Knowledge-first summativism about group evidence

Summativism about group evidence holds that the evidence of a group is a function of the evidence of its members. In this paper, I put forward a novel knowledge-first summative view of group evidence formulated in terms of the notion of being in a position to know rather than knowledge. In developing this view, I address several crucial questions for any adequate account of group evidence: whether group evidence is factive, whether a group must be able to act on E for it to count as evidence, whether the logical consequences of the group members’ evidence should be included in the group’s evidence, and, more importantly, the nature of the epistemic relationship that must exist between E and a group for E to be part of its evidence. In addressing these questions, I respond to recent criticism by Jessica Brown (Noûs 56:494–510, 2022; Philos Stud 180:3161–3178, 2023; Groups as epistemic and moral agents, Oxford University Press, 2024) against summative views.