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Expectation and confusion: Evidence and theory 期望与困惑：证据与理论
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106189
Heng Chen , Yicheng Liu
{"title":"Expectation and confusion: Evidence and theory","authors":"Heng Chen ,&nbsp;Yicheng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106189","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106189","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we characterize a forecasting model where forecasters cannot perfectly distinguish between the two persistent components (trends and cycles) in a dynamic setting. In this model, forecasters jointly update their beliefs about the two components: noisy information about one component is used to update beliefs about the other component. We present diagnostic empirical facts on forecasting behaviors and show that these facts are consistent with our model’s predictions while contradicting those of existing models in the expectation formation literature. To validate our model, we exploit the Federal Reserve’s 2012 adoption of explicit inflation targeting as a policy shock. Structural estimation reveals that this policy change altered the underlying data-generation process, and the corresponding changes in forecasting behavior indeed align with our model’s predictions. Finally, we revisit the standard Forecast Error-Forecast Revision regression approach in this literature. We examine its robustness within our enriched framework and reveal that trend-cycle confusion can interact with behavioral bias and generate horizon-dependent overreaction patterns documented in empirical studies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106189"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148187001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity 信用、金钱和（伪）匿名
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106202
Remo Isch-Taudien , Fabienne Schneider
{"title":"Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity","authors":"Remo Isch-Taudien ,&nbsp;Fabienne Schneider","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106202","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106202","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study <em>pseudonymity</em>—an information regime where agents’ histories are perfectly observable, but linked only to pseudonyms rather than to true identities. A key feature is that agents may open and use multiple pseudonyms simultaneously. In a tractable environment with limited commitment, we characterize the set of stationary credit equilibria under pseudonymity, showing that it forms a strict non-empty subset of equilibria attainable under a <em>no anonymity</em> regime, where histories are publicly linked to true identities. Moreover, money is always essential under pseudonymity, yet cannot co-exist with credit. Finally, imposing optimal fees on pseudonym creation generally raises welfare, whereas making pseudonyms tradable never does.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148187036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Covert learning and disclosure 隐性学习与披露
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179
Matteo Escudé
{"title":"Covert learning and disclosure","authors":"Matteo Escudé","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender’s ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably <em>worsening the meaning</em>of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties to characterize the sense in which the sender benefits from her claims being <em>more verifiable</em>, showing that this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I identify sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148186997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning through imitation: An experiment 通过模仿学习：一个实验
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106203
Marina Agranov , Gabriel Lopez-Moctezuma , Philipp Strack , Omer Tamuz
{"title":"Learning through imitation: An experiment","authors":"Marina Agranov ,&nbsp;Gabriel Lopez-Moctezuma ,&nbsp;Philipp Strack ,&nbsp;Omer Tamuz","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106203","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106203","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no additional payoff-relevant information, and despite potential herd behavior, free riding and information overload issues, observing and imitating the actions of others leads agents to take the optimal action more often in the second setting. We also investigate the effect of group size, as well as a setting in which agents observe private data and others’ actions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106203"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148186999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Which experiments test a model? 哪些实验可以检验一个模型？
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106191
Paul J. Healy , Greg Leo
{"title":"Which experiments test a model?","authors":"Paul J. Healy ,&nbsp;Greg Leo","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106191","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106191","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Given a model of preferences, what choice data or experiment is sufficient to definitively test whether a subject is consistent with the model or to classify them into some “type” within the model? We characterize all experiments that test or classify a given model using a novel graph-theoretic construction: the labeled permutohedron. We show how these results can be used to identify the smallest experiments that achieve a particular goal.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148187002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments 灵活的不可观察投资的拖延问题
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106205
Daniel Krähmer
{"title":"The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments","authors":"Daniel Krähmer","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106205","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106205","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. I show that, unlike in the well-understood case with linear costs, if investment costs are strictly convex, the buyer’s equilibrium utility is strictly positive and total welfare is strictly higher than when valuations are public information, thus alleviating the severity of the hold-up problem. In fact, when costs are mean-based or display decreasing risk, the equilibrium outcome might be efficient.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106205"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148186998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hard Problem and the Tyranny of the Losers 难题和失败者的暴政
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106204
Stan Cheung, Marco Mariotti, Roberto Veneziani
{"title":"The Hard Problem and the Tyranny of the Losers","authors":"Stan Cheung,&nbsp;Marco Mariotti,&nbsp;Roberto Veneziani","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106204","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106204","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A <em>Hard Problem</em> is a collective choice problem in which the only feasible alternatives to the status quo consist of a welfare gain to some people (the <em>Winners</em>) and a welfare loss to others (the <em>Losers</em>). These problems are typical in a number of settings, such as climate action, anti-trust regulation, and tax design. We study how to make collective choices when faced with Hard Problems. We find that a relatively weak fairness requirement, which we call <em>Expansion Solidarity</em>, necessarily leads to a dictatorship of the Losers, no matter how small their number. Even one single Loser must be given the power to veto any departure from the status quo, regardless of the number of Winners, how large the gains, how small the loss, or how extreme the welfare inequalities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106204"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148187000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reference-dependent choice bracketing 依赖于参考的选择括号
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106207
Pauline Vorjohann
{"title":"Reference-dependent choice bracketing","authors":"Pauline Vorjohann","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106207","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106207","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I derive a model of choice bracketing from two behavioral axioms in an expected utility framework. The first behavioral axiom establishes a link between narrow bracketing and correlation neglect. The second behavioral axiom identifies the reference point as the connector between broad and narrow preferences. The narrow bracketer is characterized by an inability to process changes from the reference point in different dimensions simultaneously. As a result, her tradeoffs between dimensions are distorted. She evaluates dimensions in isolation, implying a disregard for how they affect one another. When evaluating a dimension, she remains anchored to the reference point in the respective other dimension. This implies that she mistakenly perceives preference interactions in relation to the reference point. I present applications to portfolio choice, consumption bundle choice, and an exchange economy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 106207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148187003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields 投资组合选择与结算摩擦：一种内生便利收益理论
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106166
Javier Bianchi , Saki Bigio
{"title":"Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields","authors":"Javier Bianchi ,&nbsp;Saki Bigio","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106166","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106166","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study settlement frictions that arise from the need to finance negative balances through an over-the-counter (OTC) market. We derive a closed-form expression for the endogenous convenience yield and show how it can be incorporated into a canonical portfolio problem. Using this framework, we examine how shifts in settlement frictions affect liquidity premia, the volume of overnight funding, the dispersion of market rates, and optimal portfolio allocations. From a normative perspective, we show that in the competitive equilibrium, investors may either over- or under-invest in liquid assets; moreover, both higher risk aversion and tighter aggregate liquidity increase the likelihood of under-accumulation. Finally, we apply our framework to monetary policy implementation, showing that the transition from an abundant to a merely ample reserve regime can produce sharp movements in interbank rates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147859444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cautiousness when experts disagree 专家意见不一致时要谨慎
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2026-05-01 Epub Date: 2026-04-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106181
Antoine Bommier , Adrien Fabre , Arnaud Goussebaïle , Daniel Heyen
{"title":"Cautiousness when experts disagree","authors":"Antoine Bommier ,&nbsp;Adrien Fabre ,&nbsp;Arnaud Goussebaïle ,&nbsp;Daniel Heyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106181","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2026.106181","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may want to be cautious and prefer alternatives that have expert consensus over those that do not. Existing models of decision making under expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of cautiousness to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture cautiousness in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts’ beliefs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"234 ","pages":"Article 106181"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2026-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147804111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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