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Submission of Manuscripts to the Econometric Society Monograph Series 向计量经济学会专著系列提交手稿
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941SUM
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引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica Referees 2024–2025 计量经济学学会年度报告计量经济学评审2024-2025
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941REF
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引用次数: 0
Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information 多维筛选与精确的卖方信息
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23622
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
{"title":"Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information","authors":"Mira Frick,&nbsp;Ryota Iijima,&nbsp;Yuhta Ishii","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23622","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms—such as pure bundling or separate sales—can be far from optimal and do not admit clear-cut comparisons. We show that this changes if the monopolist has sufficiently precise information about the buyer's valuations: Now, pure bundling always outperforms separate sales; moreover, there is a sense in which pure bundling performs essentially as well as the optimal mechanism. To formalize this, we characterize how fast the corresponding revenues converge to the first-best revenue as the monopolist's information grows precise: Pure bundling achieves the same convergence rate to the first-best as optimal mechanisms; in contrast, the convergence rate under separate sales is suboptimal.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"35-70"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23622","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Econometrica report 2024–2025Marina Halac 计量经济学会年度报告计量经济报告2024 - 2025
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941EDS
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引用次数: 0
Equilibrium Existence in First-Price Auctions With Private Values 具有私人价值的首价拍卖的均衡存在性
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22570
Wojciech Olszewski, Philip J. Reny, Ron Siegel
{"title":"Equilibrium Existence in First-Price Auctions With Private Values","authors":"Wojciech Olszewski,&nbsp;Philip J. Reny,&nbsp;Ron Siegel","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22570","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with private values that accommodate non quasi-linear utilities and value-distributions that contain atoms and exhibit positive or negative correlation. These conditions show that equilibrium existence often turns on properties of a single statistic of the joint distribution of values, namely, the minimum value in the support of the high-value distribution (the mHV). We also show that modifying the standard tie-breaking rule only at the mHV is enough to guarantee equilibrium existence without our sufficient conditions. Our results also apply to Bertrand price competition when each firm's constant marginal cost is private information.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"193-224"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22570","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146196934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter of Econometrica 94 Iss. 1 《计量经济学》1994年第1期
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941FM
{"title":"Frontmatter of Econometrica 94 Iss. 1","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA941FM","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA941FM","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"i-ii"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Choosing Who Chooses: Selection-Driven Targeting in Energy Rebate Programs 选择谁来选择：能源回扣计划中的选择驱动目标
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21180
Takanori Ida, Takunori Ishihara, Koichiro Ito, Daido Kido, Toru Kitagawa, Shosei Sakaguchi, Shusaku Sasaki
{"title":"Choosing Who Chooses: Selection-Driven Targeting in Energy Rebate Programs","authors":"Takanori Ida,&nbsp;Takunori Ishihara,&nbsp;Koichiro Ito,&nbsp;Daido Kido,&nbsp;Toru Kitagawa,&nbsp;Shosei Sakaguchi,&nbsp;Shusaku Sasaki","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21180","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop an optimal policy assignment rule that integrates two distinctive approaches commonly used in economics—targeting by <i>observables</i> and targeting through <i>self-selection</i>. Our method can be used with experimental or quasi-experimental data to identify who should be treated, be untreated, and self-select to achieve a policymaker's objective. Applying this method to a randomized controlled trial on a residential energy rebate program, we find that targeting that optimally exploits both observable data and self-selection outperforms conventional targeting. We use the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) framework (Imbens and Angrist (1994)) to investigate the mechanism in our approach. By estimating several key LATEs based on the random variation created by our experiment, we demonstrate how our method allows policymakers to identify whose self-selection would be valuable and harmful to social welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"225-247"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series 计量经济学会年度报告专著系列编辑报告
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA941MONO
{"title":"The Econometric Society Annual Reports Report of the Editors of the Monograph Series","authors":"","doi":"10.3982/ECTA941MONO","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA941MONO","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"299-301"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Framework for Geoeconomics 地缘经济学框架
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA23206
Christopher Clayton, Matteo Maggiori, Jesse Schreger
{"title":"A Framework for Geoeconomics","authors":"Christopher Clayton,&nbsp;Matteo Maggiori,&nbsp;Jesse Schreger","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23206","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Governments use their countries' economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a means of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark-ups, import restrictions, tariffs, and political concessions. The hegemon uses its power to change targeted entities' activities to manipulate the global equilibrium in its favor and increase its power. A sector is strategic either in helping the hegemon form threats or in manipulating the world equilibrium via input-output amplification. The hegemon acts a global enforcer, thus adding value to the world economy, but destroys value by distorting the equilibrium in its favor.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"105-136"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Markup Estimation: Assessing Estimates From Financial Data 《搭便车者估价指南：从财务数据评估估价》
IF 7.1 1区 经济学
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22733
Maarten De Ridder, Basile Grassi, Giovanni Morzenti
{"title":"The Hitchhiker's Guide to Markup Estimation: Assessing Estimates From Financial Data","authors":"Maarten De Ridder,&nbsp;Basile Grassi,&nbsp;Giovanni Morzenti","doi":"10.3982/ECTA22733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22733","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Macroeconomic outcomes depend on the distribution of markups across firms and over time, making firm-level markup estimates key for macroeconomic analysis. Methods to obtain these estimates require data on the prices that firms charge. Firm-level data with wide coverage, however, primarily come from financial statements, which lack information on prices. We use an analytical framework to show that trends in markups over time or the dispersion of markups across firms can still be well-measured with such data. Measuring the average level of the markup does require pricing data, and we propose a consistent estimator for such settings. We validate the analytical results using simulations of a quantitative macroeconomic model and offer supporting evidence from firm-level administrative production and pricing data. Our analysis supports the use of financial data to measure trends in aggregate markups.</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 1","pages":"137-168"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA22733","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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