Econometrica最新文献

{"title":"An Adversarial Approach to Structural Estimation","authors":"Tetsuya Kaji,&nbsp;Elena Manresa,&nbsp;Guillaume Pouliot","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18707","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA18707","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We propose a new simulation-based estimation method, adversarial estimation, for structural models. The estimator is formulated as the solution to a minimax problem between a generator (which generates simulated observations using the structural model) and a discriminator (which classifies whether an observation is simulated). The discriminator maximizes the accuracy of its classification while the generator minimizes it. We show that, with a sufficiently rich discriminator, the adversarial estimator attains parametric efficiency under correct specification and the parametric rate under misspecification. We advocate the use of a neural network as a discriminator that can exploit adaptivity properties and attain fast rates of convergence.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2041-2063"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18707","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Estimation Based on Nearest Neighbor Matching: From Density Ratio to Average Treatment Effect","authors":"Zhexiao Lin,&nbsp;Peng Ding,&nbsp;Fang Han","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20598","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA20598","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Nearest neighbor (NN) matching is widely used in observational studies for causal effects. Abadie and Imbens (2006) provided the first large-sample analysis of NN matching. Their theory focuses on the case with the number of NNs, <i>M</i> fixed. We reveal something new out of their study and show that once allowing <i>M</i> to diverge with the sample size an intrinsic statistic in their analysis constitutes a consistent estimator of the density ratio with regard to covariates across the treated and control groups. Consequently, with a diverging <i>M</i>, the NN matching with Abadie and Imbens' (2011) bias correction yields a doubly robust estimator of the average treatment effect and is semiparametrically efficient if the density functions are sufficiently smooth and the outcome model is consistently estimated. It can thus be viewed as a precursor of the double machine learning estimators.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2187-2217"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nonrandom Exposure to Exogenous Shocks","authors":"Kirill Borusyak,&nbsp;Peter Hull","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19367","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a new approach to estimating the causal effects of treatments or instruments that combine multiple sources of variation according to a known formula. Examples include treatments capturing spillovers in social or transportation networks and simulated instruments for policy eligibility. We show how exogenous shocks to some—but not all—determinants of such variables can be leveraged while avoiding omitted variables bias. Our solution involves specifying counterfactual shocks that may as well have been realized and adjusting for a summary measure of nonrandomness in shock exposure: the average treatment (or instrument) across shock counterfactuals. We use this approach to address bias when estimating employment effects of market access growth from Chinese high-speed rail construction.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2155-2185"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138550434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rethinking the Welfare State","authors":"Nezih Guner,&nbsp;Remzi Kaygusuz,&nbsp;Gustavo Ventura","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19921","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The United States spends significant amounts on non-medical transfers for its working-age population in a wide range of programs that support low- and middle-income households. How valuable are these programs for U.S. households? Are there simpler, welfare-improving ways to transfer resources that are supported by a majority? What are the macroeconomic effects of such alternatives? We answer these questions in an equilibrium, life-cycle model with single and married households who face idiosyncratic productivity risk, in the presence of costly children and potential skill losses of females associated with non-participation. Our findings show that a potential revenue-neutral elimination of the welfare state generates large welfare losses in the aggregate, although most households support the move as losses are concentrated among a small group. We find that a <i>Universal Basic Income</i> program does not improve upon the current system. If, instead, per-person transfers are implemented alongside a proportional tax, a <i>Negative Income Tax</i> experiment, it becomes feasible to improve upon the current system. Providing per-person transfers to all households is costly, and reducing tax distortions helps to provide for resources to expand redistribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2261-2294"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138550439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Presidential Address: Demand-Side Constraints in Development. The Role of Market Size, Trade, and (In)Equality","authors":"Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg,&nbsp;Tristan Reed","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20787","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>What is the pathway to development in a world marked by rising economic nationalism and less international integration? This paper answers this question within a framework that emphasizes the role of demand-side constraints on national development, which is identified with sustained poverty reduction. In this framework, development is linked to the adoption of an increasing returns to scale technology by imperfectly competitive firms that need to pay the fixed setup cost of switching to that technology. Sustained poverty reduction is measured as a continuous decline in the share of the population living below $1.90/day purchasing power parity in 2011 U.S. dollars over a five-year period. This outcome is affected in a statistically significant and economically meaningful way by domestic market size, which is measured as a function of the income distribution, and international market size, which is measured as a function of legally-binding provisions to international trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, and 279 preferential trade agreements. Counterfactual estimates suggest that, in the absence of international integration, the average resident of a low- or lower-middle-income country does not live in a market large enough to experience sustained poverty reduction. Domestic redistribution targeted towards generating a larger middle class can partially compensate for the lack of an international market.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"1915-1950"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20787","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138550495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price Setting With Strategic Complementarities as a Mean Field Game","authors":"Fernando Alvarez,&nbsp;Francesco Lippi,&nbsp;Panagiotis Souganidis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20797","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA20797","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We study the propagation of monetary shocks in a sticky-price general equilibrium economy where the firms' pricing strategy features a complementarity with the decisions of other firms. In a dynamic equilibrium, the firm's price-setting decisions depend on aggregates, which in turn depend on the firms' decisions. We cast this fixed-point problem as a Mean Field Game and prove several analytic results. We establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize the impulse response function (IRF) of output following an aggregate shock. We prove that strategic complementarities make the IRF larger at each horizon. We establish that complementarities may give rise to an IRF with a hump-shaped profile. As the complementarity becomes large enough, the IRF diverges, and at a critical point there is no equilibrium. Finally, we show that the amplification effect of the strategic interactions is similar across models: the Calvo model and the Golosov–Lucas model display a comparable amplification, in spite of the fact that the non-neutrality in Calvo is much larger.