Nash bargaining is implementable via two-stage rights structures

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-09-18 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107214

Kemal Yıldız

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Koray and Yildiz (2018) introduces a new framework for implementation in which the main tool to design is the rights structure introduced by Sertel (2001).It was assumed that there is only one stage to obtain the equilibrium outcome of a rights structure.We formulate implementation via two-stage rights structures and show that the Nash bargaining solution is implementable via two-stage rights structures.

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纳什议价可以通过两阶段的权利结构来实现

Koray和Yildiz（2018）引入了一个新的实施框架，其中设计的主要工具是Sertel（2001）引入的权利结构。假设只有一个阶段才能获得权利结构的均衡结果。我们通过两阶段的权利结构来制定实施方案，并证明纳什议价方案是可以通过两阶段的权利结构来实现的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.