{"title":"Market size, innovation, and the economic effects of an epidemic","authors":"Domenico Ferraro , Pietro F. Peretto","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107113","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107113","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a framework for the analysis of the economic effects of an epidemic that incorporates firm-specific innovation and endogenous entry. Transition dynamics is characterized by two differential equations describing the evolution of the mass of susceptible in the population and the ratio of the population to the mass of firms. An epidemic propagates through the economy via changes in market size that disturb incentives to enter the market and to undertake innovative activity. We evaluate state-dependent interventions involving policy rules based on tracking susceptible or infected. Simple policy rules are announced at the time of the outbreak and anchors private sector’s expectations about the time path of the intervention, including the end date. Welfare gains or losses relative to the do-nothing scenario are computed accounting for transition dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107113"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144589060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lucas N. Garcez , María Padilla-Romo , Cecilia Peluffo , Mayra Pineda-Torres
{"title":"Improvements in schooling opportunities and teen births","authors":"Lucas N. Garcez , María Padilla-Romo , Cecilia Peluffo , Mayra Pineda-Torres","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107120","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107120","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the causal relationship between educational attainment and teenage birth rates by focusing on a large-scale, country-wide reform that made high school compulsory and removed previously existing school capacity constraints in Mexico. Relying on administrative data on schools and births, we implement a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits variation across time and municipality-level exposure to the reform to explore the effects of expanding educational opportunities on teenage fertility. We find that teenage birth rates decreased by 2.8 percent after the education reform in municipalities with high increases in high school availability relative to municipalities with low increases. Our findings suggest that this decline is not driven by a reduction in the time teenagers had to engage in risky behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107120"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144580679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Echo chambers: Choosing interlocutors and messages","authors":"Delong Meng , Siyu Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107121","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107121","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide a rational explanation for the formation of echo chambers through a novel communication game in which individuals strategically choose both whom to communicate with and what to convey. Our key insight highlights a fundamental trade-off: individuals must balance the goal of gathering truthful information against the desire to influence others when selecting communication partners. This trade-off plays a critical role in the emergence of echo chambers. Our theory and experiment demonstrate that people acquire more accurate information from those of the same type, but exert greater influence over those of a different type. Experimental results show that individuals tend to engage with like-minded counterparts unless the incentive to persuade others is exceptionally strong. These findings offer valuable insights into how information and influence shape social networks and contribute to the persistence of ideological segmentation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107121"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144589059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carlos Varela-Quintana , Luis Carlos Sánchez , Julio del Corral
{"title":"The effect of social pressure when judging favorites and underdogs","authors":"Carlos Varela-Quintana , Luis Carlos Sánchez , Julio del Corral","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107112","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107112","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Numerous studies have shown that social pressure and the reputation of others exert a significant influence on individuals’ decision-making processes. Analyzing how these two factors interact simultaneously in real-world situations poses, however, a formidable challenge. This study aims to shed light on this issue by exploiting a natural experiment in European football involving matches played in empty stadiums over more than two decades. The research examines whether the reduction in refereeing bias in stadiums without a crowd differs depending on whether the home team is the favorite or the underdog, and how this behavior influences match outcomes. Utilizing comprehensive data from 62,923 matches across eight major European leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, and Spain) between 1998/99 and 2021/22, a causal model reveals two key results. First, it finds that, under social pressure, referees tend to favor stronger home teams more than weaker home teams. Second, the study observes that, although weaker local teams receive less preferential treatment from referees, social pressure is more important to achieve better results for them than for stronger home teams. This latter result is likely due to the fact that the stronger local teams would have won anyway without the referees’ assistance. The evidence presented strongly supports the idea that the effect of social pressure is moderated by the reputation of the agent being evaluated.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107112"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144580678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Labour Market Expectations and Occupational Choice: Evidence from Teaching","authors":"Joshua Fullard","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates why teachers quit. Using new survey data and a modified discrete-choice experiment we find that i) teachers are systematically misinformed about population earnings, and misinformation is correlated with quitting intentions; ii) non-pecuniary factors are the most cost-effective method of reducing teacher attrition; and iii) quitting intentions are more affected by reductions in workplace amenities than symmetric improvements, suggesting preventing cuts is more important than rolling out more generous benefits. Linking our survey data to teachers’ administrative records we show that teachers probabilistic leaving intentions are strong predictors of actual behaviour.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107096"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144563332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can being competitive but unsuccessful harm you, even more so if you are a woman?","authors":"Simone Haeckl , Jakob Moeller , Anita Zednik","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107108","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107108","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the fairness views of impartial spectators toward workers who behave competitively but are unsuccessful in a winner-take-all, real-effort task. In an online experiment with more than 5800 participants, spectators show significantly less concern for unsuccessful workers who voluntarily entered a competition for pay or behaved selfishly by trying to sabotage, compared to those who had to compete. We do not find evidence that women are punished more for competitive behavior than men, unless spectators have very strong gender norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107108"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144549541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When expert advice fails to reduce the productivity gap: Experimental evidence from chess players","authors":"Elias Bouacida , Renaud Foucart , Maya Jalloul","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107124","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107124","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chess players. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation after observing the answers of a higher or a lower-ability adviser. Although high-quality advice has the potential to serve as a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between higher- and lower-ability players, it did not happen in our experiment. One reason is that lower-ability players tend to pay a higher premium by sticking to their initial evaluation rather than following high-quality advice.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107124"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144549540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eizo Akiyama , Yukihiko Funaki , Ryuichiro Ishikawa , Yaron Lahav , Charles N. Noussair
{"title":"Bubbles in asset markets and the heterogeneity of beliefs","authors":"Eizo Akiyama , Yukihiko Funaki , Ryuichiro Ishikawa , Yaron Lahav , Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relationship between belief heterogeneity and transaction volume in asset markets. In a laboratory experiment, we elicit long-term beliefs from traders about future prices and make different subsets of the belief information common knowledge, depending on the treatment. There is a strong tendency for traders to adjust their beliefs toward the median belief in their market. There is no effect of making belief information public on transaction volume. Surprisingly to us, however, making the median price prediction for the entire future time horizon common knowledge greatly reduces mispricing</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107117"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144536159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From bargaining to balance: How unions shape gender wage outcomes","authors":"Fredrik B. Kostøl , Elin Svarstad","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Women continue to earn less than men in OECD countries. Extensive research has explored various factors contributing to the gender wage gap. However, fewer studies have examined the impact of trade unions, despite their significant role in promoting equality. In this study, we exploit exogenous variation in tax scheme incentives for union members to identify the effect of trade unions on the gender wage gap in Norwegian private sector establishments. Using administrative register data on full-time private-sector workers in the period 2000–2014, we find that increases in union density reduce wage differences between women and men within establishments. A ten-percentage point increase in the workplace union density is estimated to reduce the gender wage gap by approximately 2.7 percentage points.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107130"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144536158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inconsistent survey histograms and point forecasts revisited","authors":"Michael P. Clements","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Past analyses of surveys of professional forecasters’ histogram and point forecasts indicate that the two are not always consistent. The point forecasts are either systematically higher or lower than the corresponding histogram means, depending on whether we consider inflation or GDP growth. We consider whether inconsistencies are related to delayed updating of the histogram forecasts, or to the reaction of the two types of forecasts to new information, and whether inconsistent pairs typically imply less accurate point or histogram forecasts. We also re-consider explanations related to the complexity of the task on an extended dataset.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107097"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144523970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}