{"title":"利用计算机信息强制执行增值税:来自巴基斯坦的证据","authors":"Jawad Shah","doi":"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103595","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I test the efficacy of VAT’s in-built third-party information trail, together with electronic filing, to deter tax evasion in a low state capacity environment. Using a reform which utilizes information beyond the VAT trail and authorizes a computerized risk analysis system to accept or reject tax credits in real time, my difference-in-differences estimates show that claims declined by 50%. Based on firm heterogeneity, the response ranges from 30%–90%. Approximately 10% of treated firms were fake, created for missing trader fraud. The lower bound estimate of increase in net VAT collection at the country level is 10%. I find that traditional VAT enforcement mechanisms of cross-matching, audit and recovery fail to deter evasion in developing countries but a risk-based real-time enforcement system is effective.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48418,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Development Economics","volume":"178 ","pages":"Article 103595"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Using computerized information to enforce VAT: Evidence from Pakistan\",\"authors\":\"Jawad Shah\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103595\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>I test the efficacy of VAT’s in-built third-party information trail, together with electronic filing, to deter tax evasion in a low state capacity environment. Using a reform which utilizes information beyond the VAT trail and authorizes a computerized risk analysis system to accept or reject tax credits in real time, my difference-in-differences estimates show that claims declined by 50%. Based on firm heterogeneity, the response ranges from 30%–90%. Approximately 10% of treated firms were fake, created for missing trader fraud. The lower bound estimate of increase in net VAT collection at the country level is 10%. I find that traditional VAT enforcement mechanisms of cross-matching, audit and recovery fail to deter evasion in developing countries but a risk-based real-time enforcement system is effective.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48418,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Development Economics\",\"volume\":\"178 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103595\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Development Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387825001464\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Development Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387825001464","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Using computerized information to enforce VAT: Evidence from Pakistan
I test the efficacy of VAT’s in-built third-party information trail, together with electronic filing, to deter tax evasion in a low state capacity environment. Using a reform which utilizes information beyond the VAT trail and authorizes a computerized risk analysis system to accept or reject tax credits in real time, my difference-in-differences estimates show that claims declined by 50%. Based on firm heterogeneity, the response ranges from 30%–90%. Approximately 10% of treated firms were fake, created for missing trader fraud. The lower bound estimate of increase in net VAT collection at the country level is 10%. I find that traditional VAT enforcement mechanisms of cross-matching, audit and recovery fail to deter evasion in developing countries but a risk-based real-time enforcement system is effective.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.