Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第10页

Making a promise increases the moral cost of lying: Evidence from Norway and the United States 做出承诺会增加说谎的道德成本：来自挪威和美国的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-04-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106995

Mathias Ekström , Kjetil Bjorvatn , Pablo Soto Mota , Hallgeir Sjåstad

{"title":"Making a promise increases the moral cost of lying: Evidence from Norway and the United States","authors":"Mathias Ekström , Kjetil Bjorvatn , Pablo Soto Mota , Hallgeir Sjåstad","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106995","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106995","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>It is commonly observed that people make promises to commit future behavior to their moral ideals. But do promises work? In particular, can making a promise effectively promote honesty by increasing the moral cost of lying? We explored this research question in three high-powered experiments using representative samples from Norway and the United States (N=7,200). Based on a one-shot “mind game”, in which dishonesty is economically incentivized but impossible to detect at the individual level, we find that about 1/4 of participants are willing to lie for the chance of winning a bonus reward of $100. Crucially, dishonesty was significantly reduced, on average by 7 percentage points (25 percent), when participants were asked to make an inconsequential promise to report accurate information. This <em>promise effect</em> was equally strong in both Norway and the United States, and in different participant subgroups. However, promises reduced dishonesty only when the promise required active choice, suggesting that personal engagement increases the internal inconsistency that would arise from a subsequent lie. In contrast with predictions, an experimentally manipulated expression of trust did not impact honesty by itself or boost the effect of making a promise. Given recent debates about the replicability of dishonesty research in social science, the current work provides high-quality evidence of broad relevance, documenting a moderate but robust effect of promises on subsequent dishonesty. The promise effect is formalized in a simple model integrating cognitive dissonance theory from psychology with perspectives on moral decision-making from behavioral economics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106995"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143747214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Behavioral subgame perfect implementation 行为子游戏的完美执行

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-04-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106992

Makoto Hagiwara

引用次数: 0

Shadow education, intra-household financial resource allocation, and educational achievements 影子教育、家庭内部财务资源配置与教育成就

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106993

Tanmoy Majilla

{"title":"Shadow education, intra-household financial resource allocation, and educational achievements","authors":"Tanmoy Majilla","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106993","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106993","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Studying intra-household allocation of financial resources is challenging as direct parental monetary expenditures on individual children is difficult to isolate from aggregate household expenditures. Due to such limitations, previous studies tend to examine parental allocation of resources indirectly from household expenditures or through other non-monetary investments. This article studies intra-household allocation of parental monetary expenditures on private supplementary tutoring or shadow education. I show a birth order disadvantage for later-born children in shadow education expenditures, and find evidence of disadvantages for girls in every birth order. These patterns are attributed to the preference for elder sons, which is common in India, and I subsequently test several features which stem from this preference. The analysis also shows that intra-household disparity in shadow education expenditures accounts for a substantial part of the gender gaps in cognitive test scores. The inequality contributions from the disparities in shadow education expenditures in test scores decrease as one moves down the birth order.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106993"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143738197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

First-order and higher-order inflation expectations: Evidence about Households and Firms 一阶和高阶通胀预期：关于家庭和企业的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106988

Pascal Kieren , Christian König-Kersting , Robert Schmidt , Stefan Trautmann , Franziska Heinicke

引用次数: 0

Forecasts as repeated cheap talk from an expert of unknown statistical bias 预测不过是一个统计偏差未知的专家反复说的廉价话

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106955

Irene Valsecchi

引用次数: 0

Ultimatum game: Regret or fairness? 最后通牒游戏：后悔还是公平？

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106969

L.H. Aleksanyan , A.E. Allahverdyan , V.G. Bardakhchyan

{"title":"Ultimatum game: Regret or fairness?","authors":"L.H. Aleksanyan , A.E. Allahverdyan , V.G. Bardakhchyan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the ultimatum game, the challenge is to explain why responders reject non-zero offers thereby defying classical rationality. Fairness and related concepts have been among the main explanations so far. Here, the ultimatum game is reformulated based on probabilistic lotteries, enabling modern decision-making tools to be applied to this problem. We explain the rejection behavior via the following principle: if the responder regrets less about losing the offer than the proposer regrets not offering a better option, the offer is rejected. This principle qualifies as a rational conflict behavior. Similar concepts were applied in the economy of wars. The principle replaces the experimentally falsified classical rationality (the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) that leads to accepting any non-zero offer. It is implemented via the transitive regret theory for probabilistic lotteries. The expected utility implementation is a limiting case of this. We show that several experimental results normally prescribed to fairness and intent-recognition can be given an alternative explanation; e.g. the comparison between “fair” and “superfair”, the behavior under raising the stakes, the influence of the initial wealth, <em>etc</em>. Hence we also propose experiments that can distinguish these two scenarios (fairness versus regret). They assume different utilities for the proposer and responder. We focus on the mini-ultimatum version of the game and also show how it can emerge from a more general setup.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106969"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143714891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Risk aversion and the punishment paradox in a crime game 犯罪博弈中的风险规避与惩罚悖论

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106985

Rabah Amir , Arup Bose , Debashis Pal , Iryna Topolyan

引用次数: 0

Competitiveness at the intersection of gender and sexual orientation 性别和性取向交叉的竞争

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106987

Billur Aksoy, Ian Chadd

引用次数: 0

Depression and Risky Health Behaviors 抑郁和危险的健康行为

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106983

Alex Xingbang Weng

引用次数: 0

Less but better? The influence of gender on political activity 少而精？性别对政治活动的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106980

Nicolas Frémeaux , Paul Maarek

{"title":"Less but better? The influence of gender on political activity","authors":"Nicolas Frémeaux , Paul Maarek","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106980","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106980","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this article, we study gender differences in the activity and effectiveness of French parliamentarians between 1993 and 2022. Using fixed-effect regressions, we find that women author less bills than men but there are no significant differences for other outcomes such as amendments or oral questions. The gender gap for bills is observed only for newcomers and fades after the first half of the term, suggesting a difference in attitudes rather than a selection effect. Conversely, women are substantially more effective: each term, 46 amendments authored by women pass, whereas 33 of the men’s amendments pass. This is mostly due to the use and quality of their amendments, with men being more prone to obstructive behaviors for instance. On the other hand, women in the opposition party are less slightly likely to have their bills passed than men in the opposition party. This is linked to discrimination within the party, which less often selects bills drafted by women to submit them to a vote. All these results are robust when using RDD strategies based on close elections. Overall, gender quotas have positive effects on parliamentary work as effectiveness is crucial in policy making. It is however essential to create an environment favorable to the inclusion of women.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106980"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143696732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0