{"title":"Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition","authors":"Brandon James Ashby","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Perceptual liberals have offered numerous arguments claiming to show that kind-representing perceptual phenomenology exists, which raises questions about what it is like to perceive objects as belonging to different kinds. Yet almost no effort has been made to answer these questions. This quietism invites the concern that liberalism may be a defunct research program: unable to answer the questions raised by its own development. Building on work by P.F. Strawson, a recent surge of empirical research, and theoretical considerations from the Helmholtzian paradigm of perceptual psychology, I argue that perceptual experience can complete the stereotypical features, behaviors, and affordances of kinds of objects even when only some of those features/behaviors/affordances are “on display”, just as it can complete the shape of a cat behind a picket fence in amodal completion. The phenomenal character of high-level kind perception, I argue, is grounded in stereotype completion.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to ground (higher-order) identities","authors":"Tien-Chun Lo","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02292-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02292-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The purity principle requires that identity truths such as “Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus” are grounded. This argument from purity for the groundedness of identity truths for <i>first-order</i> entities can be naturally generalized to higher-order identities like “to be a vixen is to be a female fox.” In this paper, I will examine various accounts of the grounds of identity truths by taking the cases of higher-order identities into consideration. Drawing on some essentialist insights, I will propose a novel account and argue that it offers an attractive explanation of how identities, including both first-order and higher-order cases, are grounded.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"129 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bias, machine learning, and conceptual engineering","authors":"Rachel Etta Rudolph, Elay Shech, Michael Tamir","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02273-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02273-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT reflect, and can potentially perpetuate, social biases in language use. Conceptual engineering aims to revise our concepts to eliminate such bias. We show how machine learning and conceptual engineering can be fruitfully brought together to offer new insights to both conceptual engineers and LLM designers. Specifically, we suggest that LLMs can be used to detect and expose bias in the prototypes associated with concepts, and that LLM de-biasing can serve conceptual engineering projects that aim to revise such conceptual prototypes. At present, these de-biasing techniques primarily involve approaches requiring bespoke interventions based on choices of the algorithm’s designers. Thus, conceptual engineering through de-biasing will include making choices about what kind of normative training an LLM should receive, especially with respect to different notions of bias. This offers a new perspective on what conceptual engineering involves and how it can be implemented. And our conceptual engineering approach also offers insight, to those engaged in LLM de-biasing, into the normative distinctions that are needed for that work.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143435655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A dualist theory of experience","authors":"Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call <i>delegatory dualism</i>—experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Graded genericity","authors":"Junhyo Lee, Anthony Nguyen","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02243-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02243-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Any adequate semantics of generic sentences (e.g., “Philosophers evaluate arguments”) must accommodate both what we call <i>the positive data</i> and <i>the negative data</i>. The positive data consists of observations about what felicitous interpretations of generic sentences are available. Conversely, the negative data consists of observations about which interpretations of generic sentences are <i>un</i>available. Nguyen argues that only his pragmatic neo-Gricean account and Sterken’s indexical account can accommodate the positive data. Lee and Nguyen have advanced the debate by arguing that the negative data is a problem for both Nguyen’s and Sterken’s accounts; these two accounts seem to incorrectly predict that generics have felicitous interpretations that they, in fact, fail to have. In this paper, we advance this debate—and, more generally, the task of developing an adequate formal semantics of generics—by arguing that a neglected class of theories are compatible with both the positive data and the negative data. Specifically, we argue that treating the generic operator GEN as a relative gradable expression with a positive, upper- and lower- bounded scale helps accommodate the positive data and the negative data. While developing this view, we show how several previously developed semantics of generics may systematically accommodate both sets of data. One broad contribution of this paper is to show that, while they generate important desiderata, the positive and negative data cannot determine a unique semantics for generics. A further contribution of this paper is to highlight previously unnoted ways in which degree semantics may inform semantic theories of generic meaning.