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Polycentric status contests 多中心地位竞争
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405
Vlad Tarko
{"title":"Polycentric status contests","authors":"Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107405","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>As societies become richer, and basic needs are satisfied, zero-sum positional contests gain more prominence, while the regular positive-sum benefits of markets subside in the background. As long argued by Hirsch, Frank and others, the institutions for managing resource scarcity and spurring economic growth, i.e. the institutions of capitalism, may not be particularly well-suited for managing the type of scarcity associated with positional goods. The long-term equilibrium of rich societies may not be as peaceful as many assume if they become overrun by status competitions. This paper provides a typology of positional goods, explaining why some positional competitions are worse than others, and a rent-seeking model of the supply response to positional goods’ price changes. The model leads to surprisingly optimistic predictions: markets tend to fragment the worst kinds of positional goods into competing hierarchies of status, tend to dissipate and eliminate some positional goods, and tend to turn the most damaging status competitions into more beneficial prestige competitions. Government interventions, by contrast, often attempt to prop‑up monopolistic status hierarchies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107405"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impact of prison experience on anti-gay sentiments: Longitudinal analysis of inmates and their families 监狱经历对反同性恋情绪的影响：囚犯及其家庭的纵向分析
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324
Maxim Ananyev , Michael Poyker
{"title":"Impact of prison experience on anti-gay sentiments: Longitudinal analysis of inmates and their families","authors":"Maxim Ananyev ,&nbsp;Michael Poyker","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107324","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Inmates’ informal code often ascribes low status to persons perceived as passive homosexuals. We use longitudinal data to investigate whether prison experience might contribute to anti-gay beliefs. We find that prison experience is related to a higher level of anti-gay sentiments among males and their families, while no discernible difference exists before incarceration. We find no effect for female ex-prisoners. We confirm that pre-incarceration trends, changes in trust and social capital, income, mental health, masculinity norms, and other potential alternative explanations do not drive the results. Our study sheds light on the overlooked role of prisons as a potential significant contributor to the propagation of anti-gay attitudes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107324"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Markets and New Industrial Policy: Systemic directionality or polycentric evolutionism? 市场与新产业政策：系统方向性还是多中心进化论？
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107378
Bryan Cheang , Mark Pennington
{"title":"Markets and New Industrial Policy: Systemic directionality or polycentric evolutionism?","authors":"Bryan Cheang ,&nbsp;Mark Pennington","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107378","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107378","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Proponents of “new industrial policy” claim that systemic directionality can be imparted to market economies in ways recognising the epistemic challenges of complexity and uncertainty. This paper evaluates these efforts to reformulate industrial policy on a more epistemically modest, evolutionary footing and argues that they fail. We contend that the focus on “systemic directionality” undercuts the emphasis placed on evolutionary learning and the epistemic limitations of centralised authority. Proper attention to these problems implies <em>neither</em> a laissez-faire/market fundamentalist position <em>nor</em> one that favours “systemic directionality.” Rather, it points towards a largely directionless environment where market-state entanglements arise through a polycentric evolutionism at multiple different scales.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107378"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Crony capitalism, populism, and democracy 裙带资本主义、民粹主义和民主
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107386
André Quintas , Peter Boettke
{"title":"Crony capitalism, populism, and democracy","authors":"André Quintas ,&nbsp;Peter Boettke","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107386","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107386","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the wake of the Cold War, liberal democracy was heralded by Francis Fukuyama as the “end of history”, the only viable form of human governance. Three decades later, that triumphalism has faded. Liberal democratic capitalism now faces mounting criticism, particularly for enabling cronyism. In response to this, Munger and Villarreal-Diaz pose one of the most important questions in contemporary political economy: <em>“Does capitalism in a democracy always devolve into corporatist cronyism?”