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Theory and Decision最新文献

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Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes. 具有累积选票的参与式预算。
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10097-1
Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Stanisław Szufa, Nimrod Talmon
{"title":"Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes.","authors":"Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Stanisław Szufa, Nimrod Talmon","doi":"10.1007/s11238-025-10097-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-025-10097-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In participatory budgeting a group of decision makers is given a set of projects-each with a cost-and has to decide which projects should be funded within the constraints of an available budget. Each decision maker, in some form, expresses their preference over the projects. The goal of an aggregation procedure is to select-based on voter preferences-a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget and optimal in some sense. We propose several aggregation methods based on the idea of cumulative votes, e.g., for the setting when each of the <i>n</i> voters is given one coin equal to [Formula: see text]th of the budget and she specifies how this coin should be split among the projects. We compare our aggregation methods based on (1) axiomatic properties, and (2) computer simulations. We identify one class of methods, Minimal Transfers, that demonstrates particularly desirable behaviour. In particular, it satisfies a strong notion of proportionality, and, thus, is promising for its use in practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"100 1","pages":"197-223"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13095935/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147785574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Using multiwinner voting to search for movies. 使用多赢家投票来搜索电影。
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10012-0
Grzegorz Gawron, Piotr Faliszewski
{"title":"Using multiwinner voting to search for movies.","authors":"Grzegorz Gawron, Piotr Faliszewski","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-10012-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10012-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We show a prototype of a system that uses multiwinner voting to suggest resources (such as movies) related to a given query set (such as a movie that one enjoys). Depending on the voting rule used, the system can either provide resources very closely related to the query set or a broader spectrum of options. We show how this ability can be interpreted as a way of controlling the diversity of the results. We test our system both on synthetic data and on the real-life collection of movie ratings from the MovieLens dataset. We also present a visual comparison of the search results corresponding to selected diversity levels.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"100 1","pages":"225-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13095991/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147785582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A duality between utility transforms and probability distortions. 效用变换和概率扭曲之间的对偶性。
IF 0.6 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10073-9
Christopher P Chambers, Peng Liu, Ruodu Wang
{"title":"A duality between utility transforms and probability distortions.","authors":"Christopher P Chambers, Peng Liu, Ruodu Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11238-025-10073-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-025-10073-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, we establish a mathematical duality between utility transforms and probability distortions. These transforms play a central role in decision under risk by forming the foundation for the classic theories of expected utility, dual utility, and rank-dependent utility. Our main results establish that probability distortions are characterized by commutation with utility transforms, and utility transforms are characterized by commutation with probability distortions. These results require no additional conditions, and hence each class can be axiomatized with only one property. Moreover, under monotonicity, rank-dependent utility transforms can be characterized by set commutation with either utility transforms or probability distortions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"99 4","pages":"757-779"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12634808/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145589487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bidding behaviour in experimental auctions under risk and uncertainty 风险和不确定性下实验性拍卖中的竞价行为
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10005-z
Chloe S. McCallum, Simone Cerroni, Daniel Derbyshire, W. George Hutchinson, Rodolfo M. Nayga
{"title":"Bidding behaviour in experimental auctions under risk and uncertainty","authors":"Chloe S. McCallum, Simone Cerroni, Daniel Derbyshire, W. George Hutchinson, Rodolfo M. Nayga","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-10005-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10005-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores bidding behaviour under risk and uncertainty using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM) and second price auction (SPA). It investigates whether values elicited via the two mechanisms are consistent and whether bidding behaviour can be influenced by differences in the number and type of sources of risk and uncertainty that people face when exposed to the two mechanisms. In our experiment, subjects are exposed to non-monetary lotteries where they bid for a high-quality seafood product, but there is a chance (known or unknown) that they receive a lower quality seafood product instead. Results indicate that bidding behaviour can be influenced by the number and type of sources of risk and uncertainty that subjects face and subjects’ bidding behaviour is only consistent with standard theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty when they bid on a risky product in the SPA. Despite this, BDM and SPA elicit equal values under risk and uncertainty in this study.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142269838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How much you talk matters: cheap talk and collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly game 你说多少都重要：伯特兰德寡头垄断博弈中的廉价言论与合谋
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10001-3
Jun Yeong Lee, Elizabeth Hoffman
