发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Satisficing Equilibrium 满足均衡
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI: arxiv-2409.00832
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
{"title":"Satisficing Equilibrium","authors":"Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush","doi":"arxiv-2409.00832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.00832","url":null,"abstract":"In a $textit{satisficing equilibrium}$ each agent plays one of their $k$\u0000best pure actions, but not necessarily their best action. We show that\u0000satisficing equilibria in which agents play only their best or second-best\u0000action exist in almost all games. In fact, in almost all games, there exist\u0000satisficing equilibria in which all but one agent best-respond and the\u0000remaining agent plays at least a second-best action. By contrast, more than one\u0000third of games possess no pure Nash equilibrium. In addition to providing\u0000static foundations for satisficing equilibria, we show that a parsimonious\u0000dynamic converges to satisficing equilibria in almost all games. We apply our\u0000results to market design and show that a mediator who can control a single\u0000agent can enforce stability in most games. Finally, we use our results to study\u0000the existence of $epsilon$-equilibria.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why do elites extend property rights: unlocking investment and the switch to public goods 精英为何扩大产权：释放投资和转向公共产品
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: arxiv-2408.17335
Alastair Langtry
{"title":"Why do elites extend property rights: unlocking investment and the switch to public goods","authors":"Alastair Langtry","doi":"arxiv-2408.17335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.17335","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new rationale for a self-interested economic elite\u0000voluntarily extending property rights. When agents make endogenous investment\u0000decisions, there is a commitment problem. Ex-post, the elite face strong\u0000incentives to expropriate investments from the non-elite (who don't have\u0000property rights), which dissuades investment. Extending property rights to new\u0000groups can resolve this problem, even for those not given property rights, by\u0000making public good provision more attractive to the elite. Unlike other models\u0000of franchise extensions, extending property rights in this paper does not\u0000involve the elite ceding control to others. Rather, it changes the incentives\u0000they face. Additionally, adding identity groups to the model shows that an\u0000elite faces weaker incentives to resolve the commitment problem when it is part\u0000of a minority identity -- identity fragmentation makes it harder for a society\u0000to extend property rights.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"170 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust Technology Regulation 健全的技术监管
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: arxiv-2408.17398
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo
{"title":"Robust Technology Regulation","authors":"Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo","doi":"arxiv-2408.17398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.17398","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated. An agent\u0000develops a new technology and, while privately learning about its harms and\u0000benefits, continually chooses whether to continue development. A principal,\u0000uncertain about what the agent might learn, chooses among dynamic mechanisms\u0000(e.g., paths of taxes or subsidies) to influence the agent's choices in\u0000different states. We show that learning robust mechanisms -- those which\u0000deliver the highest payoff guarantee across all learning processes -- are\u0000simple and resemble `regulatory sandboxes' consisting of zero marginal tax on\u0000R&D which keeps the agent maximally sensitive to new information up to a hard\u0000quota, upon which the agent turns maximally insensitive. Robustness is\u0000important: we characterize the worst-case learning process under non-robust\u0000mechanisms and show that they induce growing but weak optimism which can\u0000deliver unboundedly poor principal payoffs; hard quotas safeguard against this.\u0000If the regulator also learns, adaptive hard quotas are robustly optimal which\u0000highlights the importance of expertise in regulation.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust Robustness 稳健性
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-29 DOI: arxiv-2408.16898
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
{"title":"Robust Robustness","authors":"Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel","doi":"arxiv-2408.16898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.16898","url":null,"abstract":"The maxmin approach to distributional robustness evaluates each mechanism\u0000according to its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We\u0000propose a refinement: the guarantee must be approximately satisfied at priors\u0000near the ambiguity set (in the weak topology). We call such a guarantee robust.\u0000The payoff guarantees from some maxmin-optimal mechanisms in the literature are\u0000not robust. We show, however, that over certain standard ambiguity sets (such\u0000as continuous moment sets), every mechanism's payoff guarantee is robust. We\u0000give a behavioral characterization of our refined robustness notion by imposing\u0000a new continuity axiom on maxmin preferences.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach 利用网络效应实现数字内容货币化：机制设计方法
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: arxiv-2408.15196
Vincent Meisner, Pascal Pillath
{"title":"Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach","authors":"Vincent Meisner, Pascal Pillath","doi":"arxiv-2408.15196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.15196","url":null,"abstract":"We design the profit-maximizing mechanism to sell an excludable and non-rival\u0000good with network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend\u0000on how many others also consume the good. We characterize an algorithm that\u0000implements the optimal allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights\u0000to digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in\u0000monetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions,\u0000community subsidies, and exclusivity bids.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"184 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Asymptotic Cost of Complexity 复杂性的渐进代价
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: arxiv-2408.14949
Martin W Cripps
