PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

The story of the tablecloth: deriving “before” from atemporal notions 桌布的故事：从世俗的概念推导出“以前”

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02305-z

Daniel Saudek

引用次数: 0

Opacity in the book of the world? 世界之书的不透明？

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02310-2

Nicholas K. Jones

引用次数: 0

Credence and belief: epistemic decision theory revisited 信任与信念：重新审视认知决策理论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z

Minkyung Wang

{"title":"Credence and belief: epistemic decision theory revisited","authors":"Minkyung Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z","url":null,"abstract":"This paper employs epistemic decision theory to explore rational bridge principles between probabilistic beliefs and deductively cogent beliefs. I re-examine Hempel and Levi’s epistemic decision theories and generalize them by introducing a novel rationality norm for belief binarization. This norm posits that an agent ought to have binary beliefs that maximize expected utility in light of their credences. Our findings reveal that the proposed norm implies certain geometrical principles, namely convexity norms. Building upon this framework, I critically evaluate the Humean thesis in Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief and Lin-Kelly’s tracking theory. We establish the impossibility results, demonstrating that those theories violate the proposed norms and consequently fail to do the job of expected utility maximization. In contrast, we discover alternative approaches that align with all of the proposed norms, such as generating beliefs that minimize a Bregman divergence from credences. Our epistemic decision theory for belief binarization can be compared to Dorst’s accuracy argument for the Lockean thesis. We conclude that deductively cogent expected accuracy maximizers are neither Lockean nor Humean.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Hume’s methodological solipsism 休谟的唯我论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02334-8

Tamas Demeter

引用次数: 0

‘On Being Debased’ 《论被贬低》

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02352-6

Thomas Raleigh

引用次数: 0

Is there a tension between AI safety and AI welfare? 人工智能安全和人工智能福利之间是否存在紧张关系？

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02302-2

Robert Long, Jeff Sebo, Toni Sims

引用次数: 0

What’s in a name? Qualitativism and parsimony 名字里有什么？质变论和简约论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02280-x

Daniel S. Murphy

引用次数: 0

The hard proxy problem: proxies aren’t intentional; they’re intentional 硬代理问题：代理不是有意的；他们是故意的

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02333-9

Gabbrielle M. Johnson

{"title":"The hard proxy problem: proxies aren’t intentional; they’re intentional","authors":"Gabbrielle M. Johnson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02333-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02333-9","url":null,"abstract":"This paper concerns the proxy problem: often machine learning programs utilize seemingly innocuous features as proxies for socially-sensitive attributes, posing various challenges for the creation of ethical algorithms. I argue that to address this problem, we must first settle a prior question of what it means for an algorithm that only has access to seemingly neutral features to be using those features as “proxies” for, and so to be making decisions on the basis of, protected-class features. Borrowing resources from philosophy of mind and language, I argue that the answer depends on whether discrimination against those protected classes explains the algorithm’s selection of individuals. This approach rules out standard theories of proxy discrimination in law and computer science that rely on overly intellectual views of agent intentions or on overly deflationary views that reduce proxy use to statistical correlation. Instead, my theory highlights two distinct ways an algorithm can reason using proxies: either the proxies themselves are meaningfully about the protected classes, highlighting a new kind of intentional content for philosophical theories in mind and language; or the algorithm explicitly represents the protected-class features themselves, and proxy discrimination becomes regular, old, run-of-the-mill discrimination.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Grasp as a universal requirement for understanding 掌握是理解的普遍要求

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02342-8

Michael Strevens

引用次数: 0

Can one understand explanations of aesthetic value via testimony? Exploration of an issue from Sosa Epistemic Explanations Ch.1 我们能通过证言来理解审美价值的解释吗？索萨认识论解释中一个问题的探讨第1章

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02325-9

Elizabeth Fricker

{"title":"Can one understand explanations of aesthetic value via testimony? Exploration of an issue from Sosa Epistemic Explanations Ch.1","authors":"Elizabeth Fricker","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02325-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02325-9","url":null,"abstract":"Sosa holds one may rationally want to understand how the specific features of a particular artwork ground its aesthetic value, and that this understanding cannot be gained at second-hand. Such understanding requires one to have insight into the link between grounding features and that value, and this can only be gained through first-hand engagement with the artwork. I distinguish two senses of second-hand. In one sense Sosa is correct that one cannot understand why P at second-hand: one must have insight oneself into the link between explanans and explanandum, and this is an exercise of one’s own mental power. But this allows another sense in which understanding may be gained at second-hand, via a description of an artwork provided to one through testimony. I argue that an expert can attain understanding of how key features of an artwork ground its aesthetic value from a suitably rich description of it. Sosa has misidentified the epistemic good that can only be obtained from first-hand engagement with an artwork. This is not understanding of what makes it good, but an enjoyable episode of aesthetic appreciation of it.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144067251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0