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Investing to get a head start in contests 投资是为了在竞争中获得先机
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364
Derek J. Clark , Tapas Kundu , Tore Nilssen
{"title":"Investing to get a head start in contests","authors":"Derek J. Clark ,&nbsp;Tapas Kundu ,&nbsp;Tore Nilssen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107364","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a contest, rivals compete for a prize by making irretrievable outlays. Commonly, researchers assume that contestants spontaneously start to compete at some designated time. In practice, however, preparation is an important part of the actual contest, where rivals may undertake actions in order to improve their chance of winning the prize. We model this as a two-player all-pay auction under complete information in which rivals can make an investment to try to get a head start before the contest is played. We provide conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists in which the player with the high prize valuation invests and the opponent does not. A pure-strategy equilibrium can also exist in which it is the player with the low prize valuation that makes the investment. The investment opportunity allows the rivals to move some of the competition to the investment stage, reducing the intensity of fighting in the contest. An important feature of our model is that investment does not necessarily preclude fighting in the contest. We show when investment leads to active participation in the contest, and when it leads a rival to simply capitulate. This is an important distinction, especially if the overall aim is to minimize contest effort, such as in armed conflicts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107364"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145685010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Earthquakes and the intergenerational delegation of responsibility 地震和代际责任分配
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363
Nurun Naher Moni , Muhammad Habibur Rahman , Ruhul Salim
{"title":"Earthquakes and the intergenerational delegation of responsibility","authors":"Nurun Naher Moni ,&nbsp;Muhammad Habibur Rahman ,&nbsp;Ruhul Salim","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107363","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do earthquakes affect parents’ preferences for raising responsible children? By merging data on random variations in the frequency and timing of earthquakes with five waves of the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2022 at the district level across 90 countries, our event-specific difference-in-differences estimates reveal that parents affected by moderate earthquakes increase their preference for responsible children by 5.9 percentage points due to perceived risks. We argue that moderate shocks heighten risk perceptions without depleting parental capacity, whereas strong earthquakes dampen this effect by reducing the capacity required to instill responsibility. Our empirical evidence suggests that governments should embed child-centred disaster risk reduction frameworks within post-disaster recovery strategies to enhance long-term disaster resilience.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107363"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The long-run human capital benefits of the one-village-one-preschool pilot in rural northwestern China 西北农村一村一幼试点的长期人力资本效益
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107377
Yalin Tang , Chengfang Liu , Yingquan Song
{"title":"The long-run human capital benefits of the one-village-one-preschool pilot in rural northwestern China","authors":"Yalin Tang ,&nbsp;Chengfang Liu ,&nbsp;Yingquan Song","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107377","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107377","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Since its inception in 2009, the One Village One Preschool (OVOP) initiative has emerged as one of China’s most extensive social experiments in rural early childhood education (ECE), distinguished by stringent teacher entry standards and sustained professional development. Utilizing variations in OVOP’s access cross villages and cohorts, we find that high-school-aged students exposed to OVOP have gained human capital benefits. Specifically, an additional one-year of OVOP exposure generates a 4.6 percentage point (pp) increase in the likelihood of attending selective senior high schools and a 3.8 pp reduction in the probability of grade retention. Further examination suggests that the quality of OVOP centers, particularly teacher qualifications, plays a crucial role in generating these benefits. Moreover, the program’s impact is mediated through boosting preschool skill development and subsequent academic performance in compulsory education. Notably, students from upper-middle ability distribution derive more substantial benefits from OVOP exposure. Finally, a preliminary benefit-cost analysis indicates a return of at least 4.1:1 on OVOP investments, with the marginal value of public funds spanning from 6.2 to infinity. These findings underscore the efficacy of OVOP as a scalable model for enhancing educational equity and human capital development in rural China.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107377"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players 预算约束参与方竞争中的最优信息披露
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392
Anastasia Antsygina
{"title":"Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players","authors":"Anastasia Antsygina","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies optimal information disclosure in two competing contests where contestants face a constraint on their total effort contribution, or budget. The contestants are ex ante uninformed about the value of the prize to be allocated in one of the contests. Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown prize value chooses a public disclosure rule that maximizes the total effort exerted in her competition, and commits to it. We find that the optimal disclosure rule is generally not unique and can reveal (at least some) information to the contestants. In the absence of competition for effort among contests, the size of the budget has a non-monotonic effect on the designer’s incentives to share information. When competition for effort is at place, the designer’s incentives to share information decline with the size of the budget, which is driven by the <em>substitution effect</em> that forces contestants to reallocate their effort towards a competition with a higher perceived prize.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107392"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delayed school entry increases internal locus of control 延迟入学增加了内在控制点
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317
Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Szabó-Morvai
