PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献_第2页

Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions 评估行动的可能性：对有意遗漏的程序性元认知观点

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y

Kaisa Kärki

{"title":"Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions","authors":"Kaisa Kärki","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","url":null,"abstract":"How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action not done, the agent cannot further process the possibility of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: who is capable of intentionally omitting, when and where intentional omissions unfold, and what are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to negative agency, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Overdetermination and causal connections 过度决定和因果关系

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0

Ezra Rubenstein

引用次数: 0

Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy 气候变化与国家干预：隐私权的案例

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6

Leonhard Menges

引用次数: 0

Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism 记忆与再学习：反对排外主义

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w

Juan F. Álvarez

{"title":"Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism","authors":"Juan F. Álvarez","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Knowledge, skills, and creditability 知识、技能和信誉

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0

Carlotta Pavese

引用次数: 0

The linguistic dead zone of value-aligned agency, natural and artificial 价值取向代理的语言死区，自然的和人为的

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w

Travis LaCroix

引用次数: 0

How to be a postmodal directionalist 如何成为一个模态后指向主义者

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02237-0

Scott Dixon

引用次数: 0

Closure and the structure of justification 结束语和正当性结构

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02245-0

Christoph Kelp, Matthew Jope

引用次数: 0

A simpler model of judgment: on Sosa’s Epistemic Explanations 一个更简单的判断模式：论索萨的认识论解释

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02232-5

Antonia Peacocke

引用次数: 0

Silence as complicity and action as silence 沉默是共谋，行动是沉默

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02246-z

J. L. A. Donohue

{"title":"Silence as complicity and action as silence","authors":"J. L. A. Donohue","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02246-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02246-z","url":null,"abstract":"Silence sometimes constitutes moral complicity. We see this when protestors take to the streets against racial injustice. Think of signs with the words: “Silence is complicity.” We see this in instances of sexual harassment, when we learn that many knew and said nothing. We see this in cases of wrongdoing within a company or organization, when it becomes clear that many were aware of the negligent or criminal activity and stayed silent. In cases like this we consider agents morally complicit in virtue of their silence. Flagrant injustices cry out for action, and sometimes remaining silent amounts to complicity in those injustices. What philosophy owes us is an account of how it could be that silence constitutes complicity. In this paper I argue that one possibility is an account grounded in problematic deliberative contribution. The core idea of “deliberative complicity,” as I call it, is that agents have moral duties concerning the moral deliberation of other agents, and failures in these duties can amount to moral complicity. For example, an agent aware that a colleague is sexually harassing his students has a deliberative obligation to report the misconduct, and their silence in failing to report constitutes a failure to fulfill their deliberative obligation, a failure that grounds their moral complicity in the harassment. If my argument is successful, it provides a distinctive reason to prefer a deliberative account of moral complicity: it can capture cases of silent complicity that other views of moral complicity cannot. And further, by turning our attention toward our interpersonal deliberative obligations, a deliberative account of complicity can incorporate helpful resources from recent work in social epistemology and speech act theory as we set out to determine when and why silence amounts to complicity. And when it does, we cannot stay silent. We must speak.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142697093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0