Dead men do no deeds: moral responsibility without (robust) alternative possibilities

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that despite the apparent promise of the recently popular “robust omissions reply” to John Martin Fischer’s well-known robustness objection to flicker of freedom style responses to arguments against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs), the robustness objection succeeds after all. Though I concede that the robust omissions reply is successful with the most promising extant variety of FSC (modified blockage) in view, I present a new kind of case—“Fischer-type modified blockage”—in which I claim the subject is basically morally responsible for what he’s done despite his lacking access to any robust alternative possibilities, and against which the robust omissions reply is ineffective. Along the way, I take advantage of an opportunity to show that my Fischer-type modified blockage case also serves to effectively undermine an otherwise promising recent defense, from Justin Capes, of David Widerker’s “W-defense” argument for PAP.