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Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward-Induction Reasoning 前向归纳推理下的单调性与鲁棒性实现
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-04-01 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23709
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Emiliano Catonini
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引用次数: 0
Optimal Shrinkage Estimation of Fixed Effects in Linear Panel Data Models 线性面板数据模型中固定效应的最佳收缩估计
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-04-01 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22386
Soonwoo Kwon
{"title":"Optimal Shrinkage Estimation of Fixed Effects in Linear Panel Data Models","authors":"Soonwoo Kwon","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22386","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA22386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Shrinkage methods are frequently used to improve the precision of least squares estimators of fixed effects. However, widely used shrinkage estimators guarantee improved precision only under strong distributional assumptions. I develop an estimator for the fixed effects that obtains the best possible mean squared error within a class of shrinkage estimators. This class includes conventional shrinkage estimators and the optimality does not require distributional assumptions. The estimator has an intuitive form and is easy to implement. Moreover, the fixed effects are allowed to vary with time and to be serially correlated, in which case the shrinkage optimally incorporates the underlying correlation structure. I also provide a method to forecast fixed effects one period ahead in this setting.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 2","pages":"663-677"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147682960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments 不完全规定环境下的动态激励
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-04-01 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23373
Gabriel Carroll
{"title":"Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments","authors":"Gabriel Carroll","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23373","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA23373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a repeated interaction where it is unknown which of various stage games will be played each period. This framework separates the basic logic of intertemporal incentives from the requirement that any given strategy profile yields a well-defined payoff vector. A natural solution concept is ex post perfect equilibrium: strategies must form a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any realization of the sequence of stage games. When there is one long-run player and others are short-run, and public randomization is available, we can adapt the standard recursive approach to determine the maximum feasible gap between reward and punishment for the long-run player. This allows us to identify which actions can be played in equilibrium and, assuming perfect monitoring, to fully characterize what outcome paths can arise. With multiple long-run players or no public randomization, the approach fails; a diagnostic of this failure is that optimal penal codes may no longer exist.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 2","pages":"375-406"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147682956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimally-Transported Generalized Method of Moments 矩的最优传递广义方法
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-04-01 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22486
Susanne Schennach, Vincent Starck
{"title":"Optimally-Transported Generalized Method of Moments","authors":"Susanne Schennach,&nbsp;Vincent Starck","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22486","DOIUrl":"10.3982/ECTA22486","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a novel optimal transport-based version of the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). Instead of handling overidentification by reweighting the data to satisfy the moment conditions (as in Generalized Empirical Likelihood methods), this method proceeds by allowing for errors in the variables of the least mean-square magnitude necessary to simultaneously satisfy all moment conditions. This approach, based on the notions of optimal transport and Wasserstein metric, aims to address the problem of assigning a logical interpretation to GMM results even when overidentification tests reject the null, a situation that cannot always be avoided in applications. We illustrate the method by revisiting Duranton, Morrow and Turner's (2014) study of the relationship between a city's exports and the extent of its transportation infrastructure. Our results corroborate theirs under weaker assumptions and provide insight into the error structure of the variables.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 2","pages":"619-640"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147682959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series 向计量经济学会专著系列提交手稿
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941SUM
{"title":"Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA941SUM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA941SUM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica Referees 2024–2025 计量经济学学会年度报告计量经济学评审2024-2025
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941REF
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica Referees 2024–2025","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA941REF","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA941REF","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"287-297"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information 多维筛选与精确的卖方信息
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23622
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
{"title":"Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information","authors":"Mira Frick,&nbsp;Ryota Iijima,&nbsp;Yuhta Ishii","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23622","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms—such as pure bundling or separate sales—can be far from optimal and do not admit clear-cut comparisons. We show that this changes if the monopolist has sufficiently precise information about the buyer's valuations: Now, pure bundling always outperforms separate sales; moreover, there is a sense in which pure bundling performs essentially as well as the optimal mechanism. To formalize this, we characterize how fast the corresponding revenues converge to the first-best revenue as the monopolist's information grows precise: Pure bundling achieves the same convergence rate to the first-best as optimal mechanisms; in contrast, the convergence rate under separate sales is suboptimal.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"35-70"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23622","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica report 2024–2025Marina Halac 计量经济学会年度报告计量经济报告2024 - 2025
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941EDS
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica report 2024–2025Marina Halac","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA941EDS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA941EDS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"281-286"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equilibrium Existence in First-Price Auctions With Private Values 具有私人价值的首价拍卖的均衡存在性
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22570
Wojciech Olszewski, Philip J. Reny, Ron Siegel
{"title":"Equilibrium Existence in First-Price Auctions With Private Values","authors":"Wojciech Olszewski,&nbsp;Philip J. Reny,&nbsp;Ron Siegel","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22570","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with private values that accommodate non quasi-linear utilities and value-distributions that contain atoms and exhibit positive or negative correlation. These conditions show that equilibrium existence often turns on properties of a single statistic of the joint distribution of values, namely, the minimum value in the support of the high-value distribution (the mHV). We also show that modifying the standard tie-breaking rule only at the mHV is enough to guarantee equilibrium existence without our sufficient conditions. Our results also apply to Bertrand price competition when each firm's constant marginal cost is private information.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"193-224"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22570","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146196934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica 94 Iss. 1 《计量经济学》1994年第1期
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica 94 Iss. 1","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA941FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA941FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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