{"title":"Endogenous cool-off periods","authors":"Mark van Oldeniel, Noemi Peter","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107237","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107237","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We run an ultimatum game experiment where cool-off periods can emerge endogenously, that is, where proposers can <em>decide</em> to impose a waiting period on responders. Previous research focused on cool-off periods that were <em>exogenously imposed</em> by the researcher, but in real life people can make deliberate choices to impose such periods on others for strategic reasons. Since in our experiment cool-off periods can be imposed endogenously, we can answer several novel research questions. First, how willing are individuals to impose endogenous cool-off periods on others? Second, do offers change if cool-off is an option? Third, are endogenously imposed cool-offs effective? Finally, how does the possibility of imposing an endogenous cool-off period affect bargaining breakdowns and earnings? We find that 40% of proposers choose to impose a cool-off period on responders. Proposers make significantly lower offers when they can impose a cool-off period on responders. Endogenous cool-off periods are not effective in increasing the overall acceptance rate. The possibility to create an endogenous cool-off period does not have a significant effect on bargaining breakdowns or earnings overall. However, it lowers responder earnings significantly, as it allows proposers to exploit the timing choice to make a lower offer. Our results highlight that instead of helping to solve conflicts, the possibility to create cool-off periods hurts the less powerful party.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107237"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145060556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"E-government, inclusive growth, and the legitimacy of capitalism: lessons from estonia","authors":"Victor I. Espinosa , Antonia Pino","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107248","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107248","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how e-government (EG) can help re-legitimize capitalism by embedding the principles of transparency, trust, and security (TTS) into public governance. Using Estonia’s post-Soviet digital transformation as a case study, we argue that TTS-based EG reduces corruption, curbs rent-seeking, fosters inclusive growth, and rebuilds public confidence in market institutions. While Estonia is not a universally replicable model, it offers a compelling proof of concept: when digital reforms are grounded in democratic norms, EG can enhance the perceived fairness, accountability, and legitimacy of capitalism. We adopt a within-case process-tracing approach, combining institutional analysis with international indices and public opinion data. The findings offer both theoretical and policy-relevant insights for democracies seeking to modernize capitalism through principled digital transformation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107248"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Siramane Coulibaly , Bernard Fortin , Maripier Isabelle
{"title":"Demand for domestic help services: Evidence from a natural experiment","authors":"Siramane Coulibaly , Bernard Fortin , Maripier Isabelle","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how an increase in subsidies for purchasing domestic help services affects the consumption of individuals who need assistance to live at home. Drawing on administrative data, we analyse the impact of a reform implemented in Quebec (Canada) in 2016, which made the program more generous for a subgroup of beneficiaries. For this purpose, we estimate a difference-in-differences lognormal hurdle model. We derive the corresponding average treatment effect on the treated for this class of non-linear models. Our results suggest that the price elasticity of the demand for subsidized domestic help services for the treated is around 0.74. The elasticity of monthly purchase frequency (0.59) is much larger than the elasticity of monthly purchase intensity (0.14). Based on our results, we determine a floor to the marginal external benefit required for the reform to be socially worth adopting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107234"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic welfare implications of market-based climate policy under demand uncertainty","authors":"Felipe Gomez-Trejos","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107190","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107190","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The welfare consequences of price versus quantity-based regulation are known to differ when information about marginal benefits or costs of abatement is imperfect. Does uncertainty about demand for the polluting good also matter for welfare of these two approaches to regulation? Using plant-level survey data and high frequency variation in wholesale electricity demand, I assess the dynamic implications of uncertainty about future demand for the relative welfare consequences of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regulation. I address this question in the context of the electricity sector where demand risk is particularly salient. I show that the choice between policy instruments depends on how firms and consumers balance unpredictable output volatility (higher with carbon taxes) vs. price volatility (higher with cap-and-trade regulation). Over a wide range of policy-relevant abatement targets, I find carbon taxes outperform cap-and-trade in terms of welfare.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107190"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Individual performance and environment: Home advantage in ATP tennis","authors":"Gianluca Gucciardi , Massimo Ruberti","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107236","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107236","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the role of home advantage (HA) in ATP tennis (2000–2022). Our findings confirm the existence of HA with a heterogeneous effect shaped by a combination of individual player characteristics and situational contexts. Individual mechanisms reveal that less experienced players benefit more from HA, while talent does not show a significant interaction. Cultural background plays a role, with individualistic players exhibiting a stronger HA, unlike collectivistic ones. Among situational factors, the absence of spectators during COVID-19 indicates that while HA persists, crowd presence does not seem to be the primary driver. Opponent travel fatigue amplifies HA, whereas prior knowledge of the facilities has no substantial impact. These findings extend beyond sports, indicating that structured, familiar environments enhance performance and resilience in professional settings, though their effects vary based on experience and cultural background.