{"title":"Intergenerational income mobility and income taxation","authors":"Musab Kurnaz , Mehmet A. Soytas","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of income taxation on intergenerational income correlation. We estimate a life cycle dynastic model and conduct counterfactual analysis to observe the effects of various tax regimes. Compared to a no tax environment, a flat tax regime reduces the correlation only by one percentage points. If the flat tax regime provides child benefits, the correlation additionally declines by four percentage points. Finally, if the taxes are progressive, the reduction, which is due to the increase in the fertility rate (quantity) and the decrease in the educational outcome of children (quality), is highly significant (seven percentage points).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143887186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic trading strategies for storage","authors":"Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105110","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105110","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a dynamic model of an oligopolistic market with demand shocks, in which a storage unit buys and sells over time subject to a capacity constraint. To make progress in this stochastic game with constraints, we restrict attention to simple heuristics, and we can characterize the optimal policy of a storage unit in this restricted class of strategies. The heuristics, the exogenous stochastic process and the capacity constraint interact to induce rich dynamics. The optimal policy is sensitive to the nature of demand shocks and to storage capacity. For a fixed capacity, the storage unit internalizes its unilateral market power; it acts like a monopolist on its arbitrage spread. We uncover a new phenomenon that we call <em>continuation risk</em>. It is a corollary of market power and induces the optimal capacity to be interior even absent investment cost. We discuss some implications.</div><div>This work applies to any storable commodity such as crops, raw materials or fuels, and more recently, electricity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105110"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143881779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patent policy, invention and innovation in the theory of Schumpeterian growth","authors":"Michael A. Klein","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105112","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105112","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I develop an endogenous growth model that separates firm decisions to invent, patent, and commercialize new innovations. I use the model to examine how multiple dimensions of patent policy impact economic growth by shaping these relative incentives. I pay particular attention to the role of patenting requirements that dictate how far along the development process an inventor must progress to obtain a patent. The model formalizes how strengthening such requirements generates competing effects on economic growth; stronger requirements reduce ex ante research incentives by increasing the expected cost of patenting, but increase ex post incentives to fully develop patented inventions into commercial innovations by decreasing the additional cost associated with commercialization. Overall, my analysis supports the use of stronger patenting requirements as an effective policy tool to improve economic outcomes by shifting incentives away from invention in the pursuit of patents and towards the development of commercial innovations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105112"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143874414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial conditions, business cycle fluctuations and growth-at-risk","authors":"Andrea Falconio, Simone Manganelli","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105109","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105109","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We augment a quantile vector autoregressive model with the interquartile range of economic growth, a robust proxy for volatility, to assess the relative importance of financial conditions and economic risk in affecting the business cycle. We find that economic risk displays an asymmetric effect on economic growth distribution, very much similar to financial conditions: they substantially increase growth-at-risk, but have limited impact on upside potential. We also document that the asymmetric impact of economic risk depends on the state of the economy and is substantially amplified in times of high economic risk, while remaining subdued in tranquil times.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143868560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do search costs explain persistent investment in active mutual funds?","authors":"Aljoscha Janssen , Jurre Thiel","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Active funds, though losing market share since the 1990s, make up nearly half of all mutual funds but charge more without better performance. We analyze fund data and a search model, highlighting the impact of search costs and active fund preferences. From 1993 to 2018, reduced search costs expanded the market and heightened competition, while a preference shift from active to passive funds increased the latter's market share. However, investors who choose active funds, facing higher search costs, and continue to show a strong preference for them, allow these funds to keep charging higher fees.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105099"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143828529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Continuous-time persuasion by filtering","authors":"René Aïd , Ofelia Bonesini , Giorgia Callegaro , Luciano Campi","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We frame dynamic persuasion in a partial observation stochastic control Leader-Follower game with an ergodic criterion. The Receiver controls the dynamics of a multidimensional unobserved state process. Information is provided to the Receiver through a device designed by the Sender that generates the observation process. The commitment of the Sender is enforced. We develop this approach in the case where all dynamics are linear and the preferences of the Receiver are linear-quadratic. We prove a verification theorem for the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the HJB equation satisfied by the Receiver's value function. An extension to the case of persuasion of a mean field of interacting Receivers is also provided. We illustrate this approach in two applications: the provision of information to electricity consumers with a smart meter designed by an electricity producer; the information provided by carbon footprint accounting rules to companies engaged in a best-in-class emissions reduction effort. In the first application, we link the benefits of information provision to the mispricing of electricity production. In the latter, we show that even in the absence of information cost, it might be optimal for the regulator to blur information available to firms to prevent them from coordinating on a higher level of carbon footprint to reduce their cost of reaching a below average emission target.