{"title":"Turning the tables on Hume","authors":"Casper Storm Hansen","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02197-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02197-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philosophical intuitions, inductivism has retaken its place as the most reasonable default position, while the skeptic is called on to supply a novel argument for his. The reason is as follows. There are certain possibilities concerning the functioning of the world that, if assigned positive credence, support inductivism. Prima facie, one might think that the alternatives to those possibilities, if assigned similar or more credence, cancel out that support. However, I argue that it is plausible that reasonable credence distributions are such that the alternatives at most cancel themselves out, and thus leave the support for inductivism intact.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142245469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Each counts for one","authors":"Daniel Muñoz","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02195-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02195-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more” or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose more than equality: the Kamm/Scanlon “Balancing Argument” rests on what social choice theorists call “(Positive) Responsiveness,” Kamm’s “Aggregation Argument” assumes that “equal” lives are fungible, and Hsieh et al. have it that spreading goods broadly best approximates equality. In each case, the crucial premise is not equality itself but a further idea that Taurek, I argue, can safely reject. I conclude with a conjecture: there is no theory–neutral argument that settles the question of whether the numbers count.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142171262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gender identity: the subjective fit account","authors":"Rach Cosker-Rowland","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02184-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02184-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper proposes a new account of gender identity on which for A to have gender G as part of their gender identity is for A to not take G not to fit them (or to positively take G to fit them). It argues that this subjective fit account of gender identity fits well with trans people’s testimony and both trans and cis people’s experiences of their genders. The subjective fit account also avoids the problems that existing accounts of gender identity face. Existing accounts face broadly two types of problems. First, they seem to imply that trans people have gender identities different from those that they in fact have. For instance, they seem to imply that some trans women do not have a female gender identity or have not always had that gender identity, contrary to their testimony and experiences. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem. Second, many existing accounts of gender identity seem to conflict with the idea that our gender identities merit respect. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem because it understands gender identities to consist in normative experiences and judgments and normative experiences and judgments merit respect.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142171265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Keeping ideology in its place","authors":"Dan Moller","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02216-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02216-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Most people don’t want their teachers, scientists, or journalists to be too ideological. Calling someone an “ideologue” isn’t a compliment. But what is ideology and why exactly is it a threat? I propose that ideology is fruitfully understood in terms of three ingredients: a basic moral claim, a worldview built on top of that claim, and the attempt to politicize this worldview by injecting it into social institutions. I further argue that the central danger of ideology is that activating these three ingredients tends to undermine liberal social institutions. And yet a certain amount of ideology is both unavoidable and desirable, as I show, since it supplies us with important goods like social cohesion and mobilization. This means the best we can do is to try and set boundaries on ideology.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142171263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, Guillaume Dechauffour, Carlin Henikoff
{"title":"What are problems?","authors":"Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, Guillaume Dechauffour, Carlin Henikoff","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02201-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02201-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Building off the recent work on the semantics of problem, we suggest a more general account that encompasses problems of all agents, human or nonhuman, individual or communal. Situation <i>X</i> is a problem for agent <i>A</i>, <i>iff</i> situation <i>X</i> is at odds with the agent’s goal <i>G</i> and removing the discrepancy between <i>X</i> and <i>G</i> presents some difficulty for agent <i>A</i>. In addition, for agent <i>A</i> to actually have a problem, they must also be in such situation <i>X</i>. In contrast, agent <i>A</i> recognizes that situation <i>X</i> is a problem for them <i>iff</i> agent <i>A</i> represents, correctly or incorrectly, that situation <i>X</i> is at odds with their goal <i>G</i>, agent <i>A</i> represents, correctly or incorrectly, that removing the discrepancy between <i>X</i> and <i>G</i> presents some difficulty, and agent <i>A</i> represents, correctly or incorrectly, that they are in situation <i>X</i>. Several conclusions follow from these definitions. (1) Not every problem involves <i>questions</i>. (2) Not all problems involve <i>undesirable</i> states. (3) For an agent to consider a situation problematic, they should be <i>aware</i> of the situation; yet awareness of the situation is not necessary for an agent to <i>have</i> a problem or for a situation to <i>be</i> a problem for an agent. (4) <i>Contexts</i> need not be part of the problem: the context of a specific problem need not also be part of a more general problem. (5) The <i>complete</i> elimination of the discrepancy between a situation and a goal eliminates the problem, while the problem continues to exist when it receives a <i>partial</i> solution. (6) For something to be a problem, it does not have to be <i>solvable</i>, and the agent does not have to accept that <i>something needs to be done about it</i>, nor should they use the language of <i>ameliorable/solvable</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142171264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Binary act consequentialism","authors":"Johan E. Gustafsson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02154-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02154-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to Act Consequentialism, an act is right if and only if its outcome is not worse than the outcome of any alternative to that act. This view, however, leads to deontic paradoxes if the alternatives to an act are all other acts that can be done in the situation. A typical response is to only apply this rightness criterion to maximally specific acts and to take the alternatives to a maximally specific act to be the other maximally specific acts that can be done in the situation. (This view can then be supplanted by a separate account for the rightness of acts that are not maximally specific.) This paper defends a rival view, Binary Act Consequentialism, where, for any voluntary act, that act is right if and only if its outcome is not worse than the outcome of not doing that act. Binary Act Consequentialism, which dates back to Jeremy Bentham, has few supporters. A number of seemingly powerful objections have been considered fatal. In this paper, I rebut these objections and put forward a positive argument for the view.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142142565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Metasemantics, context, and felicitous underspecification","authors":"Una Stojnić","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02192-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02192-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>King’s <i>Felicitous Underspecification</i> (FU) is a rich, thought-provoking book, which draws on a wide range of novel and largely unappreciated linguistic examples to argue that we should take the idea of a felicitously underspecified use of context-sensitive language very seriously. If felicitous underspecification is as prevalent as King argues, understanding the mechanisms involved in its interpretation is crucial for our overall understanding of linguistic communication. FU further offers a sophisticated account of these mechanisms. In this piece, I critically examine some of the main themes in FU. In doing so, I raise some worries for the interpretive mechanisms King posits. Specifically, I pose some challenges for his intentionalist GCA meta-semantics, and raise worries about the central interpretive role he assigns to his proposed contextual update rule, FUU.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142124075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A twist on the historically authentic musical performance","authors":"Nemesio G. C. Puy","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02199-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02199-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to the mainstream view in the philosophy of music, the only way to authentically perform works of past centuries is according to the ideal of Historically Authentic Performance (HAP). This paper aims to show that, despite recent defences of the mainstream view, it lacks motivation, and hence should be abandoned or revised. As we shall see, first, there is no plausible account of HAP as a final and intrinsic value consistent with the work-focused teleology of work-performance. Second, a plausible account of the value of HAP in work-performance regards HAP as a way of performing works of past centuries convincingly. However, this approach does not support the mainstream view because this only leaves HAP as an interpretive option. Finally, an alternative defence of the value of HAP in the form of an indispensability argument is considered: HAP is indispensable to accurately comply with a work’s score, and thus to perform it faithfully. This strategy supports the demands of the mainstream view, but we will see that, if we take this option seriously, HAP must be understood in a substantively different manner than the mainstream view does, such that it ultimately amounts to the second option analysed above.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142124081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A forgotten distinction in value theory","authors":"Facundo Rodriguez","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02209-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02209-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value <i>depends</i> on. The debate’s reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back a ‘forgotten’ distinction between two ways in which value can depend on other properties. We should distinguish those properties <i>in virtue of which</i> a value is had—the <i>grounds</i> of the value—from those <i>on condition of which</i> it is had—which following Dancy I call the <i>enablers</i> of the value. With this distinction in hand, I offer a clear re-statement of the two main conditionalist accounts of final value: <i>non-instrumentalism</i> and <i>non-derivatism</i>. When understood not as making claims about the properties on which final value <i>depends</i> but rather as making more specific ones about the properties that <i>ground</i> final value, these accounts are perfectly coherent.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142124055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: difference-making and explanatory relevance","authors":"Singa Behrens, Stephan Krämer, Stefan Roski","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02213-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02213-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We introduce the overall topic of the S.I. Difference-Making and Explanatory Relevance and provide brief summaries of the twelve contributed articles.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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