Econometrica最新文献

{"title":"Integrated Monetary and Financial Policies for Small Open Economies","authors":"Suman S. Basu,&nbsp;Emine Boz,&nbsp;Gita Gopinath,&nbsp;Francisco Roch,&nbsp;D. Filiz Unsal","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21802","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a tractable small-open-economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the monetary policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, positive premia on local currency debt arising from financiers' portfolio constraints, and occasionally-binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions under which the traditional prescription—relying solely on the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility—remains sufficient, even in the presence of externalities. By contrast, to manage noise trader flows into and out of the local currency debt market, FX intervention and in some cases capital inflow taxes should be used instead of the traditional prescription. Moreover, if a country faces a mix of local currency premia and external borrowing constraints, we establish that certain regulations to limit FX mismatch may alleviate the external borrowing constraint but exacerbate the local currency premia. Finally, we show that capital controls may dominate domestic macroprudential measures in cases when external shocks trigger stress in domestic housing markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2201-2234"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reply to: Comments on “Presidential Address: Identity Politics”","authors":"Nicola Gennaioli,&nbsp;Guido Tabellini","doi":"10.3982/ECTA24596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA24596","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We thank&lt;/span&gt; Ernesto dal Bó and Francesco Trebbi for their thoughtful comments, which allow us to clarify some important aspects of our work.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trebbi points out that several recent contributions have studied the role of changing salience weights in multidimensional voting models, “without the need of forgoing voter rationality.” We agree that the questions of how politicians manipulate voters' attention on alternative issues, and with what consequences, are of primary importance, and those papers are important contributions. But we view our departure from the assumption of voter rationality as a step forward, not as a drawback.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Political scientists have long argued that the assumption of rational voters is unrealistic, and economists are also coming around to this view. A large body of work shows that voters have significant misperceptions of reality, strongly correlated with their political and social affiliations (&lt;span&gt;Flynn, Nyhan, and Reifler&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;), &lt;span&gt;Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2020&lt;/span&gt;)). The question is not how to reconcile this with voters' rationality, but what is the best account for observed voters' beliefs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The standard approach to voters' misperceptions emphasizes information acquisition (&lt;span&gt;Levy and Razin&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;)). On the one hand, voters with different partisan affiliations select exposure to different news sources. On the other hand, their processing of new information is distorted by cognitive biases, such as correlation neglect, selection bias, confirmation bias, or motivated cognition. Yet, political beliefs seldom react to informational treatments (&lt;span&gt;Flynn, Nyhan, and Reifler&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;)), and more knowledgeable individuals sometimes have more distorted beliefs over controversial political issues than less knowledgeable ones (&lt;span&gt;Kahan&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;)).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our approach points to the importance of social context, rather than new information, in the formation of political beliefs. A salient social conflict can &lt;i&gt;itself&lt;/i&gt; cause voters to view society as “us versus them,” prompting voters to identify with the groups they belong to. When this happens, voters slant their beliefs toward their ingroup stereotype. But, as shown by &lt;span&gt;Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer&lt;/span&gt; (&lt;span&gt;2016&lt;/span&gt;), stereotypes exaggerate group differences. As a result, increasing the salience of a social conflict raises polarization, even without providing any new information.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Trebbi asks who leads polarization: voters or parties? We don't think that polarization only originates in the electorate. Rather, we think that it reflects the interaction between voters and parties. This interaction also plays out in the amplification of shocks like international trade and immigration, which in our paper drive a shift of polarization from economic to cultural issues and the associated party realignment. In our model","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"1977-1980"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA24596","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply","authors":"Eliana Carranza,&nbsp;Aletheia Donald,&nbsp;Florian Grosset-Touba,&nbsp;Supreet Kaur","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21078","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In low-income communities in both rich and poor countries, redistributive transfers within kin and social networks are frequent. Such arrangements may distort labor supply—acting as a “social tax” that dampens the incentive to work. We document that across countries, from the United States to Côte d'Ivoire, low-income groups report strong pressure to share earned income with others; in addition, social groups that undertake more interpersonal transfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, we enable piece-rate factory workers in Côte d'Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 9 months. Workers may only deposit earnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. Offering Private accounts raises work attendance by 6.5% and earnings by 9.4%. These treatment effects are concentrated among workers who report higher redistributive pressure at baseline. To obtain further suggestive evidence on mechanisms, in a supplementary experiment, we vary whether blocked accounts are private or known to the worker's network. When accounts are private, take-up is substantively higher (60% vs. 14%), with a resultant 8.8% higher earnings. Outgoing transfers do not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The welfare benefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2273-2308"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21078","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 6","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA936FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA936FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Comment