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The story of the tablecloth: deriving “before” from atemporal notions 桌布的故事：从世俗的概念推导出“以前”
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02305-z
Daniel Saudek
{"title":"The story of the tablecloth: deriving “before” from atemporal notions","authors":"Daniel Saudek","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02305-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02305-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article develops a new account of the relation “before” between events. It does so by taking the set of all states of an object, irrespective of any presupposed order, and then finding the order between events by exploiting a characteristic asymmetry which appears on this set, called the “record asymmetry”. It is shown that the record asymmetry 1. implies a weak temporal order (“before or simultaneous with”), and 2. is necessary for measuring a strong temporal order (“before”). I then propose a condition necessary and sufficient for a strong temporal order in terms of the set of states of a single object. The upshot is that temporal ordering is not ontologically primitive, but reducible to the record asymmetry. Also, it is a local phenomenon which requires no global temporal structure of spacetime.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opacity in the book of the world? 世界之书的不透明？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02310-2
Nicholas K. Jones
{"title":"Opacity in the book of the world?","authors":"Nicholas K. Jones","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02310-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02310-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the view that the vocabulary of metaphysical fundamentality is opaque, using Sider’s theory of structure as a motivating case study throughout. Two conceptions of fundamentality are distinguished, only one of which can explain why the vocabulary of fundamentality is opaque.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Credence and belief: epistemic decision theory revisited 信任与信念：重新审视认知决策理论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z
Minkyung Wang
{"title":"Credence and belief: epistemic decision theory revisited","authors":"Minkyung Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper employs epistemic decision theory to explore rational bridge principles between probabilistic beliefs and deductively cogent beliefs. I re-examine Hempel and Levi’s epistemic decision theories and generalize them by introducing a novel rationality norm for belief binarization. This norm posits that an agent ought to have binary beliefs that maximize expected utility in light of their credences. Our findings reveal that the proposed norm implies certain geometrical principles, namely convexity norms. Building upon this framework, I critically evaluate the Humean thesis in Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief and Lin-Kelly’s tracking theory. We establish the impossibility results, demonstrating that those theories violate the proposed norms and consequently fail to do the job of expected utility maximization. In contrast, we discover alternative approaches that align with all of the proposed norms, such as generating beliefs that minimize a Bregman divergence from credences. Our epistemic decision theory for belief binarization can be compared to Dorst’s accuracy argument for the Lockean thesis. We conclude that deductively cogent expected accuracy maximizers are neither Lockean nor Humean.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume’s methodological solipsism 休谟的唯我论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02334-8
Tamas Demeter
{"title":"Hume’s methodological solipsism","authors":"Tamas Demeter","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02334-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02334-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers a new interpretation of Hume’s <i>Treatise</i> as a work written by a methodological solipsist. It argues that Hume anticipates later developments by launching a Fodorian project that is to be realised by Carnapian means. Hume develops an explanatory theory of mental operations based on an analysis conducted by way of similarity recollections in the stream of experience. The paper first presents the case for Hume’s commitment to methodological solipsism and then offers a reconstruction of the methodology with which his project is to be executed. Hume proceeds by analysing perceptions and the connections between them to account for their “nature” and the “principles” underlying their interaction. His analyses reveal the solipsistic methodological credo that Hume did not make explicit.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘On Being Debased’ 《论被贬低》
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6
Thomas Raleigh
{"title":"‘On Being Debased’","authors":"Thomas Raleigh","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A standard form of skeptical scenario, in the tradition of Descartes’ evil demon, raises the prospect that our sensory experiences are deceptive. A less familiar and importantly different kind of skeptical scenario raises the prospect that our beliefs have been <i>debased</i> (Schaffer, 2010). This paper provides a new and improved way of resisting this latter kind of debasing skepticism. Along the way, I explore how the debasing demon scenario connects with some potentially controversial epistemological principles and clear up various neglected or misunderstood points concerning debasing skepticism.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is there a tension between AI safety and AI welfare? 人工智能安全和人工智能福利之间是否存在紧张关系？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02302-2
Robert Long, Jeff Sebo, Toni Sims
{"title":"Is there a tension between AI safety and AI welfare?","authors":"Robert Long, Jeff Sebo, Toni Sims","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02302-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02302-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The field of AI safety considers whether and how AI development can be safe and beneficial for humans and other animals, and the field of AI welfare considers whether and how AI development can be safe and beneficial for AI systems. There is a prima facie tension between these projects, since some measures in AI safety, if deployed against humans and other animals, would raise questions about the ethics of constraint, deception, surveillance, alteration, suffering, death, disenfranchisement, and more. Is there in fact a tension between these projects? We argue that, considering all relevant factors, there is indeed a moderately strong tension—and it deserves more examination. In particular, we should devise interventions that can promote both safety and welfare where possible, and prepare frameworks for navigating any remaining tensions thoughtfully.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144133727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Grasp as a universal requirement for understanding 掌握是理解的普遍要求
