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Must your reasons move you? 你的理由必须打动你吗？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02186-8
N. L. Engel-Hawbecker
{"title":"Must your reasons move you?","authors":"N. L. Engel-Hawbecker","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02186-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02186-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many authors assume that we are rationally required to be somewhat moved by any recognized reason. This assumption turns out to be unjustified if not false, both in general and under any non-trivial restriction. Even its most plausible forms are contradicted by the possibility of exclusionary reasons. Some have doubted the latter’s possibility. But these doubts are also shown to be unfounded, and exclusionary reasons’ pervasive role in normative theorizing is defended.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Becoming oneself online: narrative self-constitution and the internet 在网上成为自己：叙事自我构成与互联网
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02169-9
Anna Bortolan
{"title":"Becoming oneself online: narrative self-constitution and the internet","authors":"Anna Bortolan","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02169-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02169-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores how self-identity can be impacted upon by the use of digital and social media. In particular, drawing on a narrative account of selfhood, it argues that some forms of activity and interaction on the internet can support the capacity to be oneself, and foster transformative processes that are self-enhancing.</p><p>I start by introducing different positions in the philosophical exploration of identity online, critically outlining the arguments of those who hold a “pessimistic” and an “optimistic” stance respectively. I then expand on the narrative identity framework that has been used to support the optimists’ view, arguing that digital and social media use can foster forms of self-understanding that enable us to preserve or develop our identity. More precisely, exploring these dynamics also in relation to the lived experience of mental ill-health, I maintain that internet-enabled technology can support narrative self-constitution in three main ways: (1) by facilitating the processes through which we remember self-defining life-stories; (2) by enabling us to give salience to the stories that we decide should matter the most; and (3) by providing us with opportunities to obtain social uptake for our narratives. I then conclude by dispelling some possible objections to the use of a narrative approach to account for selfhood online.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141730563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group prioritarianism: why AI should not replace humanity 群体优先主义：为什么人工智能不应取代人类
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02189-5
Frank Hong
{"title":"Group prioritarianism: why AI should not replace humanity","authors":"Frank Hong","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02189-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02189-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If a future AI system can enjoy far more well-being than a human per resource, what would be the best way to allocate resources between these future AI and our future descendants? It is obvious that on total utilitarianism, one should give everything to the AI. However, it turns out that every Welfarist axiology on the market also gives this same recommendation, at least if we assume consequentialism. Without resorting to non-consequentialist normative theories that suggest that we ought not always create the world with the most <i>value</i>, or non-welfarist theories that tell us that the best world may not be the world with the most <i>welfare</i>, I propose a new theory that justifies giving some resources to humanity in the face of overwhelming AI well-being. I call this new theory, “Group Prioritarianism\".</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141608163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On why proximal intentions need to remain snubbed: a reply to Mele 为什么近端意图需要继续受到冷落：对 Mele 的答复
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02181-z
Marcela Herdova
{"title":"On why proximal intentions need to remain snubbed: a reply to Mele","authors":"Marcela Herdova","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02181-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02181-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I argue against elements of Alfred Mele’s picture of the nature of intentions and the triggers of intentional actions. Mele (Philosophical Studies 176:2833–2853, 2019) offers rebuttals to my (Herdova, Philosophical Studies, 173(3), 573–587, 2016; Herdova, Philosophical Explorations, 21(3):364–383, 2018) and Ann Bumpus’s (2001) arguments which limit the scope of proximal intentions as triggers of intentional actions. Here I offer a response to Mele and provide further arguments in favor of my alternative understanding of intentions and the causes of intentional actions. Contra Mele, I argue for the following interrelated theses. First, intentions, including proximal intentions, have an array of functions or dispositions beyond that of triggering intentional actions. Second, states other than proximal intentions can trigger at least some types of intentional actions. Therefore, it is not the case that all intentional actions need to be triggered by proximal intentions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"197 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141602636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Libertarianism, decision-making, and a point of no return 自由主义、决策和不归点
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02190-y
Alfred R. Mele
{"title":"Libertarianism, decision-making, and a point of no return","authors":"Alfred R. Mele","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02190-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02190-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops a challenge to standard libertarian views that is based on an imagined neuroscientificdiscovery that is incompatible with satisfaction of a standard libertarian requirement for mainstream free decision making, and it explores potential libertarian responses to this discovery. The requirement at issue may beformulated as follows: In mainstream cases, an agent freely decided at <i>t</i> to <i>A</i> only if, given the past and the laws of nature, the agent was able right up to <i>t</i> to do something else intentionally at t than decide to <i>A</i>. The imagined discovery is about a point of no return for the making of any particular decision in a mainstream scenario.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141566264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’ 应受谴责意味着 "不应该
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02162-2
Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
{"title":"Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’","authors":"Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02162-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02162-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three <i>prima facie</i> reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141545806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Locative grounding harmony 定位接地和谐
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02171-1
Samuel Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant
{"title":"Locative grounding harmony","authors":"Samuel Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02171-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02171-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we explore locative grounding harmony, according to which the location of the grounds mirrors the location of the grounded. We proceed in three stages. First, we clarify the notion of locative harmony and describe different locative harmony principles. Second, we offer two arguments for the claim that grounding between physically located entities obeys principles of locative harmony. Third, we consider and respond to a range of cases that seem to show that grounding relations between physically located entities do not obey such principles. We conclude that grounding between such entities obeys locative harmony.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141489541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle 人工意识：从自由能原理的角度看问题
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y
Wanja Wiese
{"title":"Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle","authors":"Wanja Wiese","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness?</p><p>From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge without dogmatism 没有教条主义的知识
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02159-x
Earl Conee
{"title":"Knowledge without dogmatism","authors":"Earl Conee","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02159-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02159-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rachel Fraser, Gilbert Harman, Saul Kripke, and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio have offered arguments for paradoxical implications of knowledge. The arguments contend that knowing a proposition justifies believing it dogmatically, or dogmatically maintaining confidence in it, or dogmatically intending to continue to believe it. Yet it is quite doubtful that knowing could justify any sort of dogmatism. The arguments will be assessed. We will see why knowledge does not justify being dogmatic. The reason is essentially that deferring to our evidence is never dogmatic, and knowledge never overrides or undercuts the justification that derives from our evidence.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ability predicates, or there and back again 能力谓词，或去而复返
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02178-8
Julian J. Schloeder
{"title":"Ability predicates, or there and back again","authors":"Julian J. Schloeder","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02178-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02178-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Predicates like <i>knowable</i>, <i>believable</i> or <i>evincible</i> each are associated with Fitch-like paradoxes. Given some plausible assumptions, the <i>prima facie</i> reasonable hypotheses that <i>what is true is knowable/believable/evincible</i> entail, respectively, the decidedly unreasonable conclusions that <i>what is true is known/believed/evinced</i>. I argue that all Fitch-like paradoxes admit of a common diagnosis and give a uniform semantics for predicates like <i>knowable</i> that avoids the paradoxes while accounting for the intuitive meaning of these predicates. Moreover, I argue that a semantics of the same shape is to be given to similar predicates like <i>erasable</i> or <i>legible</i>, whose simple analyses likewise face broadly Fitch-like problems. This semantics also highlights and explains the context-sensitive nature of such predicates.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141439853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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