on: “Presidential Address: Identity Politics” by Nicola Gennaioli and Guido Tabellini","authors":"Francesco Trebbi","doi":"10.3982/ECTA24038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA24038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"1969-1971"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consumer Surplus From Suppliers: How Big Is It and Does It Matter for Growth?","authors":"David Baqaee,&nbsp;Ariel Burstein,&nbsp;Cédric Duprez,&nbsp;Emmanuel Farhi","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22672","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumer surplus, the area between the demand curve and the price, plays a key role in many models of trade and growth. Quantifying it typically requires estimating and extrapolating demand curves. This paper provides an alternative approach to measuring consumer surplus by focusing on firms as consumers of inputs. We show that the elasticity of a downstream firm's marginal cost to supplier additions and separations measures the downstream firm's consumer surplus relative to its input costs. Using Belgian data and instrumenting for changes in supplier access, we find that for every 1% of suppliers gained or lost, the marginal cost of downstream firms falls or rises by roughly 0.3%. Our estimates are directly informative about the strength of love-of-variety effects and the gains from movements along quality ladders. We use our microeconomic estimates of consumer surplus to assess the macroeconomic importance of supplier additions and separations in a growth accounting framework. We find that supplier churn plausibly accounts for about half of aggregate productivity growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2043-2081"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Search Frictions and Product Design in the Municipal Bond Market","authors":"Giulia Brancaccio,&nbsp;Karam Kang","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21277","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper shows that product design shapes search frictions and that intermediaries leverage this channel to increase their rents in the context of the U.S. municipal bond market. The majority of bonds are designed via negotiation between a local government and its underwriter. They are then traded in a decentralized market, where the underwriter often also acts as an intermediary. Exploiting variations in state regulations that limit government officials' conflicts of interest, we provide evidence that the underwriter benefits from designing and trading complex bonds, which induces an increase in search frictions. Interestingly, a simpler bond may not necessarily benefit the government, as bond complexity affords flexibility in debt repayment. Motivated by these findings, we build and estimate a model of bond origination and trading to quantify the welfare implications of a policy mandating bond standardization.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2159-2199"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21277","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Marginal Reputation","authors":"Daniel Luo,&nbsp;Alexander Wolitzky","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23782","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study reputation formation where a long-run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short-run players observe the long-run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long-run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not necessarily for playing a particular mapping from signals to actions. Nonetheless, we show that the long-run player can secure her Stackelberg payoff if distinct commitment types are statistically distinguishable and the Stackelberg strategy is <i>confound-defeating</i>. This property holds if and only if the Stackelberg strategy is the unique solution to an optimal transport problem. If the long-run player's payoff is supermodular in one-dimensional signals and actions, she secures the Stackelberg payoff if and only if the Stackelberg strategy is monotone. Applications include deterrence, delegation, signaling, and persuasion. Our results extend to the case where distinct commitment types may be indistinguishable, but the Stackelberg type is <i>salient</i> under the prior.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2007-2042"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23782","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competing Platforms and Transport Equilibrium","authors":"Nicola Rosaia","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21773","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study whether platform competition in app-based transportation generates waste and whether consolidating competing networks would improve efficiency. I build a spatial model of a ride-hailing market where competing platforms set prices strategically and estimate it using detailed data from two major platforms in New York City. Comparing the status quo to simulated counterfactuals, I find that: (i) platform market power and the fragmentation of users across networks cause a $176 million annual loss in social welfare and waste 21% of driver-generated traffic; (ii) a platform merger would trade off gains from pooling all users into a single network against harms from greater market power, reducing traffic by 8% but lowering consumer surplus by $77 million per year due to a 4% price hike; and (iii) interoperability regulations would bring these gains without undermining competition, reducing wasteful traffic by 6% while raising consumer surplus by $63 million per year.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2235-2271"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Transparency and Percent Plans","authors":"Adam Kapor","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Transparency versus opacity is an important dimension of college admission policy. Colleges may gain useful information from a holistic review of applicants' materials, but in doing so may contribute to uncertainty that discourages potential applicants with poor information. This paper investigates the impacts of admissions transparency in the context of Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, using survey and administrative data from Texas and a model of college applications, admissions, enrollment, grades, and persistence. I estimate that two thirds of the plan's 9.1 point impact on top-decile students' probability of attending a flagship university was due to information rather than mechanical effects. Students induced to enroll are more likely to come from low-income high schools, and academically outperform the students that they displace. These effects would be larger if complemented by financial-aid information, and are driven by transparency, not misalignment between the rules used for automatic and discretionary admissions.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 6","pages":"2123-2157"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145626611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}