论信息稳健最优机制的结构

IF 6.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI:10.3982/ECTA20240
Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究的是,当设计者无法确定代理人所掌握的信息形式,也无法确定会出现哪种均衡时的最优机制设计。一种机制的保证是它在所有信息结构和均衡中的最差表现。一个信息结构的潜力是它在所有机制和均衡中的最佳表现。我们提出了一对线性程序,其中一个是所有机制中最大保证的下限,另一个是所有信息结构中最小潜力的上限。在公共支出、双边贸易和最优拍卖的应用中,我们利用约束程序来描述保证最大化的机制和潜力最小化的信息结构,并证明最大保证等于最小潜力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms

On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms

We study the design of optimal mechanisms when the designer is uncertain both about the form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. The guarantee of a mechanism is its worst performance across all information structures and equilibria. The potential of an information structure is its best performance across all mechanisms and equilibria. We formulate a pair of linear programs, one of which is a lower bound on the maximum guarantee across all mechanisms, and the other of which is an upper bound on the minimum potential across all information structures. In applications to public expenditure, bilateral trade, and optimal auctions, we use the bounding programs to characterize guarantee-maximizing mechanisms and potential-minimizing information structures and show that the max guarantee is equal to the min potential.

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来源期刊
Econometrica
Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
11.00
自引率
3.30%
发文量
75
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics. Econometrica maintains a long tradition that submitted articles are refereed carefully and that detailed and thoughtful referee reports are provided to the author as an aid to scientific research, thus ensuring the high calibre of papers found in Econometrica. An international board of editors, together with the referees it has selected, has succeeded in substantially reducing editorial turnaround time, thereby encouraging submissions of the highest quality. We strongly encourage recent Ph. D. graduates to submit their work to Econometrica. Our policy is to take into account the fact that recent graduates are less experienced in the process of writing and submitting papers.
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