Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第4页

Mendicant orders and the foundations of impersonal exchange 乞讨者的命令和非个人交换的基础

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107417

Benito Arruñada , Lucas López-Manuel

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引用次数: 0

When do peers influence preventive health behavior? Evidence from breast cancer screening 同伴什么时候影响预防性健康行为？来自乳腺癌筛查的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107391

Peter Redler , Friederike Johanna Reichel

引用次数: 0

An introduction to the special issue on discrimination and diversity 关于歧视和多样性的特刊简介

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107291

Oana Borcan , Laura Gee , Laura Harvey , Boon Han Koh , Ernesto Reuben

引用次数: 0

Gender differences in willingness to guess revisited: Heterogeneity in a high stakes professional setting 猜测意愿的性别差异：高风险专业环境中的异质性

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107415

Marina Díez-Rituerto , Javier Gardeazabal , Nagore Iriberri , Pedro Rey-Biel

引用次数: 0

Trust in banks: Fostering (Naïve) firm-bank relationships 对银行的信任：培养（Naïve）商行关系

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107431

Jérémie Bertrand , Aurore Burietz , Paul-Olivier Klein

引用次数: 0

Experimental currency units in investment tasks 实验性货币单位投资任务

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107400

Sascha Füllbrunn , Wolfgang J. Luhan , Paul-Emile Mangin

引用次数: 0

Competitive disclosure of information to a rationally inattentive agent 竞争性地向理性上不注意的代理人披露信息

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107410

Vasudha Jain , Mark Whitmeyer

引用次数: 0

Commitment in sequential bargaining - An experiment 序贯议价中的承诺——一个实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360

Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen

{"title":"Commitment in sequential bargaining - An experiment","authors":"Nadine Chlaß , Topi Miettinen","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107360","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Schelling (1956) first clarified how power to reduce one’s freedom of choice might benefit a bargaining party. A commitment to reject proposals, when successful, may force concessions from opponents who otherwise might have an upper hand. This paper experimentally studies credible commitments prior to a sequential ultimatum bargaining game. We find that pre-emptive commitment strategies are exploited by responders, but less than predicted by theory. In a game where a responder can unilaterally precommit, she faces the same incentives as a proposer in an ultimatum game. Yet, observed responder commitments are less aggressive than proposals by proposers in the ultimatum game. In a simultaneous commitment game, proposers who cannot benefit from committing are nevertheless observed to commit. The observed within-treatment payoff-differences between the two parties do not comply with the theoretical predictions in the commitment variants of the game. Surprisingly in late rounds, allowing for pre-commitment yields almost 100 % efficiency while the standard ultimatum game continues to feature significant inefficiencies. We discuss four complementary behavioral explanations and find that reciprocity and concern for equality of opportunity are consistent with the observed patterns. Empirically, we observe that ethical criteria underlying preferences for equal opportunity are at work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107360"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145898048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Are people willing to pay to prevent natural disasters? 人们愿意为预防自然灾害买单吗？

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416

Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli

{"title":"Are people willing to pay to prevent natural disasters?","authors":"Luigi Guiso , Tullio Jappelli","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107416","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We implement a survey experiment to study whether awareness of the consequences of hydrogeological risk affects people’s willingness to fight it. We use a representative panel of 5,000 Italian individuals interviewed at quarterly frequency, starting in October 2023. We elicit survey participants’ willingness to contribute to a public fund to finance investment to secure areas exposed to hydrogeological risk under different information treatments. We find that disclosing information about the consequences of hydrogeological risk causes individuals to increase both support for public funding and individual willingness to pay for the policy. Compared to the control group, individuals exposed to the treatment were 9 percentage points more likely to contribute to the fund and more willing to contribute an additional €29. Applying the information treatment to the whole working age population could raise as much as €0.26 billion per year. The willingness to pay depends on individual knowledge that the success of the policy depends critically on the willingness to pay of other citizens. Our results suggest also that one-off campaigns increase the willingness to pay only in the short run, and to be effective campaigns should not be time limited. In fact, refreshing the treatment in a follow-up survey reinstates its effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"242 ","pages":"Article 107416"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145941117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk 竞争调节了买家对卖家廉价言论的反应

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403

Sander Onderstal , Shaul Shalvi , Ivan Soraperra

引用次数: 0