Random Votes to Parties and Policies in Coalition Governments

IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI:10.3982/ECTA20942
Matteo Cervellati, Giorgio Gulino, Paolo Roberti
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We exploit a natural experiment involving a randomization of votes across parties within coalitions in all local elections in Italy for over a decade. A lottery on the position of party symbols in the ballot papers allows estimating the causal effect of increasing votes to parties for coalition policies. A non-marginal random boost of votes shifts budgetary spending towards the treated party's platform, but only for issues that are salient in that party's political manifesto. We study the chains of mechanisms mapping votes into policies and link it to an increase in bargaining power within legislative majorities. Parties leverage their higher electoral support to gain the appointment of politically affiliated cabinet members. Empowering different parties also leads to the selection of cabinets with different socio-demographic characteristics. The unintentional experiment helps shed new light on mechanisms mapping votes to parties into coalition policies.

Abstract Image

对联合政府中的政党和政策随机投票
我们利用了一项自然实验,即在意大利十多年来的所有地方选举中,对联盟内各政党的选票进行随机分配。通过对政党标志在选票中的位置进行抽签,我们可以估算出政党因联盟政策而获得更多选票的因果效应。选票的非边际随机增加会使预算支出转向受影响政党的政纲,但仅限于该政党政治宣言中突出的问题。我们研究了将选票转化为政策的机制链,并将其与立法多数中议价能力的提高联系起来。政党利用其较高的选举支持率来获得政治关联内阁成员的任命。对不同党派的授权也会导致选择具有不同社会人口特征的内阁成员。这一无意实验有助于揭示将政党选票映射到联合政策的新机制。
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来源期刊
Econometrica
Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
11.00
自引率
3.30%
发文量
75
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics. Econometrica maintains a long tradition that submitted articles are refereed carefully and that detailed and thoughtful referee reports are provided to the author as an aid to scientific research, thus ensuring the high calibre of papers found in Econometrica. An international board of editors, together with the referees it has selected, has succeeded in substantially reducing editorial turnaround time, thereby encouraging submissions of the highest quality. We strongly encourage recent Ph. D. graduates to submit their work to Econometrica. Our policy is to take into account the fact that recent graduates are less experienced in the process of writing and submitting papers.
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