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The Investment Effects of Market Integration: Evidence From Renewable Energy Expansion in Chile 市场一体化的投资效应：来自智利可再生能源扩张的证据
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20769
Luis E. Gonzales, Koichiro Ito, Mar Reguant
{"title":"The Investment Effects of Market Integration: Evidence From Renewable Energy Expansion in Chile","authors":"Luis E. Gonzales,&nbsp;Koichiro Ito,&nbsp;Mar Reguant","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20769","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We study the investment effects of market integration on renewable energy expansion. Our theory highlights that market integration not only improves allocative efficiency by gains from trade but also incentivizes new investment in renewable power plants. To test our theoretical predictions, we examine how recent grid expansions in the Chilean electricity market changed electricity production, wholesale prices, generation costs, and renewable investments. We then build a structural model of power plant entry to quantify the impact of market integration with and without the investment effects. We find that the market integration in Chile increased solar generation by around 180%, saved generation costs by 8%, and reduced carbon emissions by 5%. A substantial amount of renewable entry would not have occurred in the absence of market integration. Our findings suggest that ignoring these investment effects would substantially understate the benefits of market integration and its important role in expanding renewable energy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20769","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50119613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 91 Iss. 5 计量经济学背景卷第91期。5.
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA915BM
{"title":"Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 91 Iss. 5","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA915BM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA915BM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50119617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selection Into Credit Markets: Evidence From Agriculture in Mali 信贷市场的选择：来自马里农业的证据
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18916
Lori Beaman, Dean Karlan, Bram Thuysbaert, Christopher Udry
{"title":"Selection Into Credit Markets: Evidence From Agriculture in Mali","authors":"Lori Beaman,&nbsp;Dean Karlan,&nbsp;Bram Thuysbaert,&nbsp;Christopher Udry","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18916","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We use a two-stage experiment on agricultural lending in Mali to test whether selection into lending is predictive of heterogeneous returns to capital. Understanding this heterogeneity, and the selection process which reveals it, is critical for guiding modeling of credit markets in developing countries, as well as for policy. We find such heterogeneity: returns to capital are higher for farmers who borrow than for those who do not. In our first stage, we offer loans in some villages and not others. In the second stage, we provide cash grants to a random subset of all farmers in villages where no loans were offered, and to a random subset of the farmers who do not borrow in villages where loans were offered. We estimate seasonal returns to the grant of 130% for would-be borrowers, whereas we find returns near zero for the sample representative of non-borrowers. We also provide evidence that there are some farmers—particularly those that are poor at baseline—that have high returns but do not receive a loan.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18916","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50118522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
What Can Time-Series Regressions Tell Us About Policy Counterfactuals? 关于政策反事实，时间序列的回归能告诉我们什么？
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21045
Alisdair McKay, Christian K. Wolf
{"title":"What Can Time-Series Regressions Tell Us About Policy Counterfactuals?","authors":"Alisdair McKay,&nbsp;Christian K. Wolf","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21045","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We show that, in a general family of linearized structural macroeconomic models, knowledge of the empirically estimable causal effects of contemporaneous and news shocks to the prevailing policy rule is sufficient to construct counterfactuals under alternative policy rules. If the researcher is willing to postulate a loss function, our results furthermore allow her to recover an optimal policy rule for that loss. Under our assumptions, the derived counterfactuals and optimal policies are robust to the Lucas critique. We then discuss strategies for applying these insights when only a limited amount of empirical causal evidence on policy shock transmission is available.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50118523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Quantitative Theory of the Credit Score 信用评分的定量理论
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18771
Satyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, Kyle Dempsey, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull
{"title":"A Quantitative Theory of the Credit Score","authors":"Satyajit Chatterjee,&nbsp;Dean Corbae,&nbsp;Kyle Dempsey,&nbsp;José-Víctor Ríos-Rull","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18771","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>What is the role of credit scores in credit markets? We argue that it is, in part, the market's assessment of a person's unobservable type, which here we take to be patience. We postulate a model of persistent hidden types where observable actions shape the public assessment of a person's type via Bayesian updating. We show how dynamic reputation can incentivize repayment. Importantly, we show how an economy with credit scores implements the same equilibrium allocation. We estimate the model using both credit market data and the evolution of individuals' credit scores. We conduct counterfactuals to assess how more or less information used in scoring individuals affects outcomes and welfare. If tracking of individual credit actions is outlawed, poor young adults of low type benefit from subsidization by high types despite facing higher interest rates arising from lower dynamic incentives to repay.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18771","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50118520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regret-Minimizing Project Choice 最小化项目选择的遗憾
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20157
Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya
{"title":"Regret-Minimizing Project Choice","authors":"Yingni Guo,&nbsp;Eran Shmaya","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20157","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism that minimizes the principal's worst-case regret. We compare the single-project environment in which the agent can propose only one project with the multiproject environment in which he can propose many. In both environments, if the agent proposes one project, it is chosen for sure if the principal's payoff is sufficiently high; otherwise, the probability that it is chosen decreases in the agent's payoff. In the multiproject environment, the agent's payoff from proposing multiple projects equals his maximal payoff from proposing each project alone. The multiproject environment outperforms the single-project one by providing better fallback options than rejection and by delivering this payoff to the agent more efficiently.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20157","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50118521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design 游戏与机构设计中的简单性理论
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16310
Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan
{"title":"A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design","authors":"Marek Pycia,&nbsp;Peter Troyan","doi":"10.3982/ECTA16310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16310","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>We study extensive-form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the <i>planning horizon</i>). Agents may update their so-called <i>strategic plan</i> as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of <i>simplicity</i> standards which require that the prescribed action leads to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what happens outside the planning horizon. We employ these standards to explore the trade-off between simplicity and other objectives, to characterize simple mechanisms in a wide range of economic environments, and to delineate the simplicity of common mechanisms such as posted prices and ascending auctions, with the former being simpler than the latter.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA16310","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50117395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 91 Iss. 4 《计量经济学前沿》第91卷第1期。4.
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA914FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 91 Iss. 4","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA914FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA914FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50117474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations 公共组织中的意识形态与绩效
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20355
Jörg L. Spenkuch, Edoardo Teso, Guo Xu
{"title":"Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations","authors":"Jörg L. Spenkuch,&nbsp;Edoardo Teso,&nbsp;Guo Xu","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20355","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>We combine personnel records of the United States federal bureaucracy from 1997 to 2019 with administrative voter registration data to study how ideological alignment between politicians and bureaucrats affects turnover and performance. We document significant partisan cycles and turnover among political appointees. By contrast, we find no political cycles in the civil service. At any point in time, a sizable share of bureaucrats is ideologically misaligned with their political leaders. We study the performance implications of this misalignment for the case of procurement officers. Exploiting presidential transitions as a source of “within-bureaucrat” variation in political alignment, we find that procurement contracts overseen by misaligned officers exhibit greater cost overruns and delays. We provide evidence consistent with a general “morale effect,” whereby misaligned bureaucrats are less motivated to pursue the organizational mission. Our results thus help to shed some of the first light on the costs of ideological misalignment within public organizations.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20355","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50117599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 91 Iss. 4 计量经济学背景卷第91期。4.
IF 6.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA914BM
{"title":"Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 91 Iss. 4","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA914BM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA914BM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50117600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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