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Dynamic consistency in games without expected utility 没有预期效用的游戏动态一致性
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106067
Andrés Perea
{"title":"Dynamic consistency in games without expected utility","authors":"Andrés Perea","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106067","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106067","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Within dynamic games we are interested in conditions on the players' preferences that imply <em>dynamic consistency</em> and the existence of <em>sequentially optimal strategies</em>. The latter means that the strategy is optimal at each of the player's information sets, given his beliefs there. To explore these properties we assume, following <span><span>Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003)</span></span> and <span><span>Perea (2025a)</span></span>, that every player holds a <em>conditional preference relation</em> – a mapping that assigns to every probabilistic belief about the opponents' strategies a preference relation over his own strategies. We identify sets of very basic conditions on the conditional preference relations that guarantee dynamic consistency and the existence of sequentially optimal strategies, respectively. These conditions are implied by, but are much weaker than, assuming expected utility. Moreover, it is shown that non-expected utility is compatible with dynamic consistency and consequentialism in our framework.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106067"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144926092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information agreements 信息协议
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068
Kemal Kıvanç Aköz , Arseniy Samsonov
{"title":"Information agreements","authors":"Kemal Kıvanç Aköz ,&nbsp;Arseniy Samsonov","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structure but are independent of the prior beliefs in some cases. We analyze Pareto efficient information structures in two applications: selection environments, where the receiver picks the best agent, and the bargaining between a retailer platform and a regulator on consumer privacy regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144903699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A dynamic Roy model of academic specialization 罗伊的动态学术专业化模型
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106077
Titan Alon , Daniel Fershtman
{"title":"A dynamic Roy model of academic specialization","authors":"Titan Alon ,&nbsp;Daniel Fershtman","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106077","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106077","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper generalizes the canonical model of human capital accumulation through schooling to endogenize the process of academic specialization. It provides the solution to a class of dynamic investment problems with switching and stopping under sequential uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, the model's optimal policy has a particularly simple form that can be reduced to the comparison of independent indices. The optimal policy implies that schooling should begin with a period of general education, common to all students, followed by a period of gradual academic specialization before graduation. At the microeconomic level, it is consistent with the dynamics of student course taking observed in the data and the outcomes of educational interventions studied in the literature. At the macroeconomic level, its predictions are consistent with models of how education should adapt to changes in the speed and scope of technological change in labor markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106077"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans 通货膨胀计划的声誉和可信度
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106062
Rumen Kostadinov , Francisco Roldán
{"title":"Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans","authors":"Rumen Kostadinov ,&nbsp;Francisco Roldán","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106062","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106062","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal design of inflation targets by a planner who lacks commitment and exerts imperfect control over inflation. By comparing realized inflation to the targets, the public forms beliefs about the government's commitment. Such reputation is valuable as it helps curb inflation expectations. However, plans that are more tempting to break lead to faster reputational losses in the ensuing equilibrium. The planner's optimal announcement balances low inflation promises with incentives to enhance credibility. We find that, despite the absence of private sources of inflation inertia, a gradual disinflation is preferred even in the zero-reputation limit.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106062"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144865207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure 自发歧视与内生信息披露
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106076
Arno Apffelstaedt
{"title":"Spontaneous discrimination with endogenous information disclosure","authors":"Arno Apffelstaedt","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106076","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106076","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I introduce endogenous information disclosure into a model of “spontaneous discrimination” à la <span><span>Peski and Szentes (2013)</span></span>. Individuals in a finite population repeatedly decide whether to engage in profitable interactions with a randomly assigned or chosen partner. Each individual has a fixed physical and a dynamic social color. Social color conveys information about the colors of past partners—but only if that information is disclosed by the decision maker or a random observer. I characterize conditions under which endogenous disclosure supports inefficient equilibria where individuals discriminate by conditioning interactions on the (payoff-irrelevant) colors of potential partners. The analysis shows how competition for being selected as partner interacts with discriminatory norms to create strict incentives for information disclosure, thereby sustaining discrimination that would otherwise break down.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106076"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144922530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social learning through coarse signals of others' actions 通过他人行为的粗糙信号进行社会学习
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106066
Wenji Xu
