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Continuity, catastrophic risk, and severe uncertainty 连续性、灾难性风险和严重的不确定性
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-09-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02610-1
Joe Roussos,H. Orri Stefánsson
{"title":"Continuity, catastrophic risk, and severe uncertainty","authors":"Joe Roussos,H. Orri Stefánsson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02610-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02610-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Continuity axiom implies that no catastrophe is so bad that one should not be willing to accept a gamble that might result in that catastrophe, as long as the gamble is sufficiently likely to instead result in some improvement on one’s status quo. The axiom is implied by most normative decision theories, including risk averse alternatives to expected utility theory. We argue that Continuity should be abandoned when evaluating policy options where (a) there is sufficient uncertainty about the correct probabilities, and (b) some options could be catastrophic. However, unlike Bartha and DesRoches (2021) and Steel and Bartha (2023), we argue that there are examples of policy evaluation where, although the outcome could be catastrophic, the relevant probabilities are sufficiently well-grounded such that Continuity should be satisfied.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
More representative or smarter, but not both: the democratic dilemma in lottocracy 更具代表性或更聪明，但不能两者兼得：抽签制中的民主困境
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-09-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02614-x
Jason Brennan,Christopher Freiman
{"title":"More representative or smarter, but not both: the democratic dilemma in lottocracy","authors":"Jason Brennan,Christopher Freiman","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02614-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02614-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Giving color reductionism its due 赋予色彩还原论应有的地位
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-09-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02608-9
William A. Sharp
{"title":"Giving color reductionism its due","authors":"William A. Sharp","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02608-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02608-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pautz (2003, 2013a) argues that to secure for colors’ reducers structural match with the colors-as-perceived, the reductionist turns colors (inappropriately) into mere relations to numbers, those used to denote quantities of long-, medium-, and short-wavelength light. In this paper, I argue Pautz’s objection stems from an accidental, easily shed, feature of the reducers, namely, their description in terms of long-, medium-, and short-wavelength light. The reducers should instead be given in terms of (relevant) postreceptoral sensitivity functions given directly in terms of wavelength. This results in reducers that should be fully kosher by Pautz’s lights. The upshot, if this works, for debates about perception is externalism is alive and well.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148934181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction: A causal theory of suppositional reasoning 更正：假设推理的因果理论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-09-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02589-9
Alexander Gebharter,Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla,Michał Sikorski
{"title":"Correction: A causal theory of suppositional reasoning","authors":"Alexander Gebharter,Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla,Michał Sikorski","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02589-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02589-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148934182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Performatives presume speaker knowledge 行为人假定说话者的知识
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02602-1
Peter van Elswyk
{"title":"Performatives presume speaker knowledge","authors":"Peter van Elswyk","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02602-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02602-1","url":null,"abstract":"Performatives are declarative sentences where their use by a speaker enables the speaker to perform an additional action. This paper argues that performativity requires knowledge. The speaker must know what they say to perform the additional action. The significance of this conclusion is then discussed.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"174 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148883474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supervenience, reliability, and the explanatory limitations of conciliatory expressivism 调解表现主义的监督性、可靠性和解释局限性
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02568-0
Tristram McPherson, David Plunkett
{"title":"Supervenience, reliability, and the explanatory limitations of conciliatory expressivism","authors":"Tristram McPherson, David Plunkett","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02568-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02568-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148885552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frege and the transmission model of communication 弗雷格与传播模式
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02597-9
María de Ponte, Kepa Korta
{"title":"Frege and the transmission model of communication","authors":"María de Ponte, Kepa Korta","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02597-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02597-9","url":null,"abstract":"It is a commonplace of the philosophy of language that Gottlob Frege’s pragmatics, understood as a theory of communication, engages with what is commonly referred to as “transmission model.” According to this model, successful communication requires the identity between the thought expressed by the speaker when uttering a sentence and the thought grasped by the hearer. Additionally, there is widespread agreement that indexicals and demonstratives present significant challenges to Frege’s theory of sense and reference. Philosophers of language and mind have attempted to address these issues by proposing various Fregean, neo-Fregean or directly non-Fregean approaches. The paper aims to provide insights into Frege’s theory of communication by discussing the specific problems that proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives pose to (both pure or impure versions of) the transmission model, as well as the role Frege might have envisaged for a logically perfect language. We conclude that, contrary to what might appear at first glance, Frege did not support the transmission model of communication.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148885562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How do interests matter? 利益有多重要？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02593-z
Jane Friedman
{"title":"How do interests matter?","authors":"Jane Friedman","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02593-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02593-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148885551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Blameless responsibility for faultless AI harm 对无可挑剔的人工智能伤害负无可指责的责任
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02600-3
Anna K. Boos
{"title":"Blameless responsibility for faultless AI harm","authors":"Anna K. Boos","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02600-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02600-3","url":null,"abstract":"This article advances a novel approach to the question of who should take responsibility when no one is to blame, and shows how it can be applied to the emerging problem of faultless harm caused by artificial intelligence (AI). As AI systems increase in complexity and scale, so too does the risk of harm that cannot be neatly traced back to human intent or negligence. This trajectory challenges conventional, blame-based responsibility practices, calling instead for an account that does not presuppose wrongdoing. I argue here that AI deployers bear a strict moral duty to take responsibility for harmful outcomes, even when the deployment is, all things considered, morally justified. This duty arises from what I call the ‘accidental relationship’, a distinctive moral relationship that emerges whenever an agent, here the AI deployer, non-negligently and non-intentionally inflicts harm on another party. Through this distinct agential involvement in the harm, the deployer incurs special duties to acknowledge and redress the victim’s loss. The present account does not conceptualize the duty to take responsibility as a matter of repairing a prior wrongdoing, but as a matter of affirming the victim’s equal moral standing within the accidental relationship.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148885564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral uncertainty and imaginative resistance 道德的不确定性和想象的抵抗
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-08-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02592-0
Anna Mahtani
{"title":"Moral uncertainty and imaginative resistance","authors":"Anna Mahtani","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02592-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02592-0","url":null,"abstract":"There has been a recent surge of interest in normative internalism, according to which what you ought to do depends on your beliefs about morality. This view has potentially wide-reaching implications for practical action, policy choice, and societal norms. The view is motivated by certain compelling examples, but in this paper I argue that such examples may not support normative internalism after all, for the phenomenon of imaginative resistance – well-known to philosophers of fiction – is at work here, muddying our intuitions. Once these examples are set aside, we get a more realistic view of the limited interest and importance of an internalist sense of ‘ought’.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148842814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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