{"title":"Using computerized information to enforce VAT: Evidence from Pakistan","authors":"Jawad Shah","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103595","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I test the efficacy of VAT’s in-built third-party information trail, together with electronic filing, to deter tax evasion in a low state capacity environment. Using a reform which utilizes information beyond the VAT trail and authorizes a computerized risk analysis system to accept or reject tax credits in real time, my difference-in-differences estimates show that claims declined by 50%. Based on firm heterogeneity, the response ranges from 30%–90%. Approximately 10% of treated firms were fake, created for missing trader fraud. The lower bound estimate of increase in net VAT collection at the country level is 10%. I find that traditional VAT enforcement mechanisms of cross-matching, audit and recovery fail to deter evasion in developing countries but a risk-based real-time enforcement system is effective.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"178 ","pages":"Article 103595"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Development Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387825001464","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I test the efficacy of VAT’s in-built third-party information trail, together with electronic filing, to deter tax evasion in a low state capacity environment. Using a reform which utilizes information beyond the VAT trail and authorizes a computerized risk analysis system to accept or reject tax credits in real time, my difference-in-differences estimates show that claims declined by 50%. Based on firm heterogeneity, the response ranges from 30%–90%. Approximately 10% of treated firms were fake, created for missing trader fraud. The lower bound estimate of increase in net VAT collection at the country level is 10%. I find that traditional VAT enforcement mechanisms of cross-matching, audit and recovery fail to deter evasion in developing countries but a risk-based real-time enforcement system is effective.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.