{"title":"Delayed school entry increases internal locus of control","authors":"Dániel Horn ,&nbsp;Hubert János Kiss ,&nbsp;Ágnes Szabó-Morvai","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107317","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Internal locus of control (LoC) is positively associated with numerous life outcomes, yet our understanding of how to enhance it remains limited. Leveraging statutory school enrollment cutoff dates as a source of plausibly exogenous variation, we provide the first causal evidence that delayed school entry increases internal LoC. Specifically, we estimate a policy effect of approximately 0.08 standard deviation among 8th-grade students, corresponding to an approximately 0.15 standard deviations effect among compliers. While these effects are likely relative rather than absolute, we find that the impact is significantly larger among children from financially distressed families. These heterogeneous effects highlight the potential for delayed school entry to strengthen internal LoC, particularly for students from lower-income backgrounds, though trade-offs such as increased childcare costs and delayed workforce entry should be considered.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107317"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can ratings mitigate consumer inattention? Evidence from the swedish housing market 评级能减轻消费者的注意力不集中吗？来自瑞典房地产市场的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349
Petter Berg
{"title":"Can ratings mitigate consumer inattention? Evidence from the swedish housing market","authors":"Petter Berg","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107349","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study the effects of ratings designed to capture the financial risk associated with apartment ownership in Sweden. I find a discontinuous impact around rating thresholds on sales prices and real estate agents’ pricing decisions, but only after ratings started being displayed in online listings. This is not driven by changes in the number of bidders in apartment auctions. However, the magnitude of the rating effect is larger for sales administered by high- relative to low-quality real estate agents. My results suggest that ratings conveying financial information to consumers must ensure a high degree of salience to be effective. However, financial intermediaries remain likely to play a role in the transmission of such information.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107349"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pyramid schemes 传销
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107398
Gönül Doğan , Kenan Kalaycı , Priscilla Man
{"title":"Pyramid schemes","authors":"Gönül Doğan ,&nbsp;Kenan Kalaycı ,&nbsp;Priscilla Man","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107398","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107398","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We invite experiment participants to invest their endowment in a pyramid scheme with a negative expected return. In two samples, one from the general U.S. population and one from a major German university involving higher stakes, more than half invest regardless of their age, gender, income, and trust and fairness beliefs. Higher risk tolerance positively correlates with investment in both populations, whereas preference for positively-skewed risk, and lower cognitive skills explain investment only in the general U.S. population. We vary the level of assistance provided to participants in inferring the distribution of payoff from the pyramid scheme in four treatments, and find that only those requiring no further extrapolation of information are successful in reducing investment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107398"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ETF indexing strategies and asset prices: Experimental evidence ETF指数策略与资产价格：实验证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107342
Peter Bossaerts , John Duffy , Jean Paul Rabanal , Olga A. Rud , Nitin Yadav
{"title":"ETF indexing strategies and asset prices: Experimental evidence","authors":"Peter Bossaerts ,&nbsp;John Duffy ,&nbsp;Jean Paul Rabanal ,&nbsp;Olga A. Rud ,&nbsp;Nitin Yadav","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107342","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107342","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We experimentally examine whether and how the indexing strategy used by exchange traded funds (ETFs) affects the prices of the constituent assets. We study this issue in both the primary market (ETF creations and redemptions using bots as authorized participants) and the secondary market. The experiment includes three environments: (i) no ETF, (ii) an equal weighted ETF, and (iii) an unequal, market cap weighted ETF. We find that compared to the baseline of no ETFs, the introduction of ETFs significantly affects the relative prices of the constituent assets in the equal weighted ETF but not in the unequal weighted, market-cap based ETF. The introduction of ETFs also affects order imbalances and bid-ask spreads particularly for the asset in shortest supply.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107342"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145617463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan 战场上的团队生产：来自阿富汗北约的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385
Thiemo Fetzer , Oliver Vanden Eynde , Austin L. Wright
{"title":"Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan","authors":"Thiemo Fetzer ,&nbsp;Oliver Vanden Eynde ,&nbsp;Austin L. Wright","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107385","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Managing military operations across and between teams of partner nations remains a first-order challenge to security and development during conflict. NATO, under the umbrella of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), brought together troops from 28 countries to help enhance security provision in Afghanistan. ISAF units were given responsibility for specific operational units. The assignment of responsibilities to different national armed forces could lead to coordination problems. We explore whether the provision of security is affected by horizontal frictions (when different countries are responsible for different sides of borders) or vertical frictions (when different countries control different levels of the operational hierarchy). We find that both horizontal frictions and vertical frictions are also associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. They also reduce military support activities, including aid projects and patrol activity. These findings indicate that misalignment between units within military organizations can undermine the effectiveness of security and development interventions during war.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107385"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bribery, secrecy, and communication: theory and evidence from firms 贿赂、保密与沟通：来自公司的理论与证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366
Jafar M. Olimov
{"title":"Bribery, secrecy, and communication: theory and evidence from firms","authors":"Jafar M. Olimov","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107366","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies if firms pay different types of bribes, and if corrupt bureaucrats have perfect information about resources of bribe-paying firms. We construct a model of corruption that allows for multiple informational scenarios in a single market for bribes and empirically test these scenarios on the original dataset of 429 firms operating in Tajikistan. The results indicate that firms simultaneously make voluntary and involuntary bribe payments, firms hide resources from corrupt bureaucrats to reduce involuntary bribe payments, and bureaucrats who receive voluntary bribe payments do not share bribery-relevant information with other bureaucrats.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107366"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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