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Insider trading with penalties in continuous time 内幕交易与连续时间处罚
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106061
Umut Çetin
{"title":"Insider trading with penalties in continuous time","authors":"Umut Çetin","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106061","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106061","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper addresses the question of how insiders internalize the additional penalties to trade in a continuous time Kyle model. The penalties can be interpreted as non-adverse selection transaction costs or legal penalties due to illegal insider trading. The equilibrium is established for general asset distribution. In equilibrium, the insider does not disseminate her private information fully into the market prices. Moreover, she always trades a constant multiple of the discrepancy between her own valuation and her forecast of market price right before her private information becomes public. In the particular case of normally distributed asset value, the trades are split evenly over time for sufficiently large penalties, with trade size proportional to the return on the private signal. Although the noise traders lose less when penalties increase, the insider's total penalty in equilibrium is non-monotone since the insider trades little when the penalties surpasses the value of the private signal. As a result, a budget-constrained regulator runs an investigation only if the benefits of the investigation are sufficiently high. Moreover, the optimal penalty policy is reduced to choosing from one of two extremal penalty levels that correspond to high and low liquidity regimes. The optimal choice is determined by the amount of noise trading and the relative importance of price informativeness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106061"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144748958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship 公共产品，社会选择，和林达尔- vcg关系
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106055
David Delacrétaz , Simon Loertscher , Claudio Mezzetti
{"title":"Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship","authors":"David Delacrétaz ,&nbsp;Simon Loertscher ,&nbsp;Claudio Mezzetti","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106055","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106055","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Lindahl prices, set by a fictitious auctioneer with full knowledge of values and costs, are a generalization of Walrasian prices. By making the efficient allocation utility- and profit-maximizing for all players, they induce an efficient outcome in a decentralized way even in the presence of public goods. We study a collective choice model with quasilinear utility, which encompasses the allocation of public and private goods as special cases. We show that each agent's most favorable Lindahl payment (the smallest Lindahl price for the efficient alternative) is equal to his VCG transfer while the firm's VCG transfer is equal to its most favorable Lindahl payment (the largest sum of Lindahl prices for the efficient alternative). Thus, the VCG mechanism incurs a deficit if and only if the set of vectors of the agents' Lindahl payments is multi-valued. Unlike Walrasian prices, Lindahl prices are not restricted to be anonymous or additive. This is the reason why, when considering the allocation of private goods, the agents' smallest Walrasian payments are at least as large as their most favorable Lindahl payments, and thus their VCG transfers. It is also why Lindahl prices always exist while Walrasian prices may not.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106055"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144721790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market versus optimum allocation in open economies 开放经济中的市场与最优配置
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106053
Peter H. Egger , Ruobing Huang
{"title":"Market versus optimum allocation in open economies","authors":"Peter H. Egger ,&nbsp;Ruobing Huang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106053","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106053","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A large body of theoretical and quantitative work concerns models of heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition. But most of it relies on strong assumptions regarding demand structure, firm-productivity distribution, and country heterogeneity. This paper studies a general-equilibrium model with directly explicitly additive preferences, non-specified productivity distributions, and asymmetric countries, for which much less is known. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium with a three-stage approach of analyzing competition intensities and wages. We then explore the market-allocation mechanism and provide a baseline comparison between the market and a utilitarian optimum from a global planner's perspective. We show that misallocation in open economies can be decomposed into two effects, driven by country asymmetry and the variable elasticity of substitution. We present two examples exhibiting constant and variable markups, respectively, to illustrate how to apply our general theorem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106053"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144655972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A model of rejection-based decision making 基于拒绝的决策模型
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106060
Bhavook Bhardwaj , Kriti Manocha
{"title":"A model of rejection-based decision making","authors":"Bhavook Bhardwaj ,&nbsp;Kriti Manocha","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106060","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces a model of decision making based on a procedure of <em>rejection</em>. Departing from the standard model of choice via preference maximization, the decision maker (DM) in our model rejects <em>minimal</em> alternatives from a menu according to a binary relation. We axiomatically study the correspondence of non-rejected alternatives with different rationality conditions on the underlying binary relation. We then generalize our model to study correspondences generated by an iterative procedure of rejection. It is observed that the classical rational choice model is a special case of this model, thus providing a procedural description of selecting the maximal set. We find that the rejection approach developed in this paper can also explain anomalies observed in decision theory, such as the <em>two-decoy effect</em> or the <em>two-compromise effect</em>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106060"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144770951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deadlines and matching 截止日期和匹配
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106065
Garth Baughman
