Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第5页

First-order and higher-order inflation expectations: Evidence about Households and Firms 一阶和高阶通胀预期：关于家庭和企业的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106988

Pascal Kieren , Christian König-Kersting , Robert Schmidt , Stefan Trautmann , Franziska Heinicke

引用次数: 0

Forecasts as repeated cheap talk from an expert of unknown statistical bias 预测不过是一个统计偏差未知的专家反复说的廉价话

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106955

Irene Valsecchi

引用次数: 0

Ultimatum game: Regret or fairness? 最后通牒游戏：后悔还是公平？

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106969

L.H. Aleksanyan , A.E. Allahverdyan , V.G. Bardakhchyan

{"title":"Ultimatum game: Regret or fairness?","authors":"L.H. Aleksanyan , A.E. Allahverdyan , V.G. Bardakhchyan","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the ultimatum game, the challenge is to explain why responders reject non-zero offers thereby defying classical rationality. Fairness and related concepts have been among the main explanations so far. Here, the ultimatum game is reformulated based on probabilistic lotteries, enabling modern decision-making tools to be applied to this problem. We explain the rejection behavior via the following principle: if the responder regrets less about losing the offer than the proposer regrets not offering a better option, the offer is rejected. This principle qualifies as a rational conflict behavior. Similar concepts were applied in the economy of wars. The principle replaces the experimentally falsified classical rationality (the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) that leads to accepting any non-zero offer. It is implemented via the transitive regret theory for probabilistic lotteries. The expected utility implementation is a limiting case of this. We show that several experimental results normally prescribed to fairness and intent-recognition can be given an alternative explanation; e.g. the comparison between “fair” and “superfair”, the behavior under raising the stakes, the influence of the initial wealth, <em>etc</em>. Hence we also propose experiments that can distinguish these two scenarios (fairness versus regret). They assume different utilities for the proposer and responder. We focus on the mini-ultimatum version of the game and also show how it can emerge from a more general setup.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106969"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143714891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Risk aversion and the punishment paradox in a crime game 犯罪博弈中的风险规避与惩罚悖论

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106985

Rabah Amir , Arup Bose , Debashis Pal , Iryna Topolyan

引用次数: 0

Competitiveness at the intersection of gender and sexual orientation 性别和性取向交叉的竞争

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106987

Billur Aksoy, Ian Chadd

引用次数: 0

Depression and Risky Health Behaviors 抑郁和危险的健康行为

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106983

Alex Xingbang Weng

引用次数: 0

Less but better? The influence of gender on political activity 少而精？性别对政治活动的影响

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106980

Nicolas Frémeaux , Paul Maarek

{"title":"Less but better? The influence of gender on political activity","authors":"Nicolas Frémeaux , Paul Maarek","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106980","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106980","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this article, we study gender differences in the activity and effectiveness of French parliamentarians between 1993 and 2022. Using fixed-effect regressions, we find that women author less bills than men but there are no significant differences for other outcomes such as amendments or oral questions. The gender gap for bills is observed only for newcomers and fades after the first half of the term, suggesting a difference in attitudes rather than a selection effect. Conversely, women are substantially more effective: each term, 46 amendments authored by women pass, whereas 33 of the men’s amendments pass. This is mostly due to the use and quality of their amendments, with men being more prone to obstructive behaviors for instance. On the other hand, women in the opposition party are less slightly likely to have their bills passed than men in the opposition party. This is linked to discrimination within the party, which less often selects bills drafted by women to submit them to a vote. All these results are robust when using RDD strategies based on close elections. Overall, gender quotas have positive effects on parliamentary work as effectiveness is crucial in policy making. It is however essential to create an environment favorable to the inclusion of women.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106980"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143696732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Team incentives and lower ability workers: A real-effort experiment 团队激励和低能力员工：一个真实努力的实验

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106986

Richard B. Freeman , Xiaofei Pan , Xiaolan Yang , Maoliang Ye

{"title":"Team incentives and lower ability workers: A real-effort experiment","authors":"Richard B. Freeman , Xiaofei Pan , Xiaolan Yang , Maoliang Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106986","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106986","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite a large literature on team incentives, studies on teams in a purely financial sense are limited. In such environments, team members independently engage in tasks with identifiable individual contributions, while their compensation is partially linked to team outputs. We conducted an experiment of such scenario with three distribution schemes (equal sharing, individual piece rate, and winner-takes-all) and examined these schemes both with and without a team threshold. Our results showed the surprising power of equal sharing on improving team productivity compared to winner-takes-all and individual piece-rate, contradicting the predictions of the standard economics theory. Our findings reveal that the higher team output observed under equal sharing was driven by the increased productivity of less able workers. This could be attributed to an explanation of guilt aversion and cannot be illuminated by several alternative theories. We also found that participants preferred piece rate over the other schemes. Yet, the presence of a team threshold highlighted the importance of cooperation, leading to a greater preference for equal sharing. Our findings suggest that organizations with workers of varying abilities are likely to benefit from an appropriate equal sharing component tailored to their responsiveness to sharing in rewards.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"233 ","pages":"Article 106986"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143679832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The impacts of raising the public pension eligibility age on time allocation of elderly people: Evidence from Japan 提高公共养老金领取年龄对老年人时间分配的影响：来自日本的证据

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106984

Shinya Inukai

引用次数: 0

Direct Elicitation of Parametric Belief Distributions: An application to inflation expectations 参数置信分布的直接推导：在通货膨胀预期中的应用

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-03-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106947

Pedro Gonzalez-Fernandez , Ciril Bosch-Rosa , Thomas Meissner

引用次数: 0