{"title":"Does democratic decision-making process enhance cooperation among children and adolescents? A large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment with students","authors":"Yexin Zhou 周晔馨 , Siwei Chen 陈思玮 , Jubo Yan 闫巨博","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The endogeneity premium refers to the increased cooperation observed when institutional rules are determined through a democratic decision-making process by group members rather than imposed externally. While this phenomenon has been documented among adults, little is known about whether it also appears in children. We investigate this question through a lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1600 student subjects aged 7–17, who participated in a setting where a reward or punishment rule was implemented either through democratic (i.e., endogenously chosen) or non-democratic (i.e., exogenously imposed) decision-making processes. We find that students exhibit substantial cooperation across all settings. Notably, their contributions are significantly higher under exogenously imposed institutions than under endogenously chosen ones, regardless of the rule types (i.e., reward or punishment). We provide explanatory evidence for this observation, suggesting that theoretical frameworks commonly used to explain the endogeneity premium in adult participants may not apply to children. Primary school-aged children may not yet have developed a preference for democratic decision-making and may be more accustomed to top-down rule enforcement. This explanation is further supported by the emergence of the endogeneity premium among adolescent participants, in contrast to its absence in child participants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107432"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146015784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Forced experimentation: An analysis of multi-armed bandits with an inconsistent option","authors":"Stanton Hudja , Daniel Woods , J. Braxton Gately","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates behavior in environments with forced experimentation. We analyze behavior in novel bandit problems where individuals repeatedly choose between an inconsistent option that may randomly be blocked in any given decision and a consistent option that is always available to be implemented. We analyze two environments with forced experimentation: an “Ex-Ante” environment and an “Ex-Post” environment. In the Ex-Ante environment, an individual knows at the start of a decision whether the inconsistent option can be implemented. In the Ex-Post environment, an individual only observes if the inconsistent option can be implemented by trying to implement it. We conduct an experiment where individuals in these two environments are predicted to choose the inconsistent option more often than the consistent option. Contrary to this prediction, we find evidence that subjects choose the consistent option more often. Structural analysis suggests that this result is driven by subjects who exhibit inertia after being forced into the consistent option and subjects who are averse to choosing an inconsistent option. Our results suggest that subjects may avoid inconsistently available options and that the presence of blocking in bandit problems leads to new behavioral factors to consider.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107434"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring social norms: direct and indirect methods and the role of financial incentives in reducing misreporting","authors":"Ann-Kristin Reitmann , Clotilde Mahé , Micheline Goedhuys , Eleonora Nillesen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107465","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107465","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We test two common features of the opinion-matching method to elicit personal beliefs and perceived social norms regarding female labor force participation among a sample of young Tunisian men and women. Our survey experiment contains two orthogonal treatment arms. In the first treatment arm, respondents were randomly assigned to answer a direct question about their personal beliefs regarding women working outside the home and an indirect questioning technique that provides more cover for the respondent: the list experiment. We find significant discrepancies between the two, particularly among male respondents – suggesting either biased personal beliefs in the direct question or non-strategic misreporting in the list experiment. It follows that, depending on which method is deemed more credible and which gender sample is considered, the prevalence of pluralistic ignorance varies widely in our setting. For the second treatment arm, we provided half of our sample with a financial incentive when eliciting perceived social norms regarding the appropriateness of women working. We find that financial incentives are necessary for both men and women to distinguish their personal beliefs from their perception of what others believe.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107465"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Norms as a solution to the tragedy of the commons: A co-evolutionary model","authors":"Fabian Mankat","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107433","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107433","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how societies can conserve a common-pool resource (CPR) through the cultural transmission of norms. To this end, we introduce a novel model that endogenizes the formation of behavior, personal, social injunctive, and social descriptive norms, and the resource stock. We find that the resource can persist through (1) asymptotically stable equilibrium points where personal norms and behavior are either homogeneous or heterogeneous across individuals and (2) an asymptotically stable limit cycle where herding causes alternating aggregate behavior and fluctuating resource stocks. We examine the degree of substitutability between two key factors—(a) institutional pressure and (b) social sanctions as a co-determinant of reproductive fitness—for upholding norms and, thus, the CPR. Moreover, we find that, in some cases, an increase in behavioral incentives for not exploiting the resource may, surprisingly, adversely affect resource conservation in the long run by interfering with cultural dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107433"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146015782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"WARNings – The impact of negative economic news on racial animus","authors":"Adam Bestenbostel , Abigail Peralta","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107399","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Racially charged rhetoric often surrounds layoff events, with specific minorities blamed for the loss of “American jobs.” We examine whether information about impending mass layoffs causes racial animus. Our data consist of information on mass layoff notices linked to Google Search Trends and FBI Hate Crime Statistics. We compare outcomes across areas that vary in the timing of impending mass layoffs. Results indicate an increase in both racist internet searches (1.4 percent) and hate crimes (1.2 percent) following layoff notices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107399"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146022582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A miscalculated risk: Investment choices under exponential growth bias","authors":"Karna Basu","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107365","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107365","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>“Exponential growth bias” – the tendency to underestimate exponential growth – has been shown to affect how much people save and borrow. I develop a simple theoretical framework to show that this bias, through its interaction with individual risk preferences, also affects <em>how</em> people save and borrow. Relatively risk-tolerant consumers will choose inefficiently safe investments, appearing more risk-averse than they are. In contrast, relatively risk-averse consumers will choose inefficiently risky investments, appearing less risk-averse than they are. I present survey data to support this hypothesis. The model introduces a new perspective on some apparent anomalies in intertemporal choice and raises additional considerations for consumer protection and financial literacy programs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146080959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Home ties, global trade: How clan culture shapes Chinese exports","authors":"Yi Zhang , Chenchen Deng , Chun Liu , Yunyan Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how domestic institutions, specifically Confucian clan culture, influence firms’ participation in international trade. Using a nationally representative survey of small and medium-sized private enterprises in China, we show that firms located in counties with a stronger historical presence of clans are more likely to export and achieve higher export values. These findings remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity through instrumental variable estimation, matching analysis, alternative model specifications, and an extensive set of control variables. Mechanism analysis reveals that clan culture promotes exports primarily by alleviating financial constraints and enhancing contract enforcement, with the financing channel playing the more prominent role. Moreover, the effect of clan culture on exports is significantly stronger in regions with weaker formal institutions, suggesting that clans can serve as effective substitutes for formal market-supporting institutions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Diseases of commerce: Unbundling economic freedom and public health","authors":"Vincent Geloso , Kelly Hyde , Ilia Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107460","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107460","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the institutional foundations of public health by distinguishing among three broad categories of disease: diseases of poverty, which are income-sensitive and decline with improved living standards; diseases of commerce, which are contact-transmissible and spread with mobility and exchange; and diseases of affluence, which are longevity-mediated noncommunicable conditions such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes that become more prevalent as people live longer. This classification allows us to examine how economic freedom, through its effects on income, mobility, and survival, reshapes the mix of disease rather than health outcomes in aggregate. Using global health data, we find that economically free societies experience large reductions in diseases of poverty, modest changes in diseases of commerce, and a higher relative share of diseases of affluence even as total age-standardized mortality declines. These results reveal that institutional arrangements influence the composition of mortality more than its overall level: economic freedom enhances prosperity and resilience while shifting the burden of disease toward conditions associated with longer lives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107460"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm prominence and price framing","authors":"Ioana Chioveanu , Yiquan Gu , Tobias Wenzel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107458","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107458","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper explores the strategic use of price framing in a duopoly where firms differ in their prominence and where both frame differentiation and frame complexity are sources of consumer confusion. It analyzes the interaction between the relative effectiveness of the two sources of consumer confusion and firms’ prominence levels, and its impact on equilibrium outcomes. A parametric condition on firms’ prominence delineates different equilibrium outcomes and synthesizes the interaction between firm prominence and consumer confusion. In equilibrium, firms do not always coordinate on the most effective source of confusion. The impact of consumer protection policy on market outcomes, especially consumer surplus, depends crucially on underlying market conditions, and can be ineffective or even detrimental to consumers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107458"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dissolving an ambiguous partnership","authors":"Jörg Oechssler , Alex Roomets","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107453","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107453","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a <span><math><mrow><mi>K</mi><mo>+</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></math></span> auction. We find that the <span><math><mrow><mi>K</mi><mo>+</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></math></span> auction is the most efficient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"243 ","pages":"Article 107453"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146174503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}