发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem 跨期资源分配问题的两个时间一致Paretian解
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048
Yves Sprumont
{"title":"Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem","authors":"Yves Sprumont","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106048","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the problem of aggregating individual geometric discounting (<em>GD</em>) preferences over infinite streams of consumption profiles into a system specifying, for each consumption history, a social ranking of the streams that follow that history. Such a system is time-consistent if and only if it is generated by a single underlying preference ordering over the lifetime streams. Under the Weak Pareto Principle, Neutrality, Anonymity, and Discounting Irrelevance (individual discount factors do not affect the ranking of constant streams), lifetime streams must be ranked by applying a fixed monotonic and symmetric ordering to the profiles of range-normalized <em>GD</em> utilities they yield (<span><span>Theorem 1</span></span>). History Independence singles out the <em>range-normalized utilitarian rule</em> (<span><span>Theorem 2</span></span>) whereas the <em>range-normalized Nash rule</em> is characterized by Independence of Infeasible Consumptions (the ranking of streams delivering consumption profiles in an interval from the origin does not depend on individual valuations outside that interval) or Valuation Irrelevance (the ranking of pure timing streams is independent of individual valuations) (<span><span>Theorem 3</span></span>).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106048"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144364561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuasion without ex-post commitment 没有事后承诺的劝说
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058
Sophie Kreutzkamp , Yichuan Lou
{"title":"Persuasion without ex-post commitment","authors":"Sophie Kreutzkamp ,&nbsp;Yichuan Lou","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a persuasion model with limited commitment in which the sender can commit to a signal ex ante but not to truthful reporting ex post. Sender-optimal signals exploit a key trade-off: although better-quality information allows the sender to communicate more precisely, it adversely affects the credibility of his messages. Building on this observation, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the sender to strictly benefit from obtaining an imperfect signal. Under linear preferences, we show that sender-optimal signals can take on a bi-pooling structure; if preferences are also convex, bi-pooling becomes necessary. Finally, we provide a full characterization of sender-optimal signals for the popular uniform-quadratic specification, which we use to quantify and compare the value of commitments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106058"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144739638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption 富人不像你我：收入、价格分散和消费
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046
Eungsik Kim , Stephen Spear
{"title":"The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption","authors":"Eungsik Kim ,&nbsp;Stephen Spear","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the impact of imperfect competition on life-cycle consumption profiles and consumption-risk sharing, along with its policy implications. We develop a framework by incorporating the Shapley-Shubik market game into a stochastic overlapping generations model. We characterize the inverse income-marginal price relationship under market power, where wealthy agents face lower prices for identical goods compared to a perfectly competitive economy. We present several novel findings due to the additional price effect channel arising from price dispersion. First, we show that income-dependent prices in an imperfectly competitive economy lead to a failure of consumption smoothing and generate hump-shaped consumption profiles without other frictions. We also demonstrate that the market power of agents increases consumption volatility and worsens consumption-risk sharing due to the double luck effect resulting from price dispersion caused by income shocks. The additional volatility from imperfect competition creates a complementary welfare loss. Lastly, we illustrate a severed link between fiscal and monetary policy in improving welfare in an imperfectly competitive economy, as monetary policies reinforce the inverse income-price relationship and adversely affect the poor, while fiscal policies do not.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information requirements for mechanism design 机构设计的信息需求
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056
Richard P. McLean , Andrew Postlewaite
{"title":"Information requirements for mechanism design","authors":"Richard P. McLean ,&nbsp;Andrew Postlewaite","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106056","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Standard mechanism design begins with a statement of the problem, including knowledge on the designer's part about the distribution of the characteristics (preferences and information) of the participants who are to engage with the mechanism. There is a large literature on <em>robust</em> mechanism design, much of which aims to reduce the assumed information the designer has about the participants. In this paper we provide an auction mechanism for interdependent value problems that performs well when there are many buyers, even though there is no prior distribution over the accuracy of buyers' information on the part of the designer or the participants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106056"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144721789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public goods in networks: Comparative statics results 网络中的公共产品：比较统计结果
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106054
Sebastian Bervoets, Kohmei Makihara
