Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第10页

Safety accidents and mutual fund flows 安全事故和资金互流

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106875

Xuefeng Hu , Bochen Wu , Rong Xu , Yifan Zhou

引用次数: 0

Modeling adaptive forward-looking behavior in epidemics on networks 网络流行病中自适应前瞻性行为建模

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106914

Lorenzo Amir Nemati Fard , Alberto Bisin , Michele Starnini , Michele Tizzoni

{"title":"Modeling adaptive forward-looking behavior in epidemics on networks","authors":"Lorenzo Amir Nemati Fard , Alberto Bisin , Michele Starnini , Michele Tizzoni","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106914","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106914","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Incorporating decision-making dynamics during an outbreak poses a challenge for epidemiology, faced by several modeling approaches siloed by different disciplines. We propose an epi-economic model where high-frequency choices of individuals respond to the infection dynamics over heterogeneous networks. Maintaining a rational forward-looking component to individual choices, agents follow a behavioral rule-of-thumb in the face of limited perceived forecasting precision in a highly uncertain epidemic environment. We describe the resulting equilibrium behavior of the epidemic by analytical expressions depending on the epidemic conditions. We study existence and welfare of equilibrium, identifying a fundamental negative externality. We also sign analytically the effects of the behavioral rule-of-thumb at different phases of the epidemic and characterize some comparative statics. Through numerical simulations, we contrast different information structures: global awareness – where individuals only know the prevalence of the disease in the population – with local awareness, where individuals know the prevalence in their neighborhood. We show that agents’ behavioral response through forward-looking choice can flatten the epidemic curve, but local awareness, by triggering highly heterogeneous behavioral responses, more effectively curbs the disease compared to global awareness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106914"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143479694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Boarding education and children's human capital development 寄宿教育与儿童人力资本开发

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106948

Junjie Lin , Chunchao Wang , Sheng Xu , Ling Zhang , Yunbin Zhang

引用次数: 0

Social norm uncertainty: Measurement using coordination games and behavioral relevance 社会规范不确定性：基于协调博弈和行为关联的测量

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106937

Robert Schmidt

引用次数: 0

Violence against women and the substitution of help services in times of lockdown: Triangulation of three data sources in Germany 封锁期间对妇女的暴力行为和帮助服务的替代：德国三个数据来源的三角测量

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106879

Cara Ebert , Janina Isabel Steinert

{"title":"Violence against women and the substitution of help services in times of lockdown: Triangulation of three data sources in Germany","authors":"Cara Ebert , Janina Isabel Steinert","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106879","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106879","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on domestic violence against women in Germany in 2020. The analysis draws on three data sources: (1) longitudinal administrative data on the volume of help requests to helplines, shelters and counselling services, (2) cross-sectional survey data collected during the first wave of the pandemic, and (3) a qualitative online survey with counsellors and domestic violence experts. The number of violence-related requests at helplines increased significantly by 34% with the first physical distancing measures, whereas ambulatory care services such as shelters experienced a 14% increase in help requests only after physical distancing restrictions were lifted. Our results indicate that individuals substituted help services away from ambulatory care towards helplines. We do not observe exacerbated violence in states with greater mobility reductions, lower day care capacity for childcare or higher COVID-19 infection numbers. Yet, our cross-sectional household-level data suggests that home quarantine and financial distress may have been triggers of violence. Our findings highlight the importance of providing easily accessible online counselling offers for survivors of violence and governmental financial relief packages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106879"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143463777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Rational vs. irrational beliefs in a complex world 复杂世界中的理性与非理性信念