{"title":"Deadlines and matching","authors":"Garth Baughman","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106065","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106065","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets. Deadlines drive fundamental non-stationarity and complexity in behavior, generating significant departures from the steady-state equilibria usually studied in the search and matching literature. I consider a two-sided matching market with search frictions where vertically differentiated agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give novel proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibria, and show that all equilibria exhibit an “anticipation effect” where less attractive agents become increasingly choosy over time, preferring to wait for the opportunity to match with attractive agents who, in turn, become less selective as the deadline approaches. When agents are patient, a sharp characterization is available: at any point in time, the market segments into a first class of matching agents and a second class of waiting agents. This points to a different interpretation of unraveling.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106065"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144830999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unidirectional incentive compatibility 单向激励相容
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051
Daniel Krähmer , Roland Strausz
{"title":"Unidirectional incentive compatibility","authors":"Daniel Krähmer ,&nbsp;Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106051","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study unidirectional incentive compatibility which incentivizes truth-telling by an agent who can misrepresent private information in one direction only. In the canonical setting with quasi-linear preferences and continuous, one-dimensional private information, we show that unidirectional incentive compatibility imposes no restrictions on the allocation rule and revenue equivalence fails. Moreover, unidirectional incentive compatibility holds if and only if the change of the agent's information rent respects a lower bound based on the allocation rule's monotone envelope. With strong interdependent values or countervailing incentives, optimal screening contracts differ from optimal bidirectionally incentive compatible contracts, possibly displaying non-monotone allocations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106051"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144572433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations 具有延迟接受的市场设计：特征描述的配方
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057
Battal Doğan , Kenzo Imamura , M. Bumin Yenmez
{"title":"Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations","authors":"Battal Doğan ,&nbsp;Kenzo Imamura ,&nbsp;M. Bumin Yenmez","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In matching markets, policymakers often pursue complex distributional objectives, such as promoting diversity in student populations. To this end, they embed these objectives into the choice rules of institutions, such as schools, and implement the deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism based on those rules. Given the institutional choice rules, we introduce a method for characterizing the corresponding DA mechanism through the properties of these choice rules. Utilizing this method, we derive novel characterizations of DA mechanisms across various settings, including matching problems with enrollment guarantees and overlapping reserves—motivated by school choice in Chile—as well as environments with matroidal feasibility constraints or objectives. Our approach provides a unified framework for characterizing DA mechanisms that accommodate policy-relevant objectives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106057"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144739639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate payments: A Coase theorem 气候支付：一个科斯定理
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032
Prajit K. Dutta , Roy Radner
{"title":"Climate payments: A Coase theorem","authors":"Prajit K. Dutta ,&nbsp;Roy Radner","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106032","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Climate-related payments have emerged as a contentious and complex issue in climate negotiations. Major questions remain on how this will be done and how effective payments will be. The paper studies transfers under a variety of timing possibilities. It is shown that outcome-contingent payments always lead to efficiency and a particular alignment of transfer and emission timings implies that the efficient equilibrium is the only equilibrium even when the horizon is infinite. The theoretical novelty is a multi-lateral Coase Theorem in a dynamic model. The policy prescription is for an enhanced role for transfers to solve the climate problem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106032"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144204702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence 流动性约束下的议价：实验证据
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035
John Duffy , Lucie Lebeau , Daniela Puzzello
{"title":"Bargaining under liquidity constraints: Experimental evidence","authors":"John Duffy ,&nbsp;Lucie Lebeau ,&nbsp;Daniela Puzzello","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106035","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Bargaining is widely used in monetary, labor and finance models to determine terms of trade. The chosen bargaining solution can matter for welfare analysis, for example when agents are liquidity constrained. Here we report on an experiment in which buyers and sellers engage in semi-structured bargaining to determine the terms of trade with the aim of evaluating the empirical relevance of two bargaining solutions, the generalized Nash bargaining solution and Kalai's proportional bargaining solution. These bargaining solutions predict different outcomes when buyers are constrained in their money holdings. We first use the case when the buyer is not liquidity constrained to estimate the bargaining power parameter, which we find to be equal to 1/2. Then, imposing liquidity constraints on buyers, we find strong evidence in support of the Kalai proportional solution. Our findings have policy implications, e.g., for the welfare cost of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106035"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144491490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital 新的生育模式：人力资本与物质资本的作用
IF 1.4 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037
Nicolas Abad , Johanna Etner , Natacha Raffin , Thomas Seegmuller
{"title":"New fertility patterns: The role of human versus physical capital","authors":"Nicolas Abad ,&nbsp;Johanna Etner ,&nbsp;Natacha Raffin ,&nbsp;Thomas Seegmuller","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106037","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital, and two reproductive periods to explore how fertility decisions may differ in response to economic incentives in early and late adulthood. In particular, we analyze the interplay between fertility choices—related to career opportunities—and wages, and investigate the role played by work experience and investment in both types of capital. We show that young adults postpone parenthood above a certain wage threshold and that late fertility increases with human capital. The long run trend is either to converge to a low productivity equilibrium, involving high early fertility, investment in physical capital and relatively low income, or to a high productivity equilibrium, where households postpone parenthood to invest in their human capital and work experience, with higher late fertility and higher levels of income. A convergence to the latest state would explain the postponement of parenthood and the mitigation or slight reversal of fertility decrease in some European countries in recent decades.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106037"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144243324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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