市场网络：核心

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI:10.1007/s11238-024-09982-y

Hamid Beladi, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出并分析了与博弈论中的市场博弈平行的市场网络系统。我们研究了市场网络系统中有效网络和核心网络的结构。更具体地说，我们表明，如果不存在交易成本，市场网络系统的核心部分就会出现一个基于类型的平均主义分配的完整网络。此外，在交易成本异质的情况下，我们还证明了有效网络必须是以成本最低的交易者为中心参与者的星形网络，并且星形网络是唯一的核心网络。

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Market networks: the core

We formulate and analyze market network systems parallel to market games in game theory. We study the structure of efficient and core networks in market network systems. More specifically, we show that if there is no trading cost, a complete network with type-based egalitarian allocations appears in the core of market network systems. Moreover, with heterogeneous trading costs, we show that an efficient network must take the form of a star network with the least-cost-trader as its central player and that the star network is the unique core network.

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来源期刊

Theory and Decision Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The field of decision has been investigated from many sides. However, research programs relevant to decision making in psychology, management science, economics, the theory of games, statistics, operations research, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and analytical philosophy have remained separate. Theory and Decision is devoted to all aspects of decision making belonging to such programs, but addresses also possible cross-fertilizations between these disciplines which would represent effective advances in knowledge. The purpose of the journal is to let the engineering of choice gradually emerge both for individual and for collective decision making. Formalized treatments will be favoured, to the extent that they provide new insights into the issues raised and an appropriate modeling of the situation considered. Due to its growing importance, expermentation in decision making as well as its links to the cognitive sciences will be granted special attention by Theory and Decision. Of particular interest are: Preference and belief modeling, Experimental decision making under risk or under uncertainty, Decision analysis, multicriteria decision modeling, Game theory, negotiation theory, collective decision making, social choice, Rationality, cognitive processes and interactive decision making, Methodology of the decision sciences. Applications to various problems in management and organization science, economics and finance, computer-supported decision schemes, will be welcome as long as they bear on sufficiently general cases. Analysis of actual decision making processes are also relevant topics for the journal, whether pertaining to individual, collective or negotiatory approaches; to private decisions or public policies; to operations or to strategic choices. Officially cited as: Theory Decis