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The normative insignificance of the will","authors":"Jason Kay","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02287-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02287-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Clearly, the fact that you are committed to these projects and those people is practically relevant. For example, a commitment to gardening can make it especially sensible for me to garden this afternoon, even in the presence of an equally and sufficiently good alternative like woodworking. We might capture commitment’s distinctive import by saying that it puts us in a ‘special relationship’ to the projects to which we are committed. But how do we go beyond the metaphor? After discussing the view that commitments bear on action by virtue of being a kind of normatively efficacious willing, I suggest that we reconceive commitment as a source of rational requirements. On my preferred view, a commitment to gardening strictly requires me to conduct my deliberation in a gardening-friendly way insofar as I remain committed. The distinctive way in which my commitment to gardening constrains my deliberation gives content to the metaphor without admitting special reasons or a powerful will. If my analysis is correct, then commitment’s practical import lends little support to voluntarist conceptions of normativity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"176 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nothing to it?: generalized identity and zero-grounding","authors":"Jessica Leech","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02279-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02279-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of this paper is to make some headway in understanding the notion of zero-grounding. The account of grounding in terms of generalized identity, proposed by Correia and Skiles (2019), is employed to clarify issues of ground and zero-ground. I discuss some options for accommodating zero-grounding. According to one option, we slide dangerously close to violating the irreflexivity of ground. According to another option, zero-grounding leads to a worrying kind of overdetermination. A third option offers a way out, but a challenge remains of how best to make sense of it. I further contend that these arguments broaden to concern any notion of grounding according to which groundees are “nothing over and above” their grounds. Ultimately, the aim of this paper is exploratory. It lays out some of the different options and challenges that face the grounding theorist who wants to make sense of zero-grounding.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Definition by proxy","authors":"Samuel Z. Elgin","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02276-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02276-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions (it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the <i>Identification Hypothesis</i> (if <i>F</i> is, by definition, <i>G</i>, then there is a sense in which <i>F</i> is the same as <i>G</i>), <i>Irreflexivity</i> (there are no reflexive definitions), and <i>Leibniz’s Law</i>. Additionally, it possesses the resources needed to resolve the paradox of analysis.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"53 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143371515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Insight, perceptio, and Sosa on firsthand knowledge","authors":"Jack Lyons","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02286-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02286-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sosa emphasizes \"firsthand intuitive insight\" as a distinctive kind of epistemic aim and argues that this is a characteristic epistemic goal of humanistic inquiry. He draws from this some importantly antiskeptical conclusions for the epistemology of disagreement. I try to further develop this idea of insight, which I call ‘<i>perceptio</i>’, in which we \"see\" some truth to obtain. I agree that it is a distinctive epistemic good, although I think it is central to understanding in general and not just in the humanities. It is also central to a specific kind of knowing-that that does not involve understanding. The precise way in which <i>perceptio</i> is a distinctive epistemic good means that, although it cannot do the antiskeptical work for disagreement that Sosa probably wants, it can do some related work.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143371512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introspecting bias","authors":"Daniel Greco","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02295-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02295-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his recent book, (Bias: A Philosophical Study, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022). Thomas Kelly argues that various phenomena that look initially like examples of how irrational we are in thinking about bias—especially our own biases—turn out to be exactly what you’d expect from ideally rational agents. The phenomena he discusses which I’ll focus on are (1) our inability to introspectively identify our biases, and (2) our tendency to respond to accusations of bias with counteraccusations. In this paper, I’ll concede that Kelly is right about how ideally rational agents would think about their biases, while raising questions about whether the fact that we think similarly is best explained by our rationality. In §2, I’ll explain how Kelly’s “perspectival account of bias attributions” predicts that rational agents would be unable to identify their own biases, and would respond to accusations of bias with counter-accusations of bias. In §3, I’ll describe how a certain sort of irrational agent would behave differently—these irrational agents would respond to accusations of bias with searching introspection, and that introspection might reliably turn up evidence of bias, which would then lead them to change their views in the direction of being less biased. We are clearly not such agents, since we do exhibit (1) and (2). I’ll argue that the sort of behavior we exhibit could be explained either because we’re more rational than the agents described, or because we’re less rational than them—just as incoherent, but also worse at introspectively noticing our incoherence. I’ll argue that it’s an empirical question, to which Kelly’s arguments don’t speak, whether the fact that we exhibit (1) and (2) is best explained by our rationality, or our irrationality.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143371529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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