利用网络效应实现数字内容货币化：机制设计方法

arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI:arxiv-2408.15196

Vincent Meisner, Pascal Pillath

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们设计了一种利润最大化机制，用于销售一种具有网络效应的可排除的非竞争性商品。买方具有异质的私人价值，这些价值取决于有多少人也在消费该商品。我们描述了一种算法的特点，该算法可以在占优策略中实现最优分配。我们将我们的见解应用于数字内容创作，并能合理解释该行业中货币化方案的特点，如自愿捐款、社区补贴和独家出价。

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Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach

We design the profit-maximizing mechanism to sell an excludable and non-rival good with network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. We characterize an algorithm that implements the optimal allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights to digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in monetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions, community subsidies, and exclusivity bids.

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来源期刊

arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics

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