Do firms opportunistically manipulate their responses to fake news on social media? Evidence from a natural experiment

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Maobin Wang , Tao Ye , Yaxin Chen
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Using a unique setting specific to China’s social media ecology of corporate responses to fake news on investor-interactive platforms (IIPs), this study provides novel evidence that firms systematically leverage strategically timed responses to fake news to serve self-interested objectives. We find that during information-sensitive periods, firms delay clarification of fake good news while accelerating responses to fake bad news, a pattern consistent with opportunistic timing. These results offer policy insights for emerging and developed markets with similar interactive platforms, underscoring regulators’ need to prevent potential opportunistic manipulation by firms in the face of proliferating social media fake news.
公司是否会投机地操纵他们对社交媒体上假新闻的反应?来自自然实验的证据
本研究利用中国社交媒体生态中企业在投资者互动平台(iip)上对假新闻反应的独特设置,提供了新的证据,证明企业系统地利用对假新闻的战略性定时反应来服务于自身利益目标。我们发现,在信息敏感时期,企业推迟对假好消息的澄清,同时加快对假坏消息的反应,这种模式与机会时机一致。这些结果为具有类似互动平台的新兴市场和发达市场提供了政策见解,强调了监管机构需要防止公司在面对社交媒体虚假新闻激增时潜在的机会主义操纵。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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