Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization最新文献_第5页

Expectations matter in bottom-line setting: Theory and evidence

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106944

Peikun Chen , Jianbiao Li , Jingjing Pan , Chengkang Zhu

{"title":"Expectations matter in bottom-line setting: Theory and evidence","authors":"Peikun Chen , Jianbiao Li , Jingjing Pan , Chengkang Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106944","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106944","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The bottom-line, or minimum acceptable offer (MAO), is a crucial concept in real-world economic negotiations. This study demonstrated a causal relationship between responders’ expectations of proposers’ offer and their MAOs setting, in a controlled ultimatum game. We develop three theoretical models (reference dependence, frustration aversion and bounded rationality) to further investigate the underlying mechanism. By considering two distinct scenarios - responders setting MAOs before and after knowing the proposer's offer - we generate distinguishable predictions from our models. We then conduct two experiments to test these predictions, exogenously manipulating subjects’ offer expectations and comparing the observed shifts in MAOs to our theoretical predictions. Our findings indicate that bounded rationality significantly contributes to the causal effect of responders’ expectations on their MAOs, providing a new perspective on how expectations shape bargaining behavior. Furthermore, our results help reconcile divergent findings under the strategy method and direct-response method, highlighting the effects of expectations as a key driver alongside emotion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106944"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143465146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106939

Linda Dezső , Gergely Hajdu , Yossef Tobol

引用次数: 0

Project selection with biased advice: An experiment on competitive cheap talk

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106936

Miguel A. Martínez-Carrasco , Eric Schmidbauer , John Hamman

{"title":"Project selection with biased advice: An experiment on competitive cheap talk","authors":"Miguel A. Martínez-Carrasco , Eric Schmidbauer , John Hamman","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106936","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106936","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When agents with private information compete for resources from an uninformed decision-maker and are biased towards their own favored projects (e.g., a CEO decides which division manager’s project to fund), they have incentive to strategically communicate about their project’s value. However, possible future interaction can mitigate this problem even without reputational concerns, since an agent who induces acceptance of a low-valued project today consumes firm resources that crowd out better opportunities that may arrive in the future. We study this organizational environment both theoretically and empirically using laboratory experiments. We hypothesize and find that truth telling is easier to support as low-quality projects lose value or become more likely to occur, but harder to support as agent competition grows. We see an interesting behavioral result in which beliefs influence responsiveness to parameter changes. Specifically, as agents grow more pessimistic about the likelihood of truthful reporting by their competitors, they respond more sharply to parameter changes, in line with the model’s predictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"232 ","pages":"Article 106936"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143445407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From pandemics to portfolios: Long-term impacts of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak on household investment choices

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106931

Naijia Guo , Charles Ka Yui Leung , Shumeng Zhang

引用次数: 0

Inequity aversion, mandates, and the provision of threshold public goods 不公平厌恶、授权和门槛公共产品的提供

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106935

Caroline E. Johnson, Maik Kecinski

{"title":"Inequity aversion, mandates, and the provision of threshold public goods","authors":"Caroline E. Johnson, Maik Kecinski","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106935","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106935","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Previous research has shown that individuals have preferences for equity that deviate from traditional payoff maximizing economic theory. In this research, we use an adapted model of inequity aversion to predict how inequity induced through mandated contributions influences voluntary contribution behavior in a threshold public goods game. Contrary to the model’s predictions, we find that individuals do not have preferences for equitable outcomes. Rather, we find that individuals tend to have preferences for equitable contributions to the public good among group members, regardless of income inequities within groups. In addition, we find that mandates significantly decrease the voluntary provision of the public good. That is, groups exposed to mandated contributions met the threshold less frequently than groups not exposed to mandated contributions. Thus, suggesting that mandates can have significant and negative impacts on voluntary action. The results of this research illustrate the impacts of mandates on voluntary contribution behavior, as well as the behavioral implications of inequity in the provision of public goods.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106935"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143436592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Norm enforcement on minorities: Evidence from traffic violations

