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Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights 具有分配目标的市场设计：效率、激励和产权
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099
Isa E. Hafalir , Fuhito Kojima , M. Bumin Yenmez
{"title":"Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights","authors":"Isa E. Hafalir ,&nbsp;Fuhito Kojima ,&nbsp;M. Bumin Yenmez","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M<sup>♮</sup>-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M<sup>♮</sup>-concave.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mixture-betweenness: Uncertainty and commitment 介于两者之间：不确定性和承诺
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106097
Fernando Payró
{"title":"Mixture-betweenness: Uncertainty and commitment","authors":"Fernando Payró","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops axiomatic models of preference under uncertainty and preference for commitment that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness, a weakening of the Independence axiom originally proposed by <span><span>Chew (1989)</span></span> and <span><span>Dekel (1986)</span></span>. A central contribution of the paper is a general representation theorem that can be applied across a wide range of domains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Auctions with tokens: Monetary policy as a mechanism design choice 代币拍卖：作为机制设计选择的货币政策
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106095
Andrea Canidio
{"title":"Auctions with tokens: Monetary policy as a mechanism design choice","authors":"Andrea Canidio","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106095","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106095","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the “virtual money” previously examined in mechanism design, such tokens can be saved and traded outside the mechanism. I show that the present-discounted value of expected revenues equals that of a conventional dollar auction, but revenues accrue earlier and are less volatile. The optimal monetary policy burns the tokens used for payment, a practice common in blockchain-based protocols. I also show that the same outcome can be reproduced in a dollar auction if the auctioneer issues a suitable dollar-denominated security. This equivalence breaks down with moral hazard and contracting frictions: with severe contracting frictions the token auction dominates, whereas with mild contracting frictions the dollar auction combined with a dollar-denominated financial instrument is preferred.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106095"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credible sets 可信的集
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098
Mert Kimya
{"title":"Credible sets","authors":"Mert Kimya","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A credible set is the set of stable states of an expectation satisfying internal and external stability as defined in <span><span>Dutta and Vohra (2017)</span></span>. We show that credible sets are characterized by two fundamental coalitional rationality axioms: basic coalitional rationality and farsighted rationality. Credible sets exist in a wide range of environments, including all finite games, and they provide a unifying framework for organizing prominent notions in the farsighted stability literature. Influential solution concepts such as the largest consistent set, the farsighted stable set, the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set, and the stable set when it does not suffer from the Harsanyi critique are all particular refinements of credible sets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106098"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods 对普通商品多单位拍卖的低效率进行量化
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094
Simon Essig Aberg , Brian Baisa
{"title":"Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods","authors":"Simon Essig Aberg ,&nbsp;Brian Baisa","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106094","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods in a private-value setting where bidders have multi-unit demand and non-negative wealth effects. When bidders have quasilinear preferences, the Vickrey auction implements an efficient outcome in dominant strategies. When bidders have positive wealth effects, recent impossibility results find that no auction implements an efficient outcome.</div><div>We quantify the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction and other multi-unit auctions when bidders have positive wealth effects. We measure an auction's worst-case inefficiency as the largest compensating variation associated with any Pareto improvement over an undominated auction outcome. We show that the Vickrey auction is ‘nearly’ efficient when the strength of bidder wealth effects is sufficiently small. This result follows because the set of undominated bids in the Vickrey auction collapses to truthfully reporting demand as bidder wealth effects become small. We also compare the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction with that of the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106094"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Learning under ambiguity: An experimental investigation 歧义下的学习：一项实验研究
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106093
M. Abdellaoui , B. Hill , E. Kemel , H. Maafi
{"title":"Learning under ambiguity: An experimental investigation","authors":"M. Abdellaoui ,&nbsp;B. Hill ,&nbsp;E. Kemel ,&nbsp;H. Maafi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106093","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106093","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate learning in ambiguous situations where subjects bet on a winning event whose probability depends on an unknown proportion of winning chips in an urn. Varying the number of draws prior to choice allows us to “scan” ambiguity attitudes across differing amounts of information. By separately eliciting posterior beliefs in addition to matching probabilities, we disentangle the impact of learning on ambiguity attitude from its impact on beliefs, including divergences from Bayesian update. Both “raw data” and smooth ambiguity model-based analyses show that learning affects ambiguity attitude in the direction of ambiguity neutrality. Moreover, at small sample sizes, the impact of these changes on preferences is comparable to that of the divergence from Bayesian update.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106093"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Targeting network intervention with social norm 以社会规范为目标的网络干预
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092
Dawen Meng
{"title":"Targeting network intervention with social norm","authors":"Dawen Meng","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper discusses a network game in a local-average setup, where players' payoffs depend on the social norms they confront. I focus on an optimal targeting intervention problem, where a planner aims to maximize social welfare by altering individual characteristics ex ante. First, I decompose orthogonally the optimal intervention into the eigenspaces of the social welfare matrix. In what follows, I present the limit forms of the optimal intervention as the budget approaches infinity or zero. I then identify the errors arising from approximating the optimal intervention by its various limit forms. Finally, this paper explores the intervention problem under incomplete information, where the planner switches from mean to variance intervention based on the comparison of their unit costs and the aggregate budget size.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106092"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment 信贷状况，通货膨胀和失业
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081
Chao Gu , Janet Hua Jiang , Liang Wang
{"title":"Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment","authors":"Chao Gu ,&nbsp;Janet Hua Jiang ,&nbsp;Liang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We construct a New Monetarist model with labor market search and identify two channels that affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages through bargaining because unemployed workers rely more heavily on cash transactions and suffer more from inflation than employed workers; this wage-bargaining channel generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve without assuming nominal rigidity. Second, inflation increases firms' financing costs, which discourages job creation and increases unemployment; this cash-financing channel leads to an upward-sloping Phillips curve. We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy. The improvement in firm financing conditions can explain the observation that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve has switched from positive to negative post-2000.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106081"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145120488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability 错误指定的学习和进化稳定性
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082
Kevin He , Jonathan Libgober
{"title":"Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability","authors":"Kevin He ,&nbsp;Jonathan Libgober","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide conditions under which the correctly specified resident model can only be destabilized by misspecified entrant models that contain multiple feasible beliefs (that is, entrant models that permit inference). We also show that entrants may do well in their matches against the residents only when the entrant population is large, due to the endogeneity of misspecified beliefs. Applications include the selection of demand-elasticity misperception in Cournot duopoly and the emergence of analogy-based reasoning in centipede games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106082"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145108580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bad reputation due to incompetent expert 不称职的专家造成了坏名声
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106080
Weicheng Min
{"title":"Bad reputation due to incompetent expert","authors":"Weicheng Min","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106080","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106080","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of a recommender's career concerns on the long-term relationship with a consumer when the recommender has a private type in his expertise. An informed type's expertise is valuable for the consumer's ongoing purchasing decisions, whereas an uninformed type lacks such expertise and thus cannot mimic the informed type. I show that the <em>uninformed</em> type's reputation concerns never benefit the consumer and may lead to a complete market breakdown when they are sufficiently strong. Moreover, this “bad reputation” phenomenon arises even if the informed type is myopic and the consumer is long-lived. The analysis identifies the conditions under which this result holds and provides insights into the design of compensation schemes for recommenders.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106080"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145108579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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