{"title":"稳健性","authors":"Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel","doi":"arxiv-2408.16898","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The maxmin approach to distributional robustness evaluates each mechanism\naccording to its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We\npropose a refinement: the guarantee must be approximately satisfied at priors\nnear the ambiguity set (in the weak topology). We call such a guarantee robust.\nThe payoff guarantees from some maxmin-optimal mechanisms in the literature are\nnot robust. We show, however, that over certain standard ambiguity sets (such\nas continuous moment sets), every mechanism's payoff guarantee is robust. We\ngive a behavioral characterization of our refined robustness notion by imposing\na new continuity axiom on maxmin preferences.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Robust Robustness\",\"authors\":\"Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2408.16898\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The maxmin approach to distributional robustness evaluates each mechanism\\naccording to its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We\\npropose a refinement: the guarantee must be approximately satisfied at priors\\nnear the ambiguity set (in the weak topology). We call such a guarantee robust.\\nThe payoff guarantees from some maxmin-optimal mechanisms in the literature are\\nnot robust. We show, however, that over certain standard ambiguity sets (such\\nas continuous moment sets), every mechanism's payoff guarantee is robust. We\\ngive a behavioral characterization of our refined robustness notion by imposing\\na new continuity axiom on maxmin preferences.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501188,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.16898\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.16898","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The maxmin approach to distributional robustness evaluates each mechanism
according to its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We
propose a refinement: the guarantee must be approximately satisfied at priors
near the ambiguity set (in the weak topology). We call such a guarantee robust.
The payoff guarantees from some maxmin-optimal mechanisms in the literature are
not robust. We show, however, that over certain standard ambiguity sets (such
as continuous moment sets), every mechanism's payoff guarantee is robust. We
give a behavioral characterization of our refined robustness notion by imposing
a new continuity axiom on maxmin preferences.