Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第2页

Motivated by karma 因果报应

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107441

Lawrence Choo , Zhen Lei , Wei Tang

引用次数: 0

Does allocative fairness matter? experimental evidence from India 分配公平重要吗？来自印度的实验证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436

Rohit Jindal

{"title":"Does allocative fairness matter? experimental evidence from India","authors":"Rohit Jindal","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107436","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Fairness is impartial selection when allocating scarce goods or resources. Previous studies indicate that people consider auctions and random allocations less fair than alternate mechanisms. However, these studies are based on survey research in industrialized countries. It is unclear if fairness preferences are generalizable or if these preferences lead to a change in peoples’ behavior. This paper addresses these gaps through two field studies in rural India. In the first study, 94 of 206 subjects received contracts to collect tree leaves in return for INR100 each. Participants were selected through four different allocation mechanisms - random allocation, deliberation among subjects, selection by criteria, and lowest bids in auctions. Participants selected through deliberation and criteria-based allocations collect significantly more leaves than those selected through auctions or random allocations. In the second study, a separate set of 124 subjects compared the fairness of these four allocation mechanisms, yielding 744 observations. Deliberation and criteria are ranked fairer than auctions or random allocations. The comparisons are robust to transitivity with an 86.3 percent coefficient of consistency. The close matching between experimental and survey results indicates that people provide significantly more effort when selected through allocation mechanisms that are considered fair. The study results also indicate how auctions are not always efficient.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107436"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A unifying theory of foreign intervention in domestic climate policy 国外干预国内气候政策的统一理论

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107430

Anthony Harding , Juan Moreno-Cruz

{"title":"A unifying theory of foreign intervention in domestic climate policy","authors":"Anthony Harding , Juan Moreno-Cruz","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107430","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107430","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a theory of climate-policy foreign intervention in which the climate policy is characterized in a policy externality space spanned by differences between two countries exposure to foreign policy, exposure divergence, and in preferred policy levels, preference asymmetry. Within this framework, we show that strategic behavior such as free-riding and free-driving emerge as equilibrium outcomes of position in this policy externality space, rather than as intrinsic features of a climate policy technology, such as mitigation, adaptation, or geoengineering. We also examine preferences for foreign intervention when a hegemon has three options to intervene in the domestic climate policy of a potential Target: i.) Agreements with Extraction; ii.) Agreements with Rewards; and iii.) Agreements with Sanctions. The hegemon’s choice is determined by the availability of rents that can be extracted from the target country, which is, in turn, a function of the policy externality. This explains why the same technology may require different governance approaches in different contexts and why some climate policies attract foreign intervention while others do not.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107430"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The equilibrium effects of mortality risk 死亡风险的均衡效应

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107463

Andrea Modena , Luca Regis , Giorgio Rizzini

引用次数: 0

Firm complexity and carbon emissions: Evidence from textual analysis 企业复杂性与碳排放：来自文本分析的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107454

Chih-Wei Wang , Weizheng Lin , Nina Shi

引用次数: 0

Evolving sustainable institutions in agent-based simulations with learning 基于主体的学习模拟中不断发展的可持续制度

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107455

Christopher Zosh , Andreas Pape , Todd Guilfoos , Peter DiCola

{"title":"Evolving sustainable institutions in agent-based simulations with learning","authors":"Christopher Zosh , Andreas Pape , Todd Guilfoos , Peter DiCola","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107455","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107455","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a novel, game-theoretic computational model in which learning agents explore how much to consume from a common resource.</div><div>These agents live under three different political regimes: private provision, a benevolent and powerful social planner, and competitive direct democracy. The policies of the latter two regimes are vectors of Pigouvian fines. Both agent consumption and voting decisions are guided by a single process: reinforcement learning with action similarity. The model produces panel data of fine vectors for each regime and setting. We find the benevolent social planner’s fines have significant welfare gains over uncoordinated private action, and that competitive direct democracy’s fines can nearly achieve the same gains. We also find that learning changes the optimal solution; that is, the fine vector found by the benevolent social planner is both distinct from and performs better than the socially optimal fine vector analytically derived from this setting, were it populated with rational, fully-informed agents. Elinor Ostrom empirically identified eight “design principles” common to social structures of communities which successfully cultivate a common resource. One of these principles is “graduated sanctions,” in which punishment accumulates at an accelerating rate as the degree of offense increases. We find that graduated sanctions only emerges when the agents use similarity in decision-making. We also find that, if fines generate revenue which can be costlessly redistributed, draconian (not graduated) sanctions emerge.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107455"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bonuses and loss aversion 奖金和损失厌恶