{"title":"Public goods in networks: Comparative statics results","authors":"Sebastian Bervoets,&nbsp;Kohmei Makihara","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106054","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106054","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider public goods games with heterogeneous players interacting on a network and investigate how shocks to players' characteristics and changes in interaction patterns influence individual and total contributions. We introduce a linear system associated to the initial game, in which heterogeneity in players' characteristics is removed and interactions between players are reversed, and show that what matters in determining the effects of a shock on contributions is the sign of the coordinates of its unconstrained solution. When players are identical, we demonstrate that positive shocks on active players increase contributions, while positive shocks on strictly inactive players decrease them, contrary to intuition. We also identify a subset of players, called neutral players, who exert no influence on total contributions. Furthermore, we provide precise formulas for the change in total contributions following various types of shocks, and provide conditions to determine whether the shock will have positive or negative consequences on contributions. We show that these conditions always rely on the sign of the associated problem's unconstrained solution coordinates of the players impacted by the shock.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106054"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers 永远不要说永远：最优排除和保留价格与基于预期的损失规避买家
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045
Benjamin Balzer , Antonio Rosato
{"title":"Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers","authors":"Benjamin Balzer ,&nbsp;Antonio Rosato","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106045","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show that public reserve prices are not optimal as the seller can earn a higher revenue with mechanisms that better leverage the “attachment effect”. We discuss two such mechanisms: i) an auction with a secret and random reserve price, and ii) a mechanism where an auction with a public reserve price is followed by a negotiation if the reserve price is not met. Both of these mechanisms expose more bidder types to the attachment effect, thereby increasing bids and ultimately revenue.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106045"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144306327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Meritocracy versus diversity 精英统治vs多样性
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047
Kenzo Imamura
{"title":"Meritocracy versus diversity","authors":"Kenzo Imamura","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106047","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A college or firm makes admissions or hiring decisions for which each candidate is characterized by priority ranking and type, which might depend on race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The admissions or hiring committee faces a tradeoff between meritocracy and diversity: Although a <em>merit-first choice rule</em> might admit candidates of the same type, a <em>diversity-first choice rule</em> might be unfair because of priority violations. To formalize this tradeoff, we introduce a measure of meritocracy and a measure of diversity for choice rules. A choice rule that uses both <em>reserves</em> and <em>quotas</em> can be regarded as a compromise and as a generalization of the two extreme rules. The first result is comparative statics for this class of choice rules: We demonstrate that as parameters change and the choice rule becomes more meritorious, the rule also becomes less diverse. The second result is a characterization of the choice rule, which might help admissions or hiring committees to formulate their policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106047"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144322198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Money and imperfectly competitive credit 货币和不完全竞争信用
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106050
Allen Head , Timothy Kam , Sam Ng , Guangqian Pan
{"title":"Money and imperfectly competitive credit","authors":"Allen Head ,&nbsp;Timothy Kam ,&nbsp;Sam Ng ,&nbsp;Guangqian Pan","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a monetary economy in which banks have market power emanating from search frictions. Distributions of both deposit and loan interest rates are equilibrium phenomena exhibiting dispersion consistent with new micro-level evidence on U.S. consumer loans and deposits. The theory accounts for incomplete pass-through of monetary policy to the distributions of loan and deposit rates through a novel channel. Imperfect competition links monetary policy to real consumption and welfare through its effects on interest rate spreads driven by market power and individual liquidity risk. Market power in deposits erodes the insurance banks provide against liquidity risk, while market power in lending enables banks to extract surplus from goods market trades. For a given inflation target, welfare gains arise if a central bank uses state-contingent monetary injections to reduce lenders' market power in response to fluctuations in aggregate demand.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106050"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144564036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129] “从Choquet到最大期望效用的模糊随机变量评估”[J]。经济学。理论192 (2021)105129]
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034
Tomasz Strzalecki , Juuso Toikka
{"title":"Corrigendum to “Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility” [J. Econ. Theory 192 (2021) 105129]","authors":"Tomasz Strzalecki ,&nbsp;Juuso Toikka","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106034"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144240616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Attention, coordination, and bounded recall 注意，协调和有限回忆
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-06-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106013
Alessandro Pavan
{"title":"Attention, coordination, and bounded recall","authors":"Alessandro Pavan","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I consider a class of strategic interactions under asymmetric information in which, prior to finalizing their actions (consumption, production, or investment decisions), agents choose the attention to allocate to a large number of information sources about exogenous events that are responsible for their payoffs (the underlying fundamentals). I study what type of payoff interdependencies contribute to inefficiency in the allocation of attention. I then compare the results for the benchmark of perfect recall (in which the agents remember the content of individual sources) to those for bounded recall (in which the agents are unable to keep track of the influence of individual sources on posterior beliefs). More generally, the analysis illustrates the implications (for attention and usage of information) of a certain form of bounded rationality whereby the summary statistic the agents recall from the sources they pay attention to is distorted away from the optimal action towards the Bayesian projection of the exogenous fundamentals over the signals received.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"227 ","pages":"Article 106013"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143948402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书