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Integrability and identification in multinomial choice models 多项选择模型的可积性与辨识
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105938
Debopam Bhattacharya
{"title":"Integrability and identification in multinomial choice models","authors":"Debopam Bhattacharya","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105938","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105938","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>McFadden's random-utility model of multinomial choice has long been the workhorse of applied research. We establish shape-restrictions with respect to price and income which are necessary and sufficient for multinomial choice-probability functions to be rationalized via random-utility models with additive but nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity and general income-effects. Our proof is constructive, and facilitates nonparametric identification of preference-distributions without requiring identification-at-infinity type arguments. A corollary shows that symmetry, a key condition for previous rationalizability results, is equivalent to absence of income-effects. Our results imply theory-consistent nonparametric bounds for choice-probabilities on counterfactual budget-sets. They also apply to widely used random-coefficient models, upon conditioning on observable choice characteristics. The theory of partial differential equations plays a key role in our analysis.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"223 ","pages":"Article 105938"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Granular DeGroot dynamics – A model for robust naive learning in social networks 颗粒DeGroot动力学-一个在社会网络中鲁棒朴素学习的模型
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105952
Gideon Amir , Itai Arieli , Galit Ashkenazi-Golan , Ron Peretz
{"title":"Granular DeGroot dynamics – A model for robust naive learning in social networks","authors":"Gideon Amir ,&nbsp;Itai Arieli ,&nbsp;Galit Ashkenazi-Golan ,&nbsp;Ron Peretz","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105952","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105952","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a model of opinion exchange in social networks where a state of the world is realized and every agent receives a zero-mean noisy signal of the realized state. <span><span>Golub and Jackson (2010)</span></span> have shown that under <span><span>DeGroot (1974)</span></span> dynamics agents reach a consensus that is close to the state of the world when the network is large. The DeGroot dynamics, however, is highly non-robust and the presence of a single “adversarial agent” that does not adhere to the updating rule can sway the public consensus to any other value. We introduce a variant of DeGroot dynamics that we call <span><math><mfrac><mrow><mn>1</mn></mrow><mrow><mi>m</mi></mrow></mfrac></math></span><em>-DeGroot</em>. <span><math><mfrac><mrow><mn>1</mn></mrow><mrow><mi>m</mi></mrow></mfrac></math></span>-DeGroot dynamics approximates standard DeGroot dynamics to the nearest rational number with <em>m</em> as its denominator and like the DeGroot dynamics it is Markovian and stationary. We show that in contrast to standard DeGroot dynamics, <span><math><mfrac><mrow><mn>1</mn></mrow><mrow><mi>m</mi></mrow></mfrac></math></span>-DeGroot dynamics is highly robust both to the presence of adversarial agents and to certain types of misspecifications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"223 ","pages":"Article 105952"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143171675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On-the-job wage dynamics 在职工资动态
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105953
Eric Smith
{"title":"On-the-job wage dynamics","authors":"Eric Smith","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105953","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105953","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion can meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages and workers cannot commit to not searching in the future. The resulting progression of wages (from firms paying just enough to keep their workers) yields a compensation structure consistent with well established but difficult to reconcile observations on pay dynamics within jobs at firms. Along with wage tenure effects, serial correlation in wage changes and wage growth are negatively correlated with initial wages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"224 ","pages":"Article 105953"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143340726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments 模糊实验的信息量排序
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105937
Zichang Wang
{"title":"Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments","authors":"Zichang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105937","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105937","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We generalize Blackwell's informativeness order to ambiguous experiments. A decision maker might view a statistical experiment as ambiguous if she faces uncertainty about the data generating process for its signals. Formally, an ambiguous experiment is modeled as a mapping from an auxiliary state space to the set of unambiguous experiments. Each auxiliary state corresponds to a possible data generating process. We show that one ambiguous experiment is preferred to another by every decision maker in every decision problem if and only if they are related by a condition called <em>prior-by-prior dominance</em>, which states that for any first-order belief the decision maker entertains on the auxiliary state space, the expected experiment resulting from this belief for the first experiment is Blackwell more informative than that of the second. This equivalence is robust for any class of monotone ambiguity preferences that nests expected utility. We obtain another informativeness order when we restrict attention to decision makers who apply the maxmin criterion to evaluate ambiguous experiments and connect this informativeness order to comparisons of sets of Blackwell experiments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105937"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk 交叉验证和有说服力的廉价言论
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934
Alp Atakan , Mehmet Ekmekci , Ludovic Renou
{"title":"Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk","authors":"Alp Atakan ,&nbsp;Mehmet Ekmekci ,&nbsp;Ludovic Renou","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a cheap-talk game where two experts offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker's ability to cross-verify the experts' advice acts as a commitment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert's equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105934"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition in schedules with cursed traders 与被诅咒的商人竞争时间表
