PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

Incommensurability and democratic deliberation in bioethics 生物伦理学中的不可通约性与民主讨论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02241-4

Nir Eyal

{"title":"Incommensurability and democratic deliberation in bioethics","authors":"Nir Eyal","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02241-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02241-4","url":null,"abstract":"Often, a health resource distribution (or, more generally, a health policy) ranks higher than another on one value, say, on promoting total population health; and lower on another, say, on promoting that of the worst off. Then, some opine, there need not be a rational determination as to which of the multiple distributions that partially fulfill both one ought to choose. Sometimes, reason determines only partially, intransitively, or contentiously which of the many “compromises” between these two values is best or most choiceworthy. Norman Daniels, Ruth Chang, Martijn Boot, and Anders Herlitz affirm this opinion, which I shall call “value incommensurability,” “rational underdeterminacy,” or “reasonable disagreement.” To decide between the multiple reasonable compromises on health resource distribution, these philosophers recommend a deliberative democratic process, on two main grounds. First, in such situations, deliberation can produce the determinacy needed for decisionmaking. Second, by treating respectfully and justly even those patients or communities for whom the distributive compromise selected is bad, deliberation shields the legitimacy of that policy. Increasingly, practically-oriented bioethics recommends democratic deliberation even more expansively than these philosophers do—for nearly every decision on health resource distribution and not only when values are incommensurate—on these two grounds and on others. And one could propose a more modest variant on this expansive move as the justification of democratic deliberation. I argue that none of these moves warrants democratic deliberation on health policy.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142601927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

What Is Rational Sentimentalism? 什么是理性感伤主义？

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02235-2

Selim Berker

引用次数: 0

Metaphor and ambiguity 隐喻和歧义

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02252-1

Elek Lane

引用次数: 0

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment 人工智能排列组合中的偏好之外

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02249-w

Tan Zhi-Xuan, Micah Carroll, Matija Franklin, Hal Ashton

{"title":"Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment","authors":"Tan Zhi-Xuan, Micah Carroll, Matija Franklin, Hal Ashton","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02249-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02249-w","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’ 什么是合理怀疑？为索萨 "认识论解释 "哲学研究特刊撰稿

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y

Lilith Mace, Mona Simion

引用次数: 0

Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory 梦境内容的确定支持想象力理论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02250-3

Daniel Gregory

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Reflecting on believability: on the epistemic approach to justifying implicit commitments 反思可信性：从认识论角度论证隐含承诺的合理性

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02215-6

Maciej Głowacki, Mateusz Łełyk

引用次数: 0

The new internalism about prudential value 关于审慎价值的新内部主义

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02231-6

Anthony Kelley

引用次数: 0

Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited 重新审视无主证据：我们的选择有限

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02248-x

Sanford C. Goldberg

引用次数: 0

Beautiful, troubling art: in defense of non-summative judgment 美丽而令人不安的艺术：为非总结性判断辩护

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02229-0

P. Quinn White

{"title":"Beautiful, troubling art: in defense of non-summative judgment","authors":"P. Quinn White","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02229-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02229-0","url":null,"abstract":"Do the ethical features of an artwork bear on its aesthetic value? This movie endorses misogyny, that song is a civil rights anthem, the clay constituting this statue was extracted with underpaid labor—are facts like these the proper bases for aesthetic evaluation? I argue that this debate has suffered from a false presupposition: that if the answer is “yes” (for at least some such ethical features), such considerations feature as pro tanto contributions to an artwork’s overall aesthetic value, i.e., as merits or flaws which make something have more or less overall aesthetic value. As the case of ethically laden aesthetic evaluation makes clear, however, good aesthetic judgement is irreducibly multi-dimensional, e.g., “the movie has an engaging soundtrack, tasteful camera work, and takes a misogynistically purient perspective on its female lead.” Such a “non-summative” judgement refuses to reduce those various dimensions of aesthetic value to a single aggregate aesthetic evaluation, like “it’s a 6/10” or “it’s a pretty good movie!” I defend both the modest claim that such non-summative evaluations are not mistaken and the extremist claim that summative (i.e., unidimensional) aesthetic evaluation is defective by considering other domains of normative assessment in which summing seems inappropriate, notably including evaluations of people’s character.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142536578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0