多单位拍卖中模糊性对收益的影响

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了在投标人具有独立的私人价值、最大偏好和单单位需求的多单位拍卖中,模糊性对预期收益的影响。如果先验集足够丰富,我们表明歧视性或“按出价付费”拍卖具有最高的预期收入,其次是顺序第一价格拍卖,然后是顺序第二价格拍卖。采用“最高输标”定价规则的统一价格拍卖表现最差。我们的研究结果也适用于一些公开拍卖形式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions
We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
12.50%
发文量
135
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.
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