发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields 投资组合选择与结算摩擦：一种内生便利收益理论
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106166
Javier Bianchi , Saki Bigio
{"title":"Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields","authors":"Javier Bianchi ,&nbsp;Saki Bigio","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106166","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106166","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study settlement frictions that arise from the need to finance negative balances through an over-the-counter (OTC) market. We derive a closed-form expression for the endogenous convenience yield and show how it can be incorporated into a canonical portfolio problem. Using this framework, we examine how shifts in settlement frictions affect liquidity premia, the volume of overnight funding, the dispersion of market rates, and optimal portfolio allocations. From a normative perspective, we show that in the competitive equilibrium, investors may either over- or under-invest in liquid assets; moreover, both higher risk aversion and tighter aggregate liquidity increase the likelihood of under-accumulation. Finally, we apply our framework to monetary policy implementation, showing that the transition from an abundant to a merely ample reserve regime can produce sharp movements in interbank rates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147859444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cautiousness when experts disagree 专家意见不一致时要谨慎
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106181
Antoine Bommier , Adrien Fabre , Arnaud Goussebaïle , Daniel Heyen
{"title":"Cautiousness when experts disagree","authors":"Antoine Bommier ,&nbsp;Adrien Fabre ,&nbsp;Arnaud Goussebaïle ,&nbsp;Daniel Heyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106181","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106181","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may want to be cautious and prefer alternatives that have expert consensus over those that do not. Existing models of decision making under expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of cautiousness to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture cautiousness in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts’ beliefs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106181"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147804111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered 自我保险与市场保险可替代性：对既定原则的再思考
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106180
Jean-Marc Bourgeon , Pierre Picard
{"title":"Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered","authors":"Jean-Marc Bourgeon ,&nbsp;Pierre Picard","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106180","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106180","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the interaction between self-insurance and market insurance when accident losses are multivalued. We show that self-insurance and market insurance may be complementary when self-insurance expenses do not affect much the probability distribution of large losses and the loading factor is high. This contrasts sharply with the conclusion of Ehrlich and Becker (1972) who establish the substitutability between self-insurance and market insurance when the cost of an accident is single-valued.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147804084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Meta-preference, endogenous preference formation and dynamic choice 元偏好、内生偏好形成与动态选择
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106184
Takashi Hayashi
{"title":"Meta-preference, endogenous preference formation and dynamic choice","authors":"Takashi Hayashi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106184","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106184","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a dynamic environment, this paper builds a model of layers of meta-preferences which explains endogenous preference formation as a consequence of subjective judgment by the decision maker’s current self about welfare of her successor self. The model allows us to describe how much the decision maker is willing to pay for investment in her preference formation. The paper provides a recursive utility representation of the layers of meta-preferences and applies it to the problems of investment in time preference and taste.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106184"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147859443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828] “债务到期与企业创新”理论述评[J]。经济学。理论218 (2024)105828]
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106167
Sonny Biswas , Kostas Koufopoulos , Thi Mai Nguyen
{"title":"Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828]","authors":"Sonny Biswas ,&nbsp;Kostas Koufopoulos ,&nbsp;Thi Mai Nguyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106167","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106167","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We reconsider the incomplete contracting framework of Mitkov (2024) in which an entrepreneur seeks funding for a project and can privately choose its type. Renegotiation is permitted at an intermediate date. We characterize the conditions under which pay-for-failure is necessary to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the value-maximizing innovative project. When pay-for-failure is necessary, we generalize Mitkov (2024)’s results by showing that callable long-term debt can replicate the state-contingent contract for a strictly positive measure of parameters, and hence, we provide a rationale for its use in this setting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106167"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147804083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning about ambiguous long-term prospects 了解模棱两可的长期前景
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-04-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106147
Hongseok Choi
