{"title":"连续稳定的结果","authors":"Francesc Dilmé","doi":"10.3982/ECTA21402","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n <p>This paper introduces and analyzes <i>sequentially stable outcomes</i> in extensive-form games. An outcome <i>ω</i> is sequentially stable if, for any <i>ε</i> > 0 and any small enough perturbation of the players' behavior, there is an <i>ε</i>-perturbation of the players' payoffs and a corresponding equilibrium with outcome close to <i>ω</i>. Sequentially stable outcomes exist for all finite games and are outcomes of sequential equilibria. They are closely related to stable sets of equilibria and satisfy versions of forward induction, iterated strict equilibrium dominance, and invariance to simultaneous moves. In signaling games, sequentially stable outcomes pass the standard selection criteria, and when payoffs are generic, they coincide with outcomes of stable sets of equilibria.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"92 4","pages":"1097-1134"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21402","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sequentially Stable Outcomes\",\"authors\":\"Francesc Dilmé\",\"doi\":\"10.3982/ECTA21402\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n <p>This paper introduces and analyzes <i>sequentially stable outcomes</i> in extensive-form games. An outcome <i>ω</i> is sequentially stable if, for any <i>ε</i> > 0 and any small enough perturbation of the players' behavior, there is an <i>ε</i>-perturbation of the players' payoffs and a corresponding equilibrium with outcome close to <i>ω</i>. Sequentially stable outcomes exist for all finite games and are outcomes of sequential equilibria. They are closely related to stable sets of equilibria and satisfy versions of forward induction, iterated strict equilibrium dominance, and invariance to simultaneous moves. In signaling games, sequentially stable outcomes pass the standard selection criteria, and when payoffs are generic, they coincide with outcomes of stable sets of equilibria.</p>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50556,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Econometrica\",\"volume\":\"92 4\",\"pages\":\"1097-1134\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA21402\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Econometrica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA21402\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometrica","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA21402","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive-form games. An outcome ω is sequentially stable if, for any ε > 0 and any small enough perturbation of the players' behavior, there is an ε-perturbation of the players' payoffs and a corresponding equilibrium with outcome close to ω. Sequentially stable outcomes exist for all finite games and are outcomes of sequential equilibria. They are closely related to stable sets of equilibria and satisfy versions of forward induction, iterated strict equilibrium dominance, and invariance to simultaneous moves. In signaling games, sequentially stable outcomes pass the standard selection criteria, and when payoffs are generic, they coincide with outcomes of stable sets of equilibria.
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Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics.
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