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105935
Anna Bayona , Carolina Manzano
{"title":"Competition in schedules with cursed traders","authors":"Anna Bayona ,&nbsp;Carolina Manzano","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105935","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105935","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a market with sellers that compete in supply functions, face an elastic demand, and have imperfect cost information. In our model, sellers neglect some informational content of the price. In order to capture this feature, we use the cursed expectations equilibrium concept. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear supply functions exists and derives some comparative statics results. Compared to markets with fully rational sellers, we find that market power and the expected price-cost margin are lower; the price reaction to private information can be higher due to imperfect competition and demand elasticity; expected profits can be greater; and expected total surplus can also increase if the efficiency gains from reduced market power outweigh the losses from cursedness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105935"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delegated recruitment and statistical discrimination 委托招聘和统计歧视
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105936
Stepan Aleksenko , Jacob Kohlhepp
{"title":"Delegated recruitment and statistical discrimination","authors":"Stepan Aleksenko ,&nbsp;Jacob Kohlhepp","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105936","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105936","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how delegated recruitment shapes talent selection. Firms often pay recruiters via refund contracts, which specify a payment upon the hire of a suggested candidate and a refund if a candidate is hired but terminated during an initial period of employment. We develop a model of delegated recruitment and show that refund contracts with strong screening incentives lead to statistical discrimination in favor of candidates with more precise productivity information. This contrasts with a first-best direct-hiring benchmark, where the firm has option value from uncertain candidates. Under tractable parametric assumptions, we provide a closed-form expression for the unique equilibrium contract and show that it features strong screening incentives. As a result, candidates with lower expected productivity but more informative signals (“safe bets”) are hired over candidates with higher expected productivity but less informative signals (“diamonds in the rough”).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105936"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuading large investors 说服大型投资者
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105933
Ricardo Alonso , Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
{"title":"Persuading large investors","authors":"Ricardo Alonso ,&nbsp;Konstantinos E. Zachariadis","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105933","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105933","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A regulator who designs a public stress test to avert default of a distressed bank via private investment must account for large investors' private information on the bank's state. We provide conditions for crowding-in (crowding-out) so that the regulator offers an endogenous more (less) informative signal to better-informed investors. We show that crowding-in occurs as long as investors remain responsive to public news and they are sufficiently well informed: the regulator's test perfectly reveals the state as investors' become privately perfectly informed. Investors' value from more precise private signals may come from their effect on the public test's precision.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105933"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Foundations of market power in monetary economies 货币经济中市场力量的基础
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105931
Michael Choi, Guillaume Rocheteau
{"title":"Foundations of market power in monetary economies","authors":"Michael Choi,&nbsp;Guillaume Rocheteau","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105931","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105931","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the foundations of firms' market power in a continuous-time model where agents are price-makers who interact explicitly with each other. Market power arises from the existence of rents, the size of which depends on consumers' outside options, and firms' ability to appropriate these rents through rent seeking. We study how measures of market power (e.g., markups, concentration) are affected by search frictions, monetary policy, and self-fulfilling beliefs. An increase in the nominal interest rate affects market power by changing consumers' payment capacity and the value of their outside options, and by altering firms' rent-seeking behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105931"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Commitment and investment distortions under limited liability 有限责任下的承诺和投资扭曲
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105926
Jesse Perla , Carolin Pflueger , Michal Szkup
{"title":"Commitment and investment distortions under limited liability","authors":"Jesse Perla ,&nbsp;Carolin Pflueger ,&nbsp;Michal Szkup","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105926","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105926","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how frictions originating from limited liability distort firms' investment and financing choices. By financing new investments with debt, firms can use limited liability to credibly commit to defaulting earlier—allowing both firm owners and new creditors to benefit from diluting existing creditors. In a dynamic setup, this leads to time-inconsistency, increasing the cost of external funds and discouraging investment. We show that the interaction of these two forces leads to heterogeneous investment distortions, where highly-indebted firms overinvest and those with low levels of debt underinvest. Allowing firm owners to pay themselves directly from new debt issuance can mitigate overinvestment but, in the presence of repeated investment opportunities, tends to exacerbate underinvestment among low-leverage firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"222 ","pages":"Article 105926"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142704243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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