Vincent P. Crawford , Miao Jin , Juanjuan Meng , Lan Yao
{"title":"Expectations-based reference-dependence and labor supply: Eliciting cabdrivers’ expectations in the field","authors":"Vincent P. Crawford , Miao Jin , Juanjuan Meng , Lan Yao","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107259","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107259","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper reports a field experiment on Shanghai cabdrivers’ labor supply, analyzing the data using an expectations-based reference-dependent model that allows daily income- and hours-targeting. Our main innovation is to elicit the cabdrivers’ income and hours expectations, twice a day. We find that expectations indeed affect labor supply in a way predicted by a reference-dependent model, and hours expectations have a stronger influence than income expectations. Both expectations are found to be correlated with their most recent historical average values. While income expectations do adjust within the day, hours expectations are sticky. The findings suggest that the targeting effect based on hours expectations plays a more important role than traditionally thought.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"239 ","pages":"Article 107259"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145128384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effects of a capital-use tax and automation subsidy in a model of innovation and automation","authors":"Daiki Maeda , Takaaki Morimoto , Takumi Motoyama , Yuki Saito","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107254","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107254","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To examine the effects of a capital-use tax and automation subsidy on the proportion of automated industries and the inequality between workers and capitalists, we formulate a Schumpeterian growth model with automation, innovation, and human capital accumulation. We analytically show that a higher capital-use tax drives down the wage rate and stimulates automation on the balanced growth path, whereas a reduction in automation subsidies lowers the wage rate but inhibits automation. Moreover, we conduct a quantitative analysis demonstrating that policies that inhibit automation do indeed reduce wages; nevertheless, however, they can address the disparity between workers and capitalists.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107254"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145158300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recurring labour market shocks and stated and revealed preferences for redistribution","authors":"Maria Cotofan , Konstantinos Matakos","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107239","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107239","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Evidence on the relationship between employment shocks and preferences for redistribution is mixed – on stated outcomes – and sparse — on revealed ones. In an incentivized survey of US workers, we measure the relationship between repeated labour shocks and both stated and revealed preferences. We measure the former by support on seven different policies and the latter through donations. We examine experiences of both mild (having to reduce working hours) and hard shocks (unemployment), as well as past unemployment during formative years. We find evidence of adaptation to unemployment on policy preferences and compounding for milder shocks on donations, suggesting that repeated shocks are not independent in relation to preferences for redistribution. Our results show that unemployment may impact preferences in a self-interested way, while milder shocks may lead to broader support for redistribution.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107239"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145158301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reciprocal preferences and expectations in international agreements","authors":"Doruk İriş , Suha Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107243","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107243","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of reciprocal preferences and countries’ fairness-based expectations of each other in the context of international agreements aimed at providing global public goods. Reciprocal countries reward kindness (positive reciprocity) while retaliating against unkind behavior (negative reciprocity). We introduce a model where countries decide not only whether to participate on a coalition but also determine the extent of their effort. We demonstrate that reciprocal preferences can exert both positive and negative effects on the effort of both signatories and non-signatories of a treaty, depending on their expectations of others. In the non-cooperative game, there are three possible Nash equilibria, which depends on the degree of reciprocal concerns and expectations: no contribution, full contribution by all, and an interior solution. In the coalition formation game, if countries have limited yet sufficiently strong reciprocal concerns and low expectations, the grand coalition – where all countries sign the treaty (and exert efficient effort levels) – becomes stable. Interestingly, we find that signatories positively influence non-signatories’ efforts. Anticipating this response, signatories have an additional strategic incentive to increase their efforts, thereby enhancing the overall level of cooperation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107243"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145118603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Domenico Delli Gatti , Tommaso Ferraresi , Filippo Gusella , Lilit Popoyan , Giorgio Ricchiuti , Andrea Roventini
