{"title":"多单位拍卖中模糊性对收益的影响","authors":"Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105996"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions\",\"authors\":\"Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48393,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"225 \",\"pages\":\"Article 105996\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053125000420\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053125000420","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions
We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.