{"title":"Social learning through coarse signals of others' actions","authors":"Wenji Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106066","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106066","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies a sequential social learning model in which agents learn about an underlying state from others' actions. Unlike classic models, we consider a setting where agents may observe coarse signals of past actions. We identify a simple, necessary, and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning, called <em>separability</em>, which depends on both the information environment and the payoff structure. A necessary condition for separability is “unbounded beliefs” which requires agents' private information to generate strong evidence of the true state, even if only with small probabilities. We also identify conditions on the information environment alone that guarantee separability for all payoff structures. These conditions include unbounded beliefs and a new condition on agents' signals of others' actions, termed <em>double thresholds</em>. Without double thresholds, learning can be confounded so that agents always choose different actions with positive probabilities and never reach a consensus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106066"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Biased mediation: Selection and effectiveness 偏倚调解：选择与有效性
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106069
Jin Yeub Kim , Jong Jae Lee
{"title":"Biased mediation: Selection and effectiveness","authors":"Jin Yeub Kim ,&nbsp;Jong Jae Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106069","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106069","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a theory of mediator selection in conflicts that compares biased and unbiased mediation. We characterize optimal mechanisms used by biased mediators when they are selected into mediation, and determine when and how parties in dispute accept a biased mediator in equilibrium. We find that when asymmetric information is significant, parties accept biased mediation as long as the degree of mediator bias is not too strong. Biased mediators care more about the payoffs of their favored party. Nevertheless, we find that biased mediators can be equally effective in promoting peace as the unbiased mediator. This is because biased mediators use recommendation strategies that allocate more shares of resource to their favored party while providing a higher chance of peaceful settlement to a weaker type of their disfavored party.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106069"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144902660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monopoly pricing with optimal information 具有最优信息的垄断定价
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106052
Guilherme Carmona, Krittanai Laohakunakorn
{"title":"Monopoly pricing with optimal information","authors":"Guilherme Carmona,&nbsp;Krittanai Laohakunakorn","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106052","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106052","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze a monopoly pricing model where information about the buyer's valuation is endogenous. Before the seller sets a price, both the buyer and the seller receive private signals that may be informative about the buyer's valuation. The joint distribution of these signals, as a function of the valuation, is optimally chosen by the players. In general, players have conflicting incentives over the provision of information. As a modelling device, we assume that an aggregation function determines the information structure from the choices of the players, and we characterize the pure strategy equilibrium payoffs for a natural class of aggregation functions. Every equilibrium payoff can be achieved by an information structure that is the result of the seller trying to make both players uninformed while the buyer tries to learn about his valuation. Price discrimination is limited to the seller setting different prices for informed vs uninformed buyers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106052"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144572434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Undominated monopoly regulation 不受支配的垄断管制
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106049
Debasis Mishra , Sanket Patil
{"title":"Undominated monopoly regulation","authors":"Debasis Mishra ,&nbsp;Sanket Patil","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106049","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106049","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. A mechanism is undominated if no other mechanism gives the regulator a strictly higher payoff at some marginal cost of the monopolist without lowering the regulator's payoff at other costs. We show that an undominated mechanism has a quantity floor: whenever the monopolist is allowed to operate, it produces above a threshold quantity. Moreover, the regulator's operation decision is stochastic only if the monopolist produces at the quantity floor. We provide a near-complete characterization of the set of undominated mechanisms and use it to (a) derive a max-min optimal regulatory mechanism, (b) provide a foundation for deterministic mechanisms, and (c) show that the efficient mechanism is dominated.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106049"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144491489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stationary altruism and time consistency 静止利他主义和时间一致性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038
Antoine Billot , Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Stationary altruism and time consistency","authors":"Antoine Billot ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study social intertemporal preferences constructed through the aggregation of individual preferences that differ in both time discounting and instantaneous utility. We introduce weakened forms of the Pareto condition under which the social discount and instantaneous utility functions are weighted averages of their individual counterparts. We show that if individuals are time-consistent, then society can only preserve this property without falling into dictatorship by applying the condition to comparisons involving only two periods. In such cases, the social discount factor is a weighted average of individual discount factors. When the condition is applied to longer consumption horizons, the resulting social preferences display decreasing impatience. Moreover, the longer the comparison horizon, the stronger the society's preference for patience over time becomes, under mild conditions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106038"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144221901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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