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Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding 众筹中的早期贡献者和公平回报
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09996-6
Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps, Catherine Refait-Alexandre, Guillaume Sekli
{"title":"Early contributors and fair rewards in crowdfunding","authors":"Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps, Catherine Refait-Alexandre, Guillaume Sekli","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09996-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09996-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We address the issue of fairly rewarding contributors to a crowdfunded project. We develop a theoretical non-strategic model, and introduce a new reward rule: a contributor’s reward depends both on her financial contribution and on the timing of her contribution. Following the axiomatic method used in models of resource sharing, we characterize this new reward rule by a pair of natural axioms. The resulting rewards coincide with the Shapley value of a suitable cooperative game built from the crowdfunding project. This allocation rule conveys a signaling effect: if two contributors make the same financial contribution, the earlier obtains a greater reward.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141511927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The role of polarization and hostility on equilibria in a simple class of symmetric conflict models 两极分化和敌意对一类简单对称冲突模型均衡的作用
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09998-4
Fausto Cavalli, Mario Gilli, Ahmad Naimzada
{"title":"The role of polarization and hostility on equilibria in a simple class of symmetric conflict models","authors":"Fausto Cavalli, Mario Gilli, Ahmad Naimzada","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09998-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09998-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study aims to provide a manageable symmetric two-players conflict model in which, defining measures for polarization and hostility, we investigate the effects of spillovers into the properties of the sets of equilibria, into the intensity of conflict, and into the endogenous changes in polarization and hostility. We show that, without spillovers, the equilibrium efforts’ intensity is uniquely connected to the ratio of the marginal productivity of effort to (ex ante) polarization. Conversely, we show that negative spillovers in conflict technology can imply the non-existence of equilibria. Then, introducing spillovers in the possible outcomes of the conflict, we connect the existence of multiple symmetric and asymmetric equilibria to the intensity of growing polarization and hostility. We then investigate the different effects of marginal productivity of effort, (ex ante) polarization and rates of growth of polarization and hostility on the intensity of conflict as well as on polarization and hostility at equilibrium. The results show the crucial role played by hostility, a factor disregarded in many conflict models. Finally, we show how the results obtained by considering partial spillover effects are confirmed when the general case is taken into account.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141511862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal combination of requirement and reward in financial incentive programs for weight loss 减肥经济激励计划中要求与奖励的最佳组合
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09988-6
Yves Arrighi, Fahariat Boukari, David Crainich
{"title":"Optimal combination of requirement and reward in financial incentive programs for weight loss","authors":"Yves Arrighi, Fahariat Boukari, David Crainich","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09988-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09988-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper analyzes how programs offering financial rewards for losing weight should be adapted to individuals’ preferences. Specifically, we highlight the conditions under which demanding and highly remunerative programs or—conversely—easily achievable but less remunerative programs should be proposed. We show that financial incentives are more likely to encourage efforts to lose weight if the level of difficulty of the objective and the reward in case of success increase with: 1) the degree of risk seeking; 2) the degree of cross-prudence in quality of life. This suggests that individuals should be offered a weight loss program tailored to their preferences towards risk and correlation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141252008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism 贝克尔-德格鲁特-马沙克机制中的参照依赖、预期和锚定问题
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-06-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09989-5
Achilleas Vassilopoulos, Andreas C. Drichoutis, Rodolfo M. Nayga
{"title":"Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism","authors":"Achilleas Vassilopoulos, Andreas C. Drichoutis, Rodolfo M. Nayga","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09989-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09989-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explore several behavioral issues associated with bidding behavior in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism; a popular mechanism in experimental economics and valuation research. By manipulating the random binding price and framing, we find that bids are affected by the choices made by experimenters. Our theoretical framework, shows that the treatment effects are consistent with an attachment to expectations-based reference points, anchoring on the highest price, as well as the no-loss-in-buying hypothesis of Novemsky and Kahneman (2005). Overall, our theory and experimental results confirm that the mechanism is not incentive compatible and thus previous results regarding product valuations, as well as various treatment effects identified using the mechanism, should be interpreted as conditional on the particular choice of design variables.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141196914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evidence, causality, and sequential choice 证据、因果关系和顺序选择
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09990-y
Gerard J. Rothfus
{"title":"Evidence, causality, and sequential choice","authors":"Gerard J. Rothfus","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09990-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09990-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141196885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests 多维竞赛中的中级奖