{"title":"How much you talk matters: cheap talk and collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly game","authors":"Jun Yeong Lee, Elizabeth Hoffman","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-10001-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10001-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the impact of cheap talk on price and participant profits using a repeated Bertrand oligopoly experiment. During the first 10 rounds, participants are not allowed to communicate with each other. Twenty additional rounds are then played in which the participants can text with one another using an instant message system. Some groups are allowed to text before every round, some before every other round, some every third round, some every fourth round, and others only every fifth round. On average, when texting is allowed, groups attempt to collude to raise the price after being allowed to text. In summary, success in collusion with cheap talk is correlated with a combination of how often participants can text, the subject of their texts, and whether participants actually text when they can.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142214453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Incorporating conditional morality into economic decisions 将有条件的道德纳入经济决策
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10000-4
David Masclet, David L. Dickinson
{"title":"Incorporating conditional morality into economic decisions","authors":"David Masclet, David L. Dickinson","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-10000-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10000-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present a theoretical framework of individual-decision making that incorporates both moral motivations and social influence into the utility function. The main idea of the paper is that individuals face a trade-off between their material individual interests and their desire to follow moral obligation. In our model, we assume that moral motivation is weak or conditional in the sense that it may be influenced by others’ actions. Specifically, in our framework one’s moral obligation is a combination of two main components: an autonomous component and a social component that captures the influence of others. Our theoretical framework is able to explain many stylized results commonly observed in the literature and suggests a different mechanism to explain economic behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142214454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Small amendment arguments: how they work and what they do and do not show 小修正案的论据：它们是如何起作用的，有什么作用，没有什么作用
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10002-2
Martin van Hees, Akshath Jitendranath, Roland Iwan Luttens
{"title":"Small amendment arguments: how they work and what they do and do not show","authors":"Martin van Hees, Akshath Jitendranath, Roland Iwan Luttens","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-10002-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10002-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The small improvement argument has been said to establish that the standard weak preference or value relation can be incomplete. We first show that the argument is one of three possible ‘small amendment arguments’, each of which would yield the same conclusion. Generalizing the analysis thus, we subsequently present a strong and a weak version of small amendment arguments and derive the exact rationality conditions under which they reveal incompleteness. The results show that the arguments (in any of their variants) need not reveal a problem for the possibility of rational choice. In fact, it can be argued that they only reveal such a problem if the underlying relation is complete rather than incomplete.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142214455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Some Notes on Savage’s Representation Theorem 关于萨维奇表象定理的一些说明
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10003-1
Gabriel Frahm, Lorenz Hartmann
{"title":"Some Notes on Savage’s Representation Theorem","authors":"Gabriel Frahm, Lorenz Hartmann","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-10003-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10003-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Savage’s famous representation theorem is based on seven postulates of rational choice. We resolve some loose ends in the literature concerning the relationship between different versions of Savage’s axioms. This leads us to the present form of the representation theorem. We also discuss some issues regarding the historical development of Savage’s representation theorem.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"118 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142214456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revealing preference discovery: a chronological choice framework 揭示偏好发现：按时间顺序选择的框架
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09993-9
João V. Ferreira, Nicolas Gravel
{"title":"Revealing preference discovery: a chronological choice framework","authors":"João V. Ferreira, Nicolas Gravel","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09993-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09993-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a framework for the analysis of choice behaviour when the latter is made explicitly in chronological order. We relate this framework to the traditional choice theoretic setting from which the chronological aspect is absent, and compare it to other frameworks that extend this traditional setting. Then, we use this framework to analyse various models of <i>preference discovery</i>. We characterise, via simple revealed preference tests, several models that differ in terms of (1) the priors that the decision-maker holds about alternatives and (2) whether the decision-maker chooses period by period or uses her knowledge about future menus to inform her present choices. These results provide novel testable implications for the preference discovery process of myopic and forward-looking agents.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141743135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding 众筹中的早期贡献者和公平回报
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09996-6
Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps, Catherine Refait-Alexandre, Guillaume Sekli
{"title":"Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding","authors":"Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps, Catherine Refait-Alexandre, Guillaume Sekli","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09996-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09996-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We address the issue of fairly rewarding contributors to a crowdfunded project. We develop a theoretical non-strategic model, and introduce a new reward rule: a contributor’s reward depends both on her financial contribution and on the timing of her contribution. Following the axiomatic method used in models of resource sharing, we characterize this new reward rule by a pair of natural axioms. The resulting rewards coincide with the Shapley value of a suitable cooperative game built from the crowdfunding project. This allocation rule conveys a signaling effect: if two contributors make the same financial contribution, the earlier obtains a greater reward.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141511927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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