劳动力市场的自愿质量披露

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Tom Lane , Minghai Zhou
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究求职者向潜在雇主传递有关自身素质的信息。英国网站Monster.co.uk的数据显示,近三分之一的应届毕业生选择不向雇主透露他们的学位等级,这是衡量学术质量的重要指标。为了测试雇主对这种不披露的反应,我们进行了一次自然现场实验。我们制作了一份属于应届毕业生的简历,并改变了他们的学位分类信息。这些简历被用于2019年至2021年期间在Monster.co.uk上发布的12301份毕业生工作申请,成功与否由雇主的积极回复率来衡量。不公开分类的应用程序比公开尽可能低的分类的应用程序成功得多。这表明,从缺失的信息中得出的不利推断是有限的。我们参照经典的“解开”理论来讨论我们的结果,在这个理论中,未公开的信息被完全怀疑,除了质量最差的信息外,所有信息都是自愿传递的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Voluntary quality disclosure in the Labour market
We study the transmission by jobseekers to prospective employers of information about their own quality. Data from the UK website Monster.co.uk suggests around one-third-of recent graduates opt not to reveal their degree classification, an important measure of academic quality, to employers. To test how employers react to such non-disclosure, we ran a natural field experiment. We constructed CVs supposedly belonging to recent graduates and varied the information provided about their degree classifications. The CVs were used to make 12,301 applications for graduate jobs advertised on Monster.co.uk between 2019 and 2021, with success measured by the rate of positive responses from employers. Applications leaving classification undisclosed were significantly more successful than those disclosing the lowest possible classification. This suggests limited adverse inference is drawn from missing information. We discuss our results with reference to classic ‘unravelling’ theory, in which undisclosed information is treated with full scepticism and all but the very worst quality information is voluntarily transmitted.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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