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The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption 富人不像你我：收入、价格分散和消费
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046
Eungsik Kim , Stephen Spear
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引用次数: 0
Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers 永远不要说永远：最优排除和保留价格与基于预期的损失规避买家
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045
Benjamin Balzer , Antonio Rosato
{"title":"Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers","authors":"Benjamin Balzer ,&nbsp;Antonio Rosato","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show that public reserve prices are not optimal as the seller can earn a higher revenue with mechanisms that better leverage the “attachment effect”. We discuss two such mechanisms: i) an auction with a secret and random reserve price, and ii) a mechanism where an auction with a public reserve price is followed by a negotiation if the reserve price is not met. Both of these mechanisms expose more bidder types to the attachment effect, thereby increasing bids and ultimately revenue.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Meritocracy versus diversity 精英统治vs多样性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047
Kenzo Imamura
{"title":"Meritocracy versus diversity","authors":"Kenzo Imamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A college or firm makes admissions or hiring decisions for which each candidate is characterized by priority ranking and type, which might depend on race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The admissions or hiring committee faces a tradeoff between meritocracy and diversity: Although a <em>merit-first choice rule</em> might admit candidates of the same type, a <em>diversity-first choice rule</em> might be unfair because of priority violations. To formalize this tradeoff, we introduce a measure of meritocracy and a measure of diversity for choice rules. A choice rule that uses both <em>reserves</em> and <em>quotas</em> can be regarded as a compromise and as a generalization of the two extreme rules. The first result is comparative statics for this class of choice rules: We demonstrate that as parameters change and the choice rule becomes more meritorious, the rule also becomes less diverse. The second result is a characterization of the choice rule, which might help admissions or hiring committees to formulate their policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106047"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144322198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stationary altruism and time consistency 静止利他主义和时间一致性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038
Antoine Billot , Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Stationary altruism and time consistency","authors":"Antoine Billot ,&nbsp;Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106038","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study social intertemporal preferences constructed through the aggregation of individual preferences that differ in both time discounting and instantaneous utility. We introduce weakened forms of the Pareto condition under which the social discount and instantaneous utility functions are weighted averages of their individual counterparts. We show that if individuals are time-consistent, then society can only preserve this property without falling into dictatorship by applying the condition to comparisons involving only two periods. In such cases, the social discount factor is a weighted average of individual discount factors. When the condition is applied to longer consumption horizons, the resulting social preferences display decreasing impatience. Moreover, the longer the comparison horizon, the stronger the society's preference for patience over time becomes, under mild conditions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106038"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144221901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital 新的生育模式：人力资本与物质资本的作用
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037
Nicolas Abad , Johanna Etner , Natacha Raffin , Thomas Seegmuller
{"title":"New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital","authors":"Nicolas Abad ,&nbsp;Johanna Etner ,&nbsp;Natacha Raffin ,&nbsp;Thomas Seegmuller","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital, and two reproductive periods to explore how fertility decisions may differ in response to economic incentives in early and late adulthood. In particular, we analyze the interplay between fertility choices—related to career opportunities—and wages, and investigate the role played by work experience and investment in both types of capital. We show that young adults postpone parenthood above a certain wage threshold and that late fertility increases with human capital. The long run trend is either to converge to a low productivity equilibrium, involving high early fertility, investment in physical capital and relatively low income, or to a high productivity equilibrium, where households postpone parenthood to invest in their human capital and work experience, with higher late fertility and higher levels of income. A convergence to the latest state would explain the postponement of parenthood and the mitigation or slight reversal of fertility decrease in some European countries in recent decades.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106037"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144243324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129] “从Choquet到最大期望效用的模糊随机变量评估”[J]。经济学。理论192 (2021)105129]
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034
Tomasz Strzalecki , Juuso Toikka
{"title":"Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129]","authors":"Tomasz Strzalecki ,&nbsp;Juuso Toikka","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106034"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144240616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Personalized pricing, network effects, and commitment 个性化定价、网络效应和承诺
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106036
Yan Xiong , Liyan Yang
{"title":"Personalized pricing, network effects, and commitment","authors":"Yan Xiong ,&nbsp;Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106036","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106036","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Big data and data technology have facilitated the widespread adoption of personalized pricing practices. While price personalization enables firms to extract greater rent from consumers, it often reduces price transparency, which can negatively impact firm profits in situations involving consumer coordination. In such contexts, a firm's commitment to pricing strategies can become essential for restoring profitability. We explore several commitment devices available to firms and discuss their implications. These devices include delegating pricing decisions to a manager who prioritizes consumer surplus, leveraging existing networks as signals for later consumers or to build reputation, and implementing uniform pricing or price caps in response to regulatory restrictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106036"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144190243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting 具有未知折扣的跨期分配
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106030
Justin Burkett , Kyle Woodward
{"title":"Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting","authors":"Justin Burkett ,&nbsp;Kyle Woodward","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106030","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106030","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the problem faced by a durable-good monopolist who can allocate a single good at any time, but is uncertain of a buyer's values and temporal preferences for receiving the good. We derive conditions under which it is optimal for the monopolist to ignore the uncertainty about the buyer's discount factor and allocate immediately via a single first-period price. Under one condition, the seller optimally offers a single first-period price if she would weakly raise this price upon learning that the buyer cannot be too impatient (<span><span>Corollary 2</span></span>). A related condition states that the single first-period price is optimal if buyer types with higher discount factors have stochastically higher values (<span><span>Corollary 3</span></span>). These conditions also apply when sellers face ambiguity regarding the buyer's discount factor. Our results provide a novel justification for ignoring heterogeneous discount factors when the seller is incompletely informed about buyer's temporal preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106030"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144170720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beliefs and the net worth trap 信念和净值陷阱
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106033
Goutham Gopalakrishna , Seung Joo Lee , Theofanis Papamichalis
{"title":"Beliefs and the net worth trap","authors":"Goutham Gopalakrishna ,&nbsp;Seung Joo Lee ,&nbsp;Theofanis Papamichalis","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106033","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106033","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a tractable framework to explore how beliefs about long-term economic growth shape macroeconomic and financial stability. By modeling belief distortions among productive capital users, we provide an analytical characterization of a novel phenomenon termed the “net worth trap”, wherein overly optimistic or pessimistic beliefs among productive agents prevent them from rebuilding wealth, causing permanent inefficiencies. A procyclical swing in beliefs reduces or exacerbates the instability, indicating that the type of belief when the economy is vulnerable has important consequences on financial stability and macroeconomic dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106033"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144139458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate payments: A Coase theorem 气候支付：一个科斯定理
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032
Prajit K. Dutta , Roy Radner
{"title":"Climate payments: A Coase theorem","authors":"Prajit K. Dutta ,&nbsp;Roy Radner","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Climate-related payments have emerged as a contentious and complex issue in climate negotiations. Major questions remain on how this will be done and how effective payments will be. The paper studies transfers under a variety of timing possibilities. It is shown that outcome-contingent payments always lead to efficiency and a particular alignment of transfer and emission timings implies that the efficient equilibrium is the only equilibrium even when the horizon is infinite. The theoretical novelty is a multi-lateral Coase Theorem in a dynamic model. The policy prescription is for an enhanced role for transfers to solve the climate problem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106032"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144204702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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