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106930

Xiaoyang Deng , Tao Wang , Lian Xue , Shuo Yang

{"title":"Norm enforcement on minorities: Evidence from traffic violations","authors":"Xiaoyang Deng , Tao Wang , Lian Xue , Shuo Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106930","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106930","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Compliance with social rules is crucial for fostering cooperation in societies. Motivated by observational evidence from large-scale traffic violation data in a major city in China, we investigate the impact of social identity on rule-following behavior. We empirically showed that traffic violations are significantly <em>less</em> severe when individuals drive in foreign cities rather than the local city where the car is registered, a phenomenon we describe as the “compliance minority effect”. We next conducted a laboratory experiment with a street-crossing task, to further investigate the key drivers behind the compliance minority phenomenon. We found that participants exhibit more rule compliance when identifying as an outgroup minority than a local majority only when both observability and social sanctions are at play. Participants form the prior belief that being part of a minority in the community is associated with a higher chance of being monitored and punished than when they are part of the local majority, which is consistent with the posterior observations. Our results suggest that majorities can enforce augmented social norms on minority groups through an interplay of observability and punishment, which could lead to unintended consequences of <em>local privilege</em> that hamper the equality and efficiency of society.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106930"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143429066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does bank expansion reduce domestic violence? Causal evidence from India

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106933

Rikhia Bhukta , Chandan Kumar Jha , Swarup Joshi , Ashish K. Sedai

引用次数: 0

Is there moral hazard in medical savings accounts? Evidence from Singapore

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106938

Jessica Ya Sun

{"title":"Is there moral hazard in medical savings accounts? Evidence from Singapore","authors":"Jessica Ya Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106938","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106938","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Medical savings accounts (MSAs) are designed to provide tax incentives for individuals to save for future healthcare needs, with the goal of reducing overall health expenditures. This paper first examines how individuals adjust their healthcare spending when receiving additional transfers to their MSAs. Using a comprehensive monthly longitudinal survey and a staggered difference-in-differences design, I find that individuals increase their monthly medical expenditure by 13 %, with the marginal propensity to consume from MSAs estimated at 0.6. Second, I analyze the impact of a 25 % price reduction for services at General Practitioner (GP) Clinics and Specialist Outpatient Clinics (SOCs) on healthcare utilization. The results show that MSA holders increase their medication spending by 10.7 % at the extensive margin in response to the price reduction. These findings suggest that both MSA top-ups and price reductions lead to increased healthcare utilization, indicating that MSA holders may respond to these financial incentives by consuming more healthcare in the present, prioritizing immediate healthcare needs over future savings. While this behavior may reflect moral hazard within MSAs, it may also point to unmet healthcare needs that are being addressed through increased liquidity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106938"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143419656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Shooting down trade: Firm-level effects of embargoes

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106821

Uğur Aytun , Julian Hinz , Cem Özgüzel

{"title":"Shooting down trade: Firm-level effects of embargoes","authors":"Uğur Aytun , Julian Hinz , Cem Özgüzel","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106821","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106821","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In November 2015, Turkey’s unexpected downing of a Russian military jet in Syria prompted Russia to impose a swift and comprehensive embargo on specific Turkish exports. This study leverages this quasi-natural experiment to estimate both the immediate and longer-term effects of the imposition and subsequent lifting of these sanctions. Utilizing administrative data encompassing all Turkish exporters, we first examine the impact on trade at the firm level, assessing the direct effects of the embargo, the redirection of trade to alternative markets, and the circumvention through other products. Second, we investigate broader repercussions on domestic operations, including firms’ sales, procurement, and employment. Our findings show that while the embargo caused immediate and substantial declines in exports of affected products to Russia, firms partially mitigated these losses through trade diversion. Although relative trade patterns normalized post-sanctions, absolute trade values remained subdued. The analysis reveals that affected firms experienced declines in domestic sales and supplier relationships, with temporary disruptions in employment. However, most negative effects dissipated following the embargo’s removal, except for some persistent reductions in procurement and supplier links, likely linked to persistent lower trade volumes after the lifting of the embargo.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":"231 ","pages":"Article 106821"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143419659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Peer effects in the hierarchy: Evidence from the workplace

IF 2.3 3区经济学

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-02-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106932

Miao Jin , Yu-Jane Liu , Juanjuan Meng , Yu Zhang

引用次数: 0