EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921MONO
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921MONO","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921MONO","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20806
Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz
{"title":"Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks","authors":"Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20806","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how long-lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents, the speed of learning in any equilibrium is bounded from above by a constant that only depends on the private signal distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20386
Gaetano Bloise, Cuong Le Van, Yiannis Vailakis
{"title":"Do not Blame Bellman: It Is Koopmans' Fault","authors":"Gaetano Bloise, Cuong Le Van, Yiannis Vailakis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA20386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20386","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the unavoidable failure of uniqueness in general, we argue that the greatest fixed point of the Bellman operator should have a privileged position.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA20386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18436
Evan Herrnstadt, Ryan Kellogg, Eric Lewis
{"title":"Drilling Deadlines and Oil and Gas Development","authors":"Evan Herrnstadt, Ryan Kellogg, Eric Lewis","doi":"10.3982/ECTA18436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA18436","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>Oil and gas leases between mineral owners and extraction firms typically specify a date by which the firm must either drill a well or lose the lease. These deadlines are known as primary terms. Using data from the Louisiana shale boom, we first show that well drilling is substantially bunched just before the primary term deadline. This bunching is not necessarily surplus-reducing: using an estimated model of firms' drilling and input choices, we show that primary terms can increase total surplus by countering the effects of leases' royalties, as royalties are a tax on revenue and delay drilling. These benefits are reduced, however, when production outcomes are sensitive to drilling inputs and when drilling one well indefinitely extends the period of time during which additional wells may be drilled. We enrich the model to consider mineral owners' lease offers and find small effects of primary terms on owners' revenue.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA18436","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139655121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921EDS
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors 2022–2023","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921EDS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921EDS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139655122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19021
Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller
{"title":"Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?","authors":"Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19021","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 <p>This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EconometricaPub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.3982/ECTA921TREAS
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports. Report of the Treasurer","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA921TREAS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA921TREAS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139643888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}