交叉验证和有说服力的廉价言论

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934

Alp Atakan , Mehmet Ekmekci , Ludovic Renou

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个廉价言论博弈，在这个博弈中，两位专家向决策者提供建议，而决策者的行为会影响所有人的福利。专家不能承诺报告策略。然而，我们证明决策者交叉验证专家建议的能力对专家来说是一种承诺手段。我们证明了均衡的存在，在均衡情况下，专家的均衡报酬等于他承诺如实披露信息时的报酬。

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Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk

We study a cheap-talk game where two experts offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker's ability to cross-verify the experts' advice acts as a commitment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert's equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.