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Auctioning Control and Cash-Flow Rights Separately 拍卖控制权和现金流权分开
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21343
Tingjun Liu, Dan Bernhardt
{"title":"Auctioning Control and Cash-Flow Rights Separately","authors":"Tingjun Liu,&nbsp;Dan Bernhardt","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21343","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's information rent, which depends on the importance of his private information for the value of his awarded cash flows. As project payoffs are most sensitive to a bidder's information if he controls the project, allocating cash flow to another bidder lowers bidders' informational advantage. As a result, when signals are close, the seller can increase revenues by splitting rights between the top two bidders.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"859-889"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21343","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides 个性化定价和时间价值：来自拍卖出租车的证据
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18838
Nicholas Buchholz, Laura Doval, Jakub Kastl, Filip Matejka, Tobias Salz
{"title":"Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides","authors":"Nicholas Buchholz,&nbsp;Laura Doval,&nbsp;Jakub Kastl,&nbsp;Filip Matejka,&nbsp;Tobias Salz","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18838","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We recover valuations of time using detailed data from a large ride-hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of rides with different prices and wait times. Leveraging a consumer panel, we estimate demand as a function of both prices and wait times and use the resulting estimates to recover heterogeneity in the value of time across consumers. We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing and its effect on the platform, drivers, and consumers. Taking into account drivers' optimal reaction to the platform's pricing policy, personalized pricing lowers consumer surplus by 2.5% and increases overall surplus by 5.2%. Like the platform, drivers benefit from personalized pricing. By conditioning prices on drivers' wait times and not on consumers' data, the platform can capture a significant portion of the profits garnered from personalized pricing, and simultaneously benefit consumers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"929-958"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18838","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society 2024 Annual Report of the President 计量经济学会2024年总统年度报告
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA933PRES
{"title":"The Econometric Society 2024 Annual Report of the President","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA933PRES","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA933PRES","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 3","pages":"1105-1119"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 2 计量经济学背景，第93卷第2期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA932BM
{"title":"Backmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 2","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA932BM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA932BM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"iii-v"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On (Constrained) Efficiency of Strategy-Proof Random Assignment 无策略随机分配的（约束）效率
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22762
Christian Basteck, Lars Ehlers
{"title":"On (Constrained) Efficiency of Strategy-Proof Random Assignment","authors":"Christian Basteck,&nbsp;Lars Ehlers","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22762","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents, when each agent is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Answering a longstanding open question, we show that RSD is not characterized by those properties—there are other mechanisms satisfying equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategy-proofness which are not welfare-equivalent to RSD. On the other hand, we show that RSD is not Pareto dominated by any mechanism that is (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex post efficient, strategy-proof, and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"569-595"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22762","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Quest for Knowledge 对知识的追求
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22144
Christoph Carnehl, Johannes Schneider
{"title":"A Quest for Knowledge","authors":"Christoph Carnehl,&nbsp;Johannes Schneider","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22144","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>Is more novel research always desirable? We develop a model in which knowledge shapes society's policies and guides the search for discoveries. Researchers select a question and how intensely to study it. The novelty of a question determines both the value and difficulty of discovering its answer. We show that the benefits of discoveries are nonmonotone in novelty. Knowledge expands endogenously step-by-step over time. Through a dynamic externality, moonshots—research on questions more novel than what is myopically optimal—can improve the evolution of knowledge. Moonshots induce research cycles in which subsequent researchers connect the moonshot to previous knowledge.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"623-659"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22144","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Incarceration on Employment, Earnings, and Tax Filing 监禁对就业、收入和纳税申报的影响
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22028
Andrew Garin, Dmitri Koustas, Carl McPherson, Samuel Norris, Matthew Pecenco, Evan K. Rose, Yotam Shem-Tov, Jeffrey Weaver
{"title":"The Impact of Incarceration on Employment, Earnings, and Tax Filing","authors":"Andrew Garin,&nbsp;Dmitri Koustas,&nbsp;Carl McPherson,&nbsp;Samuel Norris,&nbsp;Matthew Pecenco,&nbsp;Evan K. Rose,&nbsp;Yotam Shem-Tov,&nbsp;Jeffrey Weaver","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>We study the effect of incarceration on wages, self-employment, and taxes and transfers in North Carolina and Ohio using two quasi-experimental research designs: discontinuities in sentencing guidelines and random assignment to judges. Across both states, incarceration generates short-term drops in economic activity while individuals remain in prison. As a result, a year-long sentence decreases cumulative earnings over five years by 13%. Beyond five years, however, there is no evidence of lower employment, wage earnings, or self-employment in either state, as well as among defendants with no prior incarceration history. These results suggest that upstream factors, such as other types of criminal justice interactions or pre-existing labor market detachment, are more likely to be the cause of low earnings among the previously incarcerated, who we estimate would earn just $5000 per year on average if spared a prison sentence.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"503-538"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 2 《计量经济学》第93卷第2期
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA932FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica Vol. 93 Iss. 2","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA932FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA932FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Estimating Candidate Valence 估计候选价
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20496
Kei Kawai, Takeaki Sunada
{"title":"Estimating Candidate Valence","authors":"Kei Kawai,&nbsp;Takeaki Sunada","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20496","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We estimate valence measures of candidates running in U.S. House elections from data on vote shares. Our identification and estimation strategy builds on ideas developed for estimating production functions, allowing us to control for possible endogeneity of campaign spending and sample selection of candidates due to endogenous entry. We find that incumbents have substantially higher valence measures than challengers running against them, resulting in about 3.5 percentage-point differences in the vote share, on average. Eliminating differences in the valence of challengers and incumbents results in an increase in the winning probability of a challenger from 6.5% to 12.1%. Our measure of candidate valence can be used to study various substantive questions of political economy. We illustrate its usefulness by studying the source of incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"463-501"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Meet Arrow–Debreu 限额交易和碳税与阿罗-德布鲁会面
IF 6.6 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22923
Robert M. Anderson, Haosui Duanmu
{"title":"Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Meet Arrow–Debreu","authors":"Robert M. Anderson,&nbsp;Haosui Duanmu","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22923","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \t\t\t<p>We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium, and emission tax equilibrium. Government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, and then refrains from further action. All results remain valid regardless of how government chooses its emissions target. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission property rights impacts the distribution of welfare. If the only externality arises from total net emissions, quota equilibrium is Pareto optimal among all feasible outcomes with the same total net emissions. For certain tax rates, emission tax equilibrium may not exist. Every quota equilibrium can be realized as an emission tax equilibrium and vice versa. However, different quota prices may arise in equilibrium from a single quota, and different emission levels may arise in equilibrium from a single tax rate. This leads to inequivalence between quota and emission tax equilibria.</p>\u0000 \t\t</div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"93 2","pages":"357-393"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22923","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143726950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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