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02342-8
Michael Strevens
{"title":"Grasp as a universal requirement for understanding","authors":"Michael Strevens","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02342-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02342-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many varieties of understanding subsist in a thinker’s having the right kind of mental connection to a certain body of fact (or putative fact), a connection often called “grasp”. The use of a single term suggests a single connection that does the job in every kind of understanding. Then again, “grasp” might be an umbrella term covering a diverse plurality of understanding-granting mind-world relations. This paper argues for the former, unified view of grasp in two ways. First, it advances a broad, ability-based construal of grasp, along with a test for lack of grasp, that suggests that a certain specific connection plays an essential role in many varieties of understanding. Second, the paper considers a number of challenges to the thesis of unity that arise in a range of different kinds of understanding (scientific, moral, objectual, humanistic), and seeks to disarm them.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can one understand explanations of aesthetic value via testimony? Exploration of an issue from Sosa Epistemic Explanations Ch.1 我们能通过证言来理解审美价值的解释吗？索萨认识论解释中一个问题的探讨第1章
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02325-9
Elizabeth Fricker
{"title":"Can one understand explanations of aesthetic value via testimony? Exploration of an issue from Sosa Epistemic Explanations Ch.1","authors":"Elizabeth Fricker","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02325-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02325-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sosa holds one may rationally want to understand how the specific features of a particular artwork ground its aesthetic value, and that this understanding cannot be gained at second-hand. Such understanding requires one to have insight into the link between grounding features and that value, and this can only be gained through first-hand engagement with the artwork. I distinguish two senses of second-hand. In one sense Sosa is correct that one cannot understand why P at second-hand: one must have insight oneself into the link between explanans and explanandum, and this is an exercise of one’s own mental power. But this allows another sense in which understanding may be gained at second-hand, via a description of an artwork provided to one through testimony. I argue that an expert can attain understanding of how key features of an artwork ground its aesthetic value from a suitably rich description of it. Sosa has misidentified the epistemic good that can only be obtained from first-hand engagement with an artwork. This is not understanding of what makes it good, but an enjoyable episode of aesthetic appreciation of it.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A challenge for experiential passage realism 对经验通道现实主义的挑战
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02330-y
Kristie Miller
{"title":"A challenge for experiential passage realism","authors":"Kristie Miller","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02330-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02330-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper I outline a challenge for experiential passage realism, the view that we veridically perceptually experience the robust passage of time. The challenge lies in accommodating recent empirical data, according to which ~ 35% of people do not report that it seems as though time robustly passes, and ~ 65% report that it does. I argue that offering a plausible explanation for this data is especially challenging for the experiential passage realist. This gives us reason to reject experiential passage realism either by adopting a form of passage realism according to which although time robustly passes, we do not experience its passing, or by adopting deflationism, the view that time does not robustly pass, and we have veridical experiences of a passageless world.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143940119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Don’t mind the gap: how non-naturalists should explain normative facts 不要介意这种差距：非自然主义者应该如何解释规范事实
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02312-0
Singa Behrens
{"title":"Don’t mind the gap: how non-naturalists should explain normative facts","authors":"Singa Behrens","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02312-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02312-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I present and defend a novel way for non-naturalists to account for the sui generis status of normative facts, which is consistent with the claim that contingent normative facts obtain in virtue of non-normative facts. According to what I call unsupplemented partial ground approach, non-derivative normative facts have non-normative partial grounds, but are not fully grounded in any collection of facts. This view entails that an explanatory gap separates the normative from the non-normative domain. I argue that this account provides non-naturalists with a metaphysically coherent response to the challenge of accounting for explanatory dependence relations between two domains while positing metaphysical discontinuity (explanatory challenge), and avoids serious objections that alternative non-naturalist accounts face. Moreover, I show that the unsupplemented partial ground approach is an attractive option for the popular Reasons-First approach, which is often, but I argue prematurely, considered a particularly promising account for non-naturalists.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"115 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143910294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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