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2005-2039"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20797","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intertemporal Hedging and Trade in Repeated Games With Recursive Utility","authors":"Asen Kochov,&nbsp;Yangwei Song","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17756","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA17756","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Two key features distinguish the general class of recursive preferences from the standard model of dynamic choice: (i) agents may care about the intertemporal distribution of risk, and (ii) their rates of time preference, rather than being fixed, may vary with the level of consumption. We investigate what these features imply in the context of a repeated strategic interaction. First, we show that opportunities for intertemporal trade may expand the set of feasible payoffs relative to that in a static interaction. Two distinct sources for such trade are identified: <i>endogenous heterogeneity</i> in the players' rates of time preference and a <i>hedging motive</i> pertaining to the intertemporal distribution of risk. The set of equilibrium payoffs may on the other hand shrink drastically as many efficient outcomes become unsustainable no matter the level of patience. This “antifolk” result occurs when the players prefer stage outcomes to be positively correlated rather than independent across time. Intuitively, such preferences make it inefficient to offset short-term losses with future gains, while this is needed to ensure that security levels are met on path. We also establish a folk theorem: if security levels <i>are</i> met on path, such play can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium provided that the players are sufficiently patient.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2333-2369"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mixed Strategies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma","authors":"Julian Romero,&nbsp;Yaroslav Rosokha","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17482","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA17482","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Identifying the strategies that are played is critical to understanding behavior in repeated games. This process is difficult because only choices (not strategies) are observable. Recently, a debate has emerged regarding whether subjects play mixed strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We use an experimental approach to elicit mixed strategies from human subjects, thereby providing direct empirical evidence. We find that a majority of subjects use mixed strategies. However, the data also suggest subjects' strategies are becoming less mixed over time, and move toward three focal pure strategies: Tit For Tat, Grim Trigger, and Always Defect. We use the elicited strategies to provide an empirically-relevant foundation for analyzing commonly used mixture model estimation procedures.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"2295-2331"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA17482","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reply to: Comments on “Presidential Address: Demand-Side Constraints in Development. The Role of Market Size, Trade, and (In)Equality”","authors":"Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg,&nbsp;Tristan Reed","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22251","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"1963-1967"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138550469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Comment on: “Presidential Address: Demand-Side Constraints in Development: The Role of Market Size, Trade, and (In)Equality” by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Tristan Reed","authors":"Paula Bustos","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22318","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Let me start this comment&lt;/span&gt; by confessing that as I was reading the paper, I found myself staring at the tables documenting poverty reduction and market size changes across countries with a level of curiosity and interest that I had not experienced in a long time. Is it true that small market size is a constraint for economic development? Can it be overcome through international or domestic market size? At a time when globalization is being questioned, these are important and difficult questions that Goldberg and Reed wisely address.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The paper builds on the classic idea that the transition from agriculture to manufacturing requires the adoption of advanced technologies which are subject to increasing returns to scale and thus are only profitable when operated on a large market. The theoretical literature has proposed two mechanisms through which this market size can be attained: first, through expansion in international markets (&lt;span&gt;Helpman and Krugman&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;1985&lt;/span&gt;)), a road taken by East Asian countries; second, through growth in domestic markets (&lt;span&gt;Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;1989&lt;/span&gt;)), which the authors note was the road recently taken by other developing countries like India. Is there systematic evidence that these mechanisms were important for poverty reduction in the past four decades?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A first challenge in addressing this question is that there are several theoretical mechanisms through which market size can affect development. Some of these mechanisms involve firm-level economies of scale, while others require industry- or economy-level increasing returns. A second difficulty is that developing countries around the world had very different strategies to integrate in the world economy, encompassing regional free trade agreements and unilateral trade liberalizations. A final issue is that it is difficult to track the effects of firm-level productivity gains in the household-level outcomes of poor informal workers (&lt;span&gt;Goldberg and Pavcnik&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2004&lt;/span&gt;), &lt;span&gt;Topalova&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2010&lt;/span&gt;)).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The empirical literature has made progress by testing for different theoretical mechanisms using (i) detailed product and firm-level data that permit direct observation of the outcomes of interest at different levels of aggregation; (ii) exogenous changes in market size generated by trade liberalization episodes or other trade shocks. &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; The consensus view is that expansion into international markets induces firms to upgrade technology, quality, and skills, leading to productivity gains. A natural question at this point is to what extent these mechanisms carefully documented at the firm level had important aggregate effects on the level of poverty in developing countries.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This paper addresses this question by observing the aggregate cross-country data through the lens of a “new growth theory” model where the industrial sector is characterized by incr","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"91 6","pages":"1955-1958"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22318","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138550497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}