PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献_第3页

In search of lost principles: generic generalism in aesthetics and ethics 寻找失落的原则：美学和伦理学中的一般通论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02221-8

Errol Lord

引用次数: 0

The alchemists: on Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s rational sentimentalism 炼金术士：论 Justin D'Arms 和 Daniel Jacobson 的理性感伤主义

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02228-1

Oded Na’aman

引用次数: 0

Remembering is an imaginative project 记忆是一个充满想象力的项目

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02220-9

Seth Goldwasser

{"title":"Remembering is an imaginative project","authors":"Seth Goldwasser","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02220-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02220-9","url":null,"abstract":"This essay defends the claim that episodic remembering is a mental action by arguing that episodic remembering and sensory- or experience-like imagining are of a kind in a way relevant for agency. Episodic remembering is a type of imaginative project that involves the agential construction of imagistic-content and that aims at (veridically) representing particular events of the personal past. Neurally intact adults under normal conditions can token experiential memories of particular events from the personal past (merely) by intending or trying to. An agent’s ability to actively remember depends not only on her being able to determine that some memory event occurs but on her ability to construct the relevant scene at will as well. I claim that the ability to guide construction with respect to imagistic-content is distinctive feature of a subset of active imagining. Episodic remembering is of a kind with that subset of active imagining by being a process of agential construction of imagistic-content, in this case, scene construction that aims at (veridically) representing the personal past. Agential scene construction in the context of remembering is the agent’s exploring her personal past as a highly circumscribed region of modal space.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142329169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The selfish machine? On the power and limitation of natural selection to understand the development of advanced AI 自私的机器？从自然选择的力量和局限来理解先进人工智能的发展

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02226-3

Maarten Boudry, Simon Friederich

{"title":"The selfish machine? On the power and limitation of natural selection to understand the development of advanced AI","authors":"Maarten Boudry, Simon Friederich","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02226-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02226-3","url":null,"abstract":"Some philosophers and machine learning experts have speculated that superintelligent Artificial Intelligences (AIs), if and when they arrive on the scene, will wrestle away power from humans, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Dan Hendrycks has recently buttressed such worries by arguing that AI systems will undergo evolution by natural selection, which will endow them with instinctive drives for self-preservation, dominance and resource accumulation that are typical of evolved creatures. In this paper, we argue that this argument is not compelling as it stands. Evolutionary processes, as we point out, can be more or less Darwinian along a number of dimensions. Making use of Peter Godfrey-Smith’s framework of Darwinian spaces, we argue that the more evolution is top-down, directed and driven by intelligent agency, the less paradigmatically Darwinian it becomes. We then apply the concept of “domestication” to AI evolution, which, although theoretically satisfying the minimal definition of natural selection, is channeled through the minds of fore-sighted and intelligent agents, based on selection criteria desirable to them (which could be traits like docility, obedience and non-aggression). In the presence of such intelligent planning, it is not clear that selection of AIs, even selection in a competitive and ruthless market environment, will end up favoring “selfish” traits. In the end, however, we do agree with Hendrycks’ conditionally: If superintelligent AIs end up “going feral” and competing in a truly Darwinian fashion, reproducing autonomously and without human supervision, this could pose a grave danger to human societies.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142317551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The nature and value of firsthand insight 第一手资料的性质和价值

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02234-3

Elijah Chudnoff

{"title":"The nature and value of firsthand insight","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02234-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02234-3","url":null,"abstract":"You can be convinced that something is true but still desire to see it for yourself. A trusted critic makes some observations about a movie, now you want to watch it with them in mind. A proof demonstrates the validity of a formula, but you are not satisfied until you see how the formula works. In these cases, we place special value on knowing by what Sosa (Epistemic explanations: A theory of telic normativity, and what it explains, Oxford University Press, 2021) calls “firsthand insight” a truth that we might already know in some other way such as by testimony, the balance of evidence, or proof. This phenomenon raises two questions. First, what is the nature of firsthand insight? Second, what value motivates us to pursue firsthand insight when other kinds of knowledge are readily available? In the two central parts of this paper, I develop answers to these questions. I argue that firsthand insight that a proposition is true is knowledge based on experience of what makes that proposition true, and I argue that desires for firsthand insight are motivated by concerns with alienation. In a concluding section, I briefly illustrate how the resulting view of the nature and value of firsthand insight might bear on broader topics in the theory of value.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Incommensurability, the sequence argument, and the Pareto principle 不可通约性、序列论证和帕累托原则

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02191-x

Gustaf Arrhenius, H. Orri Stefánsson

引用次数: 0

The boundaries of gnoseology 地质学的界限

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02205-8

Jesús Navarro, Dani Pino

引用次数: 0

The monotonicity of essence 本质的单调性

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02214-7

William Vincent

引用次数: 0

Perceiving secondary qualities 感知次要品质

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02202-x

Boyd Millar

{"title":"Perceiving secondary qualities","authors":"Boyd Millar","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02202-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02202-x","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primary qualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion of secondary qualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature of secondary qualities than into the nature of primary qualities. I maintain that neither naïve realism nor the standard Russellian variety of the content view can provide a satisfying explanation; instead, in order to provide a satisfying explanation, we must posit that perceptual experiences represent properties via Fregean modes of presentation. Further, I maintain that we must depart from the standard Fregean variety of the content view in two important respects. First, the relevant modes of presentation must be characterized without appealing to causal relations between perceptual experiences and perceived properties; and second, we must posit that primary and secondary qualities are represented via modes of presentation of different kinds. The resulting view is that primary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to highly detailed descriptions, while secondary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to impoverished descriptions.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142236722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Scientific understanding as narrative intelligibility 作为叙事可理解性的科学理解

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02217-4

Gabriel Siegel

引用次数: 0