</em> They answer in the affirmative. This paper revisits their question and offers a more precise thesis: it is not democracy <em>per se</em> but its current institutional form that fosters cronyism. Democracy is a normative commitment to viewing one another as dignified equals, but how that commitment is realized is a matter of continual debate and institutional design. We further argue that the democratic system itself generates a backlash against cronyism in the form of populist movements. However, while these movements claim to restore power to the people and dismantle elite privilege, under existing institutional constraints, they reproduce the very pathologies they oppose. Current democratic institutions, then, suffer from a double failure: they breed cronyism, and the populist response they provoke deepens it. In short, in the current institutional setting, there is no endogenous path out of cronyism. Does this mean democracy is inherently incompatible with capitalism? We argue that it is not. The problem lies in how democracy is institutionalized. Drawing mainly on the works of James Buchanan, F.A. Hayek, Vincent Ostrom, and Don Lavoie, we outline an alternative vision for democracy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107386"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145790287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Of opinionated bosses and yes men 固执己见的老板和唯唯诺诺的人
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395
Yuqi (Angela) Jiang , Suraj Prasad
{"title":"Of opinionated bosses and yes men","authors":"Yuqi (Angela) Jiang ,&nbsp;Suraj Prasad","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107395","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a theory of opinionated bosses – this is where a boss reveals her opinions to a worker who is tasked with gathering information. When the worker gathers information across multiple tasks, which he views as substitutes, the boss may <em>selectively</em> reveal her opinions to the worker on a well known task to redirect his effort to the task that is less well known. The benefit is a broader expertise across activities in the organization when rewards across these activities are implicitly determined. The cost is that the worker becomes a yes man. Being opinionated can, i) go hand in hand with weaker opinions, ii) lead to excessive levels of conformity and initiative, and finally, iii) improve the tradeoff between insurance and explicit incentives when a worker is risk averse.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107395"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental and health costs of Europe’s shift from gas to coal amidst the energy crisis 能源危机中欧洲从天然气转向煤炭的环境和健康成本
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107397
Mario Liebensteiner , Alex Mburu Kimani
{"title":"Environmental and health costs of Europe’s shift from gas to coal amidst the energy crisis","authors":"Mario Liebensteiner ,&nbsp;Alex Mburu Kimani","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107397","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107397","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The gas price explosion during the 2021/22 European energy crisis prompted a shift from gas- to coal-fired electricity production. Empirical evidence on the environmental and health consequences of such a fuel-price shock – as opposed to policy reforms – is scarce. We fill this gap by quantifying how gas price surges reorder coal-gas marginal costs and, in turn, affect emissions and health outcomes. Using daily data (2015–2023) for six EU countries with substantial gas-to-coal switching potential, we estimate a control-function model (2SRI) to obtain causal effects of days on which gas is more expensive than coal. During the 510 days of the 2021/22 gas price surge when coal was cheaper, coal-fired generation rose by 23 %, driving a 10 % increase in CO<sub>2</sub>, 19 % in PM<sub>2.5</sub>, 10 % in NO<sub><em>x</em></sub>, and 24 % in SO<sub>2</sub>. We also report illustrative health implications by mapping our primary results to standard literature-based damage factors; the resulting figures are not observed health outcomes but order-of-magnitude indicators. All figures are computed relative to a model-based counterfactual in which gas remained the cheaper option and represent short-term effects that disregard longer-term structural adjustments. The results highlight the substantial welfare costs of fuel price shock-induced switching and inform the design of policies that internalize these externalities. We also discuss how these results should be interpreted within the EU ETS and the resulting “waterbed effect”.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107397"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vulnerability game 漏洞游戏
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341
Gary Charness , Diana Caporale, Anna Rinaldi
{"title":"Vulnerability game","authors":"Gary Charness ,&nbsp;Diana Caporale,&nbsp;Anna Rinaldi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The resilience of communities to natural disasters depends on mitigation actions, which can be undertaken by public institutions, communities, or individual citizens. However, in disaster-prone areas, trust is often lacking—not only in institutions but also among neighbors, hindering the implementation of collective mitigation strategies.