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A tractable group all-pay auction 一个易于处理的团体全付拍卖
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016
Stefano Barbieri , Iryna Topolyan
{"title":"A tractable group all-pay auction","authors":"Stefano Barbieri ,&nbsp;Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution of the correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects of value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game in which players engage in costless <em>unmediated</em> preplay communication.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106016"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143895423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic information design in an entry game 入门博弈中的动态信息设计
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018
Xuelin Li , Martin Szydlowski , Fangyuan Yu
{"title":"Dynamic information design in an entry game","authors":"Xuelin Li ,&nbsp;Martin Szydlowski ,&nbsp;Fangyuan Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor and then to reveal positive information to attract the adopter. We interpret the optimal policy as inducing hype cycles, and show that hype cycles are more severe in stagnant industries or with higher threat of competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106018"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143903889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economics of career concerns in teamwork 团队合作中的职业经济学
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106017
Huseyin Yildirim
{"title":"The economics of career concerns in teamwork","authors":"Huseyin Yildirim","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106017","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines incentives in teams of career-concerned members, where effort and talent can be substitutes (<span><span>Holmström, 1999</span></span>) or complements (<span><span>Dewatripont et al., 1999</span></span>). It is shown that the degree of effort-talent complementarity determines which team member exerts more effort and thus gains or loses more reputation following team performance. The paper argues that organizations can boost incentives by promoting concern for collective reputation. Strategies to achieve this include facilitating team cooperation, limiting external competition for individual talent, and positively sorting talent into teams. The paper further explores optimal performance ratings to motivate teams when the organization has easy access to individual outputs. These ratings generally deviate from team output and may even induce competition, depending on the signal-to-noise ratio and talent correlations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106017"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143887604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Universal social welfare orderings and risk 普遍的社会福利秩序和风险
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106014
Marc Fleurbaey , Stéphane Zuber
{"title":"Universal social welfare orderings and risk","authors":"Marc Fleurbaey ,&nbsp;Stéphane Zuber","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106014","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How can social prospects be evaluated and compared when there may be a risk on i) the actual allocations that people will receive, ii) the existence of these future people, and iii) their preferences? This paper investigates this question, which can arise when considering policies, such as climate policy, that affect people who do not yet exist. We start from the observation that there is no social ordering that meets minimal requirements of fairness, social rationality, and respect for people's ex ante preferences. We explore three ways around this impossibility. First, if we drop the ex ante Pareto requirement, we can obtain fair ex post criteria that take an (arbitrary) expected utility of an equally-distributed equivalent level of well-being. Second, if the social ordering is not an expected utility, we can obtain fair ex ante criteria that evaluate uncertain individual prospects with a certainty-equivalent measure of well-being. Third, if we accept that interpersonal comparisons rely on VNM utility functions even in absence of risk, we can construct expected utility social orderings that satisfy a version of Pareto ex ante.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106014"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143891460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning underspecified models 学习未明确的模型
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106015
In-Koo Cho , Jonathan Libgober
{"title":"Learning underspecified models","authors":"In-Koo Cho ,&nbsp;Jonathan Libgober","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106015","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines learning dynamics under non-parametric model uncertainty. We choose the monopolistic profit maximization problem (<span><span>Myerson (1981)</span></span>) as our laboratory. We consider a monopolist who chooses a learning algorithm to select a price following a history, facing non-parametric model uncertainty about the probability distribution of the buyer's valuation and bearing the computational cost. We posit that the monopolist has a lexicographic preference over profit and computational complexity while seeking an <em>ϵ dominant</em> algorithm that prescribes an <em>ϵ</em> best response against any cumulative distribution function of the buyer's valuation for any small <span><math><mi>ϵ</mi><mo>&gt;</mo><mn>0</mn></math></span>. We construct a simplest <em>ϵ</em> dominant algorithm among all dominant algorithms when the distribution of the buyer's valuation satisfies the increasing hazard rate property. Our algorithm recursively estimates two parameters of the distribution, even if the actual distribution is parameterized by many more variables. The monopolist chooses a misspecified model to save computational cost while learning the true optimal decision uniformly over the set of feasible distributions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106015"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143882168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Discrete/continuous choice models and representative consumer theory 离散/连续选择模型和代表性消费者理论
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012
Jean-Pierre Dubé , Joonhwi Joo , Kyeongbae Kim
