PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

Don’t mind the gap: how non-naturalists should explain normative facts 不要介意这种差距：非自然主义者应该如何解释规范事实

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02312-0

Singa Behrens

引用次数: 0

Inquiry, research, and articulate free agency 调查，研究和清晰的自由代理

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02337-5

Ram Neta

引用次数: 0

Does calibration mean what they say it means; or, the reference class problem rises again 校准的意思和他们说的一样吗？或者，引用类问题再次出现

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02322-y

Lily Hu

{"title":"Does calibration mean what they say it means; or, the reference class problem rises again","authors":"Lily Hu","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02322-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02322-y","url":null,"abstract":"Discussions of statistical criteria for fairness commonly convey the normative significance of calibration within groups by invoking what risk scores “mean.” On the Same Meaning picture, group-calibrated scores “mean the same thing” (on average) across individuals from different groups and accordingly, guard against disparate treatment of individuals based on group membership. My contention is that calibration guarantees no such thing. Since concrete actual people belong to many groups, calibration cannot ensure the kind of consistent score interpretation that the Same Meaning picture implies matters for fairness, unless calibration is met within every group to which an individual belongs. Alas only perfect predictors may meet this bar. The Same Meaning picture thus commits a reference class fallacy by inferring from calibration within some group to the “meaning” or evidential value of an individual’s score, because they are a member of that group. The reference class answer it presumes does not only lack justification; it is very likely wrong. I then show that the reference class problem besets not just calibration but other group statistical criteria that claim a close connection to fairness. Reflecting on the origins of this oversight opens a wider lens onto the predominant methodology in algorithmic fairness based on stylized cases.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143910292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Knowledge-first summativism about group evidence 关于群体证据的知识优先总结主义

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02315-x

Fernando Broncano-Berrocal

引用次数: 0

A perfectly free God cannot satisfice 完全自由的上帝无法满足

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02317-9

Luke Wilson

{"title":"A perfectly free God cannot satisfice","authors":"Luke Wilson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02317-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02317-9","url":null,"abstract":"To accept divine satisficing is to hold that it is possible for God to choose a worse option over a better one provided that the worse option is “good enough.” Divine satisficing plays an important role in certain responses to the problem of evil and problems of divine creation. Here I argue that if God is perfectly free, then divine satisficing is not possible even if it is permissible. To be perfectly free, in the sense intended here, is to be free from all non-rational influences, including desires or preferences not derived simply from the recognition of one’s external reasons. An account of divine motivation which allows for brute preferences is thus needed to accommodate divine satisficing. Thus, we should either accept a brute preference model of divine motivation or reject divine satisficing. In Sect. 1 I will give an overview of the debate on divine satisficing. After clarifying the nature of God’s reasons in Sect. 2, I will present my main argument that a perfectly free God cannot satisfice in Sect. 3 and introduce a brute preference model of divine action as an alternative to divine perfect freedom in Sect. 4. Finally, in Sect. 5 I discuss how my argument addresses countervailing considerations and the possibility that God does not face a single best option.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143857537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Four prejudices about scientific discovery and how to resolve them – with Alzheimer´s disease as a case study 关于科学发现的四种偏见以及如何解决它们——以阿尔茨海默病为例

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02327-7

Andreas Bartels

{"title":"Four prejudices about scientific discovery and how to resolve them – with Alzheimer´s disease as a case study","authors":"Andreas Bartels","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02327-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02327-7","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that four common prejudices have proven to be rather persistent obstacles to the development of an appropriate philosophical understanding of scientific discoveries: (1) the, already somewhat out-dated prejudice according to which scientific discoveries are non-rational and therefore not apt to philosophical analysis, (2) the prejudice that newly discovered scientific entities always possess sharp conceptual boundaries, (3) the prejudice that the notion of scientific discovery entails a commitment to realism about discovered entities, and (4) the prejudice that scientific discoveries are point events. In Sects. 2 to 5, I will present evidence against these four prejudices, mainly relying on the discovery of Alzheimer´s disease. In particular, while Kuhn (The Essential Tension, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 165–177, 1962) had dismissed prejudice (4) only with regard to discoveries that violate an existing paradigm, I will show it to be untenable even in a case (Alzheimer´s disease) where no paradigm has already prevailed. The rejection of prejudices (1) to (4) will lead us to a new picture according to which scientific discoveries do not always present fixed and conceptually well-determined entities, but may rather be constituted by successive steps of knowledge acquisition with respect to some moving target (Sect. 6).","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143857536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dead men do no deeds: moral responsibility without (robust) alternative possibilities 死人不做事：没有（强有力的）替代可能性的道德责任

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02328-6

Zachary Adam Akin

引用次数: 0

Disagreements in understanding 理解上的分歧

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02326-8

Federica Isabella Malfatti

{"title":"Disagreements in understanding","authors":"Federica Isabella Malfatti","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02326-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02326-8","url":null,"abstract":"The topic of disagreement has captured a great deal of attention among epistemologists in recent years. In this paper, I want to raise the issue of disagreement for the epistemic aim of understanding. I will address three main issues. The first concerns the nature of understanding disagreement. What do disagreements in understanding amount to? What kind of disagreement is at play when two agents understand something differently, or have a different understanding of something? The second concerns the norms of rational epistemic behavior in dealing with understanding disagreements. How should an agent react in realizing that another agent understands things differently than she does? The third concerns the value of understanding disagreements. Are understanding disagreements valuable? What is there to gain from understanding disagreements, and what is there to learn from those who understand things differently than we do? My arguments lend support to three main theses. The first is that understanding disagreements are interestingly different from familiar doxastic disagreements. The second is that reasonable understanding disagreements are possible, and hence that we are often entitled to stand our ground in face of an understanding disagreement. The third is that understanding disagreements can have epistemic value, because they can lead to modal insight.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143857534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics 量子力学多世界诠释中的自由意志

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02314-y

David John Baker

引用次数: 0

Neurodiversity, identity, and hypostatic abstraction 神经多样性，同一性和实体抽象

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02324-w

Sarah Arnaud, Quinn Hiroshi Gibson

{"title":"Neurodiversity, identity, and hypostatic abstraction","authors":"Sarah Arnaud, Quinn Hiroshi Gibson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02324-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02324-w","url":null,"abstract":"The Neurodiversity (ND) movement demands that some psychiatric categories be de-pathologized. It has faced much criticism, leading some to despair whether it can ever be brought together with psychiatry. In this paper, we argue for a particular understanding of this central demand of the ND movement. We argue that the demand for de-pathologizing is the rejection of (paradigmatically) autism as a hypostatic abstraction; the ND movement is committed, first and foremost, to the reconceptualization of autism not as something one has, but as something one is. We distinguish between two senses of autistic identity —one pre-reflective, and one social and political— operative in this reconceptualization. This understanding of the ND movement is centrally about a rethinking of the relation between a subject and a psychiatric label. It is not about reconceptualizing psychiatric categories in terms of advantageous variations, as we believe critics fear. Our understanding of what the ND movement is asking for has the noteworthy consequence that many of the most influential criticisms of the ND movement are missing the mark and worries about the impossibility of reconciling the movement with psychiatry are unwarranted.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143813982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0