可信的集

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-10-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098

Mert Kimya

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引用次数: 0

摘要

可信集是Dutta和Vohra（2017）定义的满足内部和外部稳定性的期望的稳定状态集。我们证明可信集具有两个基本的联合理性公理：基本联合理性公理和远见理性公理。可信集存在于广泛的环境中，包括所有有限博弈，它们为组织有远见的稳定性文献中的重要概念提供了统一的框架。有影响力的解概念，如最大一致集，远视稳定集，（强）理性期望远视稳定集，以及不受Harsanyi批评的稳定集，都是可信集的特定改进。

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Credible sets

A credible set is the set of stable states of an expectation satisfying internal and external stability as defined in Dutta and Vohra (2017). We show that credible sets are characterized by two fundamental coalitional rationality axioms: basic coalitional rationality and farsighted rationality. Credible sets exist in a wide range of environments, including all finite games, and they provide a unifying framework for organizing prominent notions in the farsighted stability literature. Influential solution concepts such as the largest consistent set, the farsighted stable set, the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set, and the stable set when it does not suffer from the Harsanyi critique are all particular refinements of credible sets.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.