{"title":"Discrete/continuous choice models and representative consumer theory","authors":"Jean-Pierre Dubé ,&nbsp;Joonhwi Joo ,&nbsp;Kyeongbae Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of <em>discrete/continuous choice,</em> additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findings should be of interest to the literature in macro, trade, industrial organization, labor, and ideal price index measurement that use representative consumer models, such as CES and its variants. Our results generalize such representative consumer formulations to the broad, empirically-relevant class of models of behavior that are routinely used in the discrete/continuous choice analysis of micro data, including specifications that do not suffer from the IIA property and that allow for heterogeneous consumer preferences and incomes. These flexible discrete/continuous choice formulations also overcome many of the known limitations of CES and its variants for equilibrium prices and markups, trade liberalization effects and welfare analysis. We also discuss quasi-linear integrability in the case where products are indivisible and integrability no longer holds. If we relax homotheticity, we find that integrability generically fails to hold except in the special case of IIA preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106012"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143855387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Business cycles fluctuations in three-sector intertemporal equilibrium models 三部门时际均衡模型中的商业周期波动
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106010
Kazuo Nishimura , Florian Pelgrin , Alain Venditti
{"title":"Business cycles fluctuations in three-sector intertemporal equilibrium models","authors":"Kazuo Nishimura ,&nbsp;Florian Pelgrin ,&nbsp;Alain Venditti","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces a novel mechanism driving endogenous business cycle fluctuations within a frictionless three-sector intertemporal equilibrium model. We emphasize the critical role of consumer preferences as a primary driver of cyclical dynamics by considering a consumption bundle composed of a pure consumption good and a mixed consumption-investment good that simultaneously serves as both a final consumption good and a capital-accumulating investment good. Endogenous fluctuations naturally arise from sectoral capital intensity differences, an intertemporal consumption trade-off between the two goods, or the interaction of both mechanisms. We offer a detailed characterization of the economy's dynamics, identifying the Hopf bifurcation conditions that trigger persistent cyclical behavior. Additionally, we explore the periodicity of the resulting limit cycles, providing insights into how shifts in preferences and sectoral complementarities can generate self-sustained macroeconomic fluctuations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106010"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143855388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds 最小传染集：度分布界
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106009
Itai Arieli , Galit Ashkenazi-Golan , Ron Peretz , Yevgeny Tsodikovich
{"title":"Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds","authors":"Itai Arieli ,&nbsp;Galit Ashkenazi-Golan ,&nbsp;Ron Peretz ,&nbsp;Yevgeny Tsodikovich","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Agents in a network adopt an innovation if a certain fraction of their neighbors has already done so. We study the minimal contagious set size required for a successful innovation adoption by the entire population, and provide upper and lower bounds on it. Since detailed information about the network structure is often unavailable, we study bounds that depend only on the degree distribution of the network – a simple statistic of the network topology. Moreover, as our bounds are robust to small changes in the degree distribution, they also apply to large networks for which the degree distribution can only be approximated. Applying our bounds to growing networks shows that the minimal contagious set size is linear in the number of nodes. Consequently, for outside of knife-edge cases (such as the star-shaped network), contagion cannot be achieved without seeding a significant fraction of the population. This finding highlights the resilience of networks and demonstrates a high penetration cost in the corresponding markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106009"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143829002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information 有限信息下的多单位拍卖竞价
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008
Bernhard Kasberger , Kyle Woodward
{"title":"Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information","authors":"Bernhard Kasberger ,&nbsp;Kyle Woodward","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multi-unit auctions frequently take place in environments with limited information, such as in new markets and under volatile macroeconomic conditions. We characterize optimal prior-free bids in such auctions; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. We show that optimal bids are readily computable in this environment despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information. In the pay-as-bid auction the prior-free bid is unique; in the uniform-price auction the prior-free bid is unique if the bidder is allowed to determine the quantities for which they bid, as in many practical applications. We compare prior-free bids and auction outcomes across auction formats; while outcome comparisons are ambiguous, pay-as-bid auctions tend to generate greater revenue and welfare than uniform-price auctions when bidders' values are dispersed. We also compare outcomes in limited-information environments to outcomes in high-information environments, modeled as bidders playing Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and show that Bayes-Nash outcomes dominate prior-free outcomes when the auction is competitive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106008"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143858944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An alternative approach for nonparametric analysis of random utility models 一种随机实用新型非参数分析的替代方法
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998
Christopher Turansick
{"title":"An alternative approach for nonparametric analysis of random utility models","authors":"Christopher Turansick","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We readdress the problem of nonparametric statistical testing of random utility models proposed in <span><span>Kitamura and Stoye (2018)</span></span>. Although their test is elegant, it is subject to computational constraints which leaves execution of the test infeasible in many applications. We note that much of the computational burden in Kitamura and Stoye's test is due to their test defining a polyhedral cone through its vertices rather than its faces. We propose an alternative but equivalent hypothesis test for random utility models. This test relies on a series of equality and inequality constraints which defines the faces of the corresponding polyhedral cone. Building on our testing procedure, we develop a novel axiomatization of the random utility model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 105998"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143816241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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