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Incommensurability and population-level bioethics 不可通约性与人口层面的生命伦理学
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02239-y
Anders Herlitz
{"title":"Incommensurability and population-level bioethics","authors":"Anders Herlitz","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02239-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02239-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper introduces incommensurability, its potential relevance to population-level bioethics, and thecontributions to the special issue. It provides an overview of recent research on incommensurability, outlines somereasons to believe in its possibility and relevance, and presents some problems and opportunities that arise onceone accepts that incommensurability is possible.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reconceptualising the Psychological Theory of Generics 重新认识通用心理学理论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02242-3
Tom Ralston
{"title":"Reconceptualising the Psychological Theory of Generics","authors":"Tom Ralston","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02242-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02242-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Generics have historically proven difficult to analyse using the tools of formal semantics. In this paper, I argue that an influential theory of the meaning of generics due to Sarah-Jane Leslie, the Psychological Theory of Generics, is best interpreted not as a theory of their meaning, but as a theory of the psychological heuristics that we use to judge whether or not generics are true. I argue that Leslie’s methodology is not well-suited to producing a theory of the meaning of generics, since it takes speakers’ judgments at face value and ignores the non-semantic factors that might affect these judgments. Leslie’s theory therefore overfits the data of our linguistic intuitions. I present a reconceptualised version of the Psychological Theory of Generics as a theory of how heuristics affect our judgements of the truth values of generics and discuss the application of this reconceptualised theory to some of the puzzles posed by generics, including their apparent content-sensitivity, their inferential asymmetry and their association with stereotyping and prejudice.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What motivates humeanism? 人本主义的动机是什么？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02238-z
Harjit Bhogal
{"title":"What motivates humeanism?","authors":"Harjit Bhogal","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02238-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02238-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The ‘great divide’ in the metaphysics of science is between Humean approaches—which reduce scientific laws (and related modalities) to patterns of occurrent facts—and anti-Humean approaches—where laws stand apart from the patterns of events, making those events hold. There is a vast literature on this debate, with many problems raised for the Humean. But a major problem comes right at the start—what’s the motivation for Humeanism in the first place? This is rather unclear. In fact Maudlin, and other anti-Humeans, claim that there is no good motivation for Humeanism. I criticize a few influential approaches to motivating Humeanism—in particular those based on empiricism, pragmatism, and fidelity to science. In their place I suggest a different type of motivation, which has not received much attention in the literature, that rests on considerations of the role of <i>unification</i> in scientific understanding.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two approaches to grounding moral standing: interests-first or value-first? 道德地位基础的两种方法：利益第一还是价值第一？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02230-7
Daniel Elbro
{"title":"Two approaches to grounding moral standing: interests-first or value-first?","authors":"Daniel Elbro","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02230-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02230-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do non-human animals have moral standing? Work on this question has focused on choosing the right grounding property (for example, personhood or sentience) while little attention has been paid to the various ways that the connection between grounding properties and moral standing has been explained. In this paper, I address that gap by offering a fresh way to approach the debate over the grounds of moral standing, including a novel taxonomy of positions, and argue that one kind of position, which takes a ‘value-first’ approach, is preferable to the other, which takes an ‘interests-first’ approach. According to value-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have properties that make them valuable. According to interests-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have interests, and any interest must always be taken into account. I argue that we should prefer value-first accounts because they engage directly with the problem the concept of moral standing is employed to solve, and because interests-first accounts cannot meet their explanatory burdens without begging the question against value-first accounts.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases 关于操纵案例中以操纵者为中心的反应
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02218-3
Gabriel De Marco, Taylor W. Cyr
{"title":"On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases","authors":"Gabriel De Marco, Taylor W. Cyr","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02218-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02218-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we identify a class of responses to cases of manipulation that we label <i>manipulator-focused views</i>. The key insight of such views is that being subject to the will of another agent significantly affects our freedom and moral responsibility. Though different authors take this key insight in different directions, and the mechanics of their views are quite different, these views turn out to share many key components, and this allows us to discuss several authors’ views at the same time, highlighting a variety of challenges for such views and helping to identify pitfalls to avoid in further developments of views of this type. Moreover, as we survey manipulator-focused views and the challenges that plague them, we go beyond the typical problem cases for such views—natural force variations of manipulation cases—and introduce several new manipulation cases. We conclude by comparing the prospects for this family of views with its main rival, namely bypassing views.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"229 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Explaining social kinds: the role of covert normativity 解释社会种类：隐蔽规范性的作用
