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Information about inequality in early child care reduces polarization in policy preferences 有关幼儿保育不平等的信息可减少政策偏好的两极分化
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106780
Henning Hermes , Philipp Lergetporer , Fabian Mierisch , Guido Schwerdt , Simon Wiederhold
{"title":"Information about inequality in early child care reduces polarization in policy preferences","authors":"Henning Hermes ,&nbsp;Philipp Lergetporer ,&nbsp;Fabian Mierisch ,&nbsp;Guido Schwerdt ,&nbsp;Simon Wiederhold","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106780","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106780","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate public preferences for equity-enhancing policies in access to early child care, using a survey experiment with a representative sample of the German population (<span><math><mrow><mi>n</mi><mo>≈</mo><mn>4</mn><mo>,</mo><mn>800</mn></mrow></math></span>). We observe strong misperceptions about migrant-native inequalities in early child care that vary by respondents’ age and right-wing voting preferences. Randomly providing information about the actual extent of inequalities has a nuanced impact on the support for equity-enhancing policy reforms: it increases support for respondents who initially underestimated these inequalities, and tends to decrease support for those who initially overestimated them. This asymmetric effect leads to a more consensual policy view, substantially decreasing the polarization in policy support between under- and overestimators. Our results suggest that correcting misperceptions can align public policy preferences, potentially leading to less polarized debates about how to address inequalities and discrimination.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106780"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142573146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
People do not demand commitment devices because they might not work 人们不要求承诺装置，因为它们可能不起作用
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106756
Ryan Westphal
{"title":"People do not demand commitment devices because they might not work","authors":"Ryan Westphal","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106756","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106756","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Low demand for pure commitment in real markets presents a puzzle. A possible explanation is that individuals are unaware of their present bias and their need for commitment. I test the relationship between perceived intertemporal inconsistency and demand for commitment in a novel context, volunteering. I run an experiment that successfully corrects subjects’ beliefs about their present bias and find that this increased awareness does not increase demand for commitment. This low demand for commitment is not driven by a perceived lack of present bias, but rather subjects’ accurate belief that they may fail to follow through, even with the offered level of commitment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106756"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142554534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pension systems revisited in the age of automation and an aging economy 在自动化和老龄化经济时代重新审视养老金制度
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106784
Jae-Yoon Kim , Dongwoo Lee
{"title":"Pension systems revisited in the age of automation and an aging economy","authors":"Jae-Yoon Kim ,&nbsp;Dongwoo Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106784","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106784","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study analyzes the impact of aging — an increase in longevity or a decrease in fertility rates — on pension benefits in an economy that incorporates automation capital in the production process. Across all three pension schemes—pay as you go, fully funded, and modified fully funded, we observe that the impact of increasing longevity is more pronounced than that of a decreasing fertility rate. Specifically, our analyses indicate that while increasing longevity consistently has a negative impact on pension benefits under all pension schemes, the impact of a decreasing fertility rate varies according to the pension scheme. Additionally, based on the common observation across all pension schemes that low-skilled households are vulnerable to the impacts of aging, we explore redistributive policies to improve the welfare of these households, and our findings indicate that the policy that leads to Pareto improvement can vary depending on the main driver of demographic transitions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106784"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142554535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “Gender disparities in the labor market during COVID-19 lockdowns: Evidence from online job postings and applications in China” [Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 223 (2024), 199-215] COVID-19封锁期间劳动力市场的性别差异：来自中国在线职位发布和申请的证据"[《经济行为与组织期刊》223 (2024), 199-215]
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106768
Jiayin Hu, Xuan Wang, Qingxu Yang, Junjian Yi
{"title":"Corrigendum to “Gender disparities in the labor market during COVID-19 lockdowns: Evidence from online job postings and applications in China” [Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 223 (2024), 199-215]","authors":"Jiayin Hu,&nbsp;Xuan Wang,&nbsp;Qingxu Yang,&nbsp;Junjian Yi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106768","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106768","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106768"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142721453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dissecting environmental efficiency: The role of technology adoption and usage 剖析环境效率：技术采用和使用的作用
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106776
Filippo Belloc , Edilio Valentini
{"title":"Dissecting environmental efficiency: The role of technology adoption and usage","authors":"Filippo Belloc ,&nbsp;Edilio Valentini","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106776","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106776","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How could firms best reduce their environmental impact? Should they change technology? Or could they do better with what they already have? This paper shows that one size does not fit all. We analyse a sample of polluting production plants (i.e. installations) regulated under the EU Emission Trading System. We employ a mixture model estimation to dissect environmental efficiency into a technology adoption component (<span><math><mrow><mi>w</mi><mi>h</mi><mi>a</mi><mi>t</mi></mrow></math></span> type of technology is used) and a technology usage component (<span><math><mrow><mi>h</mi><mi>o</mi><mi>w</mi></mrow></math></span> a technology is used). Our installation-level analysis shows that the share of installations adopting frontier technologies is about 21%. We also find that the average environmental efficiency gains that installations could reach by improving technology adoption and technology usage are 75% and 80% respectively. The analysis of balance-sheet data on parent companies reveals that better environmental technologies are adopted by larger, listed, multi-installation and international companies, while older firms and firms with higher intangible assets intensity more commonly show improved technology usage.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106776"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142535677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emergence of information aggregation to rational expectations equilibria in markets populated by biased heuristic traders 在有偏见的启发式交易者充斥的市场中，信息聚合与理性预期均衡的出现
