A coco theory for cooperative bargaining

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2025-09-19 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107249

Shiran Rachmilevitch

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I introduce a coco decomposition for bargaining solutions, analogous to the one Kalai and Kalai (2013) introduced for 2-person games in strategic form. On the basis of this decomposition I formulate a coco axiom, and show that the Nash bargaining solution is the unique scale covariant solution that satisfies it.

查看原文本刊更多论文

合作议价的coco理论

我在讨价还价解决方案中引入了coco分解，类似于Kalai和Kalai（2013）在2人策略游戏中引入的方法。在此分解的基础上，提出了一个coco公理，并证明了纳什议价解是满足该公理的唯一尺度协变解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.