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Formal insurance and altruism networks 正规保险和利他主义网络
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103335
{"title":"Formal insurance and altruism networks","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103335","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103335","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study how altruism networks affect the demand for formal insurance. Agents with CARA utilities are connected through a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to a common shock and to a large individual shock, generating heterogeneous damages. Agents can buy formal insurance to cover the common shock, up to a coverage cap. We find that <em>ex-post</em> altruistic transfers induce interdependence in <em>ex-ante</em> formal insurance decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance game and show that agents act as if they are trying to maximize the expected utility of a representative agent with average damages. Altruism thus tends to increase demand of low-damage agents and to decrease demand of high-damage agents. Its aggregate impact depends on the interplay between demand homogenization, the zero lower bound and the coverage cap. We find that aggregate demand is higher with altruism than without altruism at low prices and lower at high prices. Nash equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824000841/pdfft?md5=eea8398e3d665eda1d5f53baf2c56a52&pid=1-s2.0-S0304387824000841-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141622234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Elite persistence in Sierra Leone: What can names tell us? 塞拉利昂的精英持续存在：名字能告诉我们什么？
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103333
{"title":"Elite persistence in Sierra Leone: What can names tell us?","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103333","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103333","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Is elite persistence weaker in Africa than in other parts of the world, given historical barriers to intergenerational inheritance of status, such as limited private property rights and frequent economic and political crises? In the absence of linked intergenerational data, we use name analysis to address this question. Using surnames associated with two Sierra Leonean elites, Krio descendants of settlers and members of chiefly lineages, we measure elite persistence in politics, education and business since 1960. Both groups were highly overrepresented in elite positions at independence, and remain overrepresented today. Benchmarking our results against other countries shows that Sierra Leone's educational elites are as persistent as elsewhere, but elite persistence in the political sphere is lower than in the United Kingdom, our main comparator. We also show marked path dependence: chiefly descendants remain more overrepresented in politics and mining, while the Krio are highly over-represented in education and the professions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387824000828/pdfft?md5=90ba4bd75546f585b3f770302d18c6ac&pid=1-s2.0-S0304387824000828-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141704996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How distortive are turnover taxes? Evidence from China 营业税有多大扭曲作用？来自中国的证据
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103332
Jing Xing , Katarzyna Bilicka , Xipei Hou , Sepideh Raei
{"title":"How distortive are turnover taxes? Evidence from China","authors":"Jing Xing ,&nbsp;Katarzyna Bilicka ,&nbsp;Xipei Hou ,&nbsp;Sepideh Raei","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103332","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the impact of tax cascading on upstream and downstream firms. As a natural experiment, we explore a reform that replaced turnover taxes with value-added taxes for service industries in China, which effectively removed tax cascading. We find a relative increase in sales, R&amp;D investment, and employment for affected service firms. These changes are mainly driven by increased outsourcing from manufacturing firms, and are unlikely to be caused by changes in firms’ tax burden or output prices. Our study provides new evidence on how taxation affects supplier networks and firm performance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141539844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
College opportunity and teen fertility: Evidence from Ser Pilo Paga in Colombia 大学机会与青少年生育率：来自哥伦比亚 Ser Pilo Paga 的证据
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103321
Michael D. Bloem , Jesús Villero
{"title":"College opportunity and teen fertility: Evidence from Ser Pilo Paga in Colombia","authors":"Michael D. Bloem ,&nbsp;Jesús Villero","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103321","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effects of an increase in post-secondary educational opportunities on teen fertility by exploiting policy-induced variation from <em>Ser Pilo Paga</em> (SPP), a generous college financial aid program in Colombia that dramatically expanded college opportunities for low-income students. Our preferred empirical approach uses a triple difference design that leverages variation in the share of female students eligible for the program across municipalities and the fact that the introduction of SPP should not affect the education and fertility decisions of older women not targeted by the program. We find that after the introduction of SPP, fertility rates for women aged 15–19 years old decreased in more affected municipalities by about 6 percent relative to less affected municipalities. This effect accounts for approximately one-fourth of the overall decrease in teen fertility observed in the years following the program’s announcement. Our results suggest that increasing economic opportunities through expanding college access can contribute to lowering teen fertility rates.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141595017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Faster, taller, better: Transit improvements and land use policies 更快、更高、更好：改善交通和土地使用政策
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103322
Liming Chen , Rana Hasan , Yi Jiang , Andrii Parkhomenko
{"title":"Faster, taller, better: Transit improvements and land use policies","authors":"Liming Chen ,&nbsp;Rana Hasan ,&nbsp;Yi Jiang ,&nbsp;Andrii Parkhomenko","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103322","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the interaction between transit improvements and land use policies. Bengaluru, one of India’s largest cities, inaugurated a metro system in 2011 but has extremely low building heights, even near metro stations. We build a rich dataset and a quantitative spatial model in which heterogeneous workers choose among different commuting modes. We find that the metro increases citywide output and welfare, even net of costs. However, the net gains are several times larger with transit-oriented development (TOD), <em>i.e.</em>, when height limits are relaxed near stations. Moreover, TOD and the construction of the metro are complementary policies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141439123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The long-run costs of highly competitive exams for government jobs 竞争激烈的政府职位考试的长期成本