{"title":"Learning about ambiguous long-term prospects","authors":"Hongseok Choi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106147","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106147","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates whether ambiguity afflicting the long-run rate of growth fades away in a nonexchangeable environment (time-varying instantaneous expected growth rate). Two types of ambiguity are considered: static (multiple priors) and dynamic (multiple laws of motion). In the absence of dynamic ambiguity, likelihood-based learning resolves static ambiguity. In the presence of dynamic ambiguity, on the other hand, likelihood-based learning fails. In this case, static ambiguity fades away if the agent incorporates into the objective criteria (likelihood) her subjective criteria (penalty proportional to the Kullback–Leibler divergence). The model of learning is also applied to portfolio choice.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147600453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information design for social learning on a recommendation platform 基于推荐平台的社会化学习信息设计
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106150
Chen Lyu
{"title":"Information design for social learning on a recommendation platform","authors":"Chen Lyu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106150","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106150","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A recommendation platform sequentially collects information about a new product revealed from past consumer trials, and uses it to better guide later consumers. Because consumers do not internalize the value of information they bring to others, their incentive for trying out the product can be socially insufficient. Given such a challenge, I study how the platform can improve social welfare by designing its recommendation policy. In a model with binary product quality and general trial-generated signals, I find that the optimal design features a U-shaped sequence of recommendation standards over the product’s life, and the optimal learning dynamic can involve temporary suspensions following negative consumer feedback when the product is young. Comparative statics and extensions explore how the optimal design adjusts under changes in trial informativeness, consumer arrival rates, and platform bias. My analysis also illustrates the usefulness of a Lagrangian duality approach for dynamic information design.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106150"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147397126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions 当速度是最重要的：易腐物品拍卖
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106149
Isa Hafalir , Onur Kesten , Katerina Sherstyuk , Cong Tao
{"title":"When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions","authors":"Isa Hafalir ,&nbsp;Onur Kesten ,&nbsp;Katerina Sherstyuk ,&nbsp;Cong Tao","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106149","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106149","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a remarkable auction used in several fish markets around the world, notably in Honolulu and Sydney, whereby high-quality fish are sold fast through a hybrid auction that combines the Dutch and the English formats in one auction. Speedy sales are of essence for these perishable goods. Our theoretical model incorporating “time costs” demonstrates that such Honolulu-Sydney auction is preferred by the auctioneer over the Dutch auction when there are few bidders or when bidders have high time costs. Our laboratory experiments confirm that with a small number of bidders, Honolulu-Sydney auctions are significantly faster than Dutch auctions. Bidders overbid in Dutch, benefiting the auctioneer, while the Honolulu-Sydney format benefits bidders more compared to Dutch across all treatments. We further observe bidder attempts to tacitly lower prices in Honolulu-Sydney auctions, substantiating existing concerns about pricing in some fish markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147397127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sequential network design 顺序网络设计
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145
Yang Sun , Wei Zhao , Junjie Zhou
{"title":"Sequential network design","authors":"Yang Sun ,&nbsp;Wei Zhao ,&nbsp;Junjie Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine dynamic network formation from a centralized perspective, where a forward-looking social planner constructs one new link between previously unconnected nodes in each period. The planner derives utility from the discounted sum of benefits generated throughout the formation process. Assuming the planner’s instantaneous utility depends monotonically on the aggregate number of walks of various lengths within the network, we derive several key results. First, it is always optimal to form a nested split graph at each stage, regardless of the discount function. Second, when the planner is sufficiently myopic, the optimal strategy uniquely generates a quasi-complete graph in each period. This finding provides a micro-foundation for quasi-complete graphs as natural outcomes of greedy network formation processes. Finally, we extend our analysis to weighted networks, demonstrating the robustness of our results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106145"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146078399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nominal rigidities, rational inattention, and the optimal monetary policy 名义刚性、理性忽视和最优货币政策
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106129
Shengliang Ou , Penghui Yin , Donghai Zhang , Renbin Zhang
{"title":"Nominal rigidities, rational inattention, and the optimal monetary policy","authors":"Shengliang Ou ,&nbsp;Penghui Yin ,&nbsp;Donghai Zhang ,&nbsp;Renbin Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106129","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106129","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Optimal monetary policy has traditionally assigned <em>greater</em> importance to stabilizing prices in sectors with stickier prices, based on multi-sector models assuming full information or exogenous information frictions. This paper challenges the prevailing policy prescription by introducing rational inattention with endogenous information acquisition. Interestingly, the optimal policy assigns a <em>smaller</em> weight to sectors with stickier prices when the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently high. This counterintuitive result arises from the <em>endogenous</em> relationship between firms’ attention and nominal rigidities: firms in sectors with more flexible prices pay less attention to macroeconomic conditions. We provide empirical evidence supporting this mechanism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145877090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书