PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

A perfectly free God cannot satisfice 完全自由的上帝无法满足

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02317-9

Luke Wilson

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引用次数: 0

Four prejudices about scientific discovery and how to resolve them – with Alzheimer´s disease as a case study 关于科学发现的四种偏见以及如何解决它们——以阿尔茨海默病为例

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02327-7

Andreas Bartels

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引用次数: 0

Dead men do no deeds: moral responsibility without (robust) alternative possibilities 死人不做事：没有（强有力的）替代可能性的道德责任

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02328-6

Zachary Adam Akin

引用次数: 0

Disagreements in understanding 理解上的分歧

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02326-8

Federica Isabella Malfatti

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引用次数: 0

Free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics 量子力学多世界诠释中的自由意志

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02314-y

David John Baker

引用次数: 0

Neurodiversity, identity, and hypostatic abstraction 神经多样性，同一性和实体抽象

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02324-w

Sarah Arnaud, Quinn Hiroshi Gibson

{"title":"Neurodiversity, identity, and hypostatic abstraction","authors":"Sarah Arnaud, Quinn Hiroshi Gibson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02324-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02324-w","url":null,"abstract":"The Neurodiversity (ND) movement demands that some psychiatric categories be de-pathologized. It has faced much criticism, leading some to despair whether it can ever be brought together with psychiatry. In this paper, we argue for a particular understanding of this central demand of the ND movement. We argue that the demand for de-pathologizing is the rejection of (paradigmatically) autism as a hypostatic abstraction; the ND movement is committed, first and foremost, to the reconceptualization of autism not as something one has, but as something one is. We distinguish between two senses of autistic identity —one pre-reflective, and one social and political— operative in this reconceptualization. This understanding of the ND movement is centrally about a rethinking of the relation between a subject and a psychiatric label. It is not about reconceptualizing psychiatric categories in terms of advantageous variations, as we believe critics fear. Our understanding of what the ND movement is asking for has the noteworthy consequence that many of the most influential criticisms of the ND movement are missing the mark and worries about the impossibility of reconciling the movement with psychiatry are unwarranted.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143813982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Public reason, values in science, and the shifting boundaries of the political forum 公共理性、科学价值观和政治论坛边界的变化

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02323-x

Gabriele Badano

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引用次数: 0

In Defense of Bias: Replies to Berker, Greco, and Johnson 为偏见辩护对 Berker、Greco 和 Johnson 的答复

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02304-0

Thomas Kelly

引用次数: 0

Extension and replacement 延长和更换

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02320-0

Michal Masny

引用次数: 0

Social kind essentialism 社会类本质主义