</div><div>This paper investigates whether trust can be strategically incentivized to support the adoption of group-based mitigation in such contexts. We design a repeated coordination game in which participants first choose the number of players to group with (2, 3, or 4), and then select a mitigation strategy: no action, individual mitigation, or grou<sub>p</sub> mitigation. Group mitigation offers the lowest cost but only succeeds if all group members independently choose it; its cost decreases as group size increases. Results reveal a shift in participants' preferences over time, with a progressive transition toward larger groups. Participants increasingly abandon individual strategies in favor of group mitigation. Our findings also show that trust is not a stable trait, but a strategic belief that adapts over time. Players’ choices change dynamically in response to observed payoffs, perceived cooperation probabilities, and perceived disaster risk. The game provides insights into when and why cooperation emerges or collapses, allowing for the pre-testing of institutional interventions before they are implemented in real-world contexts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107341"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145684960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of public knowledge about central bank independence on trust and inflation expectations 公众对央行独立性的了解对信任和通胀预期的影响
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107329
Nils Brouwer , Jakob De Haan
{"title":"The impact of public knowledge about central bank independence on trust and inflation expectations","authors":"Nils Brouwer ,&nbsp;Jakob De Haan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107329","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107329","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We conducted a survey of Dutch households to examine public knowledge of central bank independence. The results suggest that the public knows little about the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB). For instance, many respondents believe the ECB is influenced by the European Commission, EU governments, or financial institutions. Using a randomized controlled trial, we analyzed whether information about the ECB’s independence affects trust in the central bank and inflation expectations. Our experiment revealed that providing this information increased trust in the central bank, particularly among older individuals, individuals knowledgeable about central banks, and individuals who trusted the European Commission less. However, our results also suggest that providing this information does not affect inflation expectations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107329"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145737783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate social responsibility as a signal in the labor market 企业社会责任是劳动力市场的一个信号
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107384
Eldar Dadon , Marie Claire Villeval , Ro’i Zultan
{"title":"Corporate social responsibility as a signal in the labor market","authors":"Eldar Dadon ,&nbsp;Marie Claire Villeval ,&nbsp;Ro’i Zultan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107384","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107384","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Working for a firm engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) appeals to potential workers by boosting their self-image and sense of purpose. We propose an additional mechanism: CSR signals a firm’s future treatment of workers. Our model links CSR engagement with a firm’s propensity to support workers during unforeseen times of need. Under this assumption, a potential future need of the worker leads to more firms engaging in CSR and to a higher workers’ willingness to accept lower wages. Our experiment manipulates potential future needs across treatments. While the aggregate analysis does not fully support our theory, exploratory analysis reveals that male workers respond as predicted, whereas female workers do not. Consistently, in a risky environment, male employers increase their CSR engagement, which raises the acceptance rate among male workers. These results do not hold for female employers and workers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107384"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Herding and informed trading: Evidence from Chinese equity markets 羊群效应与知情交易：来自中国股市的证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107406
Bartosz Gebka , Han Jin , Vasileios Kallinterakis , Rabaa Karaa , Skander Slim
{"title":"Herding and informed trading: Evidence from Chinese equity markets","authors":"Bartosz Gebka ,&nbsp;Han Jin ,&nbsp;Vasileios Kallinterakis ,&nbsp;Rabaa Karaa ,&nbsp;Skander Slim","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107406","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107406","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We empirically investigate the relationship between informed trading and market herding in China for the 2003–2022 period and find a negative contemporaneous relationship, which grows stronger for specific market/economic conditions. Herding comprises of a very strong noise-driven herding and a fundamentals-driven anti-herding; informed trading dampens the former, while boosting the latter. Our results hold when controlling for the 2012 anti-insider trading laws and days of price-limit hits. Evidence on the dynamic relationship between informed trading and herding demonstrates that informed trading Granger-causes herding. Overall, informed traders motivate stronger herding over time, dampening it contemporaneously, thus suggesting that they prey on the very herding they attract.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"241 ","pages":"Article 107406"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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