EconometricaPub Date : 2025-02-03DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931SUM
{"title":"Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA931SUM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA931SUM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"355"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2025-02-03DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21466
David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey
{"title":"Minimum Wages, Efficiency, and Welfare","authors":"David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21466","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many argue that minimum wages can prevent efficiency losses from monopsony power. We assess this argument in a general equilibrium model of oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms. We decompose welfare gains into an <i>efficiency</i> component that captures reductions in monopsony power and a <i>redistributive</i> component that captures the way minimum wages shift resources across people. The minimum wage that maximizes the efficiency component of welfare lies below $8.00 and yields gains worth less than 0.2% of lifetime consumption. When we add back in Utilitarian redistributive motives, the optimal minimum wage is $11 and redistribution accounts for 102.5% of the resulting welfare gains, implying offsetting efficiency losses of −2.5%. The reason a minimum wage struggles to deliver efficiency gains is that with realistic firm productivity dispersion, a minimum wage that eliminates monopsony power at one firm causes severe rationing at another. These results hold under an EITC and progressive labor income taxes calibrated to the U.S. economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"265-301"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2025-02-03DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931SEC
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Secretary","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA931SEC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA931SEC","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"303-318"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2025-02-03DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17051
Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
{"title":"Persuasion Meets Delegation","authors":"Anton Kolotilin, Andriy Zapechelnyuk","doi":"10.3982/ECTA17051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17051","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single-crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"195-228"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA17051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2025-02-03DOI: 10.3982/ECTA931EDS
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2023–2024","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA931EDS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA931EDS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 1","pages":"333-338"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143111396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-11-21DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22017
Philipp Strack, Kai Hao Yang
{"title":"Privacy-Preserving Signals","authors":"Philipp Strack, Kai Hao Yang","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22017","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A signal is <i>privacy-preserving</i> with respect to a collection of <i>privacy sets</i> if the posterior probability assigned to every privacy set remains unchanged conditional on any signal realization. We characterize the privacy-preserving signals for arbitrary state space and arbitrary privacy sets. A signal is privacy-preserving if and only if it is a garbling of a <i>reordered quantile signal</i>. Furthermore, distributions of posterior means induced by privacy-preserving signals are exactly mean-preserving contractions of that induced by the <i>quantile signal</i>. We discuss the economic implications of our characterization for statistical discrimination, the revelation of sensitive information in auctions and price discrimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 6","pages":"1907-1938"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-11-21DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18602
Christoph Breunig, Xiaohong Chen
{"title":"Adaptive, Rate-Optimal Hypothesis Testing in Nonparametric IV Models","authors":"Christoph Breunig, Xiaohong Chen","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18602","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a new adaptive hypothesis test for inequality (e.g., monotonicity, convexity) and equality (e.g., parametric, semiparametric) restrictions on a structural function in a nonparametric instrumental variables (NPIV) model. Our test statistic is based on a modified leave-one-out sample analog of a quadratic distance between the restricted and unrestricted sieve two-stage least squares estimators. We provide computationally simple, data-driven choices of sieve tuning parameters and Bonferroni adjusted chi-squared critical values. Our test adapts to the unknown smoothness of alternative functions in the presence of unknown degree of endogeneity and unknown strength of the instruments. It attains the adaptive minimax rate of testing in <i>L</i><sup>2</sup>. That is, the sum of the supremum of type I error over the composite null and the supremum of type II error over nonparametric alternative models cannot be minimized by any other tests for NPIV models of unknown regularities. Confidence sets in <i>L</i><sup>2</sup> are obtained by inverting the adaptive test. Simulations confirm that, across different strength of instruments and sample sizes, our adaptive test controls size and its finite-sample power greatly exceeds existing non-adaptive tests for monotonicity and parametric restrictions in NPIV models. Empirical applications to test for shape restrictions of differentiated products demand and of Engel curves are presented.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 6","pages":"2027-2067"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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