{"title":"Labour Market Expectations and Occupational Choice: Evidence from Teaching","authors":"Joshua Fullard","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates why teachers quit. Using new survey data and a modified discrete-choice experiment we find that i) teachers are systematically misinformed about population earnings, and misinformation is correlated with quitting intentions; ii) non-pecuniary factors are the most cost-effective method of reducing teacher attrition; and iii) quitting intentions are more affected by reductions in workplace amenities than symmetric improvements, suggesting preventing cuts is more important than rolling out more generous benefits. Linking our survey data to teachers’ administrative records we show that teachers probabilistic leaving intentions are strong predictors of actual behaviour.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107096"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144563332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can being competitive but unsuccessful harm you, even more so if you are a woman?","authors":"Simone Haeckl , Jakob Moeller , Anita Zednik","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107108","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107108","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the fairness views of impartial spectators toward workers who behave competitively but are unsuccessful in a winner-take-all, real-effort task. In an online experiment with more than 5800 participants, spectators show significantly less concern for unsuccessful workers who voluntarily entered a competition for pay or behaved selfishly by trying to sabotage, compared to those who had to compete. We do not find evidence that women are punished more for competitive behavior than men, unless spectators have very strong gender norms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107108"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144549541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When expert advice fails to reduce the productivity gap: Experimental evidence from chess players","authors":"Elias Bouacida , Renaud Foucart , Maya Jalloul","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107124","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107124","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chess players. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation after observing the answers of a higher or a lower-ability adviser. Although high-quality advice has the potential to serve as a “great equalizer,” reducing the difference between higher- and lower-ability players, it did not happen in our experiment. One reason is that lower-ability players tend to pay a higher premium by sticking to their initial evaluation rather than following high-quality advice.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107124"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144549540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eizo Akiyama , Yukihiko Funaki , Ryuichiro Ishikawa , Yaron Lahav , Charles N. Noussair
{"title":"Bubbles in asset markets and the heterogeneity of beliefs","authors":"Eizo Akiyama , Yukihiko Funaki , Ryuichiro Ishikawa , Yaron Lahav , Charles N. Noussair","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the relationship between belief heterogeneity and transaction volume in asset markets. In a laboratory experiment, we elicit long-term beliefs from traders about future prices and make different subsets of the belief information common knowledge, depending on the treatment. There is a strong tendency for traders to adjust their beliefs toward the median belief in their market. There is no effect of making belief information public on transaction volume. Surprisingly to us, however, making the median price prediction for the entire future time horizon common knowledge greatly reduces mispricing</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107117"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144536159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From bargaining to balance: How unions shape gender wage outcomes","authors":"Fredrik B. Kostøl , Elin Svarstad","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107130","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107130","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Women continue to earn less than men in OECD countries. Extensive research has explored various factors contributing to the gender wage gap. However, fewer studies have examined the impact of trade unions, despite their significant role in promoting equality. In this study, we exploit exogenous variation in tax scheme incentives for union members to identify the effect of trade unions on the gender wage gap in Norwegian private sector establishments. Using administrative register data on full-time private-sector workers in the period 2000–2014, we find that increases in union density reduce wage differences between women and men within establishments. A ten-percentage point increase in the workplace union density is estimated to reduce the gender wage gap by approximately 2.7 percentage points.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107130"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144536158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inconsistent survey histograms and point forecasts revisited","authors":"Michael P. Clements","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Past analyses of surveys of professional forecasters’ histogram and point forecasts indicate that the two are not always consistent. The point forecasts are either systematically higher or lower than the corresponding histogram means, depending on whether we consider inflation or GDP growth. We consider whether inconsistencies are related to delayed updating of the histogram forecasts, or to the reaction of the two types of forecasts to new information, and whether inconsistent pairs typically imply less accurate point or histogram forecasts. We also re-consider explanations related to the complexity of the task on an extended dataset.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107097"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144523970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Invest to win: A study of \"Local bias jumping\" in China","authors":"Jidong Li , Cheng Yuan , Zhichun Huang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107127","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107127","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We document a paradoxically positive relationship between the strong preference of local governments for local business and domestic capital inflow in China. Confronted by barriers posed by the bias of local governments towards local suppliers in procurement markets, firms strategically move through capital markets via investments. We call this phenomenon \"local bias jumping\" (LBJ). Using comprehensive datasets of procurement winners and losers, we find that the probability of local firms winning contracts is 1.44 times that of nonlocal firms. Furthermore, investing in local subsidiaries appears to provide a significant advantage in procurement competitions. Nonlocal firms with investments one to three years prior to bidding are 1.5 times more likely to win contracts than those without such investments. LBJ-driven investments flow from developed to less developed regions, promoting interregional capital mobility. Our findings underscore the dual impact of local bias in China's investment landscape, revealing its complex effects on economic development.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107127"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144518338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Present bias, risk management and capital structure","authors":"Jan Pape","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107094","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107094","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Standard credit risk models assume entrepreneurs maximize long-term equity value, despite significant evidence that entrepreneurs overvalue short-term profits and undervalue future long-term returns. We extend a classical credit risk framework by entrepreneurial myopia and show that myopic entrepreneurs favour lower volatility, while defaulting at a higher cash flow level. Our analysis distinguishes between sophisticated and naive entrepreneurs and shows that naivety leads to lower cash flow volatility and delayed default.</div><div>We analyse the interaction between unbiased debt-holders and myopic entrepreneurs. The desire for debt financing increases in the degree of the entrepreneur’s bias. Surprisingly, the entrepreneur’s myopia can actually increase the value of debt.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107094"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144510999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tour detour: Intermediaries’ search diversion in rental markets","authors":"Ying Fan , Yuqi Fu , Zan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107125","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107125","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how intermediaries with information advantages divert consumers’ search in rental markets and lead to inefficient outcomes. Using unique data on tenants’ initial preferences, property-showing sequences, and transaction records, we find that agents present suboptimal properties as the first option in property-showing sequences. Leveraging such door-in-the-face tactics, agents further guide tenants’ choices through sequential adjustments. These diversion strategies are robust to exogenous shocks, market variations, and platform externalities. Such search diversion is a dominant strategy through which intermediaries benefit from an increasing transaction success rate, and transaction acceleration and increased transaction prices of suboptimal properties. However, search diversion leads to rental contracts offering unsatisfactory prices and quality, resulting in perceived utility losses for the diverted tenants, subjecting tenants to discrimination.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107125"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144491614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Politicians' egalitarian cultural values and within-firm wage gaps: Evidence from China","authors":"Jie Li , Wanlin Liu , Changyuan Luo , Hong Song","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107092","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107092","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how local government politicians’ egalitarian cultural values affect within-firm wage gaps using data from China. We measure these values through prefecture-level Party Secretaries’ hometown egalitarian cultural orientation and leverage exogenous variation from personnel rotations. Results show that stronger egalitarian values among incumbent officials correlate with narrower wage gaps. Robustness checks, including high-dimensional fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions, address endogeneity concerns such as omitted variable bias. Mechanism analysis reveals that firms adjust wage gaps to secure political legitimacy and government-controlled resources, particularly under heightened regulatory scrutiny or market competition. Furthermore, non-state-owned enterprises aligning wage gaps with officials’ egalitarian values receive preferential treatment, including increased tax rebates and subsidies. These findings underscore the role of local leaders’ cultural preferences in shaping firms’ behaviors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107092"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144471253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}