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Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching 在无主导策略中实施，并应用于拍卖设计、公共产品提供和匹配
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105783
Saptarshi Mukherjee , Nozomu Muto , Arunava Sen
{"title":"Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching","authors":"Saptarshi Mukherjee ,&nbsp;Nozomu Muto ,&nbsp;Arunava Sen","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105783","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105783","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single-object auction, the second-price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision problem, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to minimise deficit subject to efficiency. In the two-sided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information, the </span>social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile, is implementable.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139374635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unilateral stability in matching problems 匹配问题中的单边稳定性
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780
Michael Richter , Ariel Rubinstein
{"title":"Unilateral stability in matching problems","authors":"Michael Richter ,&nbsp;Ariel Rubinstein","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205312300176X/pdfft?md5=dac0310ef665c0c9580e77a71282145a&pid=1-s2.0-S002205312300176X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139063149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selling information in competitive environments 在竞争环境中销售信息
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105779
Alessandro Bonatti , Munther Dahleh , Thibaut Horel , Amir Nouripour
{"title":"Selling information in competitive environments","authors":"Alessandro Bonatti ,&nbsp;Munther Dahleh ,&nbsp;Thibaut Horel ,&nbsp;Amir Nouripour","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105779","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105779","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while eliciting the buyers' types and imposing payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of games with binary actions and states. Our results highlight the critical properties of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from buyer competition increase the profitability of recommending the correct action to one buyer exclusively; (ii) for the buyers to follow the seller's recommendations, the degree of exclusivity must be limited; (iii) the buyers' obedience constraints also reduce the distortions in the allocation of information introduced by a monopolist; (iv) as competition becomes fiercer, these limitations become more severe, weakening the impact of market power on the optimal allocation of information.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139022365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asset pricing with time preference shocks: Existence and uniqueness 具有时间偏好冲击的资产定价：存在性与唯一性
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105781
John Stachurski , Ole Wilms , Junnan Zhang
{"title":"Asset pricing with time preference shocks: Existence and uniqueness","authors":"John Stachurski ,&nbsp;Ole Wilms ,&nbsp;Junnan Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105781","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105781","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies existence and uniqueness of recursive utility in asset pricing models with time preference shocks. We provide conditions that clarify existence and uniqueness for a wide range of models, including exact necessary and sufficient conditions for standard formulations. The conditions isolate the roles of preference parameters, as well as the different risks that drive the consumption and preference shock processes. By deriving and decomposing a stability coefficient for recursive utility models, we show how different parameters in the model interact to determine existence and uniqueness of solutions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138824595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns 在关注职业生涯的比赛中获得多个奖项
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105778
Alvaro J. Name Correa , Huseyin Yildirim
{"title":"Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns","authors":"Alvaro J. Name Correa ,&nbsp;Huseyin Yildirim","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105778","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105778","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We introduce career concerns into rank-order tournaments and offer a novel explanation for the pervasiveness of multiple prizes. We argue that career-concerned individuals, already facing market pressure to perform, will be reluctant to participate in winner-take-all competitions. To entice them and maximize performance, the organizer promises a softer competition through multiple prizes. We show that the minimum number of prizes is single-peaked in the population's talent variance and increasing in publicly disclosed ranks. We also examine entry fees, talent pre-screening, and prize budget as design tools for tournaments, along with prize allocation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138824111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks 亲密无间的邻里关系：网络合作的稳定性
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775
Arnold Polanski
{"title":"Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks","authors":"Arnold Polanski","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to contribute or to free-ride. The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free, but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents are farsighted and not constrained by a fixed non-cooperative protocol? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the decision to contribute depends on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concept of k-cores.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138824172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Irreversible investment under predictable growth: Why land stays vacant when housing demand is booming 可预测增长下的不可逆投资：住房需求旺盛时，土地为何一直空置？
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105776
Rutger-Jan Lange , Coen N. Teulings