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107438

Víctor González-Jiménez , Patricio S. Dalton , Charles N. Noussair

引用次数: 0

Can risk-rating of incremental premiums improve consumer sorting across coverage options in mandatory health insurance markets? 增量保费的风险评级能否改善强制性健康保险市场中消费者对不同保险选择的分类？

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107452

Marcello Antonini , Josefa Henriquez , Richard van Kleef , Adrian Melia , Francesco Paolucci

{"title":"Can risk-rating of incremental premiums improve consumer sorting across coverage options in mandatory health insurance markets?","authors":"Marcello Antonini , Josefa Henriquez , Richard van Kleef , Adrian Melia , Francesco Paolucci","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107452","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107452","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Several mandatory health insurance schemes include some consumer choice of coverage (e.g., in terms of deductible levels). Premiums in these schemes are typically community-rated per insurance plan. While community-rated premiums help achieve objectives of fairness, they can also lead to adverse selection across coverage options. Consequently, consumers may sort inefficiently across these coverage options resulting in forgone welfare gains. This paper aims to explore under what conditions risk rating of incremental premiums for more comprehensive coverage (compared to a basic plan) can improve consumer sorting. In a simulation analysis on Chilean data, results show that under perfect risk adjustment, risk rating of incremental premiums can improve consumer sorting. With imperfect risk adjustment, however, the effects of risk rating on consumer sorting are ambigous as incremental premiums will not just reflect the direct effect of more comprehensive coverage on healthcare spending, but also the under/overcompensation from the (imperfect) risk adjustment system. Moreover, we find that in the presence of imperfect risk adjustment, risk rating improves welfare over community rating but does not fully solve the problem of inefficient sorting<strong>.</strong></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107452"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Fragility and regime stability in a state–society dynamic model 国家-社会动态模型中的脆弱性和政权稳定性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107439

Constantin Colonescu

引用次数: 0

Balancing health and sustainability: Optimizing investments in organic vs. conventional agriculture through pesticide reduction 平衡健康和可持续性：通过减少农药来优化有机农业与传统农业的投资

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442

Luca Bargna , Davide La Torre , Rosario Maggistro , Benjamin Montmartin

{"title":"Balancing health and sustainability: Optimizing investments in organic vs. conventional agriculture through pesticide reduction","authors":"Luca Bargna , Davide La Torre , Rosario Maggistro , Benjamin Montmartin","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107442","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the trade-offs between organic and conventional farming methods, focusing on their respective impacts on health, environmental sustainability, and economic outcomes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model based on an optimal control problem to examine the dynamic allocation of investments between organic and conventional agriculture. This model incorporates critical social factors, including the environmental and health costs associated with pesticide use in conventional farming, as well as the long-term social benefits of organic practices. Second, we estimate the key parameters of the model using French data on pesticide levels in groundwater. This enables us to compute and analyze the optimal policy proposed by the model and derive implications for reallocating investments towards organic farming. The optimal policy emphasizes the necessity of a tailored approach across both spatial and time dimensions. Along the spatial dimension, areas with high pesticide concentrations should be prioritized, calling for place-based rather than place-neutral policies. Along the temporal dimension, earlier intervention strategies are warranted when social costs related to pesticide exposure are high or when the weight assigned to the environmental conditions of future generations is low. Overall, the optimal policy results in a more balanced distribution of pesticides across the territory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107442"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0