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103331
Kunal Mangal
{"title":"The long-run costs of highly competitive exams for government jobs","authors":"Kunal Mangal","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103331","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Public sector recruitment exams can be highly competitive. Does this competition encourage candidates to develop generalizable skills, or do investments in exam preparation burden candidates who fail to get selected? I address this question by studying the impact of a partial public sector hiring freeze in the state of Tamil Nadu, India on male college graduates. The hiring freeze eliminated 86% of the usual vacancies. This increased the applicant-to-vacancy ratio for the remaining posts. Cohorts that were exposed to the hiring freeze delayed full-time employment, most likely in order to invest more time in exam preparation. A decade after the hiring freeze ended, the affected cohorts demonstrate a lower earning capacity, have delayed household formation, and appear more likely to remain unemployed. Together, these results suggest that highly competitive exams encourage candidates to make investments that are ultimately unproductive.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141595016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Spatial inefficiencies in Africa’s trade network 非洲贸易网络的空间效率低下问题
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103319
Tilman Graff
{"title":"Spatial inefficiencies in Africa’s trade network","authors":"Tilman Graff","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103319","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I assess the efficiency of transport networks for every country in Africa. Using spatial data from various sources, I simulate trade flows over more than 70,000 links covering the entire continent. I maximise over the space of networks and find the optimal road system for every African state. My simulations predict that Africa would gain 1.3% of total welfare from reorganising its national road systems, and 0.8% from optimally expanding it by a tenth. I then construct a dataset of local network inefficiency and find that colonial infrastructure projects significantly skew trade networks towards a sub-optimal equilibrium today. I find suggestive evidence that regional favouritism played a role sustaining these imbalances.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141434381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How important are matching frictions in the labor market? Experimental & non-experimental evidence from a large Indian firm 劳动力市场中的匹配摩擦有多重要？来自一家印度大型企业的实验和非实验证据
IF 5.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103330
Abhijit V. Banerjee , Gaurav Chiplunkar
{"title":"How important are matching frictions in the labor market? Experimental & non-experimental evidence from a large Indian firm","authors":"Abhijit V. Banerjee ,&nbsp;Gaurav Chiplunkar","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103330","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103330","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides evidence of matching frictions in the Indian labor market. Using several methods to elicit genuine preferences of job-seekers over jobs, we show that: (a) there is substantial variation in job-seekers preferences over the same jobs; and (b) placement officers, responsible for placing job-seekers in jobs, have poor knowledge of it. Providing placement offers with this information improves matching of job-seekers to interviews, even after taking into account redistribution of jobs across job-seekers. Treated job-seekers get more preferred jobs and retain them in the short run (three months), but not in the longer run (six months).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141391513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In-group competition for incentives 组内竞争激励
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320
Michael Olabisi , Mywish Maredia , Jiawen Liu , Toyin Ajibade , Hakeem Ajeigbe
{"title":"In-group competition for incentives","authors":"Michael Olabisi ,&nbsp;Mywish Maredia ,&nbsp;Jiawen Liu ,&nbsp;Toyin Ajibade ,&nbsp;Hakeem Ajeigbe","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How can one motivate field staff to meet activity goals on time? Can introducing competition within groups motivate workers to meet goals faster than simply setting targets for workers? We conducted an experiment that assigned temporary field workers for a mobile app registration project into two treatment groups: field workers pursuing individual goals versus competing for a shared group-goal. We measure whether field workers reached their goal, the time to reach the goal, and the number of registered users per field worker. Our model suggests that field workers complete tasks more quickly with in-group competitive targets compared to individual targets. In line with this prediction, we observed that in-group competition led to an increased number of registrations and faster target achievement. Although the effects do not significantly vary by gender, the competition treatment proved more effective for employed individuals, those with less experience, and those with higher ability.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141413805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Altruism in governance: Insights from randomized training for Pakistan's junior ministers 治理中的利他主义：巴基斯坦初级部长随机培训的启示
IF 5 1区 经济学
Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103317
Sultan Mehmood , Shaheen Naseer , Daniel L. Chen
{"title":"Altruism in governance: Insights from randomized training for Pakistan's junior ministers","authors":"Sultan Mehmood ,&nbsp;Shaheen Naseer ,&nbsp;Daniel L. Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Randomizing different schools of thought in training altruism finds that training junior deputy ministers in the utility of empathy renders at least a 0.4 standard deviation increase in altruism. Treated ministers increased their perspective-taking: blood donations doubled, but only when blood banks requested their exact blood type. Perspective-taking in strategic dilemmas improved. Field measures such as orphanage visits and volunteering in impoverished schools also increased, as did their test scores in teamwork assessments in policy scenarios. Overall, our results underscore that the utility of empathy can be a parsimonious foundation for the formation of prosociality, even impacting the behavior of adults in the field.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141286031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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