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107236"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do firms opportunistically manipulate their responses to fake news on social media? Evidence from a natural experiment","authors":"Maobin Wang , Tao Ye , Yaxin Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107204","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107204","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a unique setting specific to China’s social media ecology of corporate responses to fake news on investor-interactive platforms (IIPs), this study provides novel evidence that firms systematically leverage strategically timed responses to fake news to serve self-interested objectives. We find that during information-sensitive periods, firms delay clarification of fake good news while accelerating responses to fake bad news, a pattern consistent with opportunistic timing. These results offer policy insights for emerging and developed markets with similar interactive platforms, underscoring regulators’ need to prevent potential opportunistic manipulation by firms in the face of proliferating social media fake news.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107204"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Navigating slippery slopes: A paradox of power in policy and cultural reform","authors":"Zachary Schaller","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107167","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107167","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study employs game theory to investigate how slippery slope problems drive policy impasses and sticky cultural practices. It identifies conditions under which hard-lining behavior, often perceived as fallacious, becomes rational. By endogenizing the probability of one policy leading to another, the model elucidates slippery slope equilibria, where players adamantly oppose all proposals, including those they want, in order to avoid those they hate. Aggressive negotiation tactics are ineffective against such equilibria, further exacerbating the political market failure. Notably, weaker reformers are able to avoid the slippery slope market failure and accomplish Pareto improving reform, whereas strong reformers can get stuck in a paradox of power.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107167"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145049387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is gender destiny? Gender bias and intergenerational educational mobility in India","authors":"M. Shahe Emran , Hanchen Jiang , Forhad Shilpi","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107217","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107217","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper provides a theory-based empirical analysis of intergenerational educational mobility in India, focusing on gender gaps, rural–urban differences, and relative importance of parents’ financial and nonfinancial investments. Evidence suggests that the daughters of uneducated fathers face the lowest absolute and relative mobility, irrespective of location. While there is a fast gender convergence in relative mobility in the rural areas, a wide gender gap in absolute mobility persists even in college-educated rural households. In contrast, we find a fast gender convergence in absolute mobility in the urban areas, but a moderate gender gap in relative mobility persists in the college-educated urban households. The gender convergence in absolute mobility for the urban children is largely explained by higher parental non-financial investments in girls compared to boys. In contrast, in the rural areas, the persistent gender gap in absolute mobility is driven by son preference, reflected in parental biases in financial investments against girls, and gender barriers in schools. Patrilineal social norms play a fundamental role, highlighted by the evidence of no significant gender inequality in educational mobility in the matrilineal states.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107217"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of sanctioning in the nonprofit sector","authors":"Jennifer Mayo","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107198","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107198","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies charity responses to alleged or confirmed misconduct. Using advisory notices published by Charity Navigator, I find that charities take steps to improve and change following these events, especially when misconduct is severe, or attracts more media attention. On average, the publication of an advisory prompts organizations to increase their program spending by over 20 percent in the years following a scandal. This response is not driven by the withdrawal of donor support, but instead could be due to concerns over long-term reputational damage. These findings help to quantify the value of a crucial accountability tool in the nonprofit sector.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107198"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145019585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beliefs, credence goods and information campaigns","authors":"Ferdinando Colombo, Giovanni Ursino","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107134","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107134","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the role of beliefs about experts’ honesty in a credence goods model with second opinions. The welfare-maximizing belief generally differs from the actual share of honest experts and exceeds the belief that maximizes honest behavior. Transparency, defined as experts’ awareness of opinion order, shapes the optimal belief and may enhance or hinder honest behavior. Incorporating beliefs and transparency into the standard model opens the door to interesting policy implications, like the opportunity for a public authority to release an information campaign that affects people’s beliefs. We identify conditions under which the costless revelation of the share of honest experts improves welfare, showing that they are independent of initial belief accuracy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"238 ","pages":"Article 107134"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145010476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}