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Genetic Prediction and Adverse Selection 遗传预测与逆向选择
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-09-22 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA24284
Eduardo Azevedo, Jonathan P. Beauchamp, Richard Karlsson Linnér
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引用次数: 0
The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair 随机优先机制具有独特的简单、高效和公平
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-09-22 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23230
Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan
{"title":"The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair","authors":"Marek Pycia,&nbsp;Peter Troyan","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23230","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Random Priority is a popular mechanism used to allocate a set of objects to a set of agents without the use of monetary transfers. Random Priority is appealing because it satisfies desirable efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties. Is it the only mechanism with these properties? We answer this long-standing question in the positive: Random Priority is the unique mechanism that is Pareto efficient, symmetric, and obviously strategy-proof.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 5","pages":"1603-1650"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23230","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149014747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Promoting Women to Managerial Roles in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector 促进妇女在孟加拉国服装部门担任管理职务
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-09-22 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18759
Rocco Macchiavello, Andreas Menzel, Atonu Rabbani, Christopher Woodruff
{"title":"Promoting Women to Managerial Roles in the Bangladeshi Garment Sector","authors":"Rocco Macchiavello,&nbsp;Andreas Menzel,&nbsp;Atonu Rabbani,&nbsp;Christopher Woodruff","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18759","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Women remain disadvantaged in promotion to managerial positions. We conduct a field experiment with 24 large garment factories in Bangladesh to test for inefficient representation of women among line supervisors. We identify the marginal female and male candidates for supervisory positions and randomly assign them to manage production lines. We document four findings: (1) In contrast to widespread negative beliefs about women's ability as supervisors at baseline, female candidates selected by the factories had similar skills to males; (2) during the trial, females performed worse than males, which we show is related to negative bias against them; (3) after the trial, however, many female candidates were retained as supervisors and, conditional on that, performed similar to males; and (4) after the end of our intervention, factories permanently increased the share of women among newly appointed supervisors. A conceptual framework of experimentation over discrimination rationalizes all these facts and cautions against the standard logic to test for discrimination: when there is uncertainty about the performance of the discriminated group, equal—or even worse—performance of the marginal candidates of that group is no longer sufficient to rule out inefficient discrimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 5","pages":"1685-1716"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18759","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149014748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Security Design Under Common-Value Competition 共同价值竞争下的安全设计
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-09-22 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21366
Yue Yuan
{"title":"Security Design Under Common-Value Competition","authors":"Yue Yuan","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21366","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies security design by bidders with dispersed information about a common-value investment opportunity. Among a broad set of securities, bidders offer debt financing—the flattest securities. A first reason is that debt mitigates bidders' exposure to the winner's curse when there are two bidders. Second, the entrepreneur either has an informational advantage initially or gains one by inferring from the bids, and is more likely to select debt offers when optimistic about the project. While a bidder's choice of security also has a signaling effect, this effect is dominated by the winner's curse and informed-selection effects, and does not affect the equilibrium outcome. These results contrast sharply with security design by a monopolistic investor, as well as with DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz's (2005) results under private-value competition. The entrepreneur's ability to commit to an ordered set of securities does not improve revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 5","pages":"1717-1759"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21366","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149014749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Design in Common Value Auction With Moral Hazard: Application to OCS Leasing Auctions 考虑道德风险的共值拍卖信息设计：在OCS租赁拍卖中的应用
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21839
Anh Nguyen
{"title":"Information Design in Common Value Auction With Moral Hazard: Application to OCS Leasing Auctions","authors":"Anh Nguyen","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21839","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the impact of information design on the auctioneer's revenue in the U.S. offshore oil/gas lease auctions where, post-auction, the winner decides whether to explore the auctioned tract and must pay the government a royalty on its production value. I first document that there is a positive correlation between the exploration rate and publicly observed losing bids. This suggests that the winning bidder uses the rivals' bids to infer their private information about the tract's potential. I then characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy when the auctioneer designs and commits to how to reveal information on losing bids to the winning bidder. Counterfactual exercises reveal that alternative bid disclosure policies significantly improve auctioneer revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 4","pages":"1171-1208"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21839","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series 向计量经济学会专著系列提交手稿
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA944SUM
{"title":"Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA944SUM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA944SUM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 94 Iss. 4 计量经济学背景，第94卷，第4期
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA944BM
{"title":"Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 94 Iss. 4","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA944BM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA944BM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 4","pages":"iii-v"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic Growth and the Rise of Large Firms 经济增长与大公司的崛起
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22110
Zhang Chen
{"title":"Economic Growth and the Rise of Large Firms","authors":"Zhang Chen","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22110","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I document that the right tail of the firm size distribution systematically thickens with economic development. To rationalize this fact, I develop a parsimonious idea search model in which both aggregate growth and the firm size distribution are endogenously determined. The model features an asymptotic balanced growth path along which Gibrat's law holds at each date, and the right tail of the firm size distribution thickens monotonically toward Zipf's law. The model also implies that policies favoring large firms can improve welfare by better utilizing the diffusion externalities arising from idea search.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 4","pages":"1375-1408"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22110","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica 94 Iss. 4 《计量经济学》1994年第4期
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA944FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica 94 Iss. 4","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA944FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA944FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 4","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Double Robustness of Local Projections and Some Unpleasant VARithmetic 局部投影的双鲁棒性及一些令人不快的算法
IF 6.2 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23345
José Luis Montiel Olea, Mikkel Plagborg-Møller, Eric Qian, Christian K. Wolf
{"title":"Double Robustness of Local Projections and Some Unpleasant VARithmetic","authors":"José Luis Montiel Olea,&nbsp;Mikkel Plagborg-Møller,&nbsp;Eric Qian,&nbsp;Christian K. Wolf","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23345","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider impulse response inference in a locally misspecified vector autoregression (VAR) model. The conventional local projection (LP) confidence interval has correct coverage even when the misspecification is so large that it can be detected with probability approaching 1. This result follows from a “double robustness” property analogous to that of popular partially linear regression estimators. By contrast, the conventional VAR confidence interval with short-to-moderate lag length can severely undercover for misspecification that is small, difficult to detect statistically, and cannot be ruled out based on economic theory. The VAR confidence interval has robust coverage if, and only if, the lag length is so large that the interval is as wide as the LP interval.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 4","pages":"1313-1343"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2,"publicationDate":"2026-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23345","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148616653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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