Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第10页

Unsafe temperatures, unsafe jobs: The impact of weather conditions on work-related injuries 不安全的温度，不安全的工作：天气条件对工伤的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.016

Mattia Filomena , Matteo Picchio

引用次数: 0

Team size and diversity 团队规模和多样性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.04.004

Brais Álvarez Pereira , Shan Aman-Rana , Alexia Delfino

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An experimental test of gaming incentives 游戏激励机制实验测试

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.015

Sheheryar Banuri , Katarína Danková , Philip Keefer

{"title":"An experimental test of gaming incentives","authors":"Sheheryar Banuri , Katarína Danková , Philip Keefer","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.015","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In recent years, many organizations have undertaken efforts to introduce gaming incentives in order to enhance employee effort and user engagement. However, these incentives are not well understood, and subsequently there is a dearth of systematically controlled empirical evidence on their effects, as well as their interaction with other forms of motivation. We present the first comprehensive test of gaming incentives using a real effort lab experiment with a standard lab task adapted to allow the inclusion of gaming incentives. We test the effect of these incentives under two types of extrinsic incentives, an unconditional wage, and a piece rate. In addition, we also measure subject task motivation and explore interaction with intrinsic (task based) incentives. We report three main findings: first, gaming incentives increase effort when extrinsic incentives to exert effort are weak. When extrinsic incentives are strong, gaming incentives have no additional impact on effort, showcasing diminishing returns to multiple forms of incentives. Finally, some forms of gaming incentives are successful in increasing effort among the least task motivated, a property that is similar to extrinsic incentives. Implications for organizations seeking to implement gaming incentives are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141593100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Early climate mitigation as a social dilemma 早期气候减缓是一个社会难题

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.030

Juana Castro-Santa , Lina Moros , Filippos Exadaktylos , César Mantilla

引用次数: 0

“Friends Are Thieves of Time”: Heuristic attention sharing in stable friendship networks "朋友是时间的小偷稳定友谊网络中的启发式注意力分享

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.005

Anastas P. Tenev

{"title":"“Friends Are Thieves of Time”: Heuristic attention sharing in stable friendship networks","authors":"Anastas P. Tenev","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies a model of network formation in which agents create links following a simple heuristic — they invest their limited resources proportionally more in neighbours who have fewer links. This decision rule captures the notion that when considering social value more connected agents are on average less beneficial as neighbours and node degree is a useful proxy when payoffs are difficult to compute. The decision rule illustrates an externalities effect whereby an agent’s actions also influence his neighbours’ neighbours. Besides complete networks and fragmented networks with complete components, the pairwise stable networks produced by this model include many non-standard ones with characteristics observed in real life networks like clustering and irregular components. Multiple stable states can develop from the same initial structure — the stable networks could have cliques linked by intermediary agents while sometimes they have a core–periphery structure. The observed pairwise stable networks have close to optimal welfare. This limited loss of welfare is due to the fact that when a link is established, this is beneficial to the linking agents, but makes them less attractive as neighbours for others, thereby partially internalising the externalities the new connection has generated.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002233/pdfft?md5=8b4afcbf4741e265fe2e30e1091f83b7&pid=1-s2.0-S0167268124002233-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141593108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

And suddenly, the rain! When surprises shape experienced utility 突然，下起了雨！当惊喜塑造出经验丰富的实用工具时

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.026

Paolo Figini , Veronica Leoni , Laura Vici

引用次数: 0

Deductibles and health care utilization: An experiment on the role of forward-looking behavior 免赔额与医疗保健的使用：关于前瞻性行为作用的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.020

Glenn W. Harrison , Nadja Kairies-Schwarz , Johann Han

{"title":"Deductibles and health care utilization: An experiment on the role of forward-looking behavior","authors":"Glenn W. Harrison , Nadja Kairies-Schwarz , Johann Han","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.020","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the effects of nonlinear deductible contracts on health utilization behavior by using a laboratory experiment in which we can control the likelihood of hitting the deductible. We also evaluate the effect of subjects receiving regular information updates on their remaining deductible. Our results show that varying the future price has a significant effect on health care consumption. At an individual level, we identify and richly characterize heterogeneity. We find fully forward-looking, fully myopic, as well as mixed types after controlling for risk preferences. We show that there is a substantial welfare loss due to a lack in forward-looking behavior. The distribution of the welfare loss are characterized and differ sharply according to the model of risk preferences adopted for normative evaluation. Potential drivers of welfare effects are investigated and have a tendency to differ across risk preference models.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002026/pdfft?md5=90e787cd5eacc5e416d514722fedbbb5&pid=1-s2.0-S0167268124002026-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141543435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Kőszegi–Rabin expectations-based model and risk-apportionment tasks for elicitation of higher order risk preferences 基于 Kőszegi-Rabin 期望的模型和风险分配任务，用于激发高阶风险偏好

