Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献

Temporal framing of tax stimuli and household consumption 税收刺激和家庭消费的时间框架

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107079

Thomas Pauls , Marten Laudi

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引用次数: 0

Personal income tax reform and health insurance purchases: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China 个人所得税改革与医疗保险购买：来自中国准自然实验的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107069

Yi Fang , Wenrui Zeng , Xuan Zhang , Yang Zhao

引用次数: 0

Why do some nudges work and others not? 为什么有些推动起作用，有些不起作用？

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107074

Matej Lorko , Tomáš Miklánek , Maroš Servátka

{"title":"Why do some nudges work and others not?","authors":"Matej Lorko , Tomáš Miklánek , Maroš Servátka","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107074","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107074","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While nudges have recently gained popularity, many nudging interventions fail, and the effects of successful ones are often short-lived. We conjecture that the success of a nudge depends on how it interacts with the underlying economic incentives that determine the payoff-maximizing behavior of the decision-maker. For example, in the domain of tax compliance, a nudge is likely to be effective only if it is financially optimal for the taxpayer to pay the tax. To test our conjecture, we run a multi-period experiment in which we manipulate tax audit probability and nudge participants to report their income. In addition, we vary how often the nudge appears to test whether more frequent nudging increases long-run compliance. We observe that the first application of a nudge has a positive immediate effect on income reporting, irrespective of whether it is optimal to comply or not. However, subsequent nudges increase income reporting only if the nudge is aligned with the taxpayer’s incentives. More frequent nudging in the direction opposite to incentives yields no effects on long-run compliance. Policy implications are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 107074"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144124394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

House price expectations and household spending— A survey-based experiment 房价预期与家庭支出——一项基于调查的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107073

Wei Qian

引用次数: 0

Firm consolidation and labor market outcomes 企业整合和劳动力市场结果

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107036

Sabien Dobbelaere , Grace McCormack , Daniel Prinz , Sándor Sóvágó

引用次数: 0

Making up for harming others — An experiment on voluntary compensation behavior 弥补伤害他人——自愿补偿行为的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107037

Frauke Stehr , Peter Werner

{"title":"Making up for harming others — An experiment on voluntary compensation behavior","authors":"Frauke Stehr , Peter Werner","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107037","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107037","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate in a controlled laboratory setting to what extent buyers are willing to offset negative consumption externalities. In one treatment dimension, we vary whether the externality associated with a purchase is irreversible or can be reduced ex post by a voluntary payment. In a second treatment dimension, we induce diffusion of harm among harmed subjects and diffusion of responsibility among buyers by separately varying the matching of buyers and harmed subjects. We find that subjects are, on average, willing to compensate for their negative externalities and that this willingness is sensitive to the surplus from buying. Yet, experimental buyers are highly heterogeneous, with some never compensating. While the introduction of voluntary compensation significantly reduces externalities, the net externality still remains high across all treatments. Diffusion of responsibility tends to reduce the size of compensation and to increase overall net externalities in the main experiment. An additional control treatment reveals that under diffusion of responsibility among buyers, patterns of conditional cooperation seem to drive compensation in the present setting: the amount paid for compensation increases with higher beliefs about the compensation by other buyers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 107037"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144115349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation 要求完善和不完善的惩戒制度促进合作

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107071

Christoph Bühren , Astrid Dannenberg , Philipp Händel

{"title":"The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation","authors":"Christoph Bühren , Astrid Dannenberg , Philipp Händel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107071","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107071","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use an experiment to study the demand for complete and incomplete formal punishment institutions and their ability to promote cooperation. Complete punishment institutions are implemented by the whole group and bind everyone. Incomplete punishment institutions are implemented by a subgroup and bind only the members of this subgroup. We distinguish between strictly incomplete institutions, in which only one subgroup can bind itself while the remaining individuals are unbound, and potentially incomplete institutions, in which two subgroups can bind themselves independently and separately in different institutions, potentially binding everyone. Theoretically, the demand for such formal punishment institutions should depend only on the benefit of cooperation within the group or subgroup bound by the institution. However, we hypothesize and the experimental results confirm that, in the case of incomplete punishment institutions, the benefit of cooperation has a much smaller impact on the demand than in complete punishment institutions. Instead, individuals’ cooperativeness and coordination between the subgroups become important determinants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 107071"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144115351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Trade and the rise of ancient Greek city-states 贸易和古希腊城邦的崛起

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107035

Jordan Adamson

引用次数: 0

Different norms of sexual activity and consent seeking among college students: Social identity and statistical discrimination 大学生性行为与同意寻求的不同规范：社会认同与统计歧视

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107028

Hanna Hoover, Erin Krupka

{"title":"Different norms of sexual activity and consent seeking among college students: Social identity and statistical discrimination","authors":"Hanna Hoover, Erin Krupka","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107028","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107028","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Preventing sexual assault on university campuses is rooted in promoting the adoption and practice of seeking consent. Using identity theory and a factorial vignette survey experiment, we test for the presence of implicit differences in appropriateness ratings based on context, gender, race and sexual orientation and, in aggregate, differences in social norms that govern college students’ sexual interactions. We provide a simple theoretical framework of statistical discrimination where the social norms for identical actions are predicted to differ because the appropriateness of actions is imperfectly observed and evaluators hold beliefs about underlying propensities of appropriate action that are rooted in identity. Our results show that context significantly alters perceptions of appropriate behavior and that heterosexual male actions are viewed as systematically less socially appropriate. We validate our findings with a post-study questionnaire which reveals that beliefs regarding appropriateness ratings are largely driven by the perceived rates of sexual assault among the represented population by the vignette narrator. The paper advances the study of norms rooted in identity and presents an identity-based theoretical framework that provides intuition for how such a differences may arise.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 107028"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144106119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impact of a public voucher for the arts 艺术公共券的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-05-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107070

Andrea Baldin, Anna Marenzi, Francesca Zantomio

引用次数: 0