卖出信号

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2025.105966

Zhuoran Lu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了一个战略参与人可以操纵信令成本的信令模型。卖方为一件商品选择一个价格方案，而具有隐藏类型的买方选择购买多少作为向接收者发送的信号。当接受者遵守价格方案时，卖方收取垄断价格，买方购买的数量少于第一优。相反，当接收者不遵守价格方案时，对信号的需求更具弹性。在均衡状态下，卖方收取较低的价格，而买方的购买量比接受者遵守价格方案时要多；最高等级的人比第一等级的人买得更多。该模型表明，价格透明对卖方有利，但对买方不利。这种模式可以应用于学校选择学费、销售奢侈品的零售商和销售广告的媒体公司。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Selling signals

This paper studies a signaling model in which a strategic player can manipulate the cost of signaling. A seller chooses a price scheme for a good, and a buyer with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. When receivers observe the price scheme, the seller charges monopoly prices, and the buyer purchases less than the first best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price scheme, the demand for signals is more elastic. In equilibrium, the seller charges lower prices, and the buyer purchases more than when receivers observe the price scheme; the highest types purchase more than the first best. The model suggests that price transparency benefits the seller but harms the buyer. The model can be applied to schools choosing tuition, retailers selling luxury goods and media companies selling advertisements.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.