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In Defense of Bias: Replies to Berker, Greco, and Johnson 为偏见辩护对 Berker、Greco 和 Johnson 的答复
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02304-0
Thomas Kelly
{"title":"In Defense of Bias: Replies to Berker, Greco, and Johnson","authors":"Thomas Kelly","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02304-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02304-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This is a contribution to a book symposium on <i>Bias: A Philosophical Study</i>, in which I respond to commentaries by Gabbrielle Johnson, Daniel Greco, and Selim Berker. In response to Johnson, I argue that many paradigmatic cases of bias are not best understood as involving underdetermination, and I defend my alternative account of bias against the concerns that she raises. In response to Greco, I note some of the ways in which the credibility of my claims depends on further empirical research, and I clarify my claims about introspection in order to show that they are consistent with the possibilities that he raises. In response to Berker, I offer a view about the metaphysical status of “non-pejorative” biases while resisting his suggestion that all non-evaluative uses of the term “bias” are misuses of the term. I defend my proposal that our knowledge that skeptical hypotheses are false is a case of “biased knowing” against a dilemma that he raises for that possibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143775598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Extension and replacement
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02320-0
Michal Masny
{"title":"Extension and replacement","authors":"Michal Masny","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02320-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02320-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many people believe that it is better to extend the length of a happy life than to create a new happy life, even if the total welfare is the same in both cases. Despite the popularity of this view, one would be hard-pressed to find a fully compelling justification for it in the literature. This paper develops a novel account of why and when extension is better than replacement that applies not just to persons but also to non-human animals and humanity as a whole.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143782464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social kind essentialism
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02307-x
Asya Passinsky
{"title":"Social kind essentialism","authors":"Asya Passinsky","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02307-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02307-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There has been widespread opposition to so-called essentialism in contemporary social theory. At the same time, within contemporary analytic metaphysics, the notion of essence has been revived and put to work by neo-Aristotelians. The ‘new essentialism’ of the neo-Aristotelians opens the prospect for a new <i>social essentialism</i>—one that avoids the problematic commitments of the ‘old essentialism’ while also providing a helpful framework for social theorizing. In this paper, I develop a neo-Aristotelian brand of essentialism about social kinds and show how it avoids the legitimate worries of social theorists. I then argue that neo-Aristotelian social kind essentialism provides a helpful framework for a wide range of projects in social ontology and feminist metaphysics, including debunking projects, descriptive inquiries, and the project of achieving social change. I further argue that an essentialist framework is more useful than a grounding framework when it comes to certain legitimate theoretical and practical purposes in social theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143767077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vagueness without truth functionality? No worries
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02318-8
Bret Donnelly
{"title":"Vagueness without truth functionality? No worries","authors":"Bret Donnelly","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02318-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02318-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Among theories of vagueness, supervaluationism stands out for its non–truth functional account of the logical connectives. For example, the disjunction of two atomic statements that are not determinately true or false can, itself, come out <i>either</i> true or indeterminate, depending on its content—a consequence several philosophers find problematic. Smith (2016) turns this point against supervaluationism most pressingly, arguing that truth functionality is <i>essential</i> to any adequate model of truth. But this conclusion is too strong. Here, I argue that the problem with standard forms of supervaluationism is not the failure of truth functionality per se, but rather that they lack the structural resources necessary to <i>algorithmically</i> assign truth values to sentences based on their respective subject matters. However, recent developments of supervaluationism, which draw upon the cognitive science framework of conceptual spaces, resolve this issue. By incorporating conceptual information directly into their model-theoretic representations of the subject matters of sentences, these newer frameworks retain sensitivity to conceptual relations while providing consistent, content-based valuations of truth. Hence, their lack of truth functionality is nothing to worry about.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143736948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two types of AI existential risk: decisive and accumulative
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02301-3
Atoosa Kasirzadeh
{"title":"Two types of AI existential risk: decisive and accumulative","authors":"Atoosa Kasirzadeh","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02301-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02301-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The conventional discourse on existential risks (x-risks) from AI typically focuses on abrupt, dire events caused by advanced AI systems, particularly those that might achieve or surpass human-level intelligence. These events have severe consequences that either lead to human extinction or irreversibly cripple human civilization to a point beyond recovery. This decisive view, however, often neglects the serious possibility of AI x-risk manifesting gradually through an incremental series of smaller yet interconnected disruptions, crossing critical thresholds over time. This paper contrasts the conventional <i>decisive AI x-risk hypothesis</i> with what I call an <i>accumulative AI x-risk hypothesis</i>. While the former envisions an overt AI takeover pathway, characterized by scenarios like uncontrollable superintelligence, the latter suggests a different pathway to existential catastrophes. This involves a gradual accumulation of AI-induced threats such as severe vulnerabilities and systemic erosion of critical economic and political structures. The accumulative hypothesis suggests a boiling frog scenario where incremental AI risks slowly undermine systemic and societal resilience until a triggering event results in irreversible collapse. Through complex systems analysis, this paper examines the distinct assumptions differentiating these two hypotheses. It is then argued that the accumulative view can reconcile seemingly incompatible perspectives on AI risks. The implications of differentiating between the two types of pathway—the decisive and the accumulative—for the governance of AI as well as long-term AI safety are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"183 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143736949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A matter of principle? AI alignment as the fair treatment of claims
