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The evolution of resilience 弹性的进化
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106078
David K. Levine
{"title":"The evolution of resilience","authors":"David K. Levine","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106078","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106078","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I analyze a social evolutionary model in which there is a non-excludable public good that reduces the chances of catastrophe. I show that while resilient types that produce the public good cannot survive head-to-head competition with other more selfish types in a fixed population, they do if catastrophes reduce population.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106078"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145108578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mixture-betweenness: Uncertainty and commitment 介于两者之间：不确定性和承诺
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106097
Fernando Payró
{"title":"Mixture-betweenness: Uncertainty and commitment","authors":"Fernando Payró","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops axiomatic models of preference under uncertainty and preference for commitment that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness, a weakening of the Independence axiom originally proposed by <span><span>Chew (1989)</span></span> and <span><span>Dekel (1986)</span></span>. A central contribution of the paper is a general representation theorem that can be applied across a wide range of domains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare and distributional effects of joint intervention in networks 网络中联合干预的福利和分配效应
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106109
Ryan Kor , Yi Liu , Yves Zenou , Junjie Zhou
{"title":"Welfare and distributional effects of joint intervention in networks","authors":"Ryan Kor ,&nbsp;Yi Liu ,&nbsp;Yves Zenou ,&nbsp;Junjie Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106109","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106109","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the optimal joint intervention of a planner who can influence both the standalone marginal utilities of agents in a network and the weights of the links connecting them. The welfare-maximizing intervention displays two key features. First, when the planner’s budget is moderate (yielding interior solutions), the optimal change in link weight between any pair of agents is proportional to the product of their eigen-centralities. Second, when the budget is sufficiently large, the optimal network converges to a simple structure: a complete network under strategic complements, or a complete balanced bipartite network under strategic substitutes. We show that welfare effects are governed by the principal eigenvalue of the network, while distributional outcomes are driven by the dispersion of the corresponding eigen-centralities. Comparing joint interventions to single interventions targeting only standalone marginal utilities, we find that joint interventions consistently generate higher aggregate welfare, but may also increase inequality, revealing a potential trade-off between efficiency and equity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145578788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credible sets 可信的集
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098
Mert Kimya
{"title":"Credible sets","authors":"Mert Kimya","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A credible set is the set of stable states of an expectation satisfying internal and external stability as defined in <span><span>Dutta and Vohra (2017)</span></span>. We show that credible sets are characterized by two fundamental coalitional rationality axioms: basic coalitional rationality and farsighted rationality. Credible sets exist in a wide range of environments, including all finite games, and they provide a unifying framework for organizing prominent notions in the farsighted stability literature. Influential solution concepts such as the largest consistent set, the farsighted stable set, the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set, and the stable set when it does not suffer from the Harsanyi critique are all particular refinements of credible sets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106098"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment 信贷状况，通货膨胀和失业
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081
Chao Gu , Janet Hua Jiang , Liang Wang
{"title":"Credit conditions, inflation, and unemployment","authors":"Chao Gu ,&nbsp;Janet Hua Jiang ,&nbsp;Liang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We construct a New Monetarist model with labor market search and identify two channels that affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages through bargaining because unemployed workers rely more heavily on cash transactions and suffer more from inflation than employed workers; this wage-bargaining channel generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve without assuming nominal rigidity. Second, inflation increases firms' financing costs, which discourages job creation and increases unemployment; this cash-financing channel leads to an upward-sloping Phillips curve. We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy. The improvement in firm financing conditions can explain the observation that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve has switched from positive to negative post-2000.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106081"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145120488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Targeting network intervention with social norm 以社会规范为目标的网络干预
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092
Dawen Meng
{"title":"Targeting network intervention with social norm","authors":"Dawen Meng","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106092","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper discusses a network game in a local-average setup, where players' payoffs depend on the social norms they confront. I focus on an optimal targeting intervention problem, where a planner aims to maximize social welfare by altering individual characteristics ex ante. First, I decompose orthogonally the optimal intervention into the eigenspaces of the social welfare matrix. In what follows, I present the limit forms of the optimal intervention as the budget approaches infinity or zero. I then identify the errors arising from approximating the optimal intervention by its various limit forms. Finally, this paper explores the intervention problem under incomplete information, where the planner switches from mean to variance intervention based on the comparison of their unit costs and the aggregate budget size.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106092"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145227583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences 根据Leontief的偏好协调慈善捐赠
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106096
Felix Brandt , Matthias Greger , Erel Segal-Halevi , Warut Suksompong
{"title":"Coordinating charitable donations with Leontief preferences","authors":"Felix Brandt ,&nbsp;Matthias Greger ,&nbsp;Erel Segal-Halevi ,&nbsp;Warut Suksompong","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing healthcare), charitable donations to different individuals, or municipal units handling different issues (e.g., security vs. transportation). We model these complementarities by assuming Leontief preferences; that is, each donor seeks to maximize an individually weighted minimum of all contributions across the charities. Decentralized funding may be inefficient due to a lack of coordination among the donors; centralized funding may be undesirable as it ignores the preferences of individual donors. We present a mechanism that combines the advantages of both methods. The mechanism efficiently distributes each donor's contribution so that no subset of donors has an incentive to redistribute their donations. Moreover, it is group-strategyproof, satisfies desirable monotonicity properties, maximizes Nash welfare, returns a unique Lindahl equilibrium, and can be implemented via natural best-response spending dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106096"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145333501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability 错误指定的学习和进化稳定性
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-09-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082
Kevin He , Jonathan Libgober
{"title":"Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability","authors":"Kevin He ,&nbsp;Jonathan Libgober","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide conditions under which the correctly specified resident model can only be destabilized by misspecified entrant models that contain multiple feasible beliefs (that is, entrant models that permit inference). We also show that entrants may do well in their matches against the residents only when the entrant population is large, due to the endogeneity of misspecified beliefs. Applications include the selection of demand-elasticity misperception in Cournot duopoly and the emergence of analogy-based reasoning in centipede games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106082"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145108580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Actions and signals 动作和信号
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100
Thomas Jungbauer, Michael Waldman
{"title":"Actions and signals","authors":"Thomas Jungbauer,&nbsp;Michael Waldman","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For many signaling applications, the real-world scenario fails to match the model setup. <em>Actions</em> are often unobservable but combine with the sender's type to determine an observable <em>signal</em>. Introducing a theory of <em>generalized signaling</em>, we show the nature of equilibria can fundamentally differ from the canonical signaling model. In fact, we find both <em>over</em>- and <em>under</em>-investment arise in important signaling environments. Our model extends to multiple actions and signal jamming environments with incomplete sender information. We present results for equilibrium construction and show that uninformed sender behavior may be more efficient than a fully informed sender's.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145333502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights 具有分配目标的市场设计：效率、激励和产权
IF 1.2 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-12-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099
Isa E. Hafalir , Fuhito Kojima , M. Bumin Yenmez
{"title":"Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights","authors":"Isa E. Hafalir ,&nbsp;Fuhito Kojima ,&nbsp;M. Bumin Yenmez","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M<sup>♮</sup>-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M<sup>♮</sup>-concave.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"230 ","pages":"Article 106099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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