Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第3页

Selective exposure reduces voluntary contributions: Experimental evidence from the German Internet Panel 选择性暴露减少自愿捐款：来自德国互联网小组的实验证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107081

Federico Innocenti, Linnéa Marie Rohde

引用次数: 0

Logit neural-network utility Logit神经网络效用

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107054

Sung-Lin Hsieh , Shaowei Ke , Zhaoran Wang , Chen Zhao

引用次数: 0

Does performance pressure accentuate outcome bias? Evidence from managerial dismissals 绩效压力会加重结果偏差吗？来自管理层解雇的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107086

Fabienne Jedelhauser, Raphael Flepp, Pascal Flurin Meier, Egon Franck

引用次数: 0

The gift of giving: Recognizing donors and revealing donation amounts 捐赠的礼物：确认捐赠者并透露捐赠金额

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107080

K. Pun Winichakul

引用次数: 0

Household income expectations: The role of unexpected income changes and aggregate conditions 家庭收入预期：意外收入变化与总体条件的作用

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107064

Alessandro Bucciol , Joshy Easaw , Serena Trucchi

引用次数: 0

Do greater sanctions deter youth crime? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design 更严厉的制裁能阻止青少年犯罪吗？来自回归不连续设计的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107083

Nicholas Lovett, Yuhan Xue

引用次数: 0

Providing global public goods using monetary deposits: Theory and experiments 利用货币存款提供全球公共产品：理论与实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107066

David M. McEvoy , Matthew McGinty , David Campoverde , Todd L. Cherry

{"title":"Providing global public goods using monetary deposits: Theory and experiments","authors":"David M. McEvoy , Matthew McGinty , David Campoverde , Todd L. Cherry","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107066","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107066","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Effective international environmental agreements (IEAs) require both meaningful participation and compliance. Most game-theoretic models of IEAs concentrate on the participation decision while assuming full compliance by the members, even when compliance is not an individual best-response. We take a different approach and model an IEA in which the members are free to deviate from their commitments. After demonstrating the need for enforcement, we introduce an institution in which members pay financial deposits that are refunded provided that members satisfy their abatement commitments. We show that in theory, the deposit-refund system can motivate full compliance and lead to more effective IEAs. We then test the theoretical implications using controlled laboratory experiments. We empirically compare the performance of IEAs with mandatory compliance (standard IEA from literature), voluntary compliance and the deposit-refund mechanism. Our empirical results largely support the theoretical predictions — most members violate their agreement without an enforcement mechanism, and IEAs utilizing a deposit-refund can effectively enhance cooperation to provide public goods.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107066"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144204777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Parental death in childhood and stock market participation: Cross-cultural insights 父母童年死亡与股票市场参与：跨文化的观察

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107078

Yibing Wang , Tarik Driouchi , Duc Duy (Louis) Nguyen

引用次数: 0

Avoiding catastrophic climate change: Heterogeneous abatement costs and voting on redistribution in a threshold public good experiment 避免灾难性气候变化：在一个门槛公共产品实验中，异质性减排成本和对再分配的投票

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107067

Matthias Greiff , Karol Kempa

{"title":"Avoiding catastrophic climate change: Heterogeneous abatement costs and voting on redistribution in a threshold public good experiment","authors":"Matthias Greiff , Karol Kempa","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107067","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107067","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Achieving the goal of limiting global warming is challenging, as it requires national contributions, whereas the benefits are shared between contributors and free-riders. We model this global climate problem as a collective-risk social dilemma (CRSD), a threshold public good game, and analyse the effectiveness of a frequently discussed instrument of global climate policy, namely climate-related transfers. Our CRSD experiment captures the incentive structure inherent in the social dilemma of global emission reductions, i.e., the heterogeneous distribution of wealth and marginal abatement costs (MAC). We find that introducing the option to vote on transfers for rich subjects increases the likelihood of reaching the threshold within the CRSD. A key mechanism is the shift of contributions from rich high-MAC subjects to poor low-MAC subjects, which reduces the costs of reaching the threshold. As a result, overall welfare is higher with redistribution and both rich and poor subjects benefit in terms of higher payoffs. Additional treatments show that the results are not driven by reciprocity or self-selection and that non-climate-related transfers may be similarly effective in increasing the likelihood of reaching the threshold, but less cost efficient. Our findings highlight the importance of climate-related transfers for limiting global warming at least cost to society.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"236 ","pages":"Article 107067"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144194802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Inference from field and laboratory experiments in economics: empirical evidence 经济学领域和实验室实验的推论：经验证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-06-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107055

Jonathan H.W. Tan , Zichen Zhao , Daniel John Zizzo

{"title":"Inference from field and laboratory experiments in economics: empirical evidence","authors":"Jonathan H.W. Tan , Zichen Zhao , Daniel John Zizzo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107055","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107055","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Experimental economics publications test and make claims that are based on inferences from the experimental datasets they are based on. We ask whether the environment that the authors make claims about matches the actual environment that exists in their data. We answer this question by employing a sample of 520 publications in 2018 and 2019 at leading general and field journals in Economics to test. This is important as out-of-domain inference may (or may not) lead to issues of over-generalization. We study inferences made in different types of field and laboratory experiments. The average match rates are 11 % for laboratory experiments and 39 % for field experiments on aggregate. Around four out of five field experiments fail to match in at least three out of the five domains, as with almost all laboratory experiments. We conclude that out-of-domain inference applies to the majority of field and laboratory experiments. Policy testing experiments have a higher match rate. Further, we find that publications by top 20 institutions authors or with experiments conducted in majority White countries are more likely to generalize out-of-domain; specifically, there appears to be an institutional bias tied to the country of the experiment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"235 ","pages":"Article 107055"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144190093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0