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Disinformation in group chat social media network
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106891
Yaping Shan
{"title":"Disinformation in group chat social media network","authors":"Yaping Shan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106891","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106891","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces a model exploring disinformation propagation within group chat social media networks and its sway on public opinions. The model highlights the observation that disinformation disseminators not only distribute misleading content to sway undecided individuals but also engage in a learning process to augment their influence. Undecided agents form divergent long-term opinions influenced by both their direct exposure to disinformation and their interactions within the social network. Identifying the key influencers in the network becomes crucial in mitigating the impact of disinformation. This study proposes novel centrality measures to pinpoint these influencers, providing social media companies with effective strategies to mitigate the impact of disinformation on their platforms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106891"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The contractual dispute resolution game: Real-effort experiments on contract negotiation and arbitration
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902
Brice Corgnet , Simon Gächter , Roberto Hernán-González
{"title":"The contractual dispute resolution game: Real-effort experiments on contract negotiation and arbitration","authors":"Brice Corgnet ,&nbsp;Simon Gächter ,&nbsp;Roberto Hernán-González","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106902","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In many contractual arrangements where product or service delivery occurs sometime after contracts have been concluded, conditions may change, leading to disputes that need to be resolved often by a third party (arbitrator/mediator). In this paper we introduce the Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG), which allows us to study dispute resolution through arbitration. Unlike prior research studying arbitration at impasse using zero-sum bargaining games, we analyze a situation where parties can create additional value. We introduce a novel real-effort task, the Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), and show in two studies how automated arbitration rules (Study 1) and human arbitrators (Study 2) affect dispute resolution and surplus creation. In Study 1, we find that high-accuracy arbitration enhances efficiency. In Study 2, we find that arbitrators who are incentivized based on the total surplus of the negotiation do also promote greater efficiency. The CDRG provides a valuable tool for examining the effects of arbitration and mediation in settings where contracts are incomplete and can be impacted by shocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106902"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of superstitious beliefs on financial reporting conservatism: Evidence from Chinese “Zodiac Year”
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106916
Deng-Kui Si , Qianqian Du , Yukun Pan
{"title":"The effect of superstitious beliefs on financial reporting conservatism: Evidence from Chinese “Zodiac Year”","authors":"Deng-Kui Si ,&nbsp;Qianqian Du ,&nbsp;Yukun Pan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106916","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106916","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Superstition persists in human societies despite economic and social progress, influencing behavior and decision-making across cultures. In this paper, we investigate the impact of superstitious beliefs on financial reporting practices. By exploiting within-individual variation in superstitious beliefs among top executives of Chinese private firms, we provide solid evidence that companies led by chairpersons in their zodiac year tend to respond to perceived misfortune by timely writing off impaired assets and are more likely to exhibit greater financial reporting conservatism. Further evidence suggests that both pessimism and regulatory concerns induced by zodiac year beliefs can explain the increase in financial reporting conservatism. Overall, our findings advance behavioral finance research on the relationship between top executives’ superstitious beliefs and firm outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106916"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Alliances and strategic advantage in sequential-move contests: Implications for offensive vs. defensive strategies
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908
Yang-Ming Chang , Manaf Sellak
{"title":"Alliances and strategic advantage in sequential-move contests: Implications for offensive vs. defensive strategies","authors":"Yang-Ming Chang ,&nbsp;Manaf Sellak","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the impact of alliances and moving order on strategic advantage, conflict intensity, and expected payoffs in three-player sequential-move contests. The study shows that in a scenario where multiple players act as defenders while facing aggression from a lone player that moves first as an attacker, they must make their arming decisions jointly to gain a strategic advantage. Conversely, when attacking a lone player that moves second as a defender, multiple players acting as first movers must make their arming decisions autonomously. Compared to the benchmark equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game, the overall conflict intensity is higher if multiple players arm independently and lower if they arm cooperatively as an alliance. The expected payoffs of all players are the highest in a sequential-move game when two players ally, regardless of their moving order. Based on the analysis, we find that it is effective to launch an <em>offensive</em> strategy when allied players make arming decisions autonomously and strike first as attackers. On the other hand, a <em>defensive</em> strategy is effective when allied players make arming decisions collectively and move second as defenders.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106908"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Different defaults affect different groups differently
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106876
Jochem de Bresser, Marike Knoef