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106700
Karim Jamal , Michael Maier , Shyam Sunder
{"title":"Emergence of information aggregation to rational expectations equilibria in markets populated by biased heuristic traders","authors":"Karim Jamal ,&nbsp;Michael Maier ,&nbsp;Shyam Sunder","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106700","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106700","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Information aggregation is a key economic function of markets. We report results of a computational experiment with markets populated by simple algorithmic traders who follow two heuristics usually thought of as leading to biased information processing in behavioral economics literature (anchor-and-adjust, and representativeness). Outcomes of these markets either tend to cluster around (or fail to do so) rational expectations equilibria under specific conditions, consistent with markets populated by profit-motivated human traders. Algorithmic trader convergence is slower and noisier than that of human traders. Our results illustrate the emergence of rational expectations equilibria through complex interactions among actions of biased heuristic traders with limited information processing capabilities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106700"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142535683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Allocators are more prosocial when affected agents can visually eavesdrop 当受影响的代理可以目视窃听时，分配者更亲社会
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106772
Stephanie W. Wang , Colin F. Camerer
{"title":"Allocators are more prosocial when affected agents can visually eavesdrop","authors":"Stephanie W. Wang ,&nbsp;Colin F. Camerer","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106772","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106772","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In these experiments, participants made binary choices in “dictator” games choosing distributions for themselves and others. All payoffs are initially hidden and can be clicked open using a mouse. To study the effect of social image on attention and choices, we used a novel screensharing technique: One of the participants receiving the chooser's allocation can observe the chooser's clicks, so they can see if the chooser is looking up what the impact will be on their own allocation (but they cannot observe the chooser's choices). This change in observability increases the possible impact of social image concerns on expressed social preferences. It increases the time choosers spend looking at the potential payoffs to the observer and makes their choices less selfish. This finding goes against the hypothesis of “willful ignorance” and suggests other behavioral influences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106772"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142535678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Territory flows and trade flows between 1870 and 2008 1870 至 2008 年间的领土流量和贸易流量
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106787
Yushan Hu , Ben G. Li , Penglong Zhang
{"title":"Territory flows and trade flows between 1870 and 2008","authors":"Yushan Hu ,&nbsp;Ben G. Li ,&nbsp;Penglong Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106787","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106787","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Countries gain and lose territories over time, generating <em>territory flows</em> that represent the transfer of territorial sovereignty. Countries also export and import goods, creating <em>trade flows</em> that represent the transfer of merchandise ownership. We find a substitution between these two international flows during the years 1870 and 2008; that is, country pairs with greater trade flows have smaller territory flows. This indicates how international trade enhances international security: reciprocal goods transactions discourage irreciprocal territorial exchanges.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106787"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142535680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Think twice before attacking: Effort, restraint, and sanctions in war conflicts 进攻前三思：战争冲突中的努力、克制和制裁
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106783
Chen Cohen , Roy Darioshi , Shmuel Nitzan
{"title":"Think twice before attacking: Effort, restraint, and sanctions in war conflicts","authors":"Chen Cohen ,&nbsp;Roy Darioshi ,&nbsp;Shmuel Nitzan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106783","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106783","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There are contrasting empirical findings about how third parties mitigate conflict and few theoretical results about war efforts and restraint. Applying a new approach that distinguishes between quantity and effectiveness of effort, we explain countries’ restraint incentives. In our setting, restraint is manifested in reducing the effectiveness of military efforts when third parties impose costs (sanctions) on unrestrained behavior. We show that intermediate sanctions may lead to a mixed-strategy equilibrium or pure strategy equilibria in which only one country reduces its effectiveness. We present the conditions that yield pure-strategy (in which, surprisingly, restraint is a corner solution) and mixed-strategy (MS) equilibria in our multi-stage model. Interestingly, a country's effort decreases with its or its rival's self-restraint, allowing a third party to reduce efforts by sanctioning only one country. Our analysis enriches the classical results, particularly those obtained in the context of war conflicts, which focus on the extent of effort expended and on means of mitigating the conflict. The theoretical study lays the groundwork for future research into war contests and suggests various avenues for further exploration.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106783"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142535800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Precautionary saving under recursive preferences 递归偏好下的预防性储蓄
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-10-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106770
AJ A. Bostian , Christoph Heinzel
{"title":"Precautionary saving under recursive preferences","authors":"AJ A. Bostian ,&nbsp;Christoph Heinzel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106770","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106770","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The preferences responsible for precautionary saving under recursive utility can be decomposed into two channels. One exactly mirrors expected utility, while the other is unique to recursive utility. Although these channels contain numerous competing saving effects, theoretical and numerical comparative statics point to some generalizable features. Risk preferences drive most of precautionary saving, and they are the only higher-order preferences ever expressed. But, plain 2nd-order intertemporal preferences (consumption smoothing) influence total saving far more than any other kind of preference. Precautionary responses to risks beyond 2nd order are minimal. Responses to return risk are typically negative.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"228 ","pages":"Article 106770"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142535442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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