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09992-w
Aner Sela
{"title":"Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests","authors":"Aner Sela","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09992-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09992-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study <i>n</i> symmetric agents engaged in simultaneous <i>k</i>-dimensional contests. We demonstrate that there is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when there are a sufficient number of agents and a prize is awarded only if the agent wins all <i>k</i> sub-contests. Therefore, intermediate prizes (a prize for a win in a single sub-contest) are required for the existence of symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium for either simultaneous or sequential two-dimensional contests and show that the agents’ expected effort increases with the value of the intermediate prizes, and that when there are more than two agents, the optimal total effort in both types of contests is the same.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141172134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Additive representation under idempotent attention 幂等注意力下的加法表示
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09986-8
Dayang Li
{"title":"Additive representation under idempotent attention","authors":"Dayang Li","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09986-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09986-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores a scenario where a decision maker evaluates bundles by adding up the utility of the options that attract her attention. We introduce a novel attention rule called the “idempotent attention rule” and examine additive representations under this rule. With idempotent attention rules, we can narrow our focus to a subset of bundles to reveal attention rules and utility functions. As a generalization of attention filters, this rule sheds light on how alternatives interact in forming attention.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"296 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140939253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A characterization of the Owen value via sign symmetries 通过符号对称分析欧文值的特征
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-05-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09985-9
Xinjuan Chen, Minghua Zhan, Zhihui Zhao
{"title":"A characterization of the Owen value via sign symmetries","authors":"Xinjuan Chen, Minghua Zhan, Zhihui Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09985-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09985-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya (Math Methods Oper Res 66(2):255–261, 2007) characterized the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure by the axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions and symmetry within coalitions. Symmetry across components requires that components with equally productive in the game between components obtain the same total payoffs of their members. In this note, inspired by Casajus (Econ Lett 169:59–62, 2018), we weaken the symmetry across components to the sign symmetry across components, which requires only that equally productive components obtain the same sign of total payoffs. We extend the Khmelnitskaya-Yanovskaya’s characterization by using efficiency, marginality, sign symmetry across coalitions, and sign symmetry within coalitions, similarly as it was done by Casajus (Econ Lett 169:59–62, 2018) for the Shapley value for general TU games. At last, we extend the main result to the Winter value for games with level structure</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"212 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140939281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Closed paths in graphs vs. voting theory 图中的封闭路径与投票理论
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09981-z
Donald G. Saari
{"title":"Closed paths in graphs vs. voting theory","authors":"Donald G. Saari","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09981-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09981-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Features of graphs that hinder finding closed paths with particular properties, as represented by the Traveling Salesperson Problem—TSP, are identified for three classes of graphs. Removing these terms leads to a companion graph with identical closed path properties that is easier to analyze. A surprise is that these troubling graph factors are precisely what is needed to analyze certain voting methods, while the companion graph’s terms are what cause voting theory complexities as manifested by Arrow’s Theorem. This means that the seemingly separate goals of analyzing closed paths in graphs and analyzing voting methods are complementary: components of data terms that assist in one of these areas are the source of troubles in the other. Consequences for standard decision methods are in Sects. 2.5, 3.7 and the companion paper (Saari in Theory Decis 91(3):377–402, 2021). The emphasis here is on paths in graphs; incomplete graphs are similarly handled.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140841119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market networks: the core 市场网络：核心
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09982-y
Hamid Beladi, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi
{"title":"Market networks: the core","authors":"Hamid Beladi, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09982-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09982-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We formulate and analyze market network systems parallel to market games in game theory. We study the structure of efficient and core networks in market network systems. More specifically, we show that if there is no trading cost, a complete network with type-based egalitarian allocations appears in the core of market network systems. Moreover, with heterogeneous trading costs, we show that an efficient network must take the form of a star network with the least-cost-trader as its central player and that the star network is the unique core network.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140812323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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