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Knowledge and merely predictive evidence 知识和仅仅是预测证据
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9
Haley Schilling Anderson
{"title":"Knowledge and merely predictive evidence","authors":"Haley Schilling Anderson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A jury needs “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” in order to convict a defendant of a crime. The standard is vexingly difficult to pin down, but some legal epistemologists have given this account: knowledge is the standard of legal proof. On this account, a jury should deliver a guilty verdict just in case they know that the defendant is guilty. In this paper, I’ll argue that legal proof requires more than just knowledge that a defendant is guilty. In cases of “merely predictive evidence,” a jury knows that the defendant is guilty but does not have legal proof. What are they missing? Evidence that is causally downstream from the crime. Legal proof requires a “smoking gun.” The point generalizes outside of the courtroom. A professor needs to read a term paper before assigning a grade, even if she knows the student will produce A + work. You may know that your roommate will forget to water the plants while you are away—she is scatterbrained and always forgets these things—but you can’t blame her until you get back home and see that the plants are wilting. In order to have appropriate reactions or reactive attitudes, we must respond causally to what other people have done.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal inference from clinical experience
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x
Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga
{"title":"Causal inference from clinical experience","authors":"Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How reliable are causal inferences in complex empirical scenarios? For example, a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, and then the patient undergoes various changes to their symptoms. They then increase their confidence that it is the drug that causes such changes. Are such inferences reliable guides to the causal relation in question, particularly when the physician can gain a large volume of such clinical experience by treating many patients? The evidence-based medicine movement says no, while some physicians and philosophers support such appeals to first-person experience. We develop a formal model and simulate causal inference based on clinical experience. We conclude that in very particular clinical scenarios such inferences can be reliable, while in many other routine clinical scenarios such inferences are not reliable.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"275 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions 评估行动的可能性:对有意遗漏的程序性元认知观点
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y
Kaisa Kärki
{"title":"Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions","authors":"Kaisa Kärki","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action <i>not</i> done, the agent cannot further process the possibility of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: <i>who</i> is capable of intentionally omitting, <i>when</i> and <i>where</i> intentional omissions unfold, and <i>what</i> are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to <i>negative agency</i>, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overdetermination and causal connections
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0
Ezra Rubenstein
{"title":"Overdetermination and causal connections","authors":"Ezra Rubenstein","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some theories are alleged to be implausible because they are committed to systematic ‘overdetermination’. In response, some authors defend ‘compatibilism’: the view that the putative overdetermination is benign, like other unproblematic cases of a single effect having many sufficient causes. The literature has tended to focus on the following question: which relations between sufficient causes of a single effect ensure that problematic overdetermination is avoided? This paper argues that several widely endorsed answers to this question are subject to counterexample. It then proposes a diagnosis of this failure: the standard answers neglect what really matters––how the causes are connected to their shared effect. In particular, overdetermination is avoided when there are no independent causal connections.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6
Leonhard Menges
{"title":"Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy","authors":"Leonhard Menges","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Climate change is one of the most important issues we are currently facing. There are many ways in which states can fight climate change. Some of them involve interfering with citizens’ personal lives. The question of whether such interference is justified is under-explored in philosophy. This paper focuses on a specific aspect of people’s personal lives, namely their informational privacy. It discusses the question of whether, given certain empirical assumptions, it is proportional of the state to risk its citizens’ privacy or to risk infringing its citizens’ right to privacy to fight climate change. The main claim this paper argues for is that if fighting climate change and protecting our privacy conflict, we have good reason to fight climate change rather than protect our privacy.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142825050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w
Juan F. Álvarez
{"title":"Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism","authors":"Juan F. Álvarez","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge, skills, and creditability
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0
Carlotta Pavese
{"title":"Knowledge, skills, and creditability","authors":"Carlotta Pavese","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article discusses the relation between skills (or competences), creditability, and aptness. The positive suggestion is that we might make progress understanding the relation between creditability and aptness by inquiring more generally about how different kinds of competences and their exercise might underwrite allocation of credit. Whether or not a competence is acquired and whether or not a competence is actively exercised might matter for the credit that the agent deserves for the exercise of that competence. A fine-grained taxonomy of competences opens up the possibility of instinctual knowledge (knowledge by mere instincts) as well as the possibility of habitual knowledge (knowledge by mere habits), alongside knowledge by skills (or alongside knowledge by yet other sorts of competences). If instinctual knowledge were possible, it is suggested that it might not be of the sort that deserves credit at all. By piggybacking from the literature in evolutionary psychology, I suggest that, as inborn social learners, merely instinctual—and so not fully creditable—knowledge might be a reality for us.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The linguistic dead zone of value-aligned agency, natural and artificial
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w
Travis LaCroix
{"title":"The linguistic dead zone of value-aligned agency, natural and artificial","authors":"Travis LaCroix","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The value alignment problem for artificial intelligence (AI) asks how we can ensure that the “values”—i.e., objective functions—of artificial systems are aligned with the values of humanity. In this paper, I argue that linguistic communication is a necessary condition for robust value alignment. I discuss the consequences that the truth of this claim would have for research programmes that attempt to ensure value alignment for AI systems—or, more loftily, those programmes that seek to design robustly beneficial or ethical artificial <i>agents</i>.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142763082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to be a postmodal directionalist
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02237-0
Scott Dixon
{"title":"How to be a postmodal directionalist","authors":"Scott Dixon","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02237-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02237-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to directionalism, non-symmetric relations are distinct from their converses. Kit Fine (2000a) argues that the directionalist faces a dilemma; they must either (i) reject the principle Uniqueness, which states that no completion (fact, state of affairs, or proposition) is a completion of more than one relation, or (ii) reject the principle Identity, which states that each completion of a relation is identical to a completion of its converse (e.g., Dante’s loving Bice is identical to Bice’s being loved by Dante). Fine’s argument has been regarded as a decisive blow to directionalism. But new strategies for replying to it can be developed with the tools of the postmodal metaphysician, who is comfortable individuating relations and their completions hyperintensionally, allowing for necessary connections between distinct entities, and making use of hyperintensional notions like essence and grounding. In what follows, I develop postmodal strategies for denying both horns of Fine’s dilemma, concluding that the postmodal directionalist need not be concerned with Fine’s argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"261 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142763349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Closure and the structure of justification
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02245-0
Christoph Kelp, Matthew Jope
{"title":"Closure and the structure of justification","authors":"Christoph Kelp, Matthew Jope","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02245-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02245-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers two recent views on the structure of justification and closure of knowledge by Ernest Sosa. It provides reason to believe that neither view is ultimately viable and sketches a better alternative.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"116 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142758198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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