{"title":"Irreversible investment under predictable growth: Why land stays vacant when housing demand is booming","authors":"Rutger-Jan Lange ,&nbsp;Coen N. Teulings","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105776","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105776","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The standard model of irreversible investment under uncertainty considers only the level of the cash flow that could be obtained through the investment. We present a general model that includes as state variables both the level and the growth rate of the cash flow, while the timing and size of the one-time investment are discretionary. As an illustration, we consider an investor with the exclusive right to develop a vacant piece of land, where the timing of the investment and the scale of the property are chosen optimally. We demonstrate that construction is optimally postponed when prospects are gloomy, but also when they are bright. Indeed, under sufficiently high growth it is, perversely, never optimal to invest. Under a cost-of-capital argument, the rational response to predictable growth combined with flexible investment conditions is to keep land vacant for extended periods, which may explain why construction in superstar cities often appears sluggish. Our proposed model can be used in all investment decisions, irrespective of sector, where the assumptions of predictable growth and a one-off, flexible but otherwise irreversible investment are met.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053123001722/pdfft?md5=3a16c778fb91ad6bc3b37f619e8f9e27&pid=1-s2.0-S0022053123001722-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138692918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price impact under heterogeneous beliefs and restricted participation 异质信念和限制参与下的价格影响
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105774
Michail Anthropelos , Constantinos Kardaras
{"title":"Price impact under heterogeneous beliefs and restricted participation","authors":"Michail Anthropelos ,&nbsp;Constantinos Kardaras","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105774","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105774","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider a financial market in which traders potentially face restrictions in trading some of the available securities. Traders are heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs and risk profiles, and the market is assumed thin: traders strategically trade against their price impacts. We prove existence and uniqueness of a corresponding equilibrium, and provide an efficient algorithm to numerically obtain the equilibrium prices and allocations given market's inputs. We find that restrictions may increase the market's welfare if traders have different views regarding the covariance matrix of securities returns. The latter heterogeneity regarding covariance matrix disagreement is essential in modelling; for instance, when traders agree on the covariance matrix, restricting participation in some securities for some traders leaves equilibrium prices unaltered in the unrestricted securities, a certainly undesirable model effect.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138685746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
As strong as the weakest node: The impact of misinformation in social networks 强如最弱的节点：社交网络中错误信息的影响
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105773
Manuel Mueller-Frank
{"title":"As strong as the weakest node: The impact of misinformation in social networks","authors":"Manuel Mueller-Frank","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105773","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105773","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the impact of misinformation in a model of boundedly rational opinion formation in a social network. We capture misinformation via misspecified prior beliefs and consider networks that contain agents with differing social learning sophistication: identity social learners and quasi-Bayesian social learners. An attractive feature of the underlying heuristics is that in the baseline case absent misinformation both coincide with DeGroot updating, the arguably canonical boundedly rational heuristic. We find that the impact of misinformation depends upon the sophistication of the agents exposed to misinformation. If at least one misinformed agent engages in the simpler heuristic, identity social learning, then the long run opinions of all agents are extremely fragile to misinformation. Even if the perceived precision of the misinformation is infinitesimally small, the opinions of all agents in the network, identity and quasi-Bayesian social learners alike, converge to the misinformation state. Instead, if only the more sophisticated quasi-Bayesian social learners are exposed to misinformation, then the opinion process is robust to infinitessimal misinformation. Finally, we consider a general class of updating functions and show that there is a type of infinitessimal perturbation to the updating function of any agent such that the asymptotic consensus opinion is extremely fragile.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053123001692/pdfft?md5=53f33bde900ab7d927edd10d87ea6a9f&pid=1-s2.0-S0022053123001692-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138685630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles 有对战的团队竞赛中的最佳奖品设计
IF 1.6 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105765
Xin Feng , Qian Jiao , Zhonghong Kuang , Jingfeng Lu
{"title":"Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles","authors":"Xin Feng ,&nbsp;Qian Jiao ,&nbsp;Zhonghong Kuang ,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105765","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a team contest with an arbitrary number (odd or even) of pairwise battles. In a setting with full heterogeneity across players and battles, the organizer determines the prize allocation rule (or the winning rule of an indivisible prize) contingent on battle outcomes. We propose a measure of team's strength, which plays a crucial role in prize design. The optimal design is a majority-score rule with a headstart score granted to the weaker team: All battles are assigned team-invariant scores, the weaker team is given an initial headstart score which is the difference in strengths between teams, and the team collecting higher total scores from its winning battles wins the entire prize. The optimal rule resembles the widely-adopted Elo rating system.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138489726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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