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Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions 多单位拍卖中模糊性对收益的影响
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996
Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu
{"title":"Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions","authors":"Daniel Bougt ,&nbsp;Gagan Ghosh ,&nbsp;Heng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105996"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143687244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection 市场紧度在逆向选择竞争均衡中的筛选作用
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995
Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li
{"title":"The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection","authors":"Hung-Chi Chang ,&nbsp;Yiting Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption relies on explicitly considering the screening role of market tightness. The assumption can be weakened further if we assume that agents' matching probability strictly increases in market tightness. In addition to providing theoretical insights, we study examples to demonstrate how generalized sorting facilitates the study of market imperfections under search and informational frictions. In our examples, indivisibility, price limits, and the minimum wage violate GSW's sorting assumption but remain tractable under generalized sorting. Thus, an additional contribution of this paper is the expansion in applicability of GSW's approach.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105995"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Offshoring and the distribution of skills 离岸外包和技能分配
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994
Hiroshi Goto , Yan Ma , Nobuyuki Takeuchi
{"title":"Offshoring and the distribution of skills","authors":"Hiroshi Goto ,&nbsp;Yan Ma ,&nbsp;Nobuyuki Takeuchi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price if the gap between the median skill levels of the two countries is sufficiently large. Finally, we demonstrate that an individual's industry of employment primarily determines how they are affected by trade in final goods, whereas their occupation (tasks) shapes how they are impacted by offshoring.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105994"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143706398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information orders in screening problems 筛选中的信息顺序问题
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993
Andreas Asseyer
{"title":"Information orders in screening problems","authors":"Andreas Asseyer","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105993"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143579206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fragility under joint financing: The (moral) hazards of diversification 联合融资下的脆弱性：多元化的（道德）风险
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105990
Piero Gottardi , Vincent Maurin , Cyril Monnet
{"title":"Fragility under joint financing: The (moral) hazards of diversification","authors":"Piero Gottardi ,&nbsp;Vincent Maurin ,&nbsp;Cyril Monnet","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105990","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105990","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of investment growth on firms' incentives under moral hazard. Adding value-increasing, but risky projects to a firm's portfolio can weaken incentives for safer ones, even when returns are independent. While the firm diversifies its sources of income, this risk contamination channel can increase its fragility. Such fragility is exacerbated in the presence of news about the value of investments. Firms can mitigate these effects by selecting safer new investments at the expense of value creation. Our model thus predicts that large firms or merged firms may be riskier or less productive than smaller firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105990"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143563834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information and policing 资讯及警务
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105992
Shota Ichihashi
{"title":"Information and policing","authors":"Shota Ichihashi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105992","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105992","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Agents decide whether to commit a crime based on their private types, which capture their heterogeneous returns from a crime. The police have information about these types. The police search agents, without commitment, to detect crime subject to a search capacity constraint. The deterrent effect of policing is lost when the police have full information about agents' types. The crime-minimizing information structure prevents the police from identifying agents who face high returns from a crime, while still allowing them to adjust their search intensities based on the types of agents who face low returns from a crime. The result extends to the case in which the police endogenously choose search capacity at a cost.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105992"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143563833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic consistency and rectangularity for the smooth ambiguity model 光滑模糊模型的动态一致性和矩形性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105991
Andrei Savochkin , Alexander Shklyaev , Alexey Galatenko
{"title":"Dynamic consistency and rectangularity for the smooth ambiguity model","authors":"Andrei Savochkin ,&nbsp;Alexander Shklyaev ,&nbsp;Alexey Galatenko","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105991","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105991","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the Smooth Ambiguity decision criterion in the dynamic setting to understand when it can satisfy the Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism properties. These properties allow one to rewrite the decision criterion recursively and solve for optimal decisions by Dynamic Programming. Our result characterizes the possibility of having these properties through a condition that resembles <span><span>Epstein and Schneider</span></span>'s (<span><span>2003</span></span>) rectangularity condition for the maxmin model. At the same time, we show that Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism can be achieved for Smooth Ambiguity preferences in a narrower set of scenarios than one would hope for.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105991"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143600777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Feedback design in games with ambiguity-averse players 厌恶模糊性玩家的游戏反馈设计
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105987
Frederic Koessler , Marieke Pahlke
{"title":"Feedback design in games with ambiguity-averse players","authors":"Frederic Koessler ,&nbsp;Marieke Pahlke","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105987","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105987","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use a notion of maxmin self-confirming equilibrium (MSCE) to study the design of players' information feedback about others' behavior in simultaneous-move games with ambiguity-averse players. Coarse feedback shapes strategic uncertainty and can, therefore, modify players' equilibrium strategies in an advantageous way. We characterize MSCE and study the equilibrium implications of coarse feedback in various classes of games. We show how feedback should be optimally designed to improve contributions in generalized volunteer dilemmas and public good games with strategic substitutes, strategic complements, or more general production functions. We also study games with negative externalities and strategic substitutes, such as Cournot oligopolies. In general, perfect and no feedback are suboptimal. Some results are extended to <em>α</em>-maxmin preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105987"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143453038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal monetary policy in production networks with distortions 扭曲生产网络中的最优货币政策
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105979
Zhihao Xu , Changhua Yu
{"title":"Optimal monetary policy in production networks with distortions","authors":"Zhihao Xu ,&nbsp;Changhua Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105979","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105979","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a multisector economy with input-output linkages and distortions. Our model incorporates both the supply side and the demand side effects of monetary policy. We derive a tractable sufficient statistic for the supply side effect, which comprises two reallocation channels resulting from substitution between sectoral products for households and firms, and substitution between labor and intermediate inputs in production. The optimal monetary policy induces an inflation bias that stems from both an aggregate wedge and the supply side effect, and targets an inflation index by assigning higher weights to (i) larger sectors, (ii) sectors with stickier prices, and (iii) sectors with less distortions. Our quantitative results indicate that production networks play a crucial role in generating both the supply and demand effects of monetary policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105979"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143429756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
General equilibrium with unhedgeable fundamentals and heterogeneous agents 基本面不可对冲和异质代理人的一般均衡
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-02-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105978
Paolo Guasoni , Marko Hans Weber
{"title":"General equilibrium with unhedgeable fundamentals and heterogeneous agents","authors":"Paolo Guasoni ,&nbsp;Marko Hans Weber","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105978","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105978","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the implications of unhedgeable fundamental risk, combined with agents' heterogeneous preferences and wealth allocations, on dynamic asset pricing and portfolio choice. We solve in closed form a continuous-time general equilibrium model in which unhedgeable fundamental risk affects aggregate consumption dynamics, rendering the market incomplete. Several long-lived agents with heterogeneous risk-aversion and time-preference make consumption and investment decisions, trading risky assets and borrowing from and lending to each other. We find that a representative agent does not exist. Agents trade assets dynamically. Their consumption rates depend on the history of unhedgeable shocks. Consumption volatility is higher for agents with preferences and wealth allocations deviating more from the average. Unhedgeable risk reduces the equilibrium interest rate only through agents' heterogeneity and proportionally to the cross-sectional variance of agents' preferences and allocations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"224 ","pages":"Article 105978"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143387330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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