods such as Thompson sampling; the risk of the latter is often twice as high.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"1003-1029"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21075","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Location Sorting and Endogenous Amenities: Evidence From Amsterdam 区位分类和内生便利设施：来自阿姆斯特丹的证据
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21394
Milena Almagro, Tomás Domínguez-Iino
{"title":"Location Sorting and Endogenous Amenities: Evidence From Amsterdam","authors":"Milena Almagro,&nbsp;Tomás Domínguez-Iino","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21394","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper shows the endogeneity of amenities plays a crucial role in determining the welfare distribution of a city's residents. We quantify this mechanism by building a dynamic model of residential choice with heterogeneous households, where consumption amenities are the equilibrium outcome of a market for non-tradables. We estimate our model using Dutch microdata and leveraging variation in Amsterdam's spatial distribution of tourists as a demand shifter, finding significant heterogeneity in residents' preferences over amenities and in the supply responses of amenities to changes in demand composition. This two-way heterogeneity dictates the degree of horizontal differentiation across neighborhoods, residential sorting, and inequality. Finally, we show the distributional effects of mass tourism depend on this heterogeneity: following rent increases due to growing tourist demand for housing, younger residents—whose amenity preferences are closest to tourists—are compensated by amenities tilting in their favor, while the losses of older residents are amplified.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"1031-1071"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21394","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Making Subsidies Work: Rules versus Discretion 让补贴发挥作用：规则与自由裁量权
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21319
Federico Cingano, Filippo Palomba, Paolo Pinotti, Enrico Rettore
{"title":"Making Subsidies Work: Rules versus Discretion","authors":"Federico Cingano,&nbsp;Filippo Palomba,&nbsp;Paolo Pinotti,&nbsp;Enrico Rettore","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21319","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We estimate the employment effects of a large program of public investment subsidies to private firms that ranked applicants on a score reflecting both objective rules and local politicians' discretion. Leveraging the rationing of funds as an ideal Regression Discontinuity Design, we characterize the heterogeneity of treatment effects and cost-per-new-job across inframarginal firms and estimate the cost-effectiveness of subsidies under factual and counterfactual allocations. Firms ranking high on objective rules and firms preferred by local politicians generated larger employment growth on average, but the latter did so at a higher cost per job. We estimate that relying only on objective criteria would reduce the cost per job by 11%, while relying only on political discretion would increase such cost by 42%.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"747-778"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21319","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Adaptive Maximization of Social Welfare 社会福利的适应性最大化
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22351
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Roberto Colomboni, Maximilian Kasy
{"title":"Adaptive Maximization of Social Welfare","authors":"Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi,&nbsp;Roberto Colomboni,&nbsp;Maximilian Kasy","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22351","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred. Response functions are learned through experimentation.</p>\u0000 <p>We derive a lower bound on regret, and a matching adversarial upper bound for a variant of the Exp3 algorithm. Cumulative regret grows at a rate of <i>T</i><sup>2/3</sup>. This implies that (i) welfare maximization is harder than the multiarmed bandit problem (with a rate of <i>T</i><sup>1/2</sup> for finite policy sets), and (ii) our algorithm achieves the optimal rate. For the stochastic setting, if social welfare is concave, we can achieve a rate of <i>T</i><sup>1/2</sup> (for continuous policy sets), using a dyadic search algorithm.</p>\u0000 <p>We analyze an extension to nonlinear income taxation, and sketch an extension to commodity taxation. We compare our setting to monopoly pricing (which is easier), and price setting for bilateral trade (which is harder).</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"1073-1104"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22351","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Soaking up the Sun: Battery Investment, Renewable Energy, and Market Equilibrium 吸收阳光：电池投资、可再生能源和市场平衡
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20411
R. Andrew Butters, Jackson Dorsey, Gautam Gowrisankaran
{"title":"Soaking up the Sun: Battery Investment, Renewable Energy, and Market Equilibrium","authors":"R. Andrew Butters,&nbsp;Jackson Dorsey,&nbsp;Gautam Gowrisankaran","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20411","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Renewable energy and battery storage are seen as complementary technologies that can together facilitate reductions in carbon emissions. We develop and estimate a framework to calculate the equilibrium effects of large-scale battery storage. Using data from California, we find that the first storage unit breaks even by 2024 without subsidies when the renewable energy share reaches 50%. Equilibrium effects are important: the first 5000 MWh of storage capacity would reduce wholesale electricity prices by 5.6%, but an increase from 25,000 to 50,000 MWh would only reduce these prices by 2.6%. Large-scale batteries will reduce revenues to both dispatchable generators and renewable energy sources. The equilibrium effects lead battery adoption to be virtually non-existent until 2030, without a storage mandate or subsidy. A 30% capital cost subsidy—such as the one in the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act—achieves 5000 MWh of battery capacity by 2024, similar to the level required under California's storage mandate.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"891-927"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insurance and Inequality With Persistent Private Information 持久私人信息下的保险与不平等
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20404
Alexander W. Bloedel, R. Vijay Krishna, Oksana Leukhina
{"title":"Insurance and Inequality With Persistent Private Information","authors":"Alexander W. Bloedel,&nbsp;R. Vijay Krishna,&nbsp;Oksana Leukhina","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20404","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the implications of optimal insurance provision for long-run welfare and inequality in economies with persistent private information. A principal insures an agent whose private type follows an ergodic, finite-state Markov chain. The optimal contract always induces <i>immiseration</i>: the agent's consumption and utility decrease without bound. Under positive serial correlation, it also <i>backloads high-powered incentives</i>: the sensitivity of the agent's utility with respect to his reports increases without bound. These results extend—and help elucidate the limits of—the hallmark immiseration results for economies with i.i.d. private information. Numerically, we find that persistence yields faster immiseration, higher inequality, and novel short-run distortions. Our analysis uses recursive methods for contracting with persistent types and allows for binding global incentive constraints.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"821-857"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 3 《计量经济学》第93卷第3期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA933FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 3","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA933FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA933FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Cost of Consumer Collateral: Evidence From Bunching 消费者抵押品的成本：来自聚类的证据
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22303
Benjamin L. Collier, Cameron M. Ellis, Benjamin J. Keys
{"title":"The Cost of Consumer Collateral: Evidence From Bunching","authors":"Benjamin L. Collier,&nbsp;Cameron M. Ellis,&nbsp;Benjamin J. Keys","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22303","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. Our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid posting collateral. Exploiting time variation in the threshold, we estimate collateral causally reduces default rates by 36%. Finally, we structurally estimate households' attachment to their homes, net of any equity, and find a median value of $11,000. Attachment creates a wedge between lender and borrower valuation of collateral of 15%. Our results explain high perceived default costs in the mortgage market, and document the importance of collateral for reducing moral hazard in consumer credit markets.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"779-819"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22303","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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