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02300-4
Iason Gabriel, Geoff Keeling
{"title":"A matter of principle? AI alignment as the fair treatment of claims","authors":"Iason Gabriel, Geoff Keeling","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02300-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02300-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The normative challenge of AI alignment centres upon what goals or values ought to be encoded in AI systems to govern their behaviour. A number of answers have been proposed, including the notion that AI must be aligned with human intentions or that it should aim to be helpful, honest and harmless. Nonetheless, both accounts suffer from critical weaknesses. On the one hand, they are incomplete: neither specification provides adequate guidance to AI systems, deployed across various domains with multiple parties. On the other hand, the justification for these approaches is questionable and, we argue, of the wrong kind. More specifically, neither approach takes seriously the need to justify the operation of AI systems to those affected by their actions – or what this means for pluralistic societies where people have different underlying beliefs about value. To address these limitations, we propose an alternative account of AI alignment that focuses on fair processes. We argue that principles that are the product of these processes are the appropriate target for alignment. This approach can meet the necessary standard of public justification, generate a fuller set of principles for AI that are sensitive to variation in context, and has explanatory power insofar as it makes sense of our intuitions about AI systems and points to a number of hitherto underappreciated ways in which an AI system may cease to be aligned.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143736950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Grounding, contingentism, and the reduction of metaphysical necessity to essence
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02309-9
Qichen Yan
{"title":"Grounding, contingentism, and the reduction of metaphysical necessity to essence","authors":"Qichen Yan","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02309-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02309-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Teitel (Mind 128:39-68, 2019) argues that the following three doctrines are jointly inconsistent: i) the doctrine that metaphysical necessity reduces to essence; ii) the doctrine that possibly something could fail to exist; and iii) the doctrine that metaphysical necessity obeys a modal logic of at least S4. This paper presents a novel solution to Teitel’s puzzle, regimented in a higher-order logical setting, which is crucially based on the idea that the putative reduction of metaphysical necessity to essence should be understood through appealing to some hyperintensional notion—such as grounding or real definition—rather than the notion of identity/identification. Moreover, it will also be shown that the proposed reductive account has a significant advantage over its rival account.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143695281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Liberal legitimacy and future citizens
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02308-w
Emil Andersson
{"title":"Liberal legitimacy and future citizens","authors":"Emil Andersson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02308-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02308-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>If the legitimate exercise of political power requires justifiability to all citizens, as John Rawls’s influential <i>Liberal Principle of Legitimacy</i> states, then what should we say about the legitimacy of institutions and actions that have a significant impact on the interests of future citizens? Surprisingly, this question has been neglected in the literature. This paper questions the assumption that it is only justifiability to presently existing citizens that matters, and provides reasons for thinking that legitimacy requires justifiability to future citizens as well. Further, it is argued that the presently dominant interpretation of Rawls’s principle is unable to take future citizens into account in an adequate way. Therefore, the inclusion of these citizens among those to whom justifiability is owed gives us good reasons to reject this interpretation, and to adopt a different understanding of the view.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143672505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the accuracy and aptness of suspension 关于悬挂的准确性和适当性
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02306-y
Sven Bernecker, Luis Rosa
{"title":"On the accuracy and aptness of suspension","authors":"Sven Bernecker, Luis Rosa","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02306-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02306-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper challenges Sosa’s account of the epistemic propriety of suspension of judgment. We take the reader on a test drive through some common problem cases in epistemology and argue that Sosa makes accurate and apt suspension both too easy and too hard.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143672506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge by acquaintance & impartial virtue
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02289-w
Emad H. Atiq
{"title":"Knowledge by acquaintance & impartial virtue","authors":"Emad H. Atiq","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02289-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02289-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Russell (Proc Aristot Soc 11:108–128, 1911; The Problems of Philosophy, Thornton Butterworth Limited, London, 1912) argued that perceptual experience grounds a species of non-propositional knowledge, “knowledge by acquaintance,” and in recent years, this account of knowledge has been gaining traction. I defend on its basis a connection between moral and epistemic failure. I argue, first, that insufficient concern for the suffering of others can be explained in terms of an agent’s lack of acquaintance knowledge of another’s suffering, and second, that empathy improves our epistemic situation. Empathic distress approximates acquaintance with another’s suffering, and empathic agents who are motivated to help rather than disengage exhibit an important epistemic virtue: a variety of intellectual courage. A key upshot is that an independently motivated account of the structure and significance of perceptual experience is shown to provide theoretical scaffolding for understanding a famously elusive idea in ethics—namely, that the failure to help others stems from a kind of ignorance of their situation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143618386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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