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106898

Gregor Boehl , Cars Hommes

引用次数: 0

The optimal choice of scaling in economic agent-based models 经济主体模型中规模的最优选择

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106928

Zsuzsanna Hosszú , András Borsos , Bence Mérő , Nikolett Vágó

{"title":"The optimal choice of scaling in economic agent-based models","authors":"Zsuzsanna Hosszú , András Borsos , Bence Mérő , Nikolett Vágó","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106928","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106928","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In economics, two strategies are typically employed to reduce the size and complexity of models: (i) using representative agents by aggregating the actual entities, (ii) and downscaling, i.e. using only a sample of agents. While the first strategy has been studied in detail in mainstream economics, the implications of the second option – which is mainly used in complexity economics – are underresearched. This paper contributes to filling this gap by proposing a protocol for sensitivity analysis with respect to the scaling choice in these models. We introduce this protocol in a dual manner. First, we identify three main theoretical channels via which scaling can influence complex economic ABMs: (i) idiosyncratic shocks, (ii) information loss due to insufficient interactions, and (iii) the distribution of the characteristics of agents. Second, we analyse the implications of these mechanisms by assessing the trade-offs between three fundamental measures of model performance: <em>precision</em>, <em>accuracy</em> and <em>running time</em>, with different downscaling levels ranging between 0.25%–100% of the full population. We illustrate our approach using the model of Mérő et al. (2023), which is suitable for representing the housing market of Hungary at any scale in this interval (from 10,000 to 4 million agents). We show that in this model there is a non-trivial relationship between the scaling factor and the model performance. Not only does the model’s accuracy and precision depend on the model size in a non-linear manner, we also found that the evaluation of a scenario at a given level of precision takes only three to four times longer with 100 times more agents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106928"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143453367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Expectations matter in bottom-line setting: Theory and evidence 期望在底线设定中很重要：理论和证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106944

Peikun Chen , Jianbiao Li , Jingjing Pan , Chengkang Zhu

{"title":"Expectations matter in bottom-line setting: Theory and evidence","authors":"Peikun Chen , Jianbiao Li , Jingjing Pan , Chengkang Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106944","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106944","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The bottom-line, or minimum acceptable offer (MAO), is a crucial concept in real-world economic negotiations. This study demonstrated a causal relationship between responders’ expectations of proposers’ offer and their MAOs setting, in a controlled ultimatum game. We develop three theoretical models (reference dependence, frustration aversion and bounded rationality) to further investigate the underlying mechanism. By considering two distinct scenarios - responders setting MAOs before and after knowing the proposer's offer - we generate distinguishable predictions from our models. We then conduct two experiments to test these predictions, exogenously manipulating subjects’ offer expectations and comparing the observed shifts in MAOs to our theoretical predictions. Our findings indicate that bounded rationality significantly contributes to the causal effect of responders’ expectations on their MAOs, providing a new perspective on how expectations shape bargaining behavior. Furthermore, our results help reconcile divergent findings under the strategy method and direct-response method, highlighting the effects of expectations as a key driver alongside emotion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106944"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143465146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected 漫长的等待会使人堕落，尤其是在意想不到的情况下

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106939

Linda Dezső , Gergely Hajdu , Yossef Tobol

引用次数: 0

Project selection with biased advice: An experiment on competitive cheap talk 带有偏见建议的项目选择：关于竞争性廉价言论的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106936

Miguel A. Martínez-Carrasco , Eric Schmidbauer , John Hamman

{"title":"Project selection with biased advice: An experiment on competitive cheap talk","authors":"Miguel A. Martínez-Carrasco , Eric Schmidbauer , John Hamman","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106936","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106936","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When agents with private information compete for resources from an uninformed decision-maker and are biased towards their own favored projects (e.g., a CEO decides which division manager’s project to fund), they have incentive to strategically communicate about their project’s value. However, possible future interaction can mitigate this problem even without reputational concerns, since an agent who induces acceptance of a low-valued project today consumes firm resources that crowd out better opportunities that may arrive in the future. We study this organizational environment both theoretically and empirically using laboratory experiments. We hypothesize and find that truth telling is easier to support as low-quality projects lose value or become more likely to occur, but harder to support as agent competition grows. We see an interesting behavioral result in which beliefs influence responsiveness to parameter changes. Specifically, as agents grow more pessimistic about the likelihood of truthful reporting by their competitors, they respond more sharply to parameter changes, in line with the model’s predictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106936"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143445407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0