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02240-5
Rachel Katherine Cooper
{"title":"Explaining social kinds: the role of covert normativity","authors":"Rachel Katherine Cooper","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02240-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02240-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The goal of the debunking social constructionist is to reveal as social kinds that are widely held to be natural (or, in some cases, to reveal as more deeply social kinds that are already widely recognized to be social). The prominent approach to such debunking has been to make a case for thinking that the individuation conditions for membership in the kinds in question are in fact social (or in fact more deeply social than has previously been recognized). In this paper, I argue that adopting the prominent approach to debunking prevents one from answering the implicit question being posed by the debunker, namely, the question of how a plausibly socially constituted kind can come to appear more natural than it in fact is. I then sketch an alternative way of understanding social kinds that enables us to answer the appearance question while remaining neutral on the nature of social kinds. In particular, I argue that the mechanism of <i>covert normativity</i> explains causally the persistence of the social kinds of interest to the debunker, and so also provides an answer to the appearance question.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The perceptual learning of socially constructed kinds: how culture biases and shapes perception 社会建构类型的感知学习：文化如何影响和塑造感知
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02211-w
Madeleine Ransom
{"title":"The perceptual learning of socially constructed kinds: how culture biases and shapes perception","authors":"Madeleine Ransom","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02211-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02211-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some kinds are both socially constructed and perceptible, such as <span>gender</span> and <span>race</span>. However, this gives rise to a puzzle that has been largely neglected in social constructionist accounts: how does culture shape and bias what we perceive? I argue that perceptual learning is the best explanation of our ability to perceive social kinds, in comparison to accounts that require a person acquire beliefs, theories, or concepts of the kind. I show how relatively simple causal factors known to influence perceptual learning in the laboratory can be extended to understand how culture shapes and biases perception. This account makes clear that the process of perceptual enculturation begins at a very early age, and does not in most cases require background beliefs on the part of the learner: the causal pathways by which perceptual learning occur suffice. It has significance for our understanding of how socially constructed kinds are culturally transmitted, as well as for how such kinds might be altered through interventions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142397776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking motivating reasons’ deliberative role seriously 认真对待动机理由的审议作用
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02223-6
Levy Wang
{"title":"Taking motivating reasons’ deliberative role seriously","authors":"Levy Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02223-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02223-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A motivating reason is a reason an agent acts for. There are two pre-theoretical intuitions about motivating reasons that seem irreconcilable. One intuition suggests that motivating reasons are factive, and the other says the opposite. As a result, a divide exists between philosophers, each side prioritizing one intuition to the detriment of the other. In this essay, I present the deliberate theory of motivating reasons and defend the second intuition that motivating reasons are non-factive. To do this, we must understand motivating reasons’ role in our deliberation. I show that non-factive motivating reasons are compatible with the underlying role which gives rise to the intuition of reasons’ factivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"228 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142405155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In search of lost principles: generic generalism in aesthetics and ethics 寻找失落的原则：美学和伦理学中的一般通论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02221-8
Errol Lord
{"title":"In search of lost principles: generic generalism in aesthetics and ethics","authors":"Errol Lord","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02221-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02221-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I defend a form of generalism in ethics and aesthetics. Generalism about a domain D is the view that there are principles that play an explanatory role in the metaphysics of D and can be used in reasoning when thinking about D. I argue that in both aesthetics and ethics, there are generic generalizations that are principles. I do this by (i) explaining the nature of a particularly important kind of generic, (ii) argue that generics of this kind play a explanatory role, and (iii) argue that we licitly use these truths in reasoning about ethics and aesthetics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The alchemists: on Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s rational sentimentalism 炼金术士：论 Justin D'Arms 和 Daniel Jacobson 的理性感伤主义
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02228-1
Oded Na’aman
{"title":"The alchemists: on Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s rational sentimentalism","authors":"Oded Na’aman","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02228-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02228-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>D’Arms and Jacobson’s <i>Rational Sentimentalism</i> promises an alchemy: a view that grounds certain values and reasons in facts about human sentiments but also treats the very same facts about values and reasons as fundamental. I examine how they attempt to deliver on the promise, doubt that they succeed, consider their motivations, and offer an alternative interpretation of what they might be doing.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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