量子力学多世界诠释中的自由意志

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-04-12 DOI:10.1007/s11098-025-02314-y

David John Baker

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引用次数: 0

摘要

大卫·华莱士（David Wallace）认为，在量子力学的多世界解释中，除了众所周知的自由意志与物理决定论的调和问题之外，自由意志并没有什么特殊的问题。与此相反，我认为，在看似合理且流行的“深层自我”相容论方法上，多世界解释确实面临着一个特殊的问题。在多世界的图景中，我们的行为是如何从我们最核心的性格特征中产生的尚不清楚，因为在其他分支中，我们的复制品肯定会采取与我们不同的行动。

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Free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics

David Wallace has argued that there is no special problem for free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, beyond the well-known problem of reconciling free will with physical determinism. I argue to the contrary that, on the plausible and popular “deep self” approach to compatibilism, the many-worlds interpretation does face a special problem. It is not clear on the many-worlds picture how our actions can issue from our most central character traits, given that copies of us in other branches are certain to act differently than we do.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

127

期刊介绍： Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.