证据、因果关系和顺序选择

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI:10.1007/s11238-024-09990-y

Gerard J. Rothfus

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引用次数: 0

摘要

哲学家们最喜欢的两种理性选择理论，即证据决策理论（EDT）和因果决策理论（CDT），各自都面临着许多严重的反对意见。尤其令人不安的是，最近有人指责这些理论在动态上不一致。我在此指出，在验证这些指控的认识论假设下，每一种满足一对有吸引力的公设的决策理论都注定会有类似的命运，然后我将考察理性选择理论家可能选择从中吸取的各种教训。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Evidence, causality, and sequential choice

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Evidence, causality, and sequential choice

Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.

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来源期刊

Theory and Decision Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The field of decision has been investigated from many sides. However, research programs relevant to decision making in psychology, management science, economics, the theory of games, statistics, operations research, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and analytical philosophy have remained separate. Theory and Decision is devoted to all aspects of decision making belonging to such programs, but addresses also possible cross-fertilizations between these disciplines which would represent effective advances in knowledge. The purpose of the journal is to let the engineering of choice gradually emerge both for individual and for collective decision making. Formalized treatments will be favoured, to the extent that they provide new insights into the issues raised and an appropriate modeling of the situation considered. Due to its growing importance, expermentation in decision making as well as its links to the cognitive sciences will be granted special attention by Theory and Decision. Of particular interest are: Preference and belief modeling, Experimental decision making under risk or under uncertainty, Decision analysis, multicriteria decision modeling, Game theory, negotiation theory, collective decision making, social choice, Rationality, cognitive processes and interactive decision making, Methodology of the decision sciences. Applications to various problems in management and organization science, economics and finance, computer-supported decision schemes, will be welcome as long as they bear on sufficiently general cases. Analysis of actual decision making processes are also relevant topics for the journal, whether pertaining to individual, collective or negotiatory approaches; to private decisions or public policies; to operations or to strategic choices. Officially cited as: Theory Decis