{"title":"On being good friends with a bad person","authors":"Yiran Hua","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02294-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02294-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophers believe that it counts against one morally if one is close and good friends with a bad person. Some argue that one acts badly by counting a bad person as a good friend, because such friendships carry significant moral risks. Others locate the moral badness in one’s moral psychology, suggesting that one becomes objectionably complacent by being good friends with a bad person. In this paper, I argue that none of these accounts are plausible. In fact, I propose that the starting intuition, that there is something <i>pro tanto</i> morally bad in being close and good friends with a bad person, does not track ethical reality. A person’s friend list isn’t at all in-principle informative of a person’s moral character. I also diagnose why we nonetheless have this mistaken intuition. I propose that friendships are <i>fragmented</i> in two crucial aspects. Once we observe these fragmentations, our initially mistaken intuition completely goes away.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143570384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Précis of Bias: A Philosophical Study”","authors":"Thomas Kelly","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02303-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02303-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I provide an overview of some of the main ideas presented in my book <i>Bias: A Philosophical Study</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143570386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"AI safety: a climb to Armageddon?","authors":"Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever, John Hawthorne","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02297-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02297-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents an argument that certain AI safety measures, rather than\u0000mitigating existential risk, may instead exacerbate it. Under certain key assumptions -\u0000the inevitability of AI failure, the expected correlation between an AI system's power at\u0000the point of failure and the severity of the resulting harm, and the tendency of safety\u0000measures to enable AI systems to become more powerful before failing - safety efforts\u0000have negative expected utility. The paper examines three response strategies:\u0000Optimism, Mitigation, and Holism. Each faces challenges stemming from intrinsic\u0000features of the AI safety landscape that we term Bottlenecking, the Perfection Barrier,\u0000and Equilibrium Fluctuation. The surprising robustness of the argument forces a reexamination\u0000of core assumptions around AI safety and points to several avenues for\u0000further research.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143570380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Off-switching not guaranteed","authors":"Sven Neth","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02296-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02296-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) propose the Off-Switch Game, a model of Human-AI cooperation in which AI agents always defer to humans because they are uncertain about our preferences. I explain two reasons why AI agents might not defer. First, AI agents might not value learning. Second, even if AI agents value learning, they might not be certain to learn our actual preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meaning-driven unacceptability, the semantics–pragmatics interface and the “spontaneous logicality of language”","authors":"Guillermo Del Pinal","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02298-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02298-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There is a class of expressions which are perceived as ‘ungrammatical’ not because they are syntactically ill-formed but because they have interpretations which are informationally trivial. Triviality-driven unacceptability constrains the distribution of determiners, modals, attitude verbs, exhaustifiers, approximatives, among many other classes of logical terms. At the same time, many superficial tautologies and contradictions—pre-theoretically, the clearest examples of trivial expressions—are judged to be perfectly acceptable. This paper discusses two promising yet fundamentally opposed attempts to model triviality-driven unacceptability without over-generating ‘ungrammaticality’ judgments. One approach combines the ‘Logicality’ view that the language system includes a deductive-inferential system (DS) that automatically identifies and filters out expressions with trivial interpretations, with the hypothesis that the DS runs on ‘modulated logical forms’, i.e., structures where all content-based terms and variables are subject to meaning-modulation operations. The other approach downplays Logicality and tries to reduce triviality-driven unacceptability to familiar kinds of pragmatic infelicities. The Logicality-based approach, I argue, is superior to the most sophisticated attempts to treat triviality-driven unacceptability as a species of pragmatic infelicity. This result suggests that our purely linguistic and logical competences are deeply intertwined, and sheds new light on the division of labor between syntax, semantics and pragmatics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Let sleeping dogs lie: stereotype completion and the Phenomenology of category recognition","authors":"Brandon James Ashby","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02268-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Perceptual liberals have offered numerous arguments claiming to show that kind-representing perceptual phenomenology exists, which raises questions about what it is like to perceive objects as belonging to different kinds. Yet almost no effort has been made to answer these questions. This quietism invites the concern that liberalism may be a defunct research program: unable to answer the questions raised by its own development. Building on work by P.F. Strawson, a recent surge of empirical research, and theoretical considerations from the Helmholtzian paradigm of perceptual psychology, I argue that perceptual experience can complete the stereotypical features, behaviors, and affordances of kinds of objects even when only some of those features/behaviors/affordances are “on display”, just as it can complete the shape of a cat behind a picket fence in amodal completion. The phenomenal character of high-level kind perception, I argue, is grounded in stereotype completion.