筛选中的信息顺序问题

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993

Andreas Asseyer

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究筛选模型中的信息顺序。我用一个关于代理类型的信号修正了一个一般的筛选问题。对于委托人和代理人的任何偏好，当且仅当信号按布莱克威尔的顺序排列时，委托人更喜欢一个信号而不是另一个信号。在标准正则性条件下，提出了一种新的信息顺序——危险率扩散（HRS）顺序，其特征是由主体对信号进行鲁棒排序。我将HRS订单与众所周知的信息订单联系起来，并为在HRS订单中增加或减少本金支付以外的其他福利措施提供了充分的条件。

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Information orders in screening problems

This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.