{"title":"The Asymptotic Cost of Complexity","authors":"Martin W Cripps","doi":"arxiv-2408.14949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.14949","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a measure of learning efficiency for non-finite state spaces. We\u0000characterize the complexity of a learning problem by the metric entropy of its\u0000state space. We then describe how learning efficiency is determined by this\u0000measure of complexity. This is, then, applied to two models where agents learn\u0000high-dimensional states.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stochastic dominance for super heavy-tailed random variables 超重尾随机变量的随机优势
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: arxiv-2408.15033
Yuyu Chen, Seva Shneer
{"title":"Stochastic dominance for super heavy-tailed random variables","authors":"Yuyu Chen, Seva Shneer","doi":"arxiv-2408.15033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.15033","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a class of super heavy-tailed distributions and establish the\u0000inequality that any weighted average of independent and identically distributed\u0000super heavy-tailed random variables stochastically dominates one such random\u0000variable. We show that many commonly used extremely heavy-tailed (i.e.,\u0000infinite-mean) distributions, such as the Pareto, Fr'echet, and Burr\u0000distributions, belong to the class of super heavy-tailed distributions. The\u0000established stochastic dominance relation is further generalized to allow\u0000negatively dependent or non-identically distributed random variables. In\u0000particular, the weighted average of non-identically distributed random\u0000variables stochastically dominates their distribution mixtures. Applications of\u0000these results in portfolio diversification, goods bundling, and inventory\u0000management are discussed. Remarkably, in the presence of super\u0000heavy-tailedness, the results that hold for finite-mean models in these\u0000applications are flipped.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evolutionary Game Dynamics Applied to Strategic Adoption of Immersive Technologies in Cultural Heritage and Tourism 将进化游戏动力学应用于文化遗产和旅游领域沉浸式技术的战略采用
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI: arxiv-2409.06720
Gioacchino Fazio, Stefano Fricano, Claudio Pirrone
{"title":"Evolutionary Game Dynamics Applied to Strategic Adoption of Immersive Technologies in Cultural Heritage and Tourism","authors":"Gioacchino Fazio, Stefano Fricano, Claudio Pirrone","doi":"arxiv-2409.06720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06720","url":null,"abstract":"Immersive technologies such as Metaverse, AR, and VR are at a crossroads,\u0000with many actors pondering their adoption and potential sectors interested in\u0000integration. The cultural and tourism industries are particularly impacted,\u0000facing significant pressure to make decisions that could shape their future\u0000landscapes. Stakeholders' perceptions play a crucial role in this process,\u0000influencing the speed and extent of technology adoption. As immersive\u0000technologies promise to revolutionize experiences, stakeholders in these fields\u0000weigh the benefits and challenges of embracing such innovations. The current\u0000choices will likely determine the trajectory of cultural preservation and\u0000tourism enhancement, potentially transforming how we engage with history, art,\u0000and travel. Starting from a decomposition of stakeholders' perceptions into\u0000principal components using Q-methodology, this article employs an evolutionary\u0000game model to attempt to map possible scenarios and highlight potential\u0000decision-making trajectories. The proposed approach highlights how evolutionary\u0000dynamics lead to identifying a dominant long-term strategy that emerges from\u0000the complex system of coexistence among various stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A topological proof of Terao's generalized Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 寺尾广义阿罗不可能性定理的拓扑证明
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI: arxiv-2408.14263
Takuma Okura
{"title":"A topological proof of Terao's generalized Arrow's Impossibility Theorem","authors":"Takuma Okura","doi":"arxiv-2408.14263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.14263","url":null,"abstract":"In Terao [24], Hiroaki Terao defined and studied \"admissible map\", which is a\u0000generalization of \"social welfare function\" in the context of hyperplane\u0000arrangements. Using this, he proved a generalized Arrow's Impossibility Theorem\u0000using combinatorial arguments. This paper provides another proof of this\u0000generalized Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, using the idea of algebraic\u0000topology.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informativeness and Trust in Bayesian Persuasion 贝叶斯说服中的知情度和信任度
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-25 DOI: arxiv-2408.13822
Reema Deori, Ankur A. Kulkarni
{"title":"Informativeness and Trust in Bayesian Persuasion","authors":"Reema Deori, Ankur A. Kulkarni","doi":"arxiv-2408.13822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.13822","url":null,"abstract":"A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular\u0000action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent\u0000that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to\u0000ask, what makes the agent trust the persuader's suggestion? We study a Bayesian\u0000persuasion interaction between a sender and a receiver where the sender has\u0000access to private information and the receiver attempts to recover this\u0000information from messages sent by the sender. The sender crafts these messages\u0000in an attempt to maximize its utility which depends on the source symbol and\u0000the symbol recovered by the receiver. Our goal is to characterize the\u0000textit{Stackelberg game value}, and the amount of true information revealed by\u0000the sender during persuasion. We find that the SGV is given by the optimal\u0000value of a textit{linear program} on probability distributions constrained by\u0000certain textit{trust constraints}. These constraints encode that any signal in\u0000a persuasion strategy must contain more truth than untruth and thus impose a\u0000fundamental bound on the extent of obfuscation a sender can perform. We define\u0000textit{informativeness} of the sender as the minimum expected number of\u0000symbols truthfully revealed by the sender in any accumulation point of a\u0000sequence of $varepsilon$-equilibrium persuasion strategies, and show that it\u0000is given by another linear program. Informativeness is a fundamental bound on\u0000the amount of information the sender must reveal to persuade a receiver. Closed\u0000form expressions for the SGV and the informativeness are presented for\u0000structured utility functions. This work generalizes our previous work where the\u0000sender and the receiver were constrained to play only deterministic strategies\u0000and a similar notion of informativeness was characterized. Comparisons between\u0000the previous and current notions are discussed.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信