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Personalized pricing, network effects, and commitment 个性化定价、网络效应和承诺
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106036
Yan Xiong , Liyan Yang
{"title":"Personalized pricing, network effects, and commitment","authors":"Yan Xiong ,&nbsp;Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106036","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106036","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Big data and data technology have facilitated the widespread adoption of personalized pricing practices. While price personalization enables firms to extract greater rent from consumers, it often reduces price transparency, which can negatively impact firm profits in situations involving consumer coordination. In such contexts, a firm's commitment to pricing strategies can become essential for restoring profitability. We explore several commitment devices available to firms and discuss their implications. These devices include delegating pricing decisions to a manager who prioritizes consumer surplus, leveraging existing networks as signals for later consumers or to build reputation, and implementing uniform pricing or price caps in response to regulatory restrictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106036"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144190243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intermediation as rent extraction 中介作为租金提取
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106029
Maryam Farboodi , Gregor Jarosch , Guido Menzio , Ursula Wiriadinata
{"title":"Intermediation as rent extraction","authors":"Maryam Farboodi ,&nbsp;Gregor Jarosch ,&nbsp;Guido Menzio ,&nbsp;Ursula Wiriadinata","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106029","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106029","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper shows that intermediation in asset markets may emerge exclusively because of rent extraction motives. Among dealers with heterogeneous bargaining skills, those with superior skills become intermediaries and constitute the core of the trading network, while those with inferior skills constitute the periphery. Intermediation is privately profitable because agents with superior bargaining skills can take positions and unwind them in the future at a better price than others could. Intermediation arises endogenously despite being socially worthless and the resources invested in bargaining skills are wasted. Using a dataset on the Indonesian interbank market, we document that prices vary with the centrality of buyers and sellers in a way that is uniquely consistent with our theory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106029"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144105084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting 具有未知折扣的跨期分配
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106030
Justin Burkett , Kyle Woodward
{"title":"Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting","authors":"Justin Burkett ,&nbsp;Kyle Woodward","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106030","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106030","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the problem faced by a durable-good monopolist who can allocate a single good at any time, but is uncertain of a buyer's values and temporal preferences for receiving the good. We derive conditions under which it is optimal for the monopolist to ignore the uncertainty about the buyer's discount factor and allocate immediately via a single first-period price. Under one condition, the seller optimally offers a single first-period price if she would weakly raise this price upon learning that the buyer cannot be too impatient (<span><span>Corollary 2</span></span>). A related condition states that the single first-period price is optimal if buyer types with higher discount factors have stochastically higher values (<span><span>Corollary 3</span></span>). These conditions also apply when sellers face ambiguity regarding the buyer's discount factor. Our results provide a novel justification for ignoring heterogeneous discount factors when the seller is incompletely informed about buyer's temporal preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106030"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144170720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two-player rationalizable implementation 合理的双人执行
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106031
Ritesh Jain , Ville Korpela , Michele Lombardi
{"title":"Two-player rationalizable implementation","authors":"Ritesh Jain ,&nbsp;Ville Korpela ,&nbsp;Michele Lombardi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106031","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106031","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies under complete information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106031"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144105085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overborrowing, underborrowing, and macroprudential policy 过度借贷、借贷不足与宏观审慎政策
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106019
Fernando Arce , Julien Bengui , Javier Bianchi
{"title":"Overborrowing, underborrowing, and macroprudential policy","authors":"Fernando Arce ,&nbsp;Julien Bengui ,&nbsp;Javier Bianchi","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106019","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106019","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with pecuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained-efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on the production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macroprudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In our quantitative analysis, macroprudential taxes on borrowing turn out to be larger when the government has access to ex-post stabilization policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106019"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143934874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beliefs and the net worth trap 信念和净值陷阱
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106033
Goutham Gopalakrishna , Seung Joo Lee , Theofanis Papamichalis
{"title":"Beliefs and the net worth trap","authors":"Goutham Gopalakrishna ,&nbsp;Seung Joo Lee ,&nbsp;Theofanis Papamichalis","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106033","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106033","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a tractable framework to explore how beliefs about long-term economic growth shape macroeconomic and financial stability. By modeling belief distortions among productive capital users, we provide an analytical characterization of a novel phenomenon termed the “net worth trap”, wherein overly optimistic or pessimistic beliefs among productive agents prevent them from rebuilding wealth, causing permanent inefficiencies. A procyclical swing in beliefs reduces or exacerbates the instability, indicating that the type of belief when the economy is vulnerable has important consequences on financial stability and macroeconomic dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106033"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144139458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information 有限信息下的多单位拍卖竞价
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008
Bernhard Kasberger , Kyle Woodward
{"title":"Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information","authors":"Bernhard Kasberger ,&nbsp;Kyle Woodward","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multi-unit auctions frequently take place in environments with limited information, such as in new markets and under volatile macroeconomic conditions. We characterize optimal prior-free bids in such auctions; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. We show that optimal bids are readily computable in this environment despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information. In the pay-as-bid auction the prior-free bid is unique; in the uniform-price auction the prior-free bid is unique if the bidder is allowed to determine the quantities for which they bid, as in many practical applications. We compare prior-free bids and auction outcomes across auction formats; while outcome comparisons are ambiguous, pay-as-bid auctions tend to generate greater revenue and welfare than uniform-price auctions when bidders' values are dispersed. We also compare outcomes in limited-information environments to outcomes in high-information environments, modeled as bidders playing Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and show that Bayes-Nash outcomes dominate prior-free outcomes when the auction is competitive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106008"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143858944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A tractable group all-pay auction 一个易于处理的团体全付拍卖
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016
Stefano Barbieri , Iryna Topolyan
{"title":"A tractable group all-pay auction","authors":"Stefano Barbieri ,&nbsp;Iryna Topolyan","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106016","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution of the correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects of value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without correlation devices as the equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game in which players engage in costless <em>unmediated</em> preplay communication.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106016"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143895423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Perverse ethical concerns: Misinformation and coordination 反常的伦理问题：错误信息和协调
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106011
Dongkyu Chang , Allen Vong
{"title":"Perverse ethical concerns: Misinformation and coordination","authors":"Dongkyu Chang ,&nbsp;Allen Vong","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a coordination game played by a large number of agents, who acquire private signals about a hidden state on a platform before choosing individual actions. The platform privately and imperfectly filters misinformation, improving the precision of these signals. We show that a platform with an ethical concern to proactively improve agents' welfare could perversely reduce their welfare by aggravating their disagreements about the state and in turn undermining coordination. We also show that misinformation regulations aimed at improving agents' welfare are effective if and only if their implementation is sufficiently aggressive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106011"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143916617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An alternative approach for nonparametric analysis of random utility models 一种随机实用新型非参数分析的替代方法
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998
Christopher Turansick
{"title":"An alternative approach for nonparametric analysis of random utility models","authors":"Christopher Turansick","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We readdress the problem of nonparametric statistical testing of random utility models proposed in <span><span>Kitamura and Stoye (2018)</span></span>. Although their test is elegant, it is subject to computational constraints which leaves execution of the test infeasible in many applications. We note that much of the computational burden in Kitamura and Stoye's test is due to their test defining a polyhedral cone through its vertices rather than its faces. We propose an alternative but equivalent hypothesis test for random utility models. This test relies on a series of equality and inequality constraints which defines the faces of the corresponding polyhedral cone. Building on our testing procedure, we develop a novel axiomatization of the random utility model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 105998"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143816241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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