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to ground (higher-order) identities","authors":"Tien-Chun Lo","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02292-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02292-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The purity principle requires that identity truths such as “Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus” are grounded. This argument from purity for the groundedness of identity truths for <i>first-order</i> entities can be naturally generalized to higher-order identities like “to be a vixen is to be a female fox.” In this paper, I will examine various accounts of the grounds of identity truths by taking the cases of higher-order identities into consideration. Drawing on some essentialist insights, I will propose a novel account and argue that it offers an attractive explanation of how identities, including both first-order and higher-order cases, are grounded.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"129 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bias, machine learning, and conceptual engineering","authors":"Rachel Etta Rudolph, Elay Shech, Michael Tamir","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02273-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02273-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT reflect, and can potentially perpetuate, social biases in language use. Conceptual engineering aims to revise our concepts to eliminate such bias. We show how machine learning and conceptual engineering can be fruitfully brought together to offer new insights to both conceptual engineers and LLM designers. Specifically, we suggest that LLMs can be used to detect and expose bias in the prototypes associated with concepts, and that LLM de-biasing can serve conceptual engineering projects that aim to revise such conceptual prototypes. At present, these de-biasing techniques primarily involve approaches requiring bespoke interventions based on choices of the algorithm’s designers. Thus, conceptual engineering through de-biasing will include making choices about what kind of normative training an LLM should receive, especially with respect to different notions of bias. This offers a new perspective on what conceptual engineering involves and how it can be implemented. And our conceptual engineering approach also offers insight, to those engaged in LLM de-biasing, into the normative distinctions that are needed for that work.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143435655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A dualist theory of experience","authors":"Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02290-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Dualism holds that experiences somehow arise from physical states, despite being neither identical with nor grounded in such states. This paper motivates a stringent set of constraints on constructing a dualist theory of experience. To meet the constraints, a dualist theory must: (1) construe experiences as causes of physical effects, (2) ensure that experiences do not cause observable violations of the causal closure of the physical domain, (3) avoid overdetermination, (4) specify a set of psychophysical laws that yield experiences as a function of physical states, and (5) ensure that functional duplication preserves phenomenology. After motivating these constraints and explaining why existing dualist theories satisfy only some of them, I construct a dualist theory that satisfies all of them. On the resulting theory—which I call <i>delegatory dualism</i>—experiences uphold causal responsibilities “delegated” to them by physical states.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Graded genericity","authors":"Junhyo Lee, Anthony Nguyen","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02243-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02243-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Any adequate semantics of generic sentences (e.g., “Philosophers evaluate arguments”) must accommodate both what we call <i>the positive data</i> and <i>the negative data</i>. The positive data consists of observations about what felicitous interpretations of generic sentences are available. Conversely, the negative data consists of observations about which interpretations of generic sentences are <i>un</i>available. Nguyen argues that only his pragmatic neo-Gricean account and Sterken’s indexical account can accommodate the positive data. Lee and Nguyen have advanced the debate by arguing that the negative data is a problem for both Nguyen’s and Sterken’s accounts; these two accounts seem to incorrectly predict that generics have felicitous interpretations that they, in fact, fail to have. In this paper, we advance this debate—and, more generally, the task of developing an adequate formal semantics of generics—by arguing that a neglected class of theories are compatible with both the positive data and the negative data. Specifically, we argue that treating the generic operator GEN as a relative gradable expression with a positive, upper- and lower- bounded scale helps accommodate the positive data and the negative data. While developing this view, we show how several previously developed semantics of generics may systematically accommodate both sets of data. One broad contribution of this paper is to show that, while they generate important desiderata, the positive and negative data cannot determine a unique semantics for generics. A further contribution of this paper is to highlight previously unnoted ways in which degree semantics may inform semantic theories of generic meaning.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143443376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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