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A model of rejection-based decision making 基于拒绝的决策模型
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-08-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106060
Bhavook Bhardwaj , Kriti Manocha
{"title":"A model of rejection-based decision making","authors":"Bhavook Bhardwaj ,&nbsp;Kriti Manocha","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106060","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces a model of decision making based on a procedure of <em>rejection</em>. Departing from the standard model of choice via preference maximization, the decision maker (DM) in our model rejects <em>minimal</em> alternatives from a menu according to a binary relation. We axiomatically study the correspondence of non-rejected alternatives with different rationality conditions on the underlying binary relation. We then generalize our model to study correspondences generated by an iterative procedure of rejection. It is observed that the classical rational choice model is a special case of this model, thus providing a procedural description of selecting the maximal set. We find that the rejection approach developed in this paper can also explain anomalies observed in decision theory, such as the <em>two-decoy effect</em> or the <em>two-compromise effect</em>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106060"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144770951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insider trading with penalties in continuous time 内幕交易与连续时间处罚
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106061
Umut Çetin
{"title":"Insider trading with penalties in continuous time","authors":"Umut Çetin","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106061","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106061","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper addresses the question of how insiders internalize the additional penalties to trade in a continuous time Kyle model. The penalties can be interpreted as non-adverse selection transaction costs or legal penalties due to illegal insider trading. The equilibrium is established for general asset distribution. In equilibrium, the insider does not disseminate her private information fully into the market prices. Moreover, she always trades a constant multiple of the discrepancy between her own valuation and her forecast of market price right before her private information becomes public. In the particular case of normally distributed asset value, the trades are split evenly over time for sufficiently large penalties, with trade size proportional to the return on the private signal. Although the noise traders lose less when penalties increase, the insider's total penalty in equilibrium is non-monotone since the insider trades little when the penalties surpasses the value of the private signal. As a result, a budget-constrained regulator runs an investigation only if the benefits of the investigation are sufficiently high. Moreover, the optimal penalty policy is reduced to choosing from one of two extremal penalty levels that correspond to high and low liquidity regimes. The optimal choice is determined by the amount of noise trading and the relative importance of price informativeness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106061"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144748958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasion without ex-post commitment 没有事后承诺的劝说
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058
Sophie Kreutzkamp , Yichuan Lou
{"title":"Persuasion without ex-post commitment","authors":"Sophie Kreutzkamp ,&nbsp;Yichuan Lou","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a persuasion model with limited commitment in which the sender can commit to a signal ex ante but not to truthful reporting ex post. Sender-optimal signals exploit a key trade-off: although better-quality information allows the sender to communicate more precisely, it adversely affects the credibility of his messages. Building on this observation, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the sender to strictly benefit from obtaining an imperfect signal. Under linear preferences, we show that sender-optimal signals can take on a bi-pooling structure; if preferences are also convex, bi-pooling becomes necessary. Finally, we provide a full characterization of sender-optimal signals for the popular uniform-quadratic specification, which we use to quantify and compare the value of commitments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106058"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144739638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations 具有延迟接受的市场设计：特征描述的配方
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057
Battal Doğan , Kenzo Imamura , M. Bumin Yenmez
{"title":"Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations","authors":"Battal Doğan ,&nbsp;Kenzo Imamura ,&nbsp;M. Bumin Yenmez","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In matching markets, policymakers often pursue complex distributional objectives, such as promoting diversity in student populations. To this end, they embed these objectives into the choice rules of institutions, such as schools, and implement the deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism based on those rules. Given the institutional choice rules, we introduce a method for characterizing the corresponding DA mechanism through the properties of these choice rules. Utilizing this method, we derive novel characterizations of DA mechanisms across various settings, including matching problems with enrollment guarantees and overlapping reserves—motivated by school choice in Chile—as well as environments with matroidal feasibility constraints or objectives. Our approach provides a unified framework for characterizing DA mechanisms that accommodate policy-relevant objectives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106057"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144739639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship 公共产品，社会选择，和林达尔- vcg关系
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106055
David Delacrétaz , Simon Loertscher , Claudio Mezzetti
{"title":"Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship","authors":"David Delacrétaz ,&nbsp;Simon Loertscher ,&nbsp;Claudio Mezzetti","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106055","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106055","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Lindahl prices, set by a fictitious auctioneer with full knowledge of values and costs, are a generalization of Walrasian prices. By making the efficient allocation utility- and profit-maximizing for all players, they induce an efficient outcome in a decentralized way even in the presence of public goods. We study a collective choice model with quasilinear utility, which encompasses the allocation of public and private goods as special cases. We show that each agent's most favorable Lindahl payment (the smallest Lindahl price for the efficient alternative) is equal to his VCG transfer while the firm's VCG transfer is equal to its most favorable Lindahl payment (the largest sum of Lindahl prices for the efficient alternative). Thus, the VCG mechanism incurs a deficit if and only if the set of vectors of the agents' Lindahl payments is multi-valued. Unlike Walrasian prices, Lindahl prices are not restricted to be anonymous or additive. This is the reason why, when considering the allocation of private goods, the agents' smallest Walrasian payments are at least as large as their most favorable Lindahl payments, and thus their VCG transfers. It is also why Lindahl prices always exist while Walrasian prices may not.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106055"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144721790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information requirements for mechanism design 机构设计的信息需求