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.033

Konstantinos Georgalos , Ivan Paya , David Peel

{"title":"The Kőszegi–Rabin expectations-based model and risk-apportionment tasks for elicitation of higher order risk preferences","authors":"Konstantinos Georgalos , Ivan Paya , David Peel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.033","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the predictions of expectations-based reference-dependent models for risk-apportionment tasks that elicit higher-order risk attitudes. We consider some of the most commonly used specifications of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and disappointment aversion models. Our analysis reveals that higher order risky choices exhibited by decision makers defined by those model specifications depend on whether risks to be apportioned in these tasks are symmetric or asymmetric, whether they include small probability outcomes, and on the level of loss aversion. We highlight that some of the predicted choice behaviour in the risk-apportionment tasks differs from the ones in alternative models of decision under risk. We employ experimental data to examine whether choice patterns in the risk apportionment tasks are in line with the predictions of the model specifications described here. We find that only a small proportion of them are consistent with those predictions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002518/pdfft?md5=710f2e42b81839ac612452effb987f3f&pid=1-s2.0-S0167268124002518-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141543436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Measuring transaction costs in China’s rural land rental market: Ex-ante bargaining associated with ex-post contract-violation uncertainty and location specificity 衡量中国农村土地租赁市场的交易成本：事前讨价还价与事后违约不确定性和地点特殊性相关联

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.022

Ziyan Yang

{"title":"Measuring transaction costs in China’s rural land rental market: Ex-ante bargaining associated with ex-post contract-violation uncertainty and location specificity","authors":"Ziyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.022","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I measure the monetary value of ex-ante bargaining costs associated with China’s rural land rental market, confirming the previously unverified existence of transaction costs in this market. I demonstrate that the ex-ante bargaining costs associated with contractual formality represent the main transaction costs that hinder market progress. In a three-step theory, I model the process through which transaction costs are generated. First, uncertainty regarding ex-post contract violations caused by non-agricultural income shocks and location specificity in China’s fragmented farmland results in conflicting partner preferences. Second, the compromise mechanism that facilitates efficient bargaining makes the agent facing lower compromise costs in a transaction more likely to compromise. Third, ex-ante bargaining costs are generated in inefficient bargaining when theoretically predicted agents refuse to compromise. Using a subsample of data introduced in Yang (2020), I find that ex-ante bargaining costs are 126.5 RMB and 35.4 RMB per mu per year, respectively, for renting-out agents and renting-in agents who refuse to compromise in contract negotiations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141543434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

To change or not to change? – Status quo bias and happiness 改变还是不改变？- 现状偏见与幸福

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.017

Guy Barokas , Hila Hindy Ling , Arie Sherman , Tal Shavit

{"title":"To change or not to change? – Status quo bias and happiness","authors":"Guy Barokas , Hila Hindy Ling , Arie Sherman , Tal Shavit","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.017","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The status-quo bias (SQB) is the tendency to stick with the current situation despite potential dissatisfaction. In this study, we explore the relationship between SQB and subjective well-being (SWB). We hypothesized that higher SQB may lead to less desirable situations (e.g., unsatisfactory marriage, unwanted job), negatively affecting SWB. We developed and examined a novel index for measuring SQB. Surveying 1,423 Israeli working adults, the index showed strong internal consistency and validity, affirming reliability and construct validity. A significant negative correlation between SQB and three SWB measures was found, with SQB explaining more to SWB variations than subjective health, income, and religion combined. Positive life changes over the past three years have moderated this relationship. Moreover, despite including factors like regret, present bias, loss aversion, and optimism—which correlate with SWB and SQB in opposite directions and, therefore, could nullify our findings—the SQB-SWB correlation remained robust. Furthermore, our SQB measure significantly predicted SWB even when controlling for the negative relationship between the affective component of SWB (i.e., emotions) and SQB, which was demonstrated to operate in reverse causality compared to our hypothesis. In other words, SQB was found to mediate between the affective component and the other components of SWB. By providing evidence of the correlation between SQB and SWB, we introduce a robust SQB measurement tool, and underscore SQB's importance when exploring SWB determinants, suggesting that policy interventions encouraging individuals to overcome barriers to change could be advantageous.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141543432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0