{"title":"The complex interplay between exchange rate and real markets: An agent-based model exploration","authors":"Domenico Delli Gatti , Tommaso Ferraresi , Filippo Gusella , Lilit Popoyan , Giorgio Ricchiuti , Andrea Roventini","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107252","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107252","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We extend the multi-country, multi-sector agent-based model of Dosi et al. (2019); Dosi et al. (2021) by integrating a currency market populated by heterogeneous financial agents—chartists and fundamentalists—who form expectations and trade foreign exchange based on boundedly rational heuristics. This addition generates complex real-financial interactions, wherein the exchange rate acts both as a channel of transmission for endogenous macroeconomic fluctuations and as an independent source of financial shocks. Through extensive simulations, the model reproduces salient empirical regularities of exchange rate behavior—such as excess volatility, fat-tailed return distributions, volatility clustering, and cross-country contagion—and sheds light on the amplification mechanisms linking financial speculation to real economic instability. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of central bank interventions under different policy rules and market configurations, highlighting their conditional capacity to stabilize macroeconomic dynamics in the presence of adaptive agent behavior.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107252"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145118604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Discriminatory social norms and early childhood development","authors":"Ashwini Deshpande , Rajesh Ramachandran","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107245","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107245","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores caste-based disparities in childhood stunting in India, focusing on the role of caste-based practices. Using data from the National Family Health Survey, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) framework to compare stunting rates between dominant and stigmatized caste groups within the same state, across a narrow geographical band on either side of the Vindhyas mountain range—a historical and social boundary associated with greater prevalence of caste-based practices in the north. Our findings reveal that children from stigmatized caste groups north of the Vindhyas exhibit significantly higher stunting rates than their southern counterparts. Validation exercises rule out alternative explanations such as economic disadvantage or disadvantages unrelated to caste. Moderation analyses further show that while socioeconomic and contextual factors partially reduce the stunting gap, they do not explain the persistent north-south divide, underscoring the structural and historical nature of caste-based inequities. These results call for targeted policy interventions addressing both material and structural barriers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107245"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A coco theory for cooperative bargaining","authors":"Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107249","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107249","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I introduce a <em>coco decomposition</em> for bargaining solutions, analogous to the one Kalai and Kalai (2013) introduced for 2-person games in strategic form. On the basis of this decomposition I formulate a <em>coco axiom</em>, and show that the Nash bargaining solution is the unique scale covariant solution that satisfies it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107249"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Simeon Djankov , Alessandro Melcarne , Giovanni B. Ramello , Rok Spruk
{"title":"Timely justice as a determinant of economic growth","authors":"Simeon Djankov , Alessandro Melcarne , Giovanni B. Ramello , Rok Spruk","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107235","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107235","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how timeliness in enforcing legal contracts affects economic growth across countries. We focus on judicial timeliness as a proxy for courts’ performance in a large panel of 169 countries over the 2004–2019 period. We show that, by raising uncertainty and promoting opportunistic behaviors in business transactions, slower courts hinder economic development. The relationship is robust to diverse model specifications and appears stronger for business environments more heavily relying on judiciaries such as economies undergoing rapid growth, countries characterized by low human capital and civil law jurisdictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107235"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taxing transitions: Inheritance tax and family firm succession","authors":"Philipp Krug , Dominika Langenmayr","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107238","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107238","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In many OECD countries, family firms face lower or no succession taxes if they fulfill continuation requirements. We study the effects of such preferential treatment in a two-generation model. Preferential treatment of continued firms leads to more entrepreneurship and higher wages, as entrepreneurs invest more as they value passing on a larger firm. However, more low-ability heirs continue the firm, leading to efficiency losses. In the presence of financial frictions, richer (but less able) heirs may invest more than buyers from outside.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107238"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A family investment model for intergenerational elasticity","authors":"Simon M.S. Lo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107213","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107213","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use a family investment model to explain intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) through three transmission channels: parents’ financial investments, human capital, and family backgrounds. We distinguish between shareable (public) and non-shareable (private) financial resources, of which the relative roles change with children’s gender. Removing the indirect effects caused by parents’ human capital significantly reduces the actual IGE from 0.32 to 0.20, indicating weak intergenerational income persistence. New findings are obtained regarding the externality of family size, substitutability of parents’ human capital, relative roles of fathers’ and mothers’ human capital, and assortative mating in the IGE.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107213"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}