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143828530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joscha Beckmann , Marco Kerkemeier , Robinson Kruse-Becher
{"title":"Regime-specific exchange rate predictability","authors":"Joscha Beckmann , Marco Kerkemeier , Robinson Kruse-Becher","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105095","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105095","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study temporary phases of exchange rate predictability in a two-regime threshold predictive regression framework allowing for persistent predictors. Regime switches are triggered by an observable transition variable which relates to media news, expectations, uncertainty and global financial conditions. As predictors for G7 currencies and effective US-Dollar exchange rates, we study various interest rate spreads, yield curve factors, uncertainty measures and deviations from fundamental exchange rate parities. Besides established uncertainty measures, we use a wide range of measures for media coverage and construct uncertainty measures from survey data as transition variables for the activation of the predictability regime. Our results emphasize that short recurring phases of significant predictability are characterized by nonlinear patterns. Phases of predictability are triggered by increased media coverage and high uncertainty with interest rate dynamics emerging as the most important predictor. We find broadly similar results for a contemporaneous threshold analysis where our regressors are allowed to affect the exchange rate in the same period. From a theoretical point of view, we argue that our empirical results are useful for the empirical identification of scapegoat effects and that media coverage and uncertainty affect the exchange rate via the heterogeneity of private signals and the precision of public signals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105095"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143868559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal policy under secular stagnation: An optimal pump-priming strategy","authors":"Jean-Baptiste Michau","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How can a depressed economy escape a permanent liquidity trap, such as to restore full employment? This can be achieved through a temporary, but massive, fiscal stimulus to overheat the economy such as to raise the inflation anchor. Despite the substantial cost of overheating the economy, this pump-priming policy is typically optimal. The lack of fiscal space <em>cannot</em> prevent the government from pump priming the economy through fiscal policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 105097"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143785164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Szabolcs Deák , Paul Levine , Afrasiab Mirza , Joseph Pearlman
{"title":"All models are wrong but all can be useful: Robust policy design using prediction pools","authors":"Szabolcs Deák , Paul Levine , Afrasiab Mirza , Joseph Pearlman","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105096","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105096","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the design of monetary policy rules robust to model uncertainty using a novel methodology. In our application, policymakers choose the optimal rule by attaching weights to a set of well-established DSGE models with varied financial frictions. The novelty of our methodology is to compute each model's weight based on their relative forecasting performance. Our results highlight the superiority of predictive pools over Bayesian model averaging and the need to combine models when none can be deemed as the true data generating process. In addition, we find that the optimal across-model robust policy rule exhibits attenuation, and nests a price level rule which has good robustness properties. Therefore, the application of our methodology offers a new rationale for price-level rules, namely the presence of uncertainty over the nature of financial frictions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 105096"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143817364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coinvestment games under uncertainty","authors":"Benoît Chevalier-Roignant , Stéphane Villeneuve , Fabien Delpech , May-Line Grapotte","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>There are many business situations in which investments by a supplier and a producer (“coinvestments”) are both necessary for either of them to grasp a business opportunity. For instance, better quality tanks are needed to manufacture reliable hydrogen-powered vehicles. One of these two firms may be more willing to invest, but the cautionary attitude of the other delays the coinvestment. We model supply-chain interactions in a classical tractable way to derive the firms' net present values (NPVs) upon coinvestment and determine their Nash equilibrium investment (timing) strategies. Firms coinvest when the real option of the weaker firm is ‘deep in the money.’ These business situations are likely to be affected by evolving market circumstances, in particular due to changes in the demand dynamics or endogenous decision (by, say, the supplier) to conduct research and development (R&D). We investigate related model extensions, which confirm the robustness of our key result.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"175 ","pages":"Article 105098"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143790902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}