{"title":"Different defaults affect different groups differently","authors":"Jochem de Bresser,&nbsp;Marike Knoef","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106876","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106876","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze heterogeneity in default effects on retirement saving in a randomized survey experiment. In the Dutch context of universal, mandatory, and high pensions, respondents make realistic choices in which they can maintain the status-quo, suspend, or double pension contributions for one, three, or five years. The aggregate effect sizes of defaults at a three-year suspension and doubling of contributions are similar, increasing the fraction choosing these options by 22%-points. The former most strongly affects those with low incomes and high pension entitlements, while the latter affects patient, non-procrastinating, and especially impulsive individuals. Average savings are influenced in different directions, depending on the alternatives that individuals would have chosen in absence of the default. When setting defaults, it is important to consider variation in counterfactuals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106876"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Authority and screening in a principal agent model
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106862
Christoph Luelfesmann
{"title":"Authority and screening in a principal agent model","authors":"Christoph Luelfesmann","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106862","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106862","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I compare authority structures in a principal agent screening model where the agent’s type determines his payoff and his preferred activity level. The uninformed principal incurs an externality and she is able to propose a revelation mechanism with contingent transfers. Under ‘principal authority’ (the agent needs the principal’s agreement for his activity), the optimal mechanism is a standard screening contract and activities are downwards distorted. Under ‘agent authority’ (the agent can pursue the activity at his own discretion), reservation utilities become type dependent and the sign of the payoff externality shapes contractual outcomes. Specifically, (1) negative externalities (the principal prefers a smaller activity than her agent) now trigger upwards distortions; (2) a subset of agents is being ‘left alone’ under the mechanism; and (3) agent authority is always associated with larger activities than principal authority. Finally, I show that under simple symmetry assumptions, agent authority always generates a higher total surplus than principal authority.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106862"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shifting social norms through endorsements
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903
Andrea Gallice , Edoardo Grillo
{"title":"Shifting social norms through endorsements","authors":"Andrea Gallice ,&nbsp;Edoardo Grillo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The attitude of individuals towards prevailing social norms can change over time. When these changes are not observable, norm abidance can remain high due to social costs. We study how an opinion leader with private information about the societal change can influence norm abidance. We show that the opinion leader can affect abidance when she is neither too ideologically sided in favor of the norm violation nor too popularity concerned. The opinion leader has a stronger impact on society when social costs are higher, the societal change is more uncertain, and citizens interact more often with like-minded individuals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106903"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143131467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to JEBO special issue on wars, economic sanctions, economic behaviors, and institutions
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106860
Luu Duc Toan Huynh , Steven Ongena
{"title":"Introduction to JEBO special issue on wars, economic sanctions, economic behaviors, and institutions","authors":"Luu Duc Toan Huynh ,&nbsp;Steven Ongena","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106860","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106860","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106860"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The impact of search frictions in experimental asset markets: Over-the-counter versus double auction
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106829
Shuze Ding , Dong Lu , Daniela Puzzello
{"title":"The impact of search frictions in experimental asset markets: Over-the-counter versus double auction","authors":"Shuze Ding ,&nbsp;Dong Lu ,&nbsp;Daniela Puzzello","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106829","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106829","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper compares the performance of a centralized trading institution, Double Auction (DA), with a decentralized Over-the-Counter (OTC) trading institution in experimental asset markets. Variants of both are commonly used in field financial markets. While bids and asks are <em>publicly</em> displayed in the DA, they are only visible to the parties involved in a trade in the OTC market due to search frictions. We study the impact of these trading institutions on transaction prices, mispricing, trade volume, and bubble measures in controlled laboratory long-lived asset markets. We find that transaction prices, mispricing, trade volume and some bubble measures are significantly lower in OTC than in DA markets, due to reduced trading activities and stronger selling pressures brought about by search frictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106829"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Investigative journalism: Market failures and government intervention through public broadcasters
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106870
Ole-Andreas Elvik Næss
{"title":"Investigative journalism: Market failures and government intervention through public broadcasters","authors":"Ole-Andreas Elvik Næss","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106870","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106870","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Investigative journalism plays a vital role in promoting democratic accountability and transparency. This paper surveys nearly 5,000 participants from the U.S., the U.K., and Norway, demonstrating that investigative journalism functions as a public good prone to underprovision. I explore how governments can address this potential market failure through the intervention of public broadcasters. A majority of participants are willing to pay higher taxes to support increased journalism through public broadcasters. However, in countries with well-established public broadcasters, subsidies to private media are preferred, largely due to perceived political non-neutrality. Public broadcasters may garner broader support by focusing their journalism on non-political contexts. A Coasian approach proves ineffective, as the willingness to pay rises with the broader sharing of output.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"229 ","pages":"Article 106870"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143142657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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