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056
Richard P. McLean , Andrew Postlewaite
{"title":"Information requirements for mechanism design","authors":"Richard P. McLean ,&nbsp;Andrew Postlewaite","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Standard mechanism design begins with a statement of the problem, including knowledge on the designer's part about the distribution of the characteristics (preferences and information) of the participants who are to engage with the mechanism. There is a large literature on <em>robust</em> mechanism design, much of which aims to reduce the assumed information the designer has about the participants. In this paper we provide an auction mechanism for interdependent value problems that performs well when there are many buyers, even though there is no prior distribution over the accuracy of buyers' information on the part of the designer or the participants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106056"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144721789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public goods in networks: Comparative statics results 网络中的公共产品：比较统计结果
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106054
Sebastian Bervoets, Kohmei Makihara
{"title":"Public goods in networks: Comparative statics results","authors":"Sebastian Bervoets,&nbsp;Kohmei Makihara","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106054","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106054","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider public goods games with heterogeneous players interacting on a network and investigate how shocks to players' characteristics and changes in interaction patterns influence individual and total contributions. We introduce a linear system associated to the initial game, in which heterogeneity in players' characteristics is removed and interactions between players are reversed, and show that what matters in determining the effects of a shock on contributions is the sign of the coordinates of its unconstrained solution. When players are identical, we demonstrate that positive shocks on active players increase contributions, while positive shocks on strictly inactive players decrease them, contrary to intuition. We also identify a subset of players, called neutral players, who exert no influence on total contributions. Furthermore, we provide precise formulas for the change in total contributions following various types of shocks, and provide conditions to determine whether the shock will have positive or negative consequences on contributions. We show that these conditions always rely on the sign of the associated problem's unconstrained solution coordinates of the players impacted by the shock.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106054"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market versus optimum allocation in open economies 开放经济中的市场与最优配置
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106053
Peter H. Egger , Ruobing Huang
{"title":"Market versus optimum allocation in open economies","authors":"Peter H. Egger ,&nbsp;Ruobing Huang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106053","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106053","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A large body of theoretical and quantitative work concerns models of heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition. But most of it relies on strong assumptions regarding demand structure, firm-productivity distribution, and country heterogeneity. This paper studies a general-equilibrium model with directly explicitly additive preferences, non-specified productivity distributions, and asymmetric countries, for which much less is known. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium with a three-stage approach of analyzing competition intensities and wages. We then explore the market-allocation mechanism and provide a baseline comparison between the market and a utilitarian optimum from a global planner's perspective. We show that misallocation in open economies can be decomposed into two effects, driven by country asymmetry and the variable elasticity of substitution. We present two examples exhibiting constant and variable markups, respectively, to illustrate how to apply our general theorem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106053"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monopoly pricing with optimal information 具有最优信息的垄断定价
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106052
Guilherme Carmona, Krittanai Laohakunakorn
{"title":"Monopoly pricing with optimal information","authors":"Guilherme Carmona,&nbsp;Krittanai Laohakunakorn","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106052","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106052","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze a monopoly pricing model where information about the buyer's valuation is endogenous. Before the seller sets a price, both the buyer and the seller receive private signals that may be informative about the buyer's valuation. The joint distribution of these signals, as a function of the valuation, is optimally chosen by the players. In general, players have conflicting incentives over the provision of information. As a modelling device, we assume that an aggregation function determines the information structure from the choices of the players, and we characterize the pure strategy equilibrium payoffs for a natural class of aggregation functions. Every equilibrium payoff can be achieved by an information structure that is the result of the seller trying to make both players uninformed while the buyer tries to learn about his valuation. Price discrimination is limited to the seller setting different prices for informed vs uninformed buyers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106052"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144572434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unidirectional incentive compatibility 单向激励相容
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051
Daniel Krähmer , Roland Strausz
{"title":"Unidirectional incentive compatibility","authors":"Daniel Krähmer ,&nbsp;Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study unidirectional incentive compatibility which incentivizes truth-telling by an agent who can misrepresent private information in one direction only. In the canonical setting with quasi-linear preferences and continuous, one-dimensional private information, we show that unidirectional incentive compatibility imposes no restrictions on the allocation rule and revenue equivalence fails. Moreover, unidirectional incentive compatibility holds if and only if the change of the agent's information rent respects a lower bound based on the allocation rule's monotone envelope. With strong interdependent values or countervailing incentives, optimal screening contracts differ from optimal bidirectionally incentive compatible contracts, possibly displaying non-monotone allocations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106051"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144572433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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