分歧、人工智能协调和讨价还价

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Harry R. Lloyd
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引用次数: 0

摘要

新的人工智能技术有可能在战争、司法判决、医疗和治理等不同领域造成意外伤害。要实现人工智能的益处,同时避免其潜在危险,一种策略是确保新的人工智能与某种形式的 "对齐目标 "适当 "对齐"。这种策略的一个危险是,根据所选择的对齐目标,我们的人工智能可能会优化目标,而这些目标只反映了社会中某一部分人的价值观,并且没有考虑到关于什么是人工智能代理的理想和安全行为的其他观点。针对这个问题,一些人工智能伦理学家提出了一些调整目标,这些目标的设计要对相关利益者之间广泛存在的规范分歧保持敏感。受投票理论启发的学者建议,人工智能应与实际或模拟的 "道德议会 "的裁决保持一致,这些议会的成员代表了相关利益攸关方的规范性观点。受决策理论和道德不确定性哲学文献启发的其他作者则建议,人工智能应最大限度地提高社会预期的选择价值。在本文中,我认为这两种建议都面临几个重要问题。尤其是,在有 "折中方案 "可供选择的情况下,它们都无法选择有吸引力的 "折中方案"。接下来,我将提出并捍卫另一种讨价还价理论的调整目标,它可以避免与投票和决策理论方法相关的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Disagreement, AI alignment, and bargaining

New AI technologies have the potential to cause unintended harms in diverse domains including warfare, judicial sentencing, medicine and governance. One strategy for realising the benefits of AI whilst avoiding its potential dangers is to ensure that new AIs are properly ‘aligned’ with some form of ‘alignment target.’ One danger of this strategy is that–dependent on the alignment target chosen–our AIs might optimise for objectives that reflect the values only of a certain subset of society, and that do not take into account alternative views about what constitutes desirable and safe behaviour for AI agents. In response to this problem, several AI ethicists have suggested alignment targets that are designed to be sensitive to widespread normative disagreement amongst the relevant stakeholders. Authors inspired by voting theory have suggested that AIs should be aligned with the verdicts of actual or simulated ‘moral parliaments’ whose members represent the normative views of the relevant stakeholders. Other authors inspired by decision theory and the philosophical literature on moral uncertainty have suggested that AIs should maximise socially expected choiceworthiness. In this paper, I argue that both of these proposals face several important problems. In particular, they fail to select attractive ‘compromise options’ in cases where such options are available. I go on to propose and defend an alternative, bargaining-theoretic alignment target, which avoids